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 Abstract 
 
This thesis contains three studies in financial economics. The first study explores the 
relationship between CEO compensation, bank performance and risk taking in European 
banks using a panel data set of 63 banks in 15 countries during 1992 to 2010. The major 
finding is a positive relationship between performance and compensation, but also a negative 
relationship between short time incentive and risk. We argue that such relationship is not 
causative, and bonus may not induce risk taking. The second study examines the efficient 
market hypothesis and forward premium puzzle using high frequency daily data from 31 
countries including both developed and emerging economies during 1990 to 2013. The study 
provides evidence covers 9 different time horizons of forward exchange rates. We show that 
the predictive power of forward rates decreases in longer time horizons in a way that similar 
to the term structure of interest rate. The third study investigates whether financial 
liberalization plays a role in explaining the current crisis. Our sample consists of 12 
developed countries for the period 2000 to 2013. Our results support that financial 
liberalization contributes to crisis, and suggest that reregulation is needed after deregulation. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
This thesis contains three studies in financial economics. The first study explores the 
relationship between CEO compensation, bank performance and risk taking in European 
banks using a panel data set of 63 banks in 15 countries from 1992 to 2010. The second study 
examines the efficient market hypothesis and forward premium puzzle using high frequency 
daily data from 31 countries including both developed and emerging economies from 1990 to 
2013. The study provides evidence covering 9 different time horizons of forward exchange 
rates. The third study investigates whether financial liberalization plays a role in explaining 
the current crisis. Our sample consists of 12 developed countries from the period 2000 to 
2013.  
Agency theory states that the separation of ownership and control in modern 
corporations leads managers to pursue their private benefits rather than those of the 
shareholders. Since the general acceptance of the Agency theory, there has been increasing 
interest in the relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. This topic 
remains timely and contemporary today. The executive pay package has increased rapidly in 
the past two decades, along with the increasing public anger towards it. Since the global 
financial crisis in 2007, social media has criticised bankers’ extraordinary high pay despite 
theirs poor performance. Many blamed their compensation practices as a contributing factor 
to the crisis because it attracts excessive risk taking. This motivates us to revisit the 
relationship between CEO compensation, performance and risk taking in the banking sector.  
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To our knowledge, no one has done any study in this area using European Union data. 
In Chapter 2, we manually collected data of CEO compensation of EU banks from their 
annual reports. Ultimately we narrowed down our sample to 63 banks in 15 countries for the 
time period 1992 to 2010. We use panel estimation technique in this study. To account for 
endogeneity, we applied the 3SLS system panel estimation. We used the estimated 
parameters to simulate the steady-state solution in the system. Our major finding is that while 
there is a positive relationship between performance and compensation, however the 
relationship between short term incentive (bonus) and risk is not causative, which lays doubt 
about the public perception that risk taking and bankers’ paid is positively correlated.  
 Chapter 3 studies the market efficiency and forward premium puzzle.  The efficient 
market hypothesis states that if the foreign exchange market is competitive, frictionless, with 
all information available and used rationally by risk, then there will be no speculations 
because the expected returns will be zero. We investigate the implication of the efficient 
market hypothesis – the forward exchange rate should be an unbiased predictor of the 
corresponding future spot exchange rate. We also investigate the forward premium puzzle, 
the negative relationship between the forward rate and the corresponding future spot rate 
return. The puzzling implication is that domestic currency is expected to appreciate when 
domestic nominal interest rates exceed foreign interest rates. 
While most of the previous literature focuses on the developed economies, we also 
include some of the major emerging economies in our investigation. More importantly, not 
only did we compare vertically between developed and economies countries, we also 
compare it horizontally using different time horizons. To our knowledge no one has looked at 
this problem from our perspective. While most of the studies used only one time horizon, we 
use high frequency daily data covering 9 time horizons, namely 1 day, 1week, 1 month, 2 
months, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year and 2 years. We provide a comprehensive 
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examination of spot and forward rates, spot return and forward premium in different time 
horizons. We used the traditional ADF test for each time series to account for cross-section 
independence and serially correlated errors. We applied cointegrating regressions by using 
FMOLS and DOLS estimators. Forward rate is an unbiased predictor of future spot rate 
according to efficient market hypothesis. Our hypothesis is that forward rate prediction power 
decreases in the longer time horizon. This study provides a more complete picture of forward 
rate unbiasedness and forward premium puzzle.  
 In the literature of bank CEO compensation and risk, many researchers investigated 
the effect of bank deregulation on bank CEO compensation. While the compensation package 
is criticized as being a contributing factor to crisis, we also want to find out whether financial 
liberalization also contributes to crisis. Previous studies have measured liberalisation by 
employing 0-1 dummy variables. In Chapter 4 we use panel data on the liberalization index, 
which captures various liberalization policies taken as well as the extent of liberalisation. 
Further, my focus is on current and the most serious crisis rather that looking at all types of 
financial crisis in general. The proxy for the current crisis is the 10-year government bond 
yield spread relative to Germany, as bond yield increases significantly in most of the EMU 
countries since crisis happened in 2007 except Germany. We employed SUR and 2SLS in the 
panel estimation to account for endogeneity. Our results show that past financial 
liberalization is responsible for the current financial crisis.  
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Chapter 2   Banker’s Compensation and Risk 
Taking in EU banks 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Banker’s pay has received considerable attention in the media in recent years and 
particularly since the global financial meltdown of 2007 - 2008. Popular opprobrium relating 
banker’s compensation to risk-taking as expressed in the media has influenced policy makers 
resulting in regulatory injunctions to cap banker’s compensation. President Barack Obama 
and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in June 2009, in which they 
capped executive pay at $500,000 per year for companies receiving extraordinary financial 
assistance from the U.S. taxpayers.  
The popular view is that bank CEOs receive upside rewards for risk-taking but are 
protected from the downside cost. Allegedly pay arrangements provide significant incentives 
to take risks beyond optimal levels. It is considered that the excessive risk taking contributes 
to the financial crisis. In a statement by US Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner on 
Compensation 2009, he stated that “This financial crisis had many significant causes, but 
executive compensation practices were a contributing factor.” The US Treasury Department 
created the Office of the Special Master for Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) 
Executive Compensation that has the responsibility of reviewing compensation structures of 
senior executive officers at financial institutions that received financial assistant under the 
TARP. The special Master determines whether the compensation structures of senior 
executives at the financial institution may result in payments that are contrary to the public 
interest, that it should avoid incentives which encourage employees to take unnecessary or 
excessive risks that could threaten the value of the bank.  
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The concern of CEOs being over paid is widely felt throughout Europe. One statistic 
shows that in 1978 the CEO of British Aerospace was paid £29,000 a year. In 2010, the CEO 
of BAE System, Ian King, was paid over £2.3m, a rise of 8,000%
1
. Yet BAE is making up to 
3,000 workers redundant, which under government defence procurement rules, the state will 
pay for. The question being raised is whether it is fair to pay Ian King millions while the 
taxpayer bears the cost of sacking the worker? In January 2012, Business Secretary Vince 
Cable unveiled plans designed to curb executive pay in a speech to MPs
2
. He said “We 
cannot continue to see chief executives’ pay rising at 13% a year, while the performance of 
companies on the stock exchange well behind. We can’t accept top pay rising at 5 times the 
rate of the average workers’ pay as it did last year.” Bell and Van Reenen (2010) document 
that about 60% of the increase in pre-crisis extreme wage inequalities in the U.K. was due to 
the financial sector. 
Bankers and legislators in the UK are also aware that the inappropriate CEO payment 
scheme may have led to the financial crisis. According to a BBC news report in September 
2008, few bankers have stood up and admitted that remuneration in the banking industry was 
one of the causes of the credit crunch. Stephen Green, the chairman of HSBC concedes in the 
interview that some bankers were paid too much for deals that may have yielded short term 
profits but ended up costing their institutions a fortune. He said “What has been blindingly 
obvious to those outside his industry for some time – that bankers pay must be reformed, so 
that bankers only receive fat rewards as and when their transactions yield sustainable long 
term profits.”3 A report by the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK also admitted 
                                                          
1 Flint, Max. "Why Is Chief Executives' Pay Not Linked To Performance? ". BBC News. 9 February 2012. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-16932043 
2 "Government Executive Pay Curbs Plans Announced”.  BBC News. 23 January 2012. Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-16688925 
3 Peston, Robert. "BBC - Peston's Picks: HSBC: Reform Bankers' Pay". BBC News. 13 September 2008. 
Retrieved from 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/blogs/thereporters/robertpeston/2008/09/hsbc_reform_bankers_pay.html 
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that “There is a strong prima facie case that inappropriate incentive structures played a role 
in encouraging behaviour which contributed to the financial crisis” (Turner 2009). 
 In July 2010, the European Parliament agreed EU-wide rules on bonus payments for 
banks, hedge funds and other financial institutions, designed to reduce risk-taking, but 
implementing them was left up to individual EU members and their regulators. FSA has 
announced plans to update its guidelines on bankers’ pay, following the agreement of new 
European rules. The plans include tighter restrictions on bonus payments and pension deals, 
and will now apply to more than 2500 City firms. Previously, only the biggest banks were 
subject to FSA pay rules. The changes also include deferring at least 40% of bonus payments 
over a period of three years, and paying at least 50% of bonuses in shares
4
. However Due to 
perceived regulatory failure of the banks during the financial crisis of 2007–2008, the UK 
government decided to restructure financial regulation and abolish the FSA. On 19 December 
2012, the Financial Services Act 2012 received royal assent, abolishing the FSA with effect 
from 1 April 2013. Its responsibilities were then split between two new agencies: the 
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) of the 
Bank of England.  Proposals from the European Union in April 2013 were to cap bonuses at 
100% of salary unless at least 65% of the firm's shareholders approve an increase to 200% 
salary or 75% of shareholders if there is no quorum. On 26 June 2013, the European 
Parliament and Council of the European Union passed the "EU banker bonus cap"
5
, which 
took effect on 1 January 2014. However in September 2013, the United Kingdom sued over 
the cap. This chapter revisits the empirical evidence that links bank CEOs compensation to 
bank performance and bank risk. Most studies in regards to CEO compensation use the USA 
as their sample, due to data availability. Only a handful of studies have been carried out using 
                                                          
4 "FSA Tightens Bankers' Pay Rules". BBC News. N.p., 2016. Web. 13 Oct. 2016. BBC News. 29 July 2010. 
Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10805903 
5 Position of the European Parliament - EP-PE_TC1-COD(2011)0203, Consolidated legislative document, 
page 201, 2013-04-16 
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data from other countries. I extend the scope of research by manually collecting 
compensation data from 63 banks across 15 European countries including the UK, and 
construct an unbalanced panel data over the period 1992 to 2010. I am interested in finding 
out results for European banks because of their major differences with US banks e.g. 
European bank chiefs are paid less than US rivals. As in 2014, European bank chief 
executives are being paid less than half the amount of their US counterpart. Also the 
proportion of long term payment is much higher in the US banks. In general US banks are 
more valuable than European banks. US banks have higher price to book value ratio, higher 
net income and higher net interest margin. European banks have higher leverage ratios (Tier I 
capital ratio to its total risk-weighted assets). The loan-to-deposit ratio of most European 
banks is far above that of its US rivals because there are many more banks, and thus more 
competition for deposits, and there are outside-bank competitors for deposits such as the 
National Post Office.  
It could be argued that Europe has a stronger culture of ‘too big to fail’ (TBTF) than the 
US. The TBTF theory asserts that certain corporations, and particularly financial institutions, 
are so large and so interconnected that their failure would be disastrous to the greater 
economic system, and therefore they must be supported by the government when they face 
potential failure. The U.S. government is less motivated to bailout banks because the U.S. 
banking industry is less highly concentrated than the banking industries in Europe. For 
example, the banking industry concentration ratio (a measure of the cumulative percentage 
share of deposits or assets as a share of total industry deposits or assets) for the five largest 
banks in the U.S. was 26.6 percent in 1999. Concentration ratios for France (70.2 percent), 
and Switzerland (57.8 percent) far exceed the ratio for the U.S
6
. Also, many companies and 
                                                          
6 "How Does The U.S. Banking System Compare With Foreign Banking Systems?". Federal Reserve Bank of 
San Francisco. April 2002. Retrieved from http://www.frbsf.org/education/publications/doctor-
econ/2002/april/us-banking-system-foreign/#fn6  
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individuals in Europe have a cultural suspicion of risk-taking, entrepreneurialism and ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ capital markets. This is also reflected in their savings habits: while Europeans save 
more than people in the U.S., far less of these savings are invested. Pension fund assets in 
Europe are just one third the size of the U.S. relative to GDP, and mutual funds are just over 
half as big
7
. There is less evidence that the Federal Reserve is stepping in to bailout banks. 
The Federal Reserve chose not to bail out Lehman Brothers citing a 'moral hazard'. In 
Europe, we see examples of the French government bailing out Credit Lyonnais, and UK 
government bailing out Northern Rock and RBS. The reality as expressed by Alistair Darling 
(the former Labour Chancellor during the crisis) is that the fear of systemic crisis means 
governments are reluctant to let even small banks fail let alone large ones
8
. During the 
Financial crisis, both the US and the UK released a rescue plan. The British rescue plan 
differed from the initial United States' $700bn bailout under the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act of 2008, which was announced on 3 October and entitled the Troubled 
Asset Relief Program (TARP). The £50bn being invested by the UK Government saw them 
purchasing shares in the banks, whereas the American program was primarily devoted to the 
U.S. government purchasing the mortgage backed securities of the American banks which 
were not able to be sold in the secondary mortgage securities market. The U.S. program 
required the U.S. government to take an equity interest in financial organisations selling their 
securities into the TARP
9
 but did not address the fundamental solvency problem faced by the 
banking sector; rather was aimed at tackling the immediate funding shortfall. The UK 
package tackled both solvency, through the £50bn recapitalisation plan, and funding, through 
the government guarantee for banks' debt issuances and the expansion of the Bank of 
                                                          
7 Brecht, Kira. "How U.S. And EU Capital Markets Are Different ". OpenMarkets. 29 October 2015. 
Retrieved from http://openmarkets.cmegroup.com/10431/how-u-s-and-eu-capital-markets-are-
different 
8 Perman R (2013), Hubris: How HBOS wrecked the best bank in Britain, Birlin: Edinburgh 
9 "Q&A: How will the UK bailout work?". CNN. 2008-10-08. 8 October 2008. Retrieved from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/BUSINESS/10/08/uk.bailout.questions/index.html 
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England's Special Liquidity Scheme. All these examples give evidence that European 
banking industry has a stronger culture of TBTF compare to the US. Although there are so 
many differences between US and European banks, it can be argued that at this high level of 
payments, there is a global market for CEOs. Consequently there is bound to be some 
infiltration of cultures. Although the cultures in European countries are different from the US, 
the people are influenced. Because of this cross fertilization, we may expect the results we 
get from Europe to be similar to that in the US, but perhaps not exactly the same coefficients 
or responses, which makes it worthy of study. 
Given the context of a stronger TBTF culture in European banking industry, while most 
of the research in this area has been using US banking data, we are motivated to explore the 
incentive pay and risk taking relationship using European sample banks. Although 
researchers give different evidences to this relationship, the more popular view is that 
incentive pay and risk taking are positively related, which implies that incentive pay are 
designed to promote risk taking. In our study, we find a significant negative relationship 
between risk and bonus (short term incentive) for the whole sample. We also find that the 
negative relationship is prominent post-crisis, but in the pre-crisis period, risk and bonus are 
positively related. When a bank is TBTF, shareholders should find it optimal to approve 
larger bonuses because they benefit selectively from the upside of increased risk. We suggest 
that excess risk taking might have contributed to the crisis. We find that bonus is reduced 
substantially after crisis.  
We also investigate the pay and performance relationship using European bank sample 
data. It is common to use compensation as the dependent variable and a performance 
indicator as the independent variable when investigating the pay-performance relationship. In 
this chapter we also look at this problem but in the opposite direction and have performance 
as the dependent variable. The literature mainly models salary and bonus together as cash 
10 
 
compensation. We recognise the distinctive role played by salary and bonus during our 
research and model them in separate equations.  Our result shows a significant positive bonus 
and performance relationship, but the relationship between salary and performance is 
insignificant. 
There are two main branches of research regarding to CEO compensation, one is the 
pay-performance relationship, and the other one is risk and incentive relationship. We 
contribute to the existing literature to bring these two together. We investigate the 
relationship amongst pay, performance and risk. Because pay, performance and risk are 
endogenous and jointly determined
10
, we use simultaneous system equations approach.  It is 
well know that OLS estimation of simultaneous equations models yields estimators that are 
biased and inconsistent. 3SLS estimates all of the coefficients in a model simultaneously, 
while allowing for a correlation between the error terms across equations. The 3SLS estimate 
could avoid spurious inferences in OLS estimate and provide asymptotically consistent 
estimates of the standard errors (Sawa 1969).  
Lastly we examine the dynamic properties and provide steady-state solution to the 
system equations. Using the steady-state solution and the 3SLS results, we are able to explain 
that the relationship between risk and bonus is driven by other exogenous factors. Although 
we observe a positive relationship between risk and bonus pre-crisis and negative post-crisis, 
it doesn't imply that the short term incentive may or may not induce risk taking, because any 
observed positive or negative relationship between short-term incentive payments and risk 
are caused by other exogenous factors and are not causally linked. 
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 is the literature review. The first part 
reviews the literature on compensation and performance for both industrial and banking 
                                                          
10 See Yang (2010), Chien and Wen (2013), and Livne et al. (2013) 
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sectors. The second part reviews the literature on risk and compensation. We discuss the 
conflict between shareholders and executives attitudes toward risk, and how compensation 
can be used as a tool to align the interests of both parties. Section 2.3 provides details of the 
manual data collecting process for compensation, and the method of obtaining different 
measure of risks, also describing and discussing the statistics of each variable used in the 
chapter.  Section 2.4 outlines the base model and presents the technical discussion relating to 
the system estimation. Section 2.5 refines the base model from the empirical experiments, 
and presents empirical findings for both single equations and system estimation. Section 2.6 
discusses the dynamic properties of the system and provides the steady-state solution. Section 
2.7 concludes this chapter. 
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2.2 Literature review 
2.2.1 CEO compensation and firm performance 
2.2.1.1 Early literature 
As a result of the separation of ownership and management in modern firms, conflicts 
of interest among different stakeholders, particularly the shareholders and the managers, have 
become an important issue that has been widely studied by academics. The relationship 
between shareholders and the managers can be traced back to Adam Smith (Smith 1776), 
which recognizes the contractual nature of the relationship between the masters and the 
workers. What are the common wages of labour depends everywhere upon the contract 
usually made between those two parties, whose interests are not the same. The workmen 
desire to get as much, the masters to give as little as possible (Smith 1776, bk. 1, chap. 7, p. 
66). He stressed the lack of appropriate incentives for slaves: The work done by slaves, 
though it appears to cost only their maintenance, is in the end the dearest of any. A person, 
who can acquire no property, can have no other interest but to eat as much, and to labour as 
little as possible. (Smith 1776, bk. 1, chap. 8, p. 365) 
However, Barnard (1938) is the one who can probably be credited with the first attempt 
to define a general theory of incentives in management, in chapter 11 (the economy of 
incentives) and chapter 12 (the theory of authority) of his celebrated book The Functions of 
the Executive. As it is quoted in Laffont and Martimort (2009): “An essential element of 
organizations is the willingness of persons to contribute their individual efforts to the 
cooperative system . . . Inadequate incentives mean dissolution, or changes of organization 
purpose, or failure to cooperate. Hence, in all sorts of organizations the affording of adequate 
incentives becomes the most definitely emphasized task in their existence”. It is probably in 
this aspect of executive work that failure is most pronounced.  
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The separation of ownership and control in modern corporations is well recognized by 
Berle and Means (1932). They argue that the structure of corporate law in the US in the 
1930s enforced the separation of ownership and control because the corporate person 
formally owns a corporate even while shareholders own shares in the corporate entity and 
elect corporate directors who control the company’s activities. As property has been gathered 
under the corporate system, and as control has been increasingly concentrated, the power of 
this control has steadily widened. He asserts that the past century has seen the corporate 
mechanism evolve from an arrangement under which an association of owners controlled 
their property on terms closely supervised by the state to an arrangement which many men 
have delivered contributions of capital into the hands of a centralized control. This has been 
accompanied by grant of power permitting such control almost unexplored permission to 
deprive the grantors at will of the beneficial interest in the capital thus contributed.  
This work is further extended by Ross (1973), who redefine it explicitly as an agency 
problem. Ross (1973) provides some of the micro foundations for such studies. It was once 
believed that the solution to the principal’s problem would not be Pareto-efficient, which 
Ross finds it naive to take. He shows that for an interesting class of utility functions and for a 
very broad and relevant class of payoff structures, the need to motivate agents does not 
conflict with the attainment of Pareto efficiency. A better understanding of the phenomenon 
was only achieved when the economists reconsidered the problem in the context of the 
principal agent theory.  
A pioneering work of executive compensation has done by Taussig and Barker (1925). 
They sent questionnaires to organizations by mail, from a fairly prosperous set of businesses 
for ten years pre-war period from 1904 to 1914. The survey reveals that during the war, 
business salaries in common with other money earnings were greatly increased, and they 
remain at the present time at a much higher level than that of the pre-war period. It also 
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suggests that poor management leads to a change in personnel, not a decrease in salary. There 
is hardly a sign in any instance that salaries are adjusted upward year by year upon the basis 
of annual earnings, and none that they are adjusted downward in the survey. While earnings 
show the ebb and flow of changing business conditions, the salaries of the mangers remain 
unchanged.  
Roberts (1956) shows that the level of executive compensation is related 
significantly only to corporate size. Its relationship to the level of profit is superficial and 
disappears when the influence of size upon both compensation and profit is taken into 
account. Within the area of manufacturing and retail trade, industrial differences in 
compensation are only a reflection of industrial differences in company size, and become 
statistically insignificant when the effect of such differences in size of company is removed. 
Roberts (1956) finds evidence that firms in the utility, railroad, airlines, insurance, banking 
and finance fields, where there is public regulation or close scrutiny, consistently pay less 
than similar firms in other lines of activity. In respect to changes as opposed to levels of 
compensation, he finds profit and size move together so frequently that little significance 
attaches to the independent affinities of compensation for profit and for size. But there is a 
minority of cases in which compensation moves contrary to both profit and size. The 
relationship that Roberts (1956) finds in his data is a logarithmic one.  
Simon (1957) developed an alternative theory of a more sociological character. His 
explanation predicts not only a positive relation between size of company and compensation, 
but also the logarithmic form of the function. He argue that the larger firms have more 
hierarchical levels and, because firms attempt to insure adequate pay differentials between 
hierarchical levels, are therefore likely to pay more to CEOs. He further infers that the 
distribution of executive salaries is not unambiguously determined by economic forces, but is 
subject to modification through social processes that determine the relevant norms.  
15 
 
A notable early literature is from Baumol (1959). He perceives that executive 
salaries are far more closely correlated with the scale of operations of the firm than with its 
profitability. He also argues that in corporations which is characterized so often by separation 
of ownership from management, many executives find it prudent to avoid an absolute or 
relative decline in their operations. It is not unusual to find a profitable firm in which some 
segment of its sales can be shown to be highly unprofitable. He asserts that the typical 
oligopolies’ objective can be characterized approximately as sales maximization subject to a 
minimum profit constraint. So long as profits are high enough to keep stockholders satisfied 
and contribute adequately to the financing of company growth, management will bend its 
efforts to the augmentation of sales revenues rather than to further increases in profits. 
Evidence from McGuire, Chiu et al. (1962) support the likelihood that there is a valid 
relationship between sales and executive incomes as Baumol (1959) assumed, but not 
between profits and executive incomes, although, because of the statistical problems involved, 
the tests employed do not completely rule out the possibility of a valid relationship between 
profits and executive incomes too.  
Studies before 1970 obtained results which was decisive by the standards of applied 
economics, and reported in favour of the ‘managerial theorists’ arguments were dominating. 
The relation between size and pay was found to be positive and passed the usual statistical 
significance tests, whereas the relationship between profitability and pay earned only scorn 
(Meeks and Whittington 1975).  
In 1970 this unanimity was disturbed by Lewellen and Huntsman (1970), who came 
to the conclusion that there is a statistically significant positive relationship between profit 
and compensation, and no sale-compensation relationship. He argues that there is a greater 
incentive for management to shape its decision rules in a manner in line with shareholder 
interests than to the alternative of pursuing the goal of revenue maximization. Subsequently 
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additional studies emerged over the next few years. There has been a debate between 
managerialists who favour the corporate growth hypothesis and the neoclassical economists 
who support the profit maximization assumption. However there was no clear resolution.  
Larner (1971) finds that despite the growing separation of ownership and control in 
the large corporation, compensation is most consistently linked to profit. Masson (1971) 
confirms the executive income/common stock performance hypothesis introduced by 
Lewellen. His results show that sales performance of the firm has no consistent positive or 
negative effect on executive financial return. It was found that firms with executives whose 
financial rewards more closely paralleled stockholders' interests performed better in the stock 
market over the post-war period. It was concluded that the hypothesis of present-value 
maximization better explains firm behaviour than the hypothesis of sales maximization. It is 
the conclusion of this author that the sales-maximization hypothesis does not usefully 
characterize the "typical oligopolist," as has been asserted by Baumol (1959). Ciscel (1974) 
supports and expands the findings of McGuire, Chiu et al. (1962). He finds a strong 
relationship among executive group compensation and company employment, and sales and 
assets indicated that growth and size, and not profitability, were the primary determinants of 
corporate financial reward. Smyth, Boyes et al. (1975) re-examine the Lewellen and 
Huntsman’s model, improving the corrections for multicollinearity and heteroscedasticity, 
and concluded that executive compensation is based on a utility function of both sales and 
profits. Cosh (1975) and also Meeks and Whittington (1975) support the managerialist 
position of a relationship between compensation and sales, but not profit. Study by Ciscel and 
Carroll (1980) is in conformity with both a neoclassical and a managerialist interpretation of 
firm behaviour. Executives are paid for increasing profits, whether through sales growth or 
cost control. He indicates that several aspects of corporate performance influence decisions 
concerning executives’ salary.  
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Only a handful of studies of executive compensation were published prior to 1980. 
The modern history of executive compensation research began with the general acceptance of 
agency theory in early 1980s. Murphy (1986) is one of the early influential papers on the 
topic of CEO compensation. Under the context of the principle-agent problem and incentive 
problem, he states that the level of managerial effort would depend on an executives’ 
incentive contact. He develops two hypotheses that based on an incentive model and a 
learning model that explain the implication so managerial contractual arrangements. His 
incentive hypothesis states that a CEO’s compensation depends on past performance, while 
his learning hypothesis states that incentives are unimportant and executive productivity 
depends on managerial ability which is initially unknown, but revealed over time. His finding 
is more consistent with the learning model, but there are significant results for both 
hypotheses. He states that cross sectional studies that analyse executive compensation across 
companies at a point in time cannot point out the correlation between pay and performance. 
Instead it is the correlation between pay and performance over time for a company that can 
provide insights into whether pay and performance are correlated. He argues that pay and 
performance of top executives are strongly and positively correlated. Many studies focused 
on testing pay-performance sensitivity empirically. In the most cited paper, Jenson and 
Murphy (1990), showed that a $1000 increase in shareholder wealth leads to a $3.25 increase 
in CEO pay, a sensitivity that many subsequent authors found surprisingly low given that 
agency problems are presumed to be important in affecting CEO behaviour and that 
compensation should therefore have a strong performance-based component. Jensen and 
Murphy (1990b) question the importance of excessive compensation in public debates. They 
instead propose the way that CEOs are paid should be analysed rather than just focusing on 
how much CEOs are paid. Based on information on salaries and bonuses for 2505 CEOs in 
1400 publicly held companies from 1974 through 1988, they found that changes in 
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compensation do not reflect changes in corporate performance because a $1000 change in 
market value of a company resulted in just 6.7 cents increase in the salary and bonus of the 
CEO. They further suggested that to align shareholder’s interest, managers should be given 
big rewards for outstanding performance and suitable penalties for underperformance. They 
argued that the political forces in the public and private spheres regarding executive 
compensation has played a role in dampening the sensitivity of pay and performance of top 
managers in the corporate sector. This paper is widely cited both in academic papers and in 
popular press, since it raised doubts whether the U.S. companies are managed efficiently.  
Studies often yielded the conclusion that the pay performance relationship was 
either short lived or non-existent. Leonard (1990) examines the effects of executive 
compensation policy and organizational structure on the performance of 439 large U.S. 
corporations between 1981 and 1985. The data reveal no strong association between 
managerial pay, equity and corporate performance. There is no significant correlation 
between the variance of managerial pay within a firm and the firm’s subsequent change in 
ROE. Evidence from Riahi‐Belkaoui (1992) does not support a positive relationship 
between executive compensation and social performance. He states that social performance 
does not appear to be a major external force considered by the executive compensation 
committee. Akhigbe, Madura et al. (1995) also offer little support for the maintained 
hypothesis that executive compensation has reduced executive-shareholder agency costs and 
in turn enhanced firm value. Their study does not find support for the prior that executive 
compensation and firm performance are strongly correlated. Davis and Shelor (1995) 
examine the relationship between financial performance and executive compensation among 
firms in the real estate industry. They find less evidence to support the relationship between 
total compensation and changes in financial performance. Ingham and Thompson (1995) find 
weak evidence to support a positive relationship between profit and pay but argue that the use 
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of performance related pay is more important as an incentive device since other market based 
controls on CEO rent-seeking behaviour are absent. Miller (1995)’s results do not support a 
linear relationship between performance and CEO compensation changes, but find support 
for an increasing, convex relationship. A Study by Core, Holthausen et al. (1999) suggest that 
firms with greater agency problems receive greater compensation; and that firms with greater 
agency problems perform worse. Their predicted component of compensation arising from 
the board and ownership variables exhibits a negative correlation with subsequent firm 
operating and stock return performance. Attaway (2000) finds weak support for Agency 
theory, as it relates to the relationship between company performance and CEO 
compensation. The results suggest that there is a small but positive relationship between firm 
performance (stockholders equity) and CEO compensation. Other studies such as Aupperle, 
Figler et al. (1991), Mehran (1995) and Madura, Martin et al. (1996) all find weak 
relationship between performance and executive compensation.  
In contrast, Murphy (1985) finds that executive compensation is strongly positively 
related to corporate performance as measured by shareholder return and growth in firm sales. 
The results are robust to the stock market performance measure utilized. Veliyath and Bishop 
(1995) support the existence of a relationship between components of CEO compensation and 
firm performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that CEOs are not paid like bureaucrats. 
They stated that the relationship between pay and performance is almost entirely driven by 
changes is the value of stock and stock options. Because of increase in stock option grants, 
both the level of CEO compensation and the sensitivity of compensation to firm performance 
have risen dramatically since 1980. Stammerjohan (1996) suggests that greater reliance on 
stock options, as a form of CEO compensation, is positively correlated with superior 
subsequent firm performance, but greater personal stock ownership may not provide 
alignment of interest between CEO and stockholder. Murphy (1999) documents and updates 
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several cross-sectional stylized facts, and has shown how executive compensation practices 
vary with company size, industry, and country. Regarding to pay-performance sensitivity, the 
study shows that levels of pay and pay-performance sensitivities are lower in larger firms; 
levels of pay and pay-performance sensitivities are lower in regulated utilities than in 
industrial firms; levels of pay and pay-performance sensitivities are higher in the US than in 
other countries. The study also documents that pay-performance sensitivities in the US are 
driven primarily by stock options and stock ownership and not through other forms of 
compensation.  
Alshimmiri (2004) reports a negative relationship between cash managerial 
remuneration and firm performance, however he found that the relationship is negative only 
when board size is small, and it turns positive when board size grows. Brick, Palmon et al. 
(2006) find a significant positive relationship between CEO and director compensation, but 
they argue that this relationship could be due to unobserved firm complexity (omitted 
variables), and to excess compensation of directors and managers. The issue of pay-
performance relationship is still attracting much comment and remains under debate. 
 
2.2.1.2 Literature using data outside US 
Mainly due to data availability, much of the academic research on executive 
compensation has been concentrated on the U.S. However, executive compensation has 
attracted much attention from economist worldwide in the past decade, though the amount of 
research done with non-US data is significantly less. Using comprehensive financial and 
accounting data on China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2002, Kato and Long (2006) find 
statistically significant sensitivities and elasticities of annual cash compensation (salary and 
bonus) for top executives with respect to shareholder value. Their results show that sales 
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growth is significantly linked to executive compensation. In addition, Chinese executives are 
penalized for making negative profit. Also as long as the executives are making positive 
profits, they are neither penalized for declining profit nor rewarded for rising profit. Firth, 
Fung et al. (2006) find that CEO compensation depends upon a firm’s return on asset 
although this relationship mainly holds with foreign shareholders and in state-owned 
companies. The pay-performance relationship is stronger for return on assets than for stock 
returns. 
 Using Indian data, Bhattacherjee, Jairam et al. (1998) does not find a significant 
relationship between CEO pay and accounting based performance measures. However, they 
find that sensitivity of pay to performance was increased after economic liberalization. Ghosh 
(2006) studied the compensation of the board of directors along with CEO compensation to 
capture the effects of inefficient monitoring by the board. Using data from a large number of 
firms in the manufacturing sector in India, he finds that board compensation depends on 
current and past year performance while CEO compensation depends on only current year 
performance. The results indicate that firm size significantly explain the differences in 
compensation across firms. However executive characteristics such as education and 
experience are found to be ineffective in explaining CEO compensation. Parthasarathy, 
Menon et al. (2006) investigate the determinants of executive compensation using data which 
encompasses the entire range of industries that are found in the Indian corporate sector. They 
suggest that CEO compensation was a function of firm performance and shareholder wealth, 
firm specific characteristics and corporate governance parameters. Their results indicate that 
none of their profitability measures is a significant determinant of total CEO pay. But firm 
size is a significant variable in explaining both total CEO pay and the proportion of variable 
or incentive pay.  
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In Japan, Kubo (2005) explore the effect of pay policy on company performance in 
Japan. The main results in this paper show that in many Japanese companies, a one percent 
increase in company performance will lead to a zero to 0.33 percent increase in directors’ pay. 
The proportion of firms with negative pay-performance sensitivity is large in Japan, showing 
the link between pay and performance is week. Evidences do not support the hypothesis of a 
positive relationship between the change of pay policy and performance, indicating that 
directors are not motivated by increases in performance-pay sensitivity. Kato and Kubo (2006) 
use panel data on CEO’s salary and bonus of Japanese firms from 1986 to 1995, and find that 
CEO’s cash compensation is sensitive to firm performance, especially on accounting 
measures. However, stock market performance is less important in explaining CEO’s 
compensation. Abe, Gaston et al. (2005) combine elements of tournament model and agency 
model and show that the outsider who monitors the firm’s activity will lower the sensitivity 
of pay to firm performance for top executives and reduce the importance of tournament-based 
incentives. They argue that bank-appointed board members help monitor top executives and 
tournament considerations are a particularly important feature of executive compensation in 
Japan. Mitsudome, Weintrop et al. (2008) find a significantly positive relation between 
changes in CEO compensation and short-term firm performance, which is measured by stock 
returns and changes in operating income. They also find a significantly positive relation 
between the changes in CEO compensation and the lagged performance measures. This 
implies that Japanese CEOs are rewarded for firm performance for more than one period.  
Vittaniemi (1997) examines the issue of executive compensation and performance in 
Finland. He uses panel data on 70 non-listed firms and 48 listed firm over 5 years from 1989 
to 1993. He uses once lagged variables to measure firm performance and finds a significant 
pay-performance relationship in executive compensation among listed firms but not in non-
listed firms. Izan, Sidhu et al. (1998) find no linkage between CEO pay and performance 
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from Australian evidence. The research by O'Neill and Iob (1999) also find an insignificant 
pay-performance relationship using Australian data. However Merhebi, Pattenden et al. (2006) 
examine a sample of 722 Australian firms for the years 1990-1999, suggesting a positive 
relationship between CEO pay and performance. In Norway, Firth, Lohne et al. (1996) 
explore the determinants CEO compensation in Norwegian stock exchange listed firms. The 
results indicate a positive relationship between CEO pay and corporate size but insignificant 
link between remuneration and corporate financial performance, as measured by accounting 
profitability and stock returns. In addition the study reports a positive and significant 
association between a CEO’s compensation and the average wage level of the company. 
Sharma and Smith (2001) examine the determinants of the growth of executive compensation 
in Australia and Canada. They investigate the influences of growth of company performance 
(revenue growth and profit growth) on executive compensation. Their empirical findings 
indicated revenue growth rather than profit growth has a statistically significant effect on the 
growth of executive compensation. Gunasekargea and Wilkinson (2002) investigated the pay-
performance relationship in New Zealand. They do not find firm performance to have any 
significant influence on CEO cash compensation. Instead, they find the size of the firm and 
the ownership concentration exert statistically significant influences on CEO cash 
compensation.  
In Israel, Amzaleg and Mehrez (2004)’s findings, which is based on both financial 
statements and the correlation between the return on shares and that of the industry as a 
whole, support the hypothesis that there is a positive and significant relation between the 
CEO’s compensation and performance. Laan (2009) uses a pooled time series cross-section 
dataset  comprising  most  listed  firms  in  the  Netherlands  for  the  period  2002-2006 
found that corporate performance a predictor of the level of equity-based compensation. 
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2.2.1.3 Literature in the banking sector 
Researchers especially in earlier studies did not look at the executive compensation and 
firm performance relationship in the financial sector. The literature focusing on the executive 
compensation practices of financial institutions has been limited. Recently the different 
nature of banking firm has been realised and thus attract more attention of researchers in this 
area. The impacts of regulation and deregulation provide a natural laboratory for 
investigating how firms adjust their executive compensation contract as the environment 
where they operate change. Moreover, commercial banks are different from manufacturing 
firms that they are regulated in a higher degree. In addition the variability in executive 
compensation that results purely from industry differences can be minimised.  
One of the main focus of the banking literature is the pay ad performance relationship, 
Barro and Barro (1990) first document a positive relationship between pay and performance 
for commercial banks in USA. Their findings support the pay and performance relationship 
being an incentive alignment mechanism for banks. Houston and James (1995)  find that 
CEOs in banking firms (with high leverage ratio) receive less cash compensation, and that 
they receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and 
stocks than do CEOs in other industries. He argued there is no difference in the pay-for-
performance relationship between banks and non-banks and that banks use less incentive pay 
(stock options and stockholdings). However, the cash compensation of bank managers is 
more sensitive to firm performance than it is in nonbank firms. Crawford, Ezzel et al. (1995) 
document a dramatic increase in the relationship between CEO  pay and commercial bank 
performance after 1981, they also find that CEOs of both high-capitalization and low-
capitalization banks experienced significant increases in pay-performance relations. Tripp 
and Kenny (1995) using 25 largest US commercial banking from 1988 to 1992, document 
that the growth in executive compensation is highly sensitive to performance. Akhigbe, 
25 
 
Madura et al. (1997) find a positive significant pay and performance relationship for both 
accounting performance proxies and market-based performance proxy. Sigler and Porterfield 
(2001) also find a strong positive and significant link between changes in CEO total 
compensation and bank performance using 31 publicly traded banks from Forbes during 1988 
to 1997. A study by Joyce (2001) find that there is a small but positive relationship between 
firm performance and CEO salary and bonus compensation. Gregoriou and Rouah (2003) 
also find a positive relationship with CEO compensation and performance. Using 9 large 
German banks, Burhop (2004) find that pay-performance elasticity and sensitivity were high 
for the 19
th
 century German joint-stock banks. During the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, the 
elasticity and the sensitivity became stronger. Frydman and Jenter (2010) point out, the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to performance surged in the 1990s, mostly owing to rapidly 
growing option portfolios.   
Some researchers aimed to find out what factors could have influenced the pay and 
performance relationship.  Demsetz and Saidenberg (1999) conduct a research using 298 
banks. They find that the structure of compensation varies substantially across firms, with 
executives at larger banks receiving a greater share of their compensation in the form of 
annual bonus, long-term compensation, and option-adjusted compensation, and a small share 
in the form of bas pay. Differences in the components of compensation translate into 
significant differences in pay-performance relationships across firms, with size being the 
distinguishing frim characteristic. John and Qian (2003) find that the CEO compensation in 
the banking industry has lower pay-for-performance sensitivity than manufacturing firms and 
that this difference is largely attributable to the difference in debt ratios between the two 
industries. Gregoriou and Rouah (2003) find that CEO compensation increases with the size 
of institution, and with the value of long-term incentive plans and CEO age. However, the 
study failed to find any effect of tenure on compensation. Ang, Lauterbach et al. (2002) 
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examine the compensation of the chief executive as well as the rest of the management team. 
Their finding suggests that CEOs receive not only great pay but also are rewarded more in 
relation to performance. Harjoto and Mullineaux (2003) find a strong link between growth 
options and CEO compensation in the 1990s. They also give evidence that leverage and 
variability in returns have positive effects on CEO incentive pay. Pay-performance sensitivity 
declines as return variability increases. Kose and Yiming (2003) comprise a sample of 120 
commercial banks and 997 manufacturing firms. They find that pay-performance sensitivity 
of a firm is declining in debt ratio and frim size, and it is lower in regulated firm. Also, given 
their high debt ratio, banks have lower pay-performance sensitivities than manufacturing 
firms. Crumley (2008) find a strong relationship between sales, assets and number of 
employees and the level of CEO compensation. John et al. (2010) using a sample of 143 US 
bank holding companies during 1993 to 2007, find the pay-for-performance sensitivity of 
bank CEO compensation decreases with the leverage ratio; and it increases with the intensity 
of monitoring provided by subordinated debtholders and regulators.  
 The methodology used in the studies of compensation and performance in the banking 
sector and industrial firms are very similar. Though evidences stand on both sides whether 
there is a significant pay-performance relationship, most literature support a positive pay-
performance relationship. Compare to the studies of the industrial firms, more studies of the 
banking sector focus on the following aspects. A branch of the literature focuses on the 
impact of changes in the structure of bank regulation (deregulation) on bank compensation 
policies. Hubbard and Darius (1995) find a stronger pay-for-performance relationship in 
deregulated interstate banking markets. CEO turnover increases substantially after 
deregulation, as does the proportion in performance-related compensation. Crawford (1995) 
also report evidence that bank executive compensation became more sensitive to performance 
as bank management became less regulated in 1982. Brewer, Hunter et al. (2003) document a 
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significant increase of Equity-based component of bank CEO compensation after 
deregulation. Cunat and Guadalup (2004) find that deregulations substantially changed the 
level and structure of compensation. The variable components of pay increased along with 
pay and performance sensitivities, at the same time, the fixed component of pay fell. The 
overall effect on total pay was small. Another branch of the literature in the banking sector 
focuses on the question of whether pay policies prompt mangers to increase risk (Saunders, 
Strock et al. 1990, Houston and James 1995). This part of the literature is reviewed in the 
next section.  
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2.2.2 CEO compensation and firm risk 
2.2.2.1 Conflict between the shareholders and the executives in their attitudes toward 
risk 
Another strand of research on CEO pay has moved away from decades of attempts to 
find evidence of the value of incentive alignment that links apportion of executive pay to 
specific performance criteria. Instead, researchers are shifting their attention toward the 
identification of those conditions under which incentive alignment, thus, risk sharing with 
CEO, is most appropriate. Managers may differ greatly from shareholders in their attitudes 
toward risk. Shareholders are considered risk-neutral because they can diversify firm-specific 
risk (Smith and Watts 1992). Shareholders can, at low cost, diversify their investments over 
many firms and thereby lower the risk from any one investment (Gray and Cannella Jr 1997). 
In fact, this ownership of a diversified portfolio makes shareholders risk-neutral with respect 
to any particular investment. On the other hand, executives cannot effectively diversify the 
risk of their compensation payments because their close association with the firm, they are 
risk-averse in their actions. One of the risks that managers facing is compensation risk, which 
is the extent to which an executive’s compensation depends upon ex post outcomes. It 
reflects the extent to which non-diversifiable risk is imposed upon the executive through the 
compensation. Executives have no control over their compensation structure and level, so this 
risk cannon be diversified. The greater the percentage of contingent pay forms within a pay 
system, or the greater the contingency of a specific pay form, there is a reduced likelihood of 
payment of the intended pay level, hence, the greater is the risk of that firm’s pay system. For 
a risk-adverse executive of a more risky firm, he would prefer salary-based compensation 
rather than equity-based compensation. Further, if executives’ firm incur large losses, there is 
a risk of being dismissed, and their own competence is likely to be assessed in reference to 
the performance of their organizations. There would be negative implications on executive 
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careers, such as sharp declines in income, failure to find subsequent employment as so on. It 
is unlikely for executives to be risk-neutral with respect to their job.  
It would be an advantage to the shareholders to place some of the risk associated with 
firm performance on the executives, because it provides incentives for them to engage in 
strategies that consistent with shareholders’ preferences, however, if executives are subjected 
to too much risk, their decision making is likely to become too risk-averse. While Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) originally defined the magnitude of the agency problem in terms of the 
degree of separation between the interest of owners and managers, subsequent clarifications 
suggest that linking a manager’s compensation too closely to firm performance might lead to 
risk-avoiding behaviour on the part of the manager. Smith and Stulz (1985) theoretically 
illustrate that executives’ compensation is a concave (or not too convex) function of firm 
value, that they have incentives to reduce firm cash flow variability. The cost to them of the 
increased project risk is greater than the benefit from the increase in firm value. Hence, such 
executives might reject variance-increasing positive net present value (NPV) projects, and 
adopt low risk – low return strategies. But for risk-neutral shareholders who maintain well-
diversified portfolios often seek to undertake all NPV projects, regardless of the risk level. 
This is the conflict between the shareholders and the executives in their attitudes toward risk. 
2.2.2.2 Mitigate the risk-related incentive problem 
Agency theory suggest that there may be an optimal level of risk sharing between 
principals and agents, and that compensation arrangements can be used to bring about risk 
sharing. Research has been looking for means of firms that would promote executive risk-
taking behaviour and its evidences. Researcher pertinent to firm risk-taking focuses on four 
areas: ownership structure, the franchise value, capital level and lines of business operated, 
and executive compensation (Min-Ming and Chen 2008), but it becomes more common to 
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argue that convex payoffs should be given to CEOs with increased incentives to take on risky 
projects. Milgrom and Roberts (1992) argue that by making adjustments to the slope and 
convexity of the wealth-performance relation, shareholders can reduce the likelihood that 
managers pass up valuable risky project. Holding the slope constant, greater convexity in the 
wealth-performance relation is expected to shrink the gap between the risk-aversion effect 
and the wealth effect. A body of theory posits that employee stock options offer incentives to 
risk-averse managers to invest in high-risk, high-return projects on behalf of risk-neutral 
shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 1976, Haugen and Senbet 1981, Smith and Stulz 1985, 
John and John 1993, Harikumar 1996, Hemmer, Kim et al. 1999). Smith and Stulz (1985) 
illustrate how shareholders can reduce this risk-related agency problem by using stock 
options or common stock to structure executives’ wealth as a convex function of firm 
performance. Since risk-related investment problems are expected to be greatest for firms 
with substantial investment opportunities, the magnitude of convexity in executives’ wealth-
performance relation is predicted to be positively related to the proportion of assets that are 
growth options. On empirical evidence, (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002)’s result shows that 
executive stock options provide managers with incentives to mitigate risk-related incentive 
problems in oil and gas firms. (Min-Ming and Chen 2008) has consistent result for the 
property/liability insurance industry. 
However it is worth noticing that a growing number of authors have questioned the 
validity of the argument that stock options induce CEO risk-taking as a general rule. (Ross 
2004) argues that a convex pay-off structure is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition to 
make an agent less risk-averse. He explores the duality between a fee schedule that makes an 
agent more or less risk averse, and gambles that increase or decrease risk. (Carpenter 2000) 
examines the optimal investment policy for a risk-averse fund manager compensated with a 
call option on the assets under his control. Her results indicate that the manager can choose a 
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volatility of the asset portfolio below the level he would set if he were trading his own 
account. The paper suggests that equity-based compensation does not necessarily lead to 
increased risk-taking because it can increase the sensitivity of the manager’s portfolio to firm 
stock price movements. (Lewellen 2006) shows that executives’ incentives to increase risk 
depend on whether the stock options held by the manager are ‘in the money’ or ‘out of the 
money’ – a higher value of the option compensation to total compensation is not a precise 
indicator of the manager’s degree of incentive to take on higher risks, and she finds that this 
has an impact on firms’ leverage choices. Much empirical work has shown a positive 
relationship between equity based compensation and risk. 
2.2.2.3 Risk in the banking industry 
There has been a growing interest in the bank compensation literature on whether pay 
policies prompt managers to increase risk. This interest stems in part from bank regulatory 
concerns with moral hazard problems arising from the provision of fixed rate deposit 
insurance in United State. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is a United 
States government corporation created by the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933. It provides deposit 
insurance, which guarantees the safety of deposits in member banks. (Merton 1977, Marcus 
and Shaked 1984, Ronn and Verma 1986) have argued that the system of levying fixed-price 
(risk-insensitive) deposit insurance premium results in a put-option-like subsidy to bank 
stockholders – the value of which also increases with bank risk. Insured depositors of banks 
have little or no incentive to monitor the risk taking of bank managers. Stockholders have an 
incentive to increase the risk of the firm resulting in a wealth transfer from bondholders to 
stockholders. Thus, stockholders can increase the value of their call-option-like equity by 
increasing bank risk (Saunders, Strock et al. 1990). Later in 1991, The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement (FDICIA), passed during the Savings and loan crisis, 
strengthened the power of the FDIC. It allowed the FDIC to borrow directly from the 
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Treasury department and mandated that the FDIC resolve failed banks using the least-costly 
method available. It also ordered the FDIC to assess insurance premiums according to risk 
and created new capital requirements. Consequently bank shareholders will face greater risk-
taking incentives than shareholders of other levered firms. (Houston and James 1995) refer to 
it as the moral hazard hypothesis that the compensation policies in banking are designed to 
encourage risk taking in order to maximize the put option feature of fixed rate of deposit 
insurance. They investigate whether compensation in the banking industry, relative to other 
industries, is also structured to promote risk-taking. They find little evidence that bank 
compensation is designed to encourage risk taking. Their results suggest that banks were less 
likely to employ incentive-based compensation than non-banks over the period 1980-1990. 
They find that bank CEOs receive less cash compensation, are less likely to participate in 
stock option plans, and receive a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of 
stock options than do their counterparts in other industries. Hence their results do not support 
the moral hazard hypothesis. (Chen, Steiner et al. 2006) using a sample of commercial banks 
during the period of 1992-2000 empirically supports his management risk-taking hypothesis 
that the structure of executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-
based wealth also induces risk-taking. 
Furthermore, deregulation in the banking sector has drawn interest of the researchers in 
this area. Whether the greater incentives for risk taking are reflected in riskier operating 
strategies will depend upon the effectiveness of incentives provided to bank manager to 
increase risk, also it depends on the costs, constraints, and restrictions imposed on bank risk 
by regulators. Buser, Chen et al. (1981) regard such restrictions as deposit insurance 
premiums that get more stringent as bank risk taking increases. In periods of bank activity 
deregulation and forbearance over closure rules, bank stockholders have greater incentives 
and ability to increase risk taking than when regulations are tight and strictly enforced. A 
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body of empirical analysis has investigated the effect of deregulation in banking industry on 
bank risk taking. Saunders, Strock et al. (1990) investigate the relationship between bank 
ownership structure and risk taking, and shows that stockholder controlled banks exhibit 
significantly higher risk taking behaviour than managerially controlled banks during the 
1979-1982 period
11
 of relative deregulation. In particular, they find that larger ownership 
positions by executive managers and the board of directors are associated with increased risk 
taking. They finding is inconsistent with the evidence from Houston and James (1995). 
Benston and Evan (2006) find that in the lenient period (pre-FDICIA, 1988-1992), low 
charter value banks (low market to book equity, weak banks) prefer short-term incentive pay 
(bonus) to long-term (stock-based) compensation, particularly when CEOs have a substantial 
amount of control as evidence by high insider ownership. In contrast, high charter banks with 
high insider ownership had less of a tendency to rely on bonus compensation in the lenient 
period. The bonus compensation induces CEOs of financially weak firms to shift risk to debt 
holders only if they do not have large insider ownership.  Elijah, William et al. (2003) 
examine the relationships between equity-based compensation and risk, capital structure, and 
investment opportunity set. They find that after deregulation (Riegle-Neal Act 1994), the 
equity-based component of bank CEO compensation increases significantly on average for 
the industry. Additionally, more risky banks have significantly higher levels of equity-based 
compensation, as do banks with more investment opportunities, but more levered banks do 
not have higher levels of equity-based CEO compensation. 
 
 
                                                          
11 The Fed changed its monetary policy operating targets away from interest rates toward non-borrowed 
reserve target in October 1979 and maintained this policy until October 1982. More3over, in 1980 and 
1982 through, respectively, the DIDMCA and Garn-St. Germain Acts, comprehensive bank deregulation 
packages were passed by Congress. 
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2.2.2.4 Measures of risk  
Recently, researches have taken more interests in measuring risk using vega and delta 
in this research area. In mathematical finance, the Greeks are the quantities representing the 
sensitivities of the price of derivatives such as options to a change in underlying parameters 
on which the value of an instrument or portfolio of financial instruments is dependent. The 
First-order Greeks include delta - the rate of change of option value with respect to changes 
in the underlying asset's price; vega – the sensitivity to volatility; theta - the sensitivity of the 
value of the derivative to the passage of time, and rho - sensitivity to the interest rate. (Black 
and Scholes 1973) formula is commonly used to calculate the value of European call 
option
12
. 
)()(ueOption val 2/1TZNXeZNSe dTdT      (2.1) 
As in (Core and Guay 2002), the sensitivity with respect to a 0.01 change in stock-return 
volatility, vega is defined as: 
01.0)('01.0
tility)stock vola(
lue)(option va 2/1 

  STZNe dT    (2.2) 
It measures sensitivity of CEO wealth to risk; it is also been use as a measure of stock option 
risk incentive (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002) 
The sensitivity with respect to a 1% change in stock price, delta is defined as: 
                                                          
12 2/12 /)]2/()/[ln(Z TdrTXS   
N = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
σ = expected stock-return volatility over the life of the option   
r = natural logarithm of risk-free interest rate 
T = time to maturity of the option in years 
d = natural logarithm of expected dividend yield over the life of the option 
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)100/price()()100/price(
price)stock (
lue)(option va


  ZNe dT   (2.3) 
Thus it measures sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price performance. 
Coles, Daniel et al. (2006) find that vega implements riskier policy choices, including 
relatively more investment in research and development (R&D), less investment in property, 
plant, and equipment (PPE), and higher leverage. They also find that riskier policy choices 
generally lead to compensation structures with higher vega and lower delta. Stock-return 
volatility has a positive effect on both vega and delta. (Rogers 2002) use the ratio of vega-to-
delta as a measure of the relative risk-taking incentives of CEOs. He shows CEO risk-taking 
incentives provide by portfolios of stock and options are negatively related to derivative 
holdings for a broad cross-section of firms. In the banking industry (Low 2009) provides 
evidence that firms counter the reduced risk-taking incentives of managers by increasing 
CEO vega gradually after the regime shift. In contrast to delta, vega is a more efficient 
mechanism for mitigating managerial risk aversion. (Belkhir and Chazi 2008) find that larger 
BHCs with better investment opportunities and those that operate in a deregulated 
environment reward their CEOs with a compensation that has a higher sensitivity to risk.  
The literature suggests that bank risk is dependent on several factors including 
vega/delta, compensation, growth opportunities (usually proxy by market to book ratio), 
leverage, firm size, and CEO ownership.  It is common to use stock return volatility as a 
measure of bank risk (Houston and James 1995, Elijah, William et al. 2003, Benston and 
Evan 2006, Coles, Daniel et al. 2006).  The other common risk measure in the banking 
literature is obtained from the two-factor market model (Saunders, Strock et al. 1990, Chen, 
Steiner et al. 2006, Belkhir and Chazi 2008). 
jIjmmjj uIRR  )()(     (2.4) 
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jR is the daily stock return of bank j, mR is the daily return on the CRSP database equally-
weighted index, I is the daily 3-month T-bill yield, and 
ju is a random error. I use Ordinary 
Least Square to estimate the above equation and obtain the standard deviation of the residuals
uj . Total risk j is measure by the standard deviation of daily stock returns for a given year. 
uj is idiosyncratic risk. mj and Ij  are proxies for systematic risk and interest rate risk. 
The majority of the literature use pooled OLS as the method of estimation. However 
(Low 2009) points out that empirical evidence on the effect of equity-based incentives on 
managerial risk-taking behavior is inconclusive, mainly because endogeneity issues often 
cloud the interpretation of the relation between equity-based incentives and firm risk. (Coles, 
Daniel et al. 2006) argue that empirical work needs to disentangle the effects of firm risk on 
incentives and of incentives on risk-taking, to avoid spurious inferences and to isolate 
causation. Regarding this problem, (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002) use Two Stage Least Square 
(2SLS) to estimate firm risk and stock option incentive simultaneously. (Chen, Steiner et al. 
2006) also use 2SLS estimate relation between risk measures and compensation structure. 
(Coles, Daniel et al. 2006) apply 3SLS and specify simultaneous regressions of investment 
measure (R&D, net capital expenditures scaled by assets), vega and delta. 
Stock return volatility, Vega and Delta are the most common measure of risk. 
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2.3 Data collection and description 
2.3.1 CEO compensation and other CEO characteristics 
Enormous amounts of time and effort was expended to manually collect the data used 
in this research. Most of the modern literatures use the Standard & Poor’s Execucomp data 
base for data on CEO compensation. Although this data base provides data of various 
compensation packages for top executives in the banking industry of the United States, it 
does not have any data on European banks. Thomson One Banker provides salary and bonus 
for the current CEOs of the European banks, but it does not give any information of the 
previous CEOs. Considering the average tenure of a CEO is around 3 to 4 years, Thomson 
One Banker would not provide sufficient data that meets our prior standard. Moreover, 
Thomson One Banker rarely covers dates prior to the year 2004. To conduct our research 
with a larger data set, we had to collect the compensation data manually from the annual 
reports. I downloaded all of the companies’ filings of European banks that are available in the 
Filings section of Thomson One Banker, from which I put together all the annual reports. I 
was then able to identify annual reports for 366 banks in 25 European countries. However, 
none of the banks in the following countries, Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Hungary, 
Luxembourg, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Turkey, disclosed details of the 
executive’s compensation in their annual reports, which leaves annual reports from 292 banks 
in 15 countries. The process of extracting information from the remaining annual reports is 
onerous and time-consuming and frequently not in English resulting in the cumbersome use 
of Google Translation to locate  key words such as executive and director to locate the 
Director’s report13 section in the annual reports. Unfortunately many banks in continental 
European do not disclose information of CEO compensation in their annual reports. I was 
                                                          
13 In some of the annually reports, the exact figure of compensation is not in the Director’s report, but in 
the Note appended at the end of the annual report. 
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able to collect 63 banks with 516 bank-years observations of salary and 481 bank-years 
observations of bonus. The data range and banks used in the study are set out in the Table 
2.1.  
In the earlier literature, the measure of compensation was salary and bonus. Recently, 
long-term payments such as restricted stock and stock options are also included in the 
compensation package for research. This is because the portion of cash and short-term 
incentive payment of total compensation in America has been declining through the years. In 
recent years, salary and bonus only comprised around 20% of the total compensation (Figure 
2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Salary plus bonus in percentage of total compensation in S&P500 companies in 
the United States, 1992-2010 
 
Note: Data are from Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS), Compustat, Execucomp. Total compensation for the 
individual year, comprised of the following: Salary, Bonus, Other Annual, Total Value of Restricted Stock Granted, 
Total Value of Stock Options Granted (using Black-Scholes), Long-Term Incentive Payouts, and All Other Total. Values 
are mean values in percentages. 
 
Long-term incentive payment (LTIP) is usually in the form of share-based or equity-
based payment. Their objective is to motivate the executive directors to contribute towards 
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the creation of long-term shareholder value. I made strong attempts to collect data of the 
executive long-term incentive payments scheme. However there are reasons that data for 
long-term incentive payments are not used in this study. Firstly there is hardly any data on 
executives’ long term payment for European bank CEOs on databases such as Bank Scope or 
Thompson One Banker. Only about half of the sample banks reveal information on long-term 
incentive payment in their annual reports. For the rest we do not know whether they do not 
reveal their long-term incentive payment or they simply do not have such a payment scheme. 
In other words we cannot decide whether I should put zero or NA for the long-term incentive 
payment for this sample banks.  Secondly, to calculate the value of options granted requires 
more detailed information of the option such as spot price, strike price and time to maturity. 
The limited information on the annual reports simply does not allow us to do that. This would 
further reduce our sample size. Moreover while most of the literature use US banks for their 
research, we focus on European banks, and the long-term payment scheme is very different 
across countries and banks. In the UK, a number of share-based payment schemes have 
operated in some of the banks. For example, employee share option scheme (ESOS), 
employee share ownership plan (ESOP), save as you earn scheme (SAYE), performance 
share plan (PSP), approved profit sharing scheme (APSS), and deferred share scheme (DSS). 
Share option grants are often subject to a performance condition which is reviewed by the 
Remuneration Committee annually, and they are usually vested three to five years after being 
granted. Sometimes options are exercisable only if they are over a period of years from the 
date of grant, or the performance of the bank has exceeded a certain target. 
 However the main reason we ignore the long-term incentive payment in our study is 
that the structure of the European CEO Remuneration differs significantly from that of US 
executives. Not only that the executive remuneration is lower in the European countries, but 
European CEOs receive a much smaller proportion of their total remuneration for long-term 
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incentive payments such as options. Hall and Murphy (2003) states that the median option 
grant for US CEOs was approximately 16 times that for UK CEOs. The option grant 
comprised 42% of total remuneration among US CEOs, which it is only10% in the UK. 
According to Towers Perrin’s Worldwide Remuneration Survey 2006, the proportion of 
salary plus bonus in percentage of total remuneration is 37.5% in the US, while it is 55.9% in 
the UK. Arguably one would expect even higher proportion of fixed salary and bonus in other 
European countries. In European countries, such as Poland, Spain, Sweden etc., as in Figure 
1.2, the percentage of Option and Long-term incentive payment (LTIP) in total compensation 
is significantly less than that in the United States. For these reasons, our study only focuses 
on salary and bonuses of the CEO compensations.  
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Figure 2.2 CEO Pay Mix: International Comparison 
 
Note: Level and mix of CEO pay by country. The figure shows the estimated compensation level and mix for local 
employees of firms in 26 countries in 2005 with at least US $500 million in worldwide sales. The amounts are 
expressed in USD converted at the exchange rates of April 1, 2005. Salary represents the base salary, including 
regular payments (vacation allowance, 13th month salary) and non-performance-related bonus; bonus is target 
performance-based cash awards, options/LTIPs include the expected value of option grants at the grant date and 
annualized targets from LTIPs. Other compensation includes both compulsory and voluntary company contributions. 
Source: Tower Perrin’s 2006 Worldwide Total Remuneration report, from Goergen (2011). 
 
 
Bonuses are usually paid when certain targets or benchmarks were met in the past year. 
Bonuses can be deferred for a vesting period with the purpose of retaining the CEO, and the 
deferred bonus can also be paid as restricted stock. This “bonus” is categorized as equity-
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based compensation. In our study, bonus is paid in cash in respect of the accounting year, 
which is an annual short-term incentive payment.  
Due to the difference in corporate governance structures among countries, some 
countries such as Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Poland, their 
banks may not have an officer titled as CEO. In this case the managing director, president of 
the executive committee or chairman of the management board, is considered as their CEO. I 
also collected the number of the CEO shareholdings, CEO age and the starting date of the 
CEO position, from which I calculate the CEO tenure.  
Figure 2.3 shows how the value of compensation evolved in the last two decades. 
Although the fixed salary fluctuates, it increases moderately with an average rate of 5.1% per 
annum (average 8.24% before financial crisis in 2007). The bonus increases in a greater 
magnitude compared to the salary. The mean of real bonus exceeded real salary from 2002. 
The mean of real bonus peaked in the year 2007 at € 1.28 million, which is more than 5 times 
compared to the year 1993. We use the ratio of bonus to total cash compensation (salary plus 
bonus) to measure the CEO’s short term incentives. Figure 2.4 shows that the bonus in 
proportion of the CEO compensation increased moderately before 2007. The figure of bonus 
plummets for the year 2007 and 2008 because of the financial crisis. The median value of 
bonus dropped to zero in 2008. Bonus recovered soon after the crisis, reaching € 7.35 million, 
which is similar to the level in 2003. During the financial crisis, many banks offered zero-
bonuses to theirs CEOs. Not surprisingly, we see a median value or zero bonus in 2008. Also 
in the distribution chart of compensation in Figure 2.5, we have a high frequency of zero 
bonus bar. We observe that the mean value of compensation is higher than their median value, 
and the distribution of compensation has a positive skew. It suggests that some CEOs 
received a much larger compensation package than other CEOs. Table 2.2 provides summary 
statistics for the full sample, pre-crisis period, crisis year, and post crisis period. The inflation 
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adjusted salary grows steadily through the crisis year. On the other hand, real bonus and also 
the bonus to cash compensation ratio dropped dramatically during the crisis year. Although 
bonuses increased after the crisis year, it still hasn’t recovered to the pre-crisis level. 
 
Figure 2.3 Median and Mean of the real value of salary, bonus and total cash compensation 
 
 
 
There is a sharp decrease in bonus in2008 due to financial crisis. 
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Figure 2.4 Mean and Median of short-term incentives  
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Short-term CEO incentives BONUSR is calculated as the ratio of bonus to total cash compensation. There is a notable 
dip in 2008 due to financial crisis.  
 
Figure 2.5 Distribution of real value of salary, bonus, total cash compensation and short-term 
CEO incentives of the whole sample 
 
Note: Short-term CEO incentives BONUSR is calculated as the ratio of bonus to total cash compensation 
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We use three variables to measure the CEO’s characteristics - CEO’s tenure, age and 
ownership. This data is also manually collected from the bank’s annual reports. Ownership is 
calculated as the number of CEO’s shareholding in percentage of the total number shares. 
CEO tenure is the number of years in which the top executive has served the bank as chief 
executive officer. A CEO with longer tenure is likely to obtain a higher remuneration 
package to compensate him for his company-specific human capital. Moreover, his long 
experience may also make him more competitive on the managerial labour market. 
Furthermore, a more entrenched CEO with a longer tenure may have more influence on their 
remuneration. This will be the case especially if he also serves on the compensation and 
remuneration committees. Table 2.3 shows the CEO’s average age is about 54 years old with 
a standard deviation of 6.5 year, while the mean of their tenure is around 3 years with a 
standard deviation of 3.2 years. Both age and tenure are proxy to human capital. We 
hypothesised that there is a positive relationship between compensation and human capital.  
 
2.3.2 Bank performance and other bank accounting measures 
All bank-accounting data is from Thomson One Banker and Data Stream. ROE (Return on 
Equity), ROA (Return on Asset) and EPS (Earning per Share) are common measures of 
performance in the literature. However, EPS can vary across banks simply because of 
differences in the number of shares outstanding, which could be linked to the growth rate and 
other factors. ROE is more closely measures return to shareholders. In this study we use ROE 
as bench mark for bank performance. Table 2.5 shows the mean of ROE for each year. We 
observe a notable fall of ROE in the year 2002 and 2008. The mean of ROE after crisis is 
significant lower than the pre-crisis level. One of the most important influences on 
compensation in the literature is firm (bank) size. Firm size has been shown to explain most 
of the cross-sectional variation in total managerial compensation (Murphy 2000). Larger 
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firms pay their executives more than small firms because they require CEOs with high 
managerial talent which also entails more responsibilities. Firm size is often measured by 
book value of assets, level of sales or even number of employees being managed. Here we 
use the logarithm of the book value of the real assets to measure firm size. Leverage is 
measure as the total debt as percentage of assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio – a ratio of 
the market value of the bank to the book value of the bank, which is a proxy for growth 
opportunities. NPLOAN is the ratio of non-performing loan to loan. 
 
Figure 2.6 Mean and Median of short-term incentives  
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 2.3.3 Risk Measures 
 
Four different risk measures are used in this study. Total risk δj is measured by the 
standard deviation of the daily stock return of the year. Another risk measure Beta is 
downloaded from Data Stream. Beta is a measure of market risk which shows the relationship 
between the volatility of the stock and the volatility of the market
14
. This coefficient is based 
on between 23 and 35 consecutive month end price percent changes and their relativity to a 
local market index. Beta is calculated using a 5 year period. The share price is then regressed 
against the respective DataStream total market index using log changes of the closing price 
on the first day of each month
15
.  The other two measures of risks, systematic risk and 
idiosyncratic risk are obtained from the two-factor market model. This method has been 
widely used in the banking literature (Flannery and James 1984, Kane and Unal 1988, 
Saunders, Strock et al. 1990, Chen, Steiner et al. 2006, Belkhir and Chazi 2008, Pathan 2009). 
For each year for each bank, the model estimate: 
jIjmmjj uIRR  )()(     (2.5) 
where Rj is the daily stock return of bank j, α is the intercept term, Rm is the daily return on 
the weighted market index for each country, I is the daily yield in the interest rate, and uj is 
the error term. The Table 2.6 table gives the market index that is used in the estimation for 
each country. 
The coefficient is estimated by ordinary least square (OLS). βm provides a risk measure, 
as a proxy for systematic risk (market risk). The other risk measure, idiosyncratic risk (firm 
risk) δuj is generated by calculating the standard deviation of the residual uj. Daily stock 
                                                          
14 Data Definition Guide 
http://extranet.datastream.com/News_Events/product_data%20news/caccounts/Worldscope%20Data
%20Definition%20Guide%20(Issue%2014.2).pdf 
15 http://extranet.datastream.com/Codes/Economics/69Chan/69Beta.htm 
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return Rj and stock market index Rm data is also from the DataStream. The estimated interest 
rate risk is highly volatile and may give inconsistent result, so I didn’t use interest rate risk in 
the study. I downloaded the Beta from Data Stream as an attempt at robustness. The results 
using the estimate Beta and the download do not given any significant difference. Also the 
estimate for idiosyncratic risk and systematic risk agree with the literature. The following 
Table 2.7 presents the sample descriptive statistics for all the risk measures. 
Total risk δj, measured by the standard deviation of daily stock returns for a given year, 
has a mean (median) of 0.0207 (0.0179) with a standard deviation of 0.013, whereas 
idiosyncratic risk δuj has a mean (median) of 0.0165 (0.014) with a standard deviation of 
0.0112. The average systematic βm risk is 0.8215 with a median of 0.8632, while the average 
beta is 1.0852 with a median of 1.09. Our risk measures are comparable to Pathan’s (2009) 
risk measures over the 1997-2004 period, Belkhir’s (2008) over the 1993-2006 period, and 
Chen’s (2006) over the 1992-2000 period. Pathan reports a mean of total risk of 
0.026(median: 0.0202), a mean of idiosyncratic risk of 0.0198 (median: 0.0185) and a mean 
of systematic risk of 0.52 (median: 0.47); Belkhir reports a mean of total risk of 0.0221 
(median: 0.0208), a mean of idiosyncratic risk of 0.0213 (median: 0.02) and a mean of 
systematic risk of 0.5523 (median: 0.4232); while Chen reports a mean of total risk of 0.0184 
(median: 0.017), a mean of idiosyncratic risk of 0.0171 (median: 0.0157) and a mean of 
systematic risk of 0.9491 (median: 0.9072). The above comparison shows the total risk and 
idiosyncratic risk in European banks are similar to those of the US banks, and it suggests that 
the market risk in the US has decreased and now European banks bear a higher market risk 
than the US banks. 
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2.4 Model and methodology 
2.4.1 Empirical models and estimation methods 
The following base model is formulated to test the interacting relationship between bank 
performance, bank risk, and CEO compensation.  
Risk Equation: 
itititit
ititititit
OWNERSHIPNPLOANePerformanc
MBLEVERAGESIZEonCompensatiRisk




876
54321
              
)ln(
            (2.6) 
Performance Equation: 
ititit
itititit
MBLEVERAGE
SIZEonCompensatiRiskePerformanc



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            (2.7) 
Compensation Equation: 
itititit
ititititit
AGETENUREePerformanc
RISKLEVERAGESIZEMBnCompensato




876
54321
                          
                  (2.8) 
where subscripts i denotes individual bank (i=1, 2, …, 63), t time period and ln is the natural 
logarithmic. β, δ, and θ are the parameters to be estimated . ε is the idiosyncratic error term. 
The primary estimation method is ordinary least squares (OLS) single equation with panel 
fixed-effect (FE) for both bank (cross-section) and year (period).  We test these three 
equations with all the for risk measures: total risk, systematic risk (market risk), idiosyncratic 
risk (firm risk), and beta.  
 
 
50 
 
 
2.4.2 System Estimation 
Not only do we have simultaneity, but endogeneity may also exist amongst the 
independent variables. Although we have four equations, there might be other variables that 
are endogenous excluded from the model. In a full general equilibrium model, it is possible 
some of the independent variables will be endogenous. Those variables are correlated with 
the error term, and omitting those leads to biased inconsistent results. I don’t develop the 
general equilibrium model here because I have a simultaneous structural model. As well as 
the single equation approach, we also use the system estimation approach where we estimate 
simultaneously the complete set of parameters of the equations in the system.  
It is argued that 2SLS is a single equation estimator that does not take account of the 
covariance between residuals. It is not in general fully efficient. It is an appropriate technique 
when the right-hand side variables are correlated with the error terms, and there is both 
heteroskedasticity, and contemporaneous correlation in the residuals. 3SLS is a system 
method that estimates all of the coefficients of the model, then forms weights and re-
estimates the model using the estimated weighting matrix.  
Because 3SLS uses the 2SLS residuals, the first two stages of 3SLS are the same as in 
2SLS. Consider a case of single equation 2SLS estimation when some of the variables in X 
are endogenous. The system may be written in compact form as, 
  Xy         (2.9) 
Under the standard assumption, the residual variance matrix from this system is given 
by, 
)()( 2' TM IIEV         (2.10) 
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The errors may be heteroskedastic across the equation, and they may be heteroskedastic 
and contemporanesouly correlated. These cases can be characterize by defining the matrix of 
contemporaneous correlations,   , where the (i, j)th element of   is given by )( jtitij E    
for all t. If the error are contemporaneous uncorrelated then 0ij for ji  . More generally, 
if the errors are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated, TIV  . 
Write the j-th equation of the system as, 
0 jjj XY         (2.11) 
Or, alternatively: 
   
jjjjjjjjj ZXYy        (2.12) 
where )0,,1(
''
jj  , )0,(
''
jj  , ),(
'''
jjj XYZ   and ),(
'''
jjj   . Y is the matrix of 
endogenous variables and X is the matrix of exogenous variables; Yj is the matrix of 
endogenous variables not including yj. 
In the first stage, regress the right-hand side endogenous variables Yj on all exogenous 
variables X and get the fitted values: 
jj YXXXXY
'1' )(ˆ         (2.13) 
In the second stage, regress 
jy  on jYˆ  and jX  to get: 
yZZZ jjSLS
ˆ)ˆˆ( 1'2
        (2.14) 
where ),ˆ(ˆ jjj XYZ  .  
52 
 
3SLS uses these 2SLS residuals to obtain a consistent estimate of  . In the third stage, 
apply feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) to the equations in the system in a manner 
analogous to the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR). SUR is appropriate when all the 
right-hand side regressors X are assumed to be exogenous, and the errors are heteroskedastic 
and contemporaneously correlated so that the error variance matrix is given by TIV  . 
Zellner’s SUR estimator takes the form: 
yIXXIXb tTSUR
1'11' )ˆ())ˆ((       (2.15) 
while 3SLS takes the form: 
yXXXXZZXXXXZSLS ))(
ˆ()))(ˆ(( '1'11'1'13
    (2.16) 
where ˆ  has typical element: 
 ),max(/))ˆ()ˆ(( 2
'
2 jiSLSjjSLSiiij TTZyZys    
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2.5 Empirical results 
The OLS estimates results of the base model in section 2.4.1 are presented in Appendix 
I at the end of this chapter.  The result of the risk equation is in Table A.1. It shows a strong 
negative relationship between risk and compensation across all the four risk measures. This is 
contrary to the popular view that incentives induce risk taking. We separate the total cash 
compensation into two parts – salary and bonus, and estimate the same equation again. It is 
worth mentioning again that we use BONUSR here, the ratio of bonus to total cash 
compensation as a proxy for short-term incentive compensation. Since bonus can be zero, we 
do not take natural logarithm of this variable. The result from Table A.1.1 suggests that the 
negative relationship between compensation and risk comes from the aggregation with bonus. 
There is no statistical significant relationship between salary and risk. The result of the 
performance equation is in Table A.2. We observe a negative relationship between ROE and 
risks here. The result of compensation equation is in Table A.3. We again separate the salary 
and bonus in this equation as we did for the risk equation. Result is Table A.3.1 also shows a 
negative relationship between risk and bonus. Risk and salary is not statistically related. 
These results suggest that we should separate salary and bonus when modelling 
compensation. As we did so, we also find a positive relationship between size and salary, but 
the relationship between size and bonus is not significant. Moreover, results show that ROE 
and bonus is positively related, however no significant relationship is found between ROE 
and salary. We use a Wald test to examine each independent variable and remove the 
insignificant ones from each equation. We also recognised there might be dynamic issues, so 
we include a lagged dependent variable (LDV) in each equation. The literature on wage 
stickiness
16
, suggest rigidity in nominal wages.  We expect a positive coefficient on lagged 
salary, because people tend to use last year’s salary as a benchmark for this year’s salary. 
                                                          
16 Keynes, J.M., 2006. General theory of employment, interest and money. Atlantic Publishers & Dist. 
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Bonus on the other hand doesn’t have this relationship. ROE tends to follow the business 
cycle, and the business cycle is highly auto-correlated, so we expect dynamics in ROE. Risk 
on the other hand is related to ROE by portfolio theory. If return is auto-correlated, risk is 
also auto-correlated. We find that the LDVs are significant, except for the bonus equation, 
which is what we expected because the wage stickiness only applies for fixed salary but not 
for bonus. Base on the results of these experiments, we cleaned up the previous results and 
redesign the following four equations as our base model. 
Risk Equation: 
itit
ititititit
NPLOAN
MBSIZESBONUSRRISKRISK



 
6
543121
                          (2.17) 
Bonus Equation 
ititititit RISKPRICEROEBONUSR   4321 )ln(
17
                  (2.18) 
Salary equation: 
itit
ititititit
TENURE
ROESIZEMBSALARYSALARY



 
6
543121 lnln
                 (2.19) 
Performance Equation: 
itititititit RISKMBBONUSRROEROE    543121         (2.20) 
 
 
                                                          
17 PRICE is the share price. )ln(PRICE  measures the growth in share price. Bonus has zero value and 
it cannot be expressed in log form. 
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We recognised that the least squares dummy variable regression (LSDV) is inconsistent 
for a dynamic panel data model with individual effects, whether the effects are fixed or 
random. The bias of the LSDV estimator in a dynamic model is generally known as dynamic 
panel bias or Nickell (1981)’s bias. In both the fixed and random effects setting, the difficulty 
is that the lagged dependent variable is correlated with the disturbance, even if it is assumed 
that εit is not itself auto-correlated. We can think of the fixed effects model as an ordinary 
regression with a lagged variable. Consider a regression with a stochastic regress that is 
dependent across observation. In a dynamic regression model, the estimator based on T 
observation is not unbiased, but it is consistent in T. The finite sample bias is of order 1/T. 
We would obtain large sample results by allowing T to grow large, but in a panel dynamic 
model setting, T is assumed to be small, and large-sample results are obtained with respect to 
n growing large, not T. The fixed effect estimator can be view as an average of n estimators. 
The average of n inconsistent estimators will still be inconsistent. One of the solutions is to 
use alternative estimators such as IV (Anderson and Hsiao 1982) or GMM (Arellano and 
Bond 1991).  
Taking consideration of the endogeneity amongst risk, compensation and ROE, we use 
simultaneous equations estimation, which take into account the interdependencies amongst 
the equation in the system. Simultaneous equation models include 3 stage least square (3SLS), 
full-information maximum likelihood (FIML), and generalized method of moments (GMM). 
The GMM estimator brings efficiency gains in the presence of heteroscedasticity. If the 
disturbances are homoscedastic, then it is asymptotically the same as 3SLS. Although GMM 
is generally more efficient than 3SLS, 3SLS is estimator has better finite sample properties 
than GMM
18
. 
                                                          
18 Wooldridge, J. M. (2010). Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. MIT press. 
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In this study we use a 3SLS estimator. Although most researchers apply a single 
equation technique to investigate compensation, risk, and performance, there are still many 
literatures in both corporations and banks that use the 3SLS estimator in this area of research. 
Barnhart and Rosenstein (1997) used a 3SLS estimator to model the board composition, 
managerial ownership, and firm performance. Campbell et al (2007) find that CEOs are 
compensated for exposure to environmental risk, which considered as endogenous in their 
study. They also find that this premium is reduced when the CEO has greater opportunities to 
improve the firm’s environmental performance. Callan and Thomas (2008) hypothesise that 
financial performance and social performance are determined simultaneously. They show that 
corporate social responsibility is among the determinants of CEO pay, which indicates that 
pay-for-performance does not sufficiently explain compensation. Chien and Wen (2013) used 
a two-equation simultaneous equation system, in which both firm’s risks and compensation 
structures are endogenous. They show that contracts with large versus small bonus-option 
components induce risk-taking and in addition, perceptions of firms’ risk do substantially 
impact the design of compensation contracts. In the banking literature, Pathan (2009) used 
3SLS approach to model board structure, CEO power and bank risk taking. Yang (2010) used 
3SLS system to explore the causal relationship between compensation structure and risk-
taking in banks, where both risk and incentive measures are contemporaneously determined. 
Livne et al. (2013) examines the relation between the investment horizon of banks and their 
CEO compensation, and its consequences for risk and performance. They use 3SLS 
simultaneous equations to control for the endogeneity in the relation between firm risk, 
compensation, and investment patterns, Yang and Peng (2014) investigates the dynamic 
relationship between bank management structure payment contract and bank return volatility. 
In their model, vega, delta and bank risk are all treated as endogenous variables and are 
jointly determined. 
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Our 3SLS results are presented in Table B.2. In the risk equation, we find that risk is 
auto-correlated. Because risk is related to ROE by portfolio theory, if return is auto-correlated, 
risk is also auto-correlated. Both size and non-performing loans are insignificant in the risk 
equation. If size is positively related to risk, it could imply that larger banks appear to be 
more sensitive to general market movements and bear higher risk. On the other hand, it can 
also be argued that small (and medium-sized) enterprises tend to take on more risk and face 
more uncertainty. Lafrance (2012) finds a higher volatility of the rates of return for smaller 
firms, especially, the smallest.  However we do not find this evidence in our European bank 
samples. Market to book ratio is the proxy for investment opportunities and it is negatively 
related to risk. We also find a strong negative relationship between risk and bonus. 
We also confirmed a strong negative relationship between risk and bonus in the bonus 
equation. Both the change in ROE and change in stock price are positively related to bonus. 
This suggests that bonus is rewarded for better performance. Our results confirm a positive 
pay to performance relationship. We tried to include the lagged of bonus in the bonus 
equation. However it is not significant, which is what we expected. ‘Wage stickiness’ doesn’t 
apply to bonus itself, but to fixed salary or overall wage.  
Fixed salary shows strong auto-correlation in the salary equation, which gives evidence 
to the ‘wage stickiness’ theory by Keynes (2006), who argued that nominal wages display 
downward rigidity, in the sense that workers are reluctant to accept cuts in nominal wages. 
Market to book ratio and salary are positively related. Since Market to book ratio signalling 
growth rates, it suggests banks with higher growth opportunities offer higher salaries. There 
is a positive relationship between size and salary. Many literatures have confirmed this 
relationship (Kostiuk 1990, Cordeiro 2003 and Anderson 2003). Large banks tend to offer 
higher compensation packages. There is no significant relationship between ROE and salary. 
It suggests that bonuses would be rewarded or penalised on performance, but fix salary is not 
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affected by performance. Tenure is not significant in the salary equation. It suggests that 
being loyal to the same bank doesn’t contribute to CEOs’ higher salary.  
Lastly in the ROE equation, we find the ROE is also auto-correlated. This is because 
ROE tends to follow the business cycle, which is also auto-correlated. We find a positive 
relationship between market to book ratio and ROE. A high market to book ratio commonly 
has a correspondingly high ROE, since investors are inclined to pay higher multiples of book 
value for a stock that is showing them a good return. Companies with high growth rates are 
likely to have high market to book ratios. Chandra and James (2000) also document the same 
finding – “the growth opportunity variable (market-to-book ratio) is the most significant 
factor in bank performance.” Risk is negatively related to ROE. This finding is in accordance 
with Low (2009), which indicates that less profitable firms have higher equity volatility. It 
could also mean that higher risk results in higher cost of capital and therefore lower return. It 
may suggest that excessive risk taking has negative impact to performance. Bonus carries a 
positive sign in the ROE equation. It shows higher bonus can incentivize CEOs to make more 
profits.  
Our results confirm a positive pay-performance relationship. This conforms to the 
finding in the majority of the US banking literature (Crawford et al. 1995, Madura et al. 1997 
and Gregoriou and Rouah 2003). We find that the positive relationship comes from bonus but 
not the fixed salary. However, contrary to the more popular view that risk and bonus is 
positively related, we find that the relationship between risk and bonus is negative. In both 
the bonus and risk equation, their negative relationship remains strong at 1% significance 
level. We have investigated whether the negative relationship between our risk measures and 
cash compensation changes at high levels of cash compensation by adding a quadratic term of 
cash compensation. However the quadratic relation is not significant. Although whether 
managerial incentives matters; whether incentives generated by executive compensation 
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programs are correlated with excessive risk-taking by banks is still under debate (see 
discussion in Bhagat and Bolton 2014), we raise the question whether the relationship 
between bonus and risk is causally correlated or determined by exogenous factors, whether 
this relationship persists throughout the period. We discuss this in the next section. 
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2.6 Dynamic properties and steady-state solution 
 
In this section we look at the dynamic properties of the simultaneous equation. It is 
important to examine whether our solution is stable. For example our result suggests that a 
positive shock in size increases risk. However a higher risk implies a lower ROE, which 
reduces bonus; bonus has a negative effect on risk, so it further increases risk. At this stage 
we cannot be certain if our system is stable and therefore converges on a determinate solution. 
We have a structural simultaneous model. This model is a dynamic model. Any movement of 
an exogenous variable cannot say with definitiveness that a solution exists. An unstable 
solution cannot make a determinate statement of equilibrium.  
In Appendix II we evaluate the dynamic properties of the system. We remove the salary 
equation from the system because salary doesn’t feed into the loop of the system. The 
simultaneity only exists amongst risk, bonus, and ROE. We show that the system can be 
reduced to a second-order difference equation. We find that the solution is stable. This 
suggests moving from one equilibrium to another is a stable process. This process is not 
monotonic but cyclical because we find complex characteristic roots. 
We also solve for the steady-state solution of the system. Details are provided in 
Appendix II. The steady-state solution is as follows, 
NPLOAN
MBSIZEDLNPRICERISK
136715.0          
006774.0001872.0006693.0262838.0


          (2.21) 
NPLOAN
MBSIZEDLNPRICEBONUSR
0.656329-          
0.0325180.008986-0.1118100.431203 
   (2.22) 
NPLOAN
MBSIZEDLNPRICEROE
0.954088-
0.0866850.013062-0.070946240319.0 
     (2.23)  
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We checked this solution by simulation. The simulation procedure is described at the 
end of Appendix II. Simulation results and hand-solving results are identical. We put down 
the steady-state solution above in a Jacobian matrix in Table B.2. 
Our results show that size has a positive effect on risk and a negative effect on bonus 
ratio and ROE. Larger banks tend to take higher risks. They may offer higher salaries and 
long-term incentive schemec and other forms of compensation so that the short term bonus 
pay as a ratio of total compensation is lower. Larger banks also have lower ROE. We find a 
negative effect of MB to Risk and positive effects of MB to bonus ratio and ROE. ROE is 
positively associated with the market value so that the effect of MB to ROE is also positive. 
There have been debates whether MB is a proxy for risk. We find that MB and risk are 
negatively related. Benston and Evan (2006) and Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) also report 
a negative relationship between risk and MB. Banks with higher level Non-performing loan 
bear higher risk and have lower bonus ratio and ROE as expected. Finally higher the growth 
in share prices, lower the risk level, and higher the bonus ratios and ROE. 
We have shown a positive relationship between change in ROE and the bonus ratio, 
which confirms a positive pay-performance relationship. Regarding the risk and incentive 
payment, it is established in the literature that equity based compensation (long-term 
incentive plan such as option) is positively related to risk. Most literature using data from 
firms/banks in the USA, where long-term incentive scheme is a major part of the CEO’s 
compensation. Bonus is considered to be a part of cash compensation, and it is not separately 
specified in the risk equation. So far there is no literature addressing the exclusively the 
relationship between short-term incentive bonus and risk. A study by Belkhir and Chazi 
(2008) show that  cash compensation has negative effect on risk. In European banks where 
equity-based compensation is less dominant in the compensation package, and short-term 
bonus is an essential part of compensation, we believed that bonus also has a positive 
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relationship with risk. However we find a strong negative relationship between risk and 
bonus ratio. We postulate that any potential positive relation between risk and bonus may 
cause by two separate events. We now reconsider the following two equations in the system. 
 
tttttt NPLOANMBSIZEBONUSRRISKRISK 6543121       (2.24) 
 
ttttt RISKDLNPRICEROEROEBONUSR 541321        (2.25) 
 
 
In the steady-state RISKt=RISKt-1 and ROEt=ROEt-1, If we plot equation (2.24) and 
(2.25) together in a chart with RISK being the vertical axis and BONUSR being the 
horizontal axis. The slope of equation (2.24) is 23
1  
, and the slope of equation (2.25) is 
41  .  According our estimated results, the slopes are -0.059 and -0.208 respectively. The 
slope of equation (2.24) is flatter than the slope of equation (2.25).  
 We take three arbitrary periods, 1994 to 2001, 2002 to 2005 and 2006 to 2010, and 
then we plot the scatter plot between risk and bonus for these three periods in Figure 2.7 to 
Figure 2.8. From the scatter plot, we see that in the first period the slope is positive. In the 
second period the slope is rather flat. In the last period, the slope became negative.  In order 
to understand the movement of risk and bonus, we produce a figure under each scatter plot. 
Equation (2.24) is represented by line RB and Equation (2.25) is represented by line BR in 
Figure 2.7 to Figure 2.9. In Figure 2.7, A to B represents the movement of risk and bonus 
from 1994 to 2001. This is the overall effect of a downward shift of both the risk and bonus 
equation. The overall effect is calculated in Table B.3.  
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Figure 2.7  
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Scatter plot of TRISK and BONUSR for the period 1994 to 2001. RB represents the risk equation. BR represents the 
bonus equation. Movement from A to B represents the overall effect from Table 2.13. 
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Figure 2.8  
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Scatter plot of TRISK and BONUSR for the period 2002 to 2005. RB represents the risk equation. BR represents the 
bonus equation. Movement from A to B represents the overall effect from Table 2.13. 
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Figure 2.9  
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Scatter plot of TRISK and BONUSR for the period 2006 to 2010. RB represents the risk equation. BR represents the 
bonus equation. Movement from A to B represents the overall effect from Table 2.13. 
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Figure 2.7 to Figure 2.9 show different associations between risk and bonus in three 
different periods. The First period is from 1994 to 2001. We use a longer period because we 
have an imbalanced panel data, and there are less data points in the early period of the sample. 
Data shows that there is a positive relationship between risk and bonus. The next period is 
from 2002 to 2005. Although we can still observe a positive relationship between risk and 
bonus, the relationship is not very strong as the slope of the curve is flat. The last period is 
from 2006 to 2010 which includes the crisis period. In contrast to the previous two periods, 
the figure shows a strong negative relationship between risk and bonus.  
More often, the positive relationship between the incentive payment and risk taking is 
recognised in the literature. An early literature by Saunders et al. (1990) shows that 
stockholder controlled banks exhibit significantly higher risk taking behaviour than 
managerially controlled banks during the 1979-1982 period of relative deregulation. Houston 
and James (1995) examine 134 commercial banks from 1980 to 1990, and show a positive 
and significant relation between the importance of equity-based incentives and the value of 
the bank’s charter. Chen et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between option-based 
executive compensation and market measures of risk for a sample of commercial banks 
during the period of 1992 to 2000. They show that following deregulation, banks have 
increasingly employed stock option-based compensation. As a result, the structure of 
executive compensation induces risk-taking, and the stock of option-based wealth also 
induces risk-taking. Bhagat and Bolton (2014) study the executive compensation structure in 
14 of the largest U.S. financial institutions during 2000 to 2008. They focus on the CEO's 
purchases and sales of their bank's stock, their salary and bonus, and the capital losses these 
CEOs incur due to the dramatic share price declines in 2008. Their results are supportive of 
the findings of Bebchuk, Cohen and Spamann (2010), that is, managerial incentives matter — 
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incentives generated by executive compensation programs are correlated with excessive risk-
taking by banks. 
However, some researchers do not support the view that incentive payment and risk 
taking is strictly positively related. Mullins (1992) argues that Saunders et al. (1990) findings 
of the positive link between risk and incentives are largely attributable to their failure to 
adequately control for bank size. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find some evidence that banks 
with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed 
worse with no evidence that they performed better. Using 98 sample banks for the period 
2006 to 2008, they find that banks with higher option compensation and a larger fraction of 
compensation in cash bonuses for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. They 
argue that bank CEOs and senior executives could not, nor did not, foresee the extreme high 
risk nature of some of the bank's investment and trading strategies. The poor performance of 
these banks during the crisis is attributable to an extremely negative realization of the high 
risk nature of their investment and trading strategy. 
Our result shows the bonus and risk relationship is positive in the pre-crisis period, but 
negative after crisis. However, it is not uncommon to have contrary results for pre-crisis and 
post-crisis periods. Efling et al. (2015) exploits a large payroll data set to extract incentive 
pay measures for 67 banks in Austria, Germany, and Switzerland in the period 2004–2011. 
They show that the Bonus Share, defined as the average bonus relative to the total salary, 
decreased substantially in the crisis period 2008–2011 relative to the pre-crisis period 2004–
2007. This substantial reduction occurred despite the fact that the overall trading income in 
our bank sample did not decrease in the crisis period. They document a robust positive 
correlation of pay incentives with the bank's trading income and its volatility, and this 
positive correlation is particularly pronounced in the pre-crisis period. In their study, 
instrumented incentive pay shows a negative and weakly significant effect on the Sharpe 
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Ratio (ratio of trading returns and their standard deviation) of trading returns for the pre-crisis 
period, which becomes positive and significant for the later crisis period. From the 
perspective of NPV maximization, the optimal incentive pay for a bank's trading operation 
should maximize the Sharpe ratio of trading income. This requires the marginal effect of the 
incentive pay on the Sharpe Ratio to be zero. Therefore, bonus payments seem too high 
before and too low during the crisis. Our evidence supports Efling et al. (2015)’s finding. As 
we have discussed, European banks has a strong culture of ‘too big to fail’. Bank 
shareholders should find it optimal to approve larger bonuses to the CEOs because they 
benefit selectively from the upside of increased risk. We show a positive relationship between 
bonus and risk in the pre-crisis periods. However, the excess risk taking behaviour might 
have contributed to the financial crisis. This is supported by Bhagat and Bolton (2014). 
The popular view is that incentives generated by executive compensation programs led 
to excessive risk-taking. However, in the post-crisis period, we observe a strong and negative 
relationship between risk and bonus. We argue that short-term incentive pay (bonus) and risk 
are not casually related, rather, they are determined by exogenous factors. We evaluate the 
overall exogenous effect for bonus and risk. The results are set out in Table 2.13. In the first 
pre-crisis period, the overall exogenous effect for both risk and bonus are negative (-0.00408 
and -0.04389). Therefore in Figure 2.7, both the risk and bonus curve shift downwards. As a 
result, it is showing a positive relationship between risk and bonus. In the second pre-crisis 
period, Table 2.13 shows that the exogenous effect for risk is negative (-0.00135), but it is 
positive for bonus (0.079211). The risk curve shifts downwards and the bonus curve shifts 
upwards in Figure 2.8, resulting a positive relationship between risk and bonus. In the last 
period, the overall exogenous effect for risk is negative (-0.04366) while it is positive for 
bonus (0.007154). Therefore the risk curve shifts upwards and the bonus curve shifts 
downwards in Figure 2.9. As a result, the relationship between risk and bonus is negative. 
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The structure equations we have don’t support the popular thinking that bonus and risk 
taking is positively related. We find that the actual causal relationship between risk and bonus 
are actually negative for the whole sample. When we decompose the shocks to explaining the 
general movement of bonus and risk in three different periods, we find that the relationship 
between risk and bonus can be both positive and negative. However as a result of exogenous 
factors jointly determine bonus and risk, bonus and risk are not causally related. Future 
empirical works need to fully investigate what other exogenous factors could have also 
driven the relationship between risk and bonus. 
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2.7 Conclusion  
Conflicts of interest between the shareholders and managers have been recognized in 
the Agency Theory since the early 80s. The public’s perception of CEO compensation is 
generally negative because executive compensations are constantly on the rise, even during 
dismal economic conditions and often despite the poor performance of the firm they manage. 
Compensation of CEOs in the banking industry has been a major controversy since the 
tremendous growth in executive compensation during the last decades. How well the 
compensation package is playing the role of aligning the interests between CEOs and 
shareholders still attract public and academic attentions. On the other hand the use of 
incentive pay in banking is also believed to have motivated excessive risk taking and acted as 
a contributory factor to the recent financial crisis.  
This chapter considers the relationship between bank CEO compensation, bank 
performance and bank risk. Our empirical evidence is based on 63 banks across 15 European 
countries for the period 1992 to 2010. Data for CEO compensation are collected from annual 
reports. We specified three single equations with fixed effect, and included dynamics to 
investigate this relationship. We account of endogeneity and estimated them as three 
simultaneous equations in a system using 3SLS. We also explore the dynamic properties in 
the system and solved for steady-state solution. 
Our evidence confirms a significant positive relationship between CEO compensation 
and performance. This relationship is mainly attributed to bonus and performance. The 
relationship between salary and performance is not as strong. CEO characteristic such as 
tenure is positively related to salary but not bonus. Long-term incentive payment (equity 
based compensation) may induce higher risk taking according to previous studies. We find 
that higher short-term incentives (bonus paid in cash) actually reduces risk taking. This 
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negative relationship between bonus and risk remain strong with four different measures of 
risk.  
The popular view is that there should be a positive relationship between bonus and risk 
taking. The negative relationship we have from the structural model is surprising. It suggests 
that bonus might not be a tool to induce risk taking. However when we separate the sample, 
we find that there is a positive relationship between risk and bonus in the two pre-crisis 
periods, this relationship became positive in the post crisis period. We argue that because the 
European banking industry has a strong culture of TBTF, CEOs might take on excessive risk 
which contributed to the crisis. At the same time shareholders should find it optimal to 
approve larger bonuses because they benefit selectively from the upside of increased risk. 
However, we argue that the relationship between risk and bonus are not casual, and we could 
explain the positive relationship from the shocks to the individual equations and the 
interaction of the equations. We conclude that any observed positive relationship between 
short-term incentive payments and risk is caused by other exogenous factors and are not 
causally linked. Our result suggests that short-term incentive may not be a tool to induce risk 
taking.  
Our results are empirically generated using the bench marks which have been used in 
the previous literatures. Without a theoretical model, it’s hard to interpret structural 
parameters. We are not driven by the deductive approach common in economic modelling, 
starting from a theoretical model, and then identifying and estimating the model. Rather, we 
reverse the process by looking at the literature, and then estimate the empirical regularities 
from the literature. By doing so we find a surprising result which cannot be explained by the 
theoretical model. In that sense therefore, one could question the validity of the theoretical 
models. However we have looked at identification of structural parameters and conducted 
appropriate tests, the negative relationship between risk and bonus is robust. It may well be 
72 
 
the model is mis-specified and that the negative result is misconstrued, or alternatively the 
model is correct but we haven’t found a good enough theory to interpret it, or it could be a bit 
of both. Although the positive relationship can be explained, the result from the structural 
model is inelegant.  This area clearly requires more work both on the theory as well as the 
empirics.  
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Appendix I  Tables 
Table 2.1 Sample banks 
NAME COUNTRY SAMPLE PERIOD 
Erste Group Bank AG Austria 2003-2010 
Dexia Belgium 2001-2010 
Danske Bank A/S Denmark 2005-2010 
BNP Paribas France 1998-2010 
Credit Agricole S.A. France 2003-2010 
Credit Industriel & Commecial France 2005-2010 
Natixis France 2002-2010 
Societe Generale  France 2000-2010 
Aareal Bank AG Germany 2004-2010 
Commerzbank AG Germany 2004-2010 
Deutsche Bank AG Germany 2003-2010 
Deutsche Postbank AG Germany 2003-2010 
IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG Germany 2004-2010 
LBB(Landesbank Berlin) Holding AG Germany 2005-2010 
Kaupthing Bank  Iceland 2005-2008 
Anglo Irish Bank Corp LTD Ireland 2001-2008 
Allied Irish Bank Plc Ireland 1999-2010 
Bank of Ireland  Ireland 2000-2010 
Banca Carige Italy 2000-2007 
Banca Finnat   Italy 2003-2010 
Gruppo Monte dei Paschi di Siena Italy 2005-2008 
Banca Popolare DI Milano  Italy 2000-2009 
BANCA POPOLARE DELL ETRURIA & DEL 
LAZIO 
Italy 2002-2010 
Banca Popolare DI Sondrio Italy 2001-2010 
BANCO DI DESIO & DELLA BRIANZA SPA Italy 2000-2007 
Credito Bergamasco Italy 2000-2008 
Credito Emiliano Italy 2003-2010 
Intesa Sanpolo Italy 2004-2010 
Mediobanca Spa Italy 2002-2010 
ABN Amro Holding NV Netherlands 2000-2006 
Van Lanschot NV Netherlands 2001-2010 
DnB Nor ASA Norway 2002-2010 
SpareBank 1 Nord Norge Norway 1992-2010 
Sparebank 1 SR Bank  Norway 2004-2010 
Sparebanken Ost Norway 2003-2007 
BRE Bank Poland 2004-2010 
Fortis Bank Polska Poland 2004-2010 
Kredyt Bank Poland 2003-2010 
74 
 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Spain 2002-2010 
Banco Santander SA Spain 2002-2010 
Banco Popular Espanol Spain 2005-2010 
Nordea Bank AB Sweden 2000-2010 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken AB Sweden 1998-2010 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB Sweden 2002-2010 
Swedbank AB Sweden 2000-2010 
BANK SARASIN & CO LTD Switzerland  2008-2010 
Banque Cantonale Vaudoise Switzerland  2008-2010 
Banque Cantonale De Geneve  Switzerland  2008-2010 
Credit Suisse Group  Switzerland  2007-2010 
EFG International Switzerland  2007-2010 
Julius Baer Group Switzerland  2007-2010 
Liechtensteinische Landesbank Switzerland  2006-2010 
UBS AG Switzerland  2008-2010 
Abbey National Plc UK 1998-2008 
Barclays Plc UK 1995-2010 
Bank of Scotland UK 1997-2001 
Bradford & Bingley Plc UK 2000-2010 
HBOS Plc UK 2001-2008 
HSBC Holding Plc UK 1993-2010 
Lloyds Banking Group Plc UK 1995-2010 
Northern Rock UK 1997-2009 
Royal Bank of Scotland Group Plc UK 1995-2010 
Standard Chartered UK 1993-2010 
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Table 2.2 Summary statistics of CEO compensation 
Full Sample (1992 – 2010) 
 CASH BONUS SALARY BONUSR 
 Mean  1607.814  781.8013  788.7830  0.338796 
 Median  1095.005  367.7222  713.3206  0.348042 
 Maximum  9120.641  7990.975  3346.891  0.878230 
 Minimum  122.3800  0.000000  95.29592  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  1447.614  1107.281  490.1945  0.249823 
 Observations  457  481  516  457 
 
 
Pre-crisis (1992 – 2007) 
 CASH SALARY BONUS BONUSR 
 Mean 1722.386 775.7019 904.1928 0.392961 
 Median 1196.493 710.5182 489.9329 0.414201 
 Std. Dev. 1491.159 451.0776 1163.922 0.226899 
 
 
 
Crisis (2008) 
 
 CASH SALARY BONUS BONUSR 
 Mean 1075.964 789.8372 265.4896 0.113171 
 Median 819.8263 731.706 0 0 
 Std. Dev. 1191.783 488.929 789.9969 0.207509 
 
 
Post-crisis (2009 – 2010) 
 CASH SALARY BONUS BONUSR 
 Mean 1462.034 835.2845 552.7164 0.251237 
 Median 1049.953 724.0702 121.5445 0.189627 
 Std. Dev. 1323.241 613.632 855.8255 0.265241 
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Table 2.3 Summary statistics of CEO characteristics  
 TENURE AGE OWNERSHIP 
Mean 3.075117 53.67877 0.000944 
Median 2.000000 54.00000 4.63E-05 
Maximum 18.00000 71.00000 0.055053 
Minimum 0.000000 35.00000 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 3.207196 6.433469 0.006048 
Skewness 1.551450 -0.279428 8.504287 
Kurtosis 5.732393 2.951164 74.46290 
Observations 426 358 315 
 
Table 2.4 Summary bank-accounting data
19
  
 MB SIZE LEVERAGE ROE NPLOAN 
Mean 1.712163 11.51214 0.388573 0.106241 0.021144 
Median 1.628935 11.81491 0.368318 0.122800 0.013708 
Maximum 6.948480 14.68670 0.969926 1.188400 0.720582 
Minimum 0.102995 5.878818 0.000000 -3.777200 0.000000 
Std. Dev. 0.872800 1.832702 0.187451 0.198081 0.044155 
Skewness 1.214792 -0.541946 1.102186 -9.844044 11.94856 
Kurtosis 7.095526 2.756692 4.758139 167.1232 173.7027 
Observations 506 536 526 1043 445 
MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing loan/loan 
  
                                                          
19 Initial we have other controls such as capital asset ratio, liquidity ratio. In all of these are insignificant 
except for equity to asset ratio in salary is only marginally significant at 10%. 
77 
 
 
Table 2.5 Mean and standard deviation of ROE each year 
 
YEAR Mean Std. Dev. Obs. 
1992 -0.041418 0.626572 39 
1993 0.095516 0.099747 44 
1994 0.113229 0.098124 45 
1995 0.125076 0.083008 49 
1996 0.129647 0.092515 51 
1997 0.124375 0.104220 53 
1998 0.146119 0.072001 54 
1999 0.148107 0.133274 54 
2000 0.157812 0.180977 59 
2001 0.113270 0.086542 60 
2002 0.055658 0.190843 59 
2003 0.096908 0.208002 61 
2004 0.138156 0.082469 61 
2005 0.168200 0.068716 61 
2006 0.177431 0.062012 61 
2007 0.167944 0.088024 62 
2008 -0.009687 0.322520 60 
2009 0.036062 0.131253 55 
2010 0.023229 0.248991 55 
All 0.106241 0.198081 1043 
 
Table 2.6 Market Index 
Austria ATX 
Belgium BEL20 
Denmark OMX Copenhagen 20 
France CAC 40 
Germany DAX  
Iceland OMX 
Italy FTSE MIB 
Netherland AEX 
Norway OBX 
Poland MWIG 40 
Spain IBEX 35 
Sweden OMX Stockholm 30 
Switzerland SMI 
UK FTSE 100 
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Table 2.7 Summary statistics of four risk measures 
 Total Risk δj Idiosyncratic  Risk δuj Systematic Risk βm Beta 
 Mean 0.020737 0.016495 0.821499 1.085233 
 Median 0.017901 0.014062 0.863192 1.090000 
 Maximum 0.152582 0.130527 2.745963 5.070000 
 Minimum 0.001462 0.001553 -1.401413 -1.610000 
 Std. Dev. 0.012858 0.011188 0.529770 0.575959 
 Skewness 3.234562 3.688273 0.156839 0.694769 
 Kurtosis 21.84018 25.55723 3.073419 7.832071 
 Observations 1019 864 864 508 
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Table A.1 Risk Equations 
Variable TRISK  FRISK  SRISK  BETA  
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.001455 0.9669 0.01882 0.5756 -2.54523 0.0333 2.436509 0.0971 
LNCASH -0.00574 0.0011 -0.00661 0.0001 -0.12847 0.0256 -0.19033 0.0100 
SIZE 0.005271 0.0542 0.004011 0.1278 0.358594 0.0002 0.011394 0.9199 
LEVERAGE 0.015106 0.0227 0.013167 0.0367 0.501999 0.0244 0.010467 0.9696 
MB -0.00525 0.0000 -0.00476 0.0000 -0.06778 0.0778 -0.06535 0.1640 
ROE -0.01581 0.0568 -0.02176 0.0054 0.167631 0.5399 -0.61999 0.0728 
NPLOAN 0.258626 0.0000 0.200382 0.0008 5.39017 0.0103 10.02749 0.0002 
OWNERSHIP -2.34801 0.0541 -0.91313 0.4169 -45.8691 0.2490 -12.1122 0.8103 
R-squared 0.828489  0.773784  0.825194  0.796481  
Obs 246  223  223  224  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables are Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic 
risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing 
loan/loan. Ownership is the percentage of shareholding. Lncash is the log of total compensation. 
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Table A.1.1 Risk Equations separating salary and bonus 
Salary: 
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables are Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic 
risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing 
loan/loan. Ownership is the percentage of shareholding. Lnsalary is the log of fixed pay. 
 
Bonus: 
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables are Total risk, Firm risk, 
Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-
performing loan/loan. Ownership is the percentage of shareholding. Bonusr=bonus/total compensation.  
  
Variable TRISK  FRISK  SRISK  BETA  
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -0.03324 0.3589 -0.01453 0.6791 -2.56009 0.0329 2.025258 0.1743 
LNSALARY 0.001103 0.6953 -0.00021 0.9392 -0.0974 0.2901 -0.09212 0.4322 
SIZE 0.004252 0.1272 0.00302 0.2709 0.337744 0.0004 -0.02003 0.8603 
LEVERAGE 0.013475 0.0435 0.011156 0.0833 0.544625 0.0131 0.048278 0.8596 
MB -0.00535 0.0000 -0.00497 0.0000 -0.06071 0.1062 -0.06639 0.1498 
ROE -0.02114 0.0027 -0.02326 0.0005 -0.05254 0.8146 -0.55957 0.0513 
NPLOAN 0.250333 0.0001 0.197433 0.0009 5.730511 0.0045 10.36386 0.0001 
OWNERSHIP -2.22474 0.0740 -0.91778 0.4314 -47.8444 0.2275 -21.5777 0.6709 
R-squared 0.816483  0.747233  0.83687  0.795566  
Obs 263  240  240  259  
Variable TRISK  FRISK  SRISK  BETA  
 Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept -0.01884 0.5646 -0.0034 0.9141 -3.02485 0.0090 1.554238 0.2746 
BONUSR -0.0168 0.0000 -0.01735 0.0000 -0.2808 0.0194 -0.2695 0.0748 
SIZE 0.003953 0.1353 0.002386 0.3491 0.329658 0.0005 -0.0202 0.8597 
LEVERAGE 0.014313 0.0252 0.011155 0.0661 0.459486 0.0376 -0.03869 0.8886 
MB -0.00502 0.0000 -0.0045 0.0000 -0.06299 0.1003 -0.0619 0.1916 
ROE -0.01405 0.0809 -0.02032 0.0075 0.175091 0.5218 -0.66005 0.0587 
NPLOAN 0.280828 0.0000 0.221313 0.0001 5.783607 0.0058 10.40618 0.0001 
OWNERSHIP -2.33209 0.0486 -0.89606 0.4119 -45.5574 0.2515 -12.3848 0.8079 
R-squared 0.838601  0.786841  0.825694  0.792609  
Obs 246  223  223  242  
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Table A.2 Performance equation  
 
 Dependent variable : ROE      
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.314467 0.3282 0.225151 0.5265 0.161645 0.6578 0.320102 0.3302 
LNCASH 0.037169 0.0336 0.032812 0.0699 0.049778 0.0059 0.048973 0.0051 
SIZE -0.03627 0.1930 -0.02567 0.4019 -0.03345 0.2929 -0.04228 0.1324 
LEVERAGE -0.06119 0.3806 -0.04846 0.5052 -0.08948 0.2240 -0.08144 0.2589 
MB 0.033345 0.0127 0.027396 0.0523 0.039989 0.0046 0.036405 0.0072 
TRISK -2.4065 0.0010       
FIRSK   -3.33252 0.0001     
SRISK     -0.0303 0.2012   
BETA       -0.06135 0.0014 
R-squared 0.500983  0.504277  0.481524  0.498109  
Obs 416  389  389  407  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is ROE. Four risk measures is applied 
- Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. 
Nploan=non-performing loan/loan. Lncash is the log of total compensation. 
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Table A.2.1 Performance equation separating salary and bonus 
Salary: 
 Dependent variable : ROE      
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.06542 0.8336 0.009348 0.9786 -0.07613 0.8325 0.115179 0.7216 
LNSALARY 0.072338 0.0049 0.073469 0.0062 0.085539 0.0019 0.095248 0.0008 
SIZE -0.03322 0.2076 -0.02855 0.3359 -0.03189 0.3040 -0.05095 0.0616 
LEVERAGE -0.05251 0.4387 -0.04895 0.4873 -0.0847 0.2401 -0.06904 0.3425 
MB 0.033801 0.0074 0.027943 0.0373 0.041837 0.0019 0.041382 0.0012 
TRISK -2.83589 0.0000       
FIRSK   -3.71663 0.0000     
SRISK     -0.03006 0.1834   
BETA       -0.05673 0.0018 
R-squared 0.501848  0.505651  0.477183  0.495206  
Obs 470  443  443  456  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is ROE. Four risk measures is applied 
- Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. 
Nploan=non-performing loan/loan. Lnsalary is the log of fixed pay. 
 
Bonus: 
 Dependent variable : ROE      
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.435757 0.1716 0.333268 0.3433 0.32298 0.3731 0.483774 0.1368 
BONUSR 0.050743 0.1986 0.041409 0.3100 0.085381 0.0352 0.084593 0.0265 
SIZE -0.02585 0.3448 -0.01642 0.5863 -0.02013 0.5212 -0.02952 0.2867 
LEVERAGE -0.05135 0.4624 -0.03767 0.6042 -0.0749 0.3103 -0.06826 0.3452 
MB 0.034057 0.0113 0.028157 0.0469 0.041629 0.0032 0.037077 0.0065 
TRISK -2.51644 0.0007       
FIRSK   -3.49569 0.0000     
SRISK     -0.03174 0.1857   
BETA       -0.0628 0.0012 
R-squared 0.496719  0.500686  0.476289  0.493596  
Obs 416  389  389  407  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is ROE. Four risk measures is applied 
- Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Leverage = debt/asset. 
Nploan=non-performing loan/loan. Bonusr=bonus/total compensation. 
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Table A.3 Compensation Equations 
 Dependent variable : LNCASH 
LNCASH Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 4.78437 0.0001 4.960439 0.0003 4.879549 0.0006 4.993571 0.0001 
MB -0.0481 0.3048 -0.05176 0.3029 -0.01391 0.7808 -0.02337 0.6193 
SIZE 0.197959 0.0354 0.16693 0.1102 0.177228 0.1052 0.170124 0.0732 
LEVERAGE 0.783579 0.0017 0.903693 0.0005 0.771623 0.0033 0.682785 0.0065 
ROE 0.483523 0.0068 0.404839 0.0277 0.558968 0.0022 0.59798 0.0008 
TENURE 0.018704 0.0717 0.01191 0.2743 0.019519 0.0746 0.023394 0.0245 
AGE -0.00223 0.6836 0.003316 0.5833 0.000667 0.9142 -0.00286 0.6051 
TRISK -6.94546 0.0119       
FIRSK   -11.2678 0.0003     
SRISK     -0.14769 0.1008   
BETA       -0.02814 0.6712 
R-squared 0.840601  0.83667  0.828736  0.836066  
Obs 297  274  274  296  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is log of total compensation. Four 
risk measures is applied - Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real 
asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing loan/loan.  
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Table A.3.1 Compensation equation separating salary and bonus 
Salary: 
 Dependent variable : LNSALARY 
LNSALARY Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 4.361352 0.0000 4.039238 0.0000 4.00422 0.0000 4.323741 0.0000 
MB 0.012039 0.6623 0.025162 0.3929 0.026496 0.3518 0.013063 0.6299 
SIZE 0.174724 0.0018 0.183603 0.0030 0.189722 0.0025 0.176161 0.0016 
LEVERAGE 0.551985 0.0002 0.637661 0.0000 0.636717 0.0000 0.552619 0.0002 
ROE 0.365965 0.0004 0.346007 0.0010 0.347218 0.0006 0.37207 0.0002 
TENURE 0.019845 0.0012 0.015078 0.0175 0.015447 0.0130 0.019912 0.0010 
AGE -0.0027 0.3912 0.0014 0.6842 0.001066 0.7570 -0.00272 0.3877 
TRISK 0.243262 0.8773       
FIRSK   -0.73425 0.6828     
SRISK     -0.03401 0.4981   
BETA       0.019202 0.6127 
R-squared 0.861469  0.864576  0.864744  0.861434  
Obs 321  298  298  320  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is log of fixed pay. Four risk 
measures is applied - Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). 
Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing loan/loan.  
 
Bonus: 
 Dependent variable : BONUSR      
Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value Estimate P-value 
Intercept 0.123386 0.8285 0.450767 0.4704 0.39165 0.5518 4.78437 0.0001 
MB -0.0278 0.2001 -0.03652 0.1150 -0.01173 0.6184 -0.0481 0.3048 
SIZE 0.02002 0.6441 -0.00775 0.8716 -9.83E-05 0.9985 0.197959 0.0354 
LEVERAGE 0.168546 0.1405 0.185617 0.1185 0.09953 0.4175 0.783579 0.0017 
ROE 0.129617 0.1151 0.097047 0.2499 0.197406 0.0214 0.483523 0.0068 
TENURE -0.00162 0.7360 -0.0027 0.5898 0.002302 0.6542 0.018704 0.0717 
AGE 0.001939 0.4431 0.002875 0.3022 0.001109 0.7039 -0.00223 0.6836 
TRISK -5.66709 0.0000       
FIRSK   -7.42787 0.0000     
SRISK     -0.1006 0.0181   
BETA       -6.94546 0.0119 
R-squared 0.737644    0.71034  0.840601  
Obs 297  274  274  297  
OLS estimation using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables is bonus/total compensation. Four 
risk measures is applied - Total risk, Firm risk, Systematic risk and Beta. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real 
asset). Leverage = debt/asset. Nploan=non-performing loan/loan.   
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Table B.1 3SLS estimation 
 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
Dependent Variable: TRISK   
   
C 0.0210 0.0061 3.4399 0.0006 
TRISK(-1) 0.4302 0.0577 7.4532 0.0000 
BONUSR -0.0341 0.0041 -8.2445 0.0000 
SIZE 0.0008 0.0005 1.5643 0.1181 
MB -0.0028 0.0009 -2.9396 0.0034 
NPLOAN 0.0555 0.0421 1.3196 0.1873 
Dependent Variable: BONUSR   
   
C 0.4839 0.0323 14.9603 0.0000 
D(ROE) 0.4909 0.1168 4.2023 0.0000 
D(LOG(PRICE)) 0.0797 0.0295 2.6993 0.0071 
TRISK -4.8007 1.2635 -3.7996 0.0002 
Dependent Variable: LNSALARY   
   
C 1.1521 0.2497 4.6146 0.0000 
LNSALARY(-1) 0.7372 0.0438 16.8369 0.0000 
MB 0.0447 0.0173 2.5795 0.0100 
SIZE 0.0414 0.0125 3.3120 0.0010 
ROE 0.0825 0.1021 0.8082 0.4191 
TENURE 0.0128 0.0187 0.6819 0.4955 
Dependent Variable: ROE   
   
C 0.0390 0.0293 1.3324 0.1830 
ROE(-1) 0.4636 0.0789 5.8766 0.0000 
BONUSR 0.1632 0.0389 4.1925 0.0000 
MB 0.0211 0.0101 2.0860 0.0372 
TRISK -2.9601 0.5765 -5.1351 0.0000 
3 Stage Least Squares using annual over the period 1994 to 2010. Dependent variables are total risk, bonus/total 
compensation, log of fixed pay, and ROE. D(ROE) is the first difference of ROE. D(lnprice) is the first difference of the 
log of stock price. MB - market to book ratio. Size = ln(real asset). Nploan=non-performing loan/loan. Using lagged 
dependent variables as instruments is a standard approach. Two lags of dependent variable are used in all equations 
as instruments. In addition, we use D(ROE) D(LOG(PRICE)) for Risk equation, SIZE MB NPLOAN  for bonus equation, 
NPLOAN D(ROE) D(LOG(PRICE)) for salary equation and SIZE NPLOAN D(ROE) D(LOG(PRICE)) for ROE equation. 
Sargan’s instrument validity test is not rejected, showing the instruments are valid. 
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Table B.2 Steady-state solutions 
 
SIZE MB  NPLOAN DLNPRICE 
RISK 0.001872 -0.006774 0.136715 -0.006693 
BONUSR -0.008986 0.032518 -0.656329 0.111810 
ROE -0.0130.62 0.086685 -0.954088 0.070946 
This is a Jacobian matrix which summarised the steady-state solution for the endogenous variable risk, bonusr and 
ROE. See Appendix II for calculations. 
 
Table B.3 Exogenous effect for risk and bonus 
 1994 2002 2006 2010 
Mean     
SIZE 11.604 11.392 11.386 11.722 
MB 1.195 1.727 2.019 1.016 
NPLOAN 0.026 0.014 0.015 0.033 
DLOGPRICE -0.106 -0.207 0.251 -0.032 
DROE 0.016 -0.057 0.03 -0.013 
Difference     
SIZE  -0.212 -0.006 0.336 
MB  0.532 0.292 -1.003 
NPLOAN  -0.012 0.001 0.018 
DLOGPRICE -0.101 0.458 -0.283 
DROE  -0.073 0.087 -0.043 
Marginal effect    
SIZE  -0.00017 -4.8E-06 0.000269 
MB  -0.00149 -0.00082 0.002808 
NPLOAN  -0.00067 5.55E-05 0.000999 
DLOGPRICE -0.00805 0.036503 -0.02256 
DROE  -0.03584 0.042708 -0.02111 
Overall effect    
TRISK  -0.00408 -0.00135 0.007154 
BONUSR  -0.04389 0.079211 -0.04366 
The first section of the table takes the mean of each variable in the corresponding year. The second section takes the 
difference of mean from the first section. The third section of uses the coefficient of the variables from 3SLS 
estimation in Table B.2, multiply by the differenced of mean in the second section. In the last section, the overall effect 
of Trisk is the sum of the Marginal effect of SIZE, MB and NPLOAN, and the marginal effect of BONUSR is the sum of 
the marginal effect of DLOGPRICE and DROE. 
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Appendix II   Dynamic Properties and Steady-state Solution of the System 
 
Salary doesn’t feed into the loop of the system, so we only concern the simultaneity amongst 
risk, bonus, and ROE, which leaves us the following three equations. 
tttttt NPLOANMBSIZEBONUSRRISKRISK 6543121       (1) 
ttttt RISKDLNPRICEROEROEBONUSR 431221       (2) 
ttttt RISKMBBONUSRROEROE 543121       (3) 
Substitute for BONUSR in (1), 
tttt
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1232313121
)
(

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 (4) 
Let 431 A  
ttt
tttt
NPLOAN
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1
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




 
  (5) 
Substitute for BONUSR in (2), 
tttt
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
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

 
   (6) 
Let )( 543  B  
tt
ttt
MB
B
DLNPRICE
B
ROE
B
ROE
BB
RISK
433
1
23223131 )()1(








 
   (7) 
Use (7) to substitute for RISK in (5) 
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   (8) 
Let m be the constant and exogenous variable terms,  
C
ABBA
d  )
)()1(
( 232322321





  
and  
)( 2322
2 C
BA
d
 
  
mROEdROEdROE ttt   2211  
This is a second order difference equation. 
The two characteristic roots are, 
2
4
, 2
2
11
21
ddd 
  
Using the estimated coefficients from the base model, we find that  
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1d =-0.925 and 2d =0.233.  We have complex roots because 04 2
2
1  dd .  21 1 dd   and 
12 d  suggest the solution is stable. 
Steady State solution: 
1 tt RISKRISKRISK  
1 tt ROEROEROE  
Let 4321  D  
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Substitute (9) in (2) 
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NPLOANMBSIZEDLNPRICEROE 0.954088-0.0866850.013062-0.070946240319.0 
 
 
We also use an alternative method, using computer to simulate the solution. To get the 
marginal effect of size on risk, bonusr and ROE, we give all the variables zero as starting 
value but size equal to one. The system repetitively calculates the value of risk, bonusr and 
ROE from equation (1) to (3) until they converge. This is the first repetition. We use the 
value of risk, bonusr and ROE we got from the first repetition as the starting value, and put it 
back to the system. Iterate until risk, bonusr and ROE converges. This is the second repetition. 
Use the new set of value from the second repetition as starting value for the third repetition. 
We carry on this procedure until the value of risk, bonusr and ROE doesn’t change any more 
for each repetition. The converged values of risk, bonusr and ROE are the marginal effect of 
size. The results are exactly the same as the results above solved by hand. To get the marginal 
effects of mb nploan and dlnprice, we set their staring value as one and everything else to 
zero in the first repetition, and follow the same procedure above. Again the solution we got 
from simulation confirms our hand-solving solution. 
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Chapter 3   Forecasting Horizon and Forward 
Market Efficiency 
 
 
3.1 Introduction of research background and motivation 
One of the fundamental concepts in finance is market efficiency. Malkiel and 
Fama (1970) summarise this idea in their classic survey as: “a market in which prices 
always ‘fully reflect’ available information is called ‘efficient’.” They also 
distinguished three different forms of market efficiency, with respect to different 
available information sets: the weak-form, the semi-strong form and the strong form. 
Geweke and Feige (1979) further distinguish two categories between single-market 
efficiency and multi-market efficiency within the semi-strong form of market 
efficiency. The efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) states that if the foreign exchange 
market is competitive, frictionless (i.e. no taxes, transaction costs or other costs), with 
all information available and used rationally by the risk – neutral economic agents, 
then there will be no speculations because the expected returns will be zero (Hansen 
and Hodrick 1980). In other words, in an aggregate sense, if the participants in the 
foreign exchange rates market are risk neutral and have rational expectation (RE), 
forward exchange rate should be an unbiased predictor of the corresponding future 
spot exchange rate because it contains all of the relevant information about the 
expected future exchange rate.  
However one the implications of efficiency market hypothesis, that forward rate 
being an unbiased predictor of future spot rate is empirically far from conclusive. 
Many empirical literature find a forward rate bias, where the forward rate does not 
provide an unbiased forecast of the future spot exchange rate. In theory, the 
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relationship between spot and forward exchange rates is governed by the uncovered 
interest rate parity (UIP) condition, which suggests that the forward premium must be 
perfectly positively related to future spot exchange rate changes. In practice, we 
usually observe a negative relationship empirically. Fama (1984) reports the evidence 
of the relationship between spot and forward exchange rates is generally discrediting 
towards the expectations theory of unbiased forward rates. In particular, he finds that 
the difference between the current forward and spot rates is an upward-biased 
estimate of the subsequent change in the spot rate. His result suggests that the bias in 
the forward rate is such that when the forward rate exceeds the spot rate, then the spot 
rate tends to decline on the average, whereas the expectations theory predicts that the 
spot rate will increase on the average in this situation (Tauchen 2001).  
The forward premium puzzle is closely related to the presence of forward rates 
bias, and the failure of the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) to hold. The theoretical 
implication of UIP, that the forward premium must be perfectly positively related to 
future exchange rate changes is not empirically supported as we observe a negative 
relationship. The puzzle is that the forward premium tends to points at the opposite 
direction of the ex post movement of the spot exchange rate. It subsequently suggests 
that domestic currency is likely to appreciate when its nominal interest rate is higher 
which again contrary to what the theory predicts. To illustrate this contradiction, we 
start from the following relationship: 
11   ttt uFS      ( 3.1 )  
Let st be the current spot exchange rate, and St be the natural logarithm of the spot rate 
(defined as the domestic currency per unit of foreign currency), so that tt sS ln . tf  
is the forward exchange rate, and Ft denotes the natural logarithm of the forward 
exchange rate, so tt fF ln . ut+1 is the residual term. If forward rate is an unbiased 
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predictor of the corresponding future spot exchange rate, one would expect α=0 and 
β=1 provided the agents are risk neutral and do not make systematic errors in their 
forecast. However in reality, regression estimates do not find a zero α and a unity β. 
Moreover, the estimated regression error term often exhibits serial correlation, 
violating the rational expectations hypothesis.  
More formally, researchers test the following equation, by subtracting St from 
the previous equation: 
11 )(   tttt uSFS      ( 3.2 ) 
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111 lnln  is the future rate of depreciation, the 
depreciation of spot exchange rate from period t to t+1. )( tt SF  is the forward 
premium. This equation if often referred as the Fama equation
20
. The puzzle is that 
not only α appears different from zero, β also appears different from unit, and β is 
typically negative. McCallum (1994) also emphasized another stylised fact that the R
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in this equation is typically very low and the forward premium itself is positively 
correlated. The forward premium is linked to the interest rate by the interest rate 
parity. If the covered interest rate parity (CIP) holds, then: 
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      (3.3) 
where iH is the nominal interest rate in the home country and iF is the nominal interest 
rate in the foreign country. Let )1ln( Ht
H
t iR  , )1ln(
F
tF iR  , )ln( tt fF   and 
)ln( tt sS  , from the equation above we have: 
tt
F
t
H
t SFRR      (3.4) 
Then equation ( 3.2 ) becomes: 
                                                          
20 See Fama (1984) 
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11 )(   t
F
t
H
tt uRRS     (3.5) 
 
A negative β suggests that if there is a positive change in F
t
H
t RR  , there will 
be a negative response of 1 tS . In other words when 
H
tR the domestic interest rate 
becomes higher, we would expect a decrease in St+1, that the domestic currency will 
appreciate. 
 If covered interest rate parity is assumed to be held, testing equation (3.1) is 
equivalent of testing equation (3.2). A large volume of empirical work has tested the 
efficient market hypothesis as β=1. Results often showed that the least-squares 
estimates of β is significantly smaller than 1. Actually, in many cases, β is less than 
zero. The evidence is strongly against the efficient market hypothesis which 
theoretically predicts that β=1. Moreover, many researches often produce a negative 
slope coefficient of the equation, which suggests that domestic currency will 
appreciate when the domestic interest rate is higher. This suggests a simple and 
profitable trading scheme (Roll and Yan 2000): a trader can borrow in the low interest 
rate country and use the proceeds to buy bonds in the high interest rate country. On 
the contrary, an implication of many economic models is that the domestic currency is 
expected to depreciate when domestic nominal interest rates exceed foreign interest 
rate (Lucas Jr 1982, Bansal, Gallant et al. 1995, Bekaert 1996, Bansal and Dahlquist 
2000). Also Equation (3.5) is the uncovered interest rate (UIP) test equation. If UIP 
holds the slope coefficient β is expected to be unity. The finding of a negative β not 
only represents an alluring opportunity, it also rejects UIP. This puzzling phenomenon 
is known as the Forward Premium Puzzle.  
Since the Forward Premium Puzzle arose in the 80s, numerous researches in this 
area have done in the past decades. Economists have used different sample countries 
and periods to test the Forward Premium Puzzle. Researchers have tried various ways 
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to explain the Forward Premium Puzzle, by either modifying the model or 
incorporating new econometric techniques. The explanation of the Forward Premium 
Puzzle is still far from conclusive. 
In this study we also collect 3 sets of exchange rates with US dollar, sterling and 
Euro as numeraire to see if they get consistent results. One of the main differences 
between these currencies is their liquidity. For example the US dollar and Euro are 
more liquid than Sterling. However the primary reason of using all three currencies is 
for robustness. If there is no significant difference between currencies, it suggests that 
our result is robust. If the results are different, this could mean that the arbitrage 
opportunities haven't been completely exploited. If cross rate exists, then there might 
be an opportunity of triangular arbitrage between these three currencies. When the 
market is efficient, if one dollar is exchanged to Sterling, then to Euro, then back to 
dollar, this should generate exactly one dollar subject to transition cost. Even with 
zero transaction cost, there is no triangular arbitrage opportunity under the assumption 
of market efficiency. The other arbitrage opportunity in the foreign exchange market 
is similar to the carry trade strategy, where an investor borrows money in a low-
interest-rate currency, converts the funds into a high-interest rate currency and lends 
the resulting amount in the target currency at the higher interest rate. In the foreign 
exchange market, investors can sell currencies which the forward exchange rate is 
higher than the spot exchange rate, and buy currencies which the forward exchange 
rate is lower than the spot exchange rate. However the theory of market efficiency 
implies that these strategies should yield no predictable profits. For these reasons, it is 
important for us the carry out this study with three different currencies and see 
whether they yield significantly different results. 
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Time horizon is an important element in the studies related to market efficiency. 
Investors in equity markets intervene according to different decision-making time 
horizons: e.g., intra-day or daily traders, individual non-professional portfolio 
managers, long-term institutional investors such as pension funds. When returns are 
unpredictable, there is a single risk premium, but when stock returns are predictable, 
risk premia are horizon-dependent. Prat (2013) points out that since the years 2000, 
academic work using survey data revealing experts’ stock return expectations 
straightforwardly confirms the existence of a time-varying term structure for equity 
risk premia. Thus, studies by Welch (2000) and Prat (2001) show that, despite 
common trends, substantial discrepancies characterize risk premia depending on the 
time horizon. These studies strongly confirm that risk premium is both time-varying 
and horizon-dependent.  The existence of time-varying return premia implies that the 
movements of the yield curve over time are driven not only by changes in the 
expectations about future one-period interest rates but also by changes in the return 
premia. It was also argued that in the traditional liquidity preference theory that return 
premia (and forward premia) exists because lenders prefer the liquidity provided by 
short-term bonds. Hence, extra rewards have to be made to induce them to purchase 
long-term bonds. Under the liquidity preference theory, changes in the return premia 
over time should be related to changes in the liquidity preference of investors in the 
bond markets.  
It is a general consensus that risk premium is not constant but time variant, and 
risk premium increase over time. Harvey (1989) shows that US equity risk premia are 
higher at business cycle troughs than they are at peaks. Subsequent results of Li (2001) 
confirm these findings. Cochrane and Piazessi (2005) find that the term premium is 
countercyclical in the US. De Paolia (2008) shows that in order to generate 
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countercyclical varying premia, one requires either hump shaped consumption 
dynamics or highly persistent shocks and slow-moving habits. It is also recognised in 
the literature on the existence of time varying premiums in forward rates [Hsieh 
(1982), Hansen and Hodrick (1983), and Hodrick and Srivastava (1984)]. Fama (1984) 
argues that the currency forward rates are in general biased predictors for spot 
exchange rates, because they not only reflect expected spot rates but additionally 
comprise time-varying risk premium.  
We aim to revisit the issue of spot-forward market efficiency at different time 
(forecast) horizons. Most existing literatures focus on a single forecast period while 
testing this hypothesis. In the real world, different agents require forward contracts 
spanning different durations (i.e., maturity): forward contract for a day, a week, a 
month, etc. At any point in time, forward rates on offer for different durations are in 
effect the predictions of future spot exchange rates. In this context, it is natural to 
think that the longer the duration of forward contract (e.g., a year versus a week) the 
longer is the forecast horizon of the movement of the future spot rate. Analogously, 
the longer the forecast horizon the higher the likelihood of committing larger forecast 
errors.  This provides us with an interesting testable hypothesis. 
We hypothesize that the rejection of the unbiasedness of the forward market is 
positively associated with the horizon of the forward contract. In other words, there 
should be more rejections of the market efficiency hypothesis as the length of the 
forward contract gets longer. This is due to the forecast errors associated with the long 
horizon forecast. It is much easier to forecast what the spot exchange rate will be 
tomorrow and set the corresponding forward rate accordingly compared to a month or 
a year hence.  It is also important to note that it is extremely difficult to forecast risk 
premium and factor determining risk premium for longer forecast horizons. We use 9 
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different time horizons, namely, one day, one week, one month, two months, three 
months, six months, nine months, one year and two years.  We expect rejection of 
unbiasedness hypothesis to increase as the contract horizon gets longer. Our result 
shows that forward rate bias is not much of a bias when forecast (forward contract) 
horizon is short. Only two of the 32 countries reject the hypothesis for one day 
contract and 7 countries reject the weekly forward contract in the Sterling exchange 
rate sample. Consistent with our hypothesis, the number of rejections increases in the 
longer forecast horizon. It suggests that the forward rate unbiasedness holds in the 
short horizon but not in the longer horizon. Forward rate started to lose its predictive 
power when the time to maturity is longer than a month.  
We select a mixture of developed and developing countries, which includes 
some large economies e.g. China, India and Russia, some strong trading economies 
e.g. Taiwan, Turkey and Philippines, countries with or without capital controls, and 
countries with different levels of liquidity. It is generally assumed that the emerging 
markets are less efficient than the developed market. Many researches have confirmed 
a weak-form market efficiency in emerging economies (Dickenson 1994, Vieito 
2013). It is not unlikely that the market participants are not well informed and 
behaving irrationally compared to well organised markets.  The causes of the lack of 
financial development, especially in capital markets, are due to certain market 
imperfection such as transaction costs, lack of timely information cost of acquiring 
new information, and possibly greater uncertainty about the future (Mobarek 2008). 
The effect of liquidity to market efficiency is mixed. Chordia (2008) is the first study 
that focuses specifically and examines empirically the effects of liquidity on market 
efficiency. He presents two hypotheses on how liquidity can be related to short-
horizon market efficiency. First, if market makers cannot absorb the impact of price 
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pressure from imbalances in buy and sell orders, temporary price deviations arise 
inducing return predictability and creating arbitrage profit potential. Higher liquidity 
facilitates arbitrage trading which leads to lower return predictability and higher 
market efficiency. In this situation, liquidity is positively related with market 
efficiency. Second, if market makers fail to utilize the information in order flows and 
eliminate return predictability, other market participants have incentives to gather new 
information about order flows and trade on such information. While the consequent 
increased adverse selection faced by market makers lowers liquidity, the market is 
more efficient as more information is incorporated in the prices (Barberis et al., 1998). 
In this case, liquidity is negatively associated with market efficiency. Chordia (2008) 
also points out that if market makers could fully absorb the price pressure from 
imbalances in buying and selling orders and utilizing all information in the order 
flows, then there should be no relationship between liquidity and market efficiency. 
An empirical study by Oh et al. (2007) suggests that the markets with a larger 
liquidity such as European and North American foreign exchange markets have 
higher market efficiencies than those with a smaller liquidity such as the African and 
Asian markets, except Japan.  We select countries with a mixture of different 
characteristics. The idea is to examine the forward market efficiency across a range of 
economies to arrive at robust results. We are interested if the hypothesis holds across 
all countries in short horizons or if there are clusters of countries showing different 
results.  
When comparing emerging economies with developed economies, we find that 
the predicting bias is worse in emerging economies. We argue it is because emerging 
economies are less liquid and have higher risk premium. Our evidence support Oh and 
Kim et al. (2007) who suggest that the markets with a larger liquidity such as 
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European and North American foreign exchange markets have a higher market 
efficiency than those with a smaller liquidity, such as the African and Asian markets - 
except Japan. 
We use unit root test to test the stationarity of both the spot exchange rate and 
the forward rate. It is established in the early literatures that exchange rate can be 
viewed as following a non-stationary time series process or process with a unit root 
(Baillie and McMahon, 1990). However there are some contrary evidences. For 
example Zhou (2008) rejects the null hypothesis of nonstationarity for most of the 
Asian-Pacific real exchange rates, but not for the Japanese Yen based rates. We find 
that exchanges rates in most countries are stationary, although there are a few 
exceptions. We contribute to the existing literature by detailing the changes of the 
predicting parameters over different time horizons. To test for efficient market 
hypothesis using nonstationary data, we use cointegrating regression methods 
FMOLS and DOLS. 
We also investigate the forward premium puzzle by testing the Fama equation. 
We are interested to find out whether forward premium puzzle worsen in longer time 
horizons. We test the Fama equation for each horizon for all 31 countries. β has 
increasing or decreasing trend for only a few countries, but for the majority of the 
countries, β doesn’t have a trend as time horizon becomes longer. Our evidence 
doesn’t support the finding of To (2007). They find that the longer the maturity of the 
forward contracts, the less negative the β coefficient is. Our finding suggests that 
forward premium doesn’t disappear even in longer time horizons.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides a 
brief review of some of the key literature addressing the forward premium puzzle. 
Section 3.3 introduces the econometric methodologies applied in this chapter. Data 
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description and the basic analysis of the raw data is in Section 3.4. Details of the 
models and empirical results are provided in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 concludes the 
chapter.  
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3.2 Literature Review 
 
Serious effort has been made to explain the forward premium puzzle. One of the 
main approaches to resolve the puzzle is by introducing risk-averse behaviour into the 
standard rational expectations model. Nobel Prize winner Eugene Fama (1984) first 
attribute the forward rate bias to time-varying risk premium. Assume that investors in 
the foreign exchange market are risk averse, thus the forward rate not only 
incorporates their expectations of future spot rates but also a risk premium hedging 
against the risky asset, a more volatile asset with higher expected rate of return. From 
the principle of no-arbitrage, one can argue that currency forwards are in general 
biased predictors for spot exchange rates because they not only reflect expected spot 
rates but also a time-varying risk premium that compensate for both currency risk and 
interest rate risk. 
Fama decomposed the forward premium into the expected rate of depreciation 
qt and the expected excess return pt, 
tttttttttt qpSSESEFSF   )()( 11  (3.6) 
where tt sS ln and tt fF ln , the natural log of the spot and forward exchange rate 
at time t. The excess return is pt , which also interpreted as the risk premium. qt is the 
expected depreciation. Let  represent the estimate of β in equation (3.1). If the 
estimator is consistent, the population regression coefficients β is 
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Clearly if we assume a constant risk premium p, cov(q,p)=0 and var(p+q)=var(q), 
hence β=1 according to equation (3.7). Since 0)var(  qp , to generate a negative 
value of β requires cov(q,p) + var(q) < 0. Given that var(q) > 0, we need 
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0),cov( pq , and )var(),cov( qpq   i.e. )var()var( qp  . Fama concludes a 
negative regression coefficient β needs a negative covariance between p and q, and a 
greater variance of p than q. In other words implied risk premium must be negatively 
related with its expected rate of depreciation and have greater variance. Although 
theoretically possible, in reality such models have difficulty reproducing this 
inequality under reasonable levels of risk aversion (Engel 1996), thus led to a general 
scepticism of the time-varying risk-premium explanation. 
Researchers adopt several alternatives to rational expectations models including 
irrational expectations, learning, speculative bubbles, expected utility and peso 
problems to explain the forward premium puzzle. Frankel and Froot (1987) find that 
exchange rate expectations are not static. They reject rational expectations and 
suggest that investigating heterogeneous investor expectations would be a useful 
avenue. Froot and Frankel (1989) assert that the bias is entirely due to expectational 
errors and that none is due to time-varying risk. They also reject the claim that the risk 
premium is more variable than expected depreciation. Landon and Smith (2003) 
provides evidence that the rejection of forward exchange rate unbiasedness can be 
attribute to both non-rational expectation and a time-varying risk premium.  
Rational learning happens when there is a potential permanent shift in the 
economy, due to a change in monetary or fiscal policy. Agents did not immediately 
believe that the change would persist, but instead learned the shift rationally. The 
expected future exchange rate is the weighted expected exchange rates under the two 
regimes, where the weights are the probabilities of each regime. The exchange rate 
will be biased until the learning process is finished. Lewis (1989) investigates the 
effects of learning about the increase in U.S. money demand in the early 1980s. The 
process of learning implies that β should converge to one at later times after the shift 
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happened. However Lewis (1989) also acknowledges that the bias continued beyond 
the initial shift she considered. The problem of explaining the puzzle using learning is 
that regime changes do not occur frequently enough to account for the persistence of 
the puzzle over many periods of time. Chakraborty and Evans (2008) show that 
replacing rational expectation with perpetual learning (discounted least-squares) 
generates a negative bias that becomes strongest when the fundamentals are strongly 
persistent (close to a random walk). If traders do not have perfectly rational 
expectations, their forecast errors may be correlated with the previous period’s 
information and this would bring a bias in the forward-premium regression results. 
They argued that learning theory approach should be considered in future empirical 
work on the forward premium puzzle. Chakraborty (2009) argued that the negative β 
is a reflection of the learning dynamics, and is not intrinsically an indication of market 
inefficiency.  
Evans and Lewis (1995) seek to explain risk premium variability by the peso 
problem. Asset prices are determined by expectations about the paths of future 
economic variables. Hence, the asset price behaviour is directly affected by the 
anticipated discrete changes in the distribution of these variables. The ‘peso problem’ 
focuses on how asset prices behave when the market has expectations about 
infrequent discrete shifts in economic determinants. With these expectations, the 
discrete changes can induce behaviour in asset prices that apparently contradicts 
conventional rational expectation assumptions. The fundamental shifts typically occur 
infrequently, even in relatively large samples. In a way, the ‘peso problem’ can be 
seen as a small-sample inference problem arising from these expected events. The 
‘peso problem’ was first noted in the Mexican peso market. The original source of the 
term is unknown, although some economists have attributed it to Milton Friedman.  
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The empirical phenomenon was originally mentioned by Rogoff (1980). Based 
on evidence from the Mexican peso futures market from Jun 1974 to Jun 1976, 
Rogoff used the relationship between futures contracts and spot contract to test market 
efficiency under rational expectations and risk neutrality. He found that the 
implications of market efficiency were rejected, but that the behaviour of future 
contracts could be explained by the market’s persistent belief that the Mexican peso 
might be devalued. Consistent with his explanation, the peso was devalued in August 
1976.  
Evans and Lewis (1995) describes that dollars appears to have periods of 
persistent appreciation and then depreciation, and traders in the market is likely to 
anticipate shifts between these regimes. This expectation in turn affects the behaviour 
of forward rates relative to observed spot rates. If exchange rates switch infrequently 
between different regimes, rational expectations of switches that are not realised over 
significant periods of time will result in systematic differences between the expected 
and realised exchange rate through a ‘peso problem’. They purposed that ‘peso 
problem’ can affect inferences about the risk premium in at least two ways: one is that 
it can make the foreign exchange risk premium appear to contain a permanent 
disturbance when it does not; and secondly it can bias downward the Fama (1984) 
coefficient and contribute to a higher measured risk premium. If foreign- exchange 
markets think there is some chance the exchange rate will fall, then until it actually 
does, the forward exchange rate will remain below the spot value of the exchange rate, 
since the forward rate embodies the market’s expectation. However it is also argued 
that the peso problem alone cannot explain the puzzle (Lewis 1994). The puzzle still 
exists after adjusting the coefficients and variances based on the simulated 
distribution. 
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McCallum (1994) argued that UIP relation is both more enlightening and more 
important from the perspective of economic analysis than the question of foreign 
exchange market unbiasedness. He developed an explanation for the failure of 
unbiasedness to hold that is consistent with UIP. His model takes account the effect of 
the central banks, and his policy response hypothesis is that the monetary authorities 
manage interest rate differentials so as to smooth their movements, while also resist 
rapid changes in exchange rates. For example when the home currency is tending to 
appreciate, central banks can “lean against the wind”, becoming more expansionary 
leading to a relative decrease in the interest rate. He finds his policy response 
hypothesis is attractive conceptually and is capable of explaining the negative β while 
maintaining the UIP relationship. Meredith and Ma (2002) extends McCallum (1994) 
to show how a correlation between the forward premium and shocks from risk 
premium or expectations can arise from the response of monetary policy to output and 
inflation, which are in turn affected by the exchange rate.  Using five-year simulated 
data, they find that UIP is restored over longer horizons. 
Other existing theories in financial economics have also been used to explain 
the puzzle. Term structure has brought to attention. Earlier papers that investigate the 
link between exchange rate and interest rates with term structure factor models 
include Bakshi and Chen (1997) and Bansal (1997). A Pioneering paper is Backus, 
Foresi et al. (2001), which adapts modern affine term structure theory to a multi-
economy setting. They replicated the puzzle by imposing further conditions on affine 
models: either there is a common-idiosyncratic factor structure and interest rates take 
on negative values with positive probabilities, or global factors and state variables 
have symmetric effects on state prices in different countries. A recent paper by Sarno, 
Schneider et al. (2012) developed an expression for the risk premium and employ it in 
117 
 
a prediction model resembling the Fama (1984) regression, where the time-varying 
risk premium is estimated from a multi-currency term structure model. They find their 
model is capable of producing unbiased predictions for excess return, and hence 
suggest that accounting for risk premium can be sufficient to resolve the forward bias 
puzzle without additionally requiring departures from rational expectations. Fukuta 
and Saito (2002) find that introducing liquidity effects is able to contribute to solving 
the puzzle. Suppose there is positive monetary shock, the current nominal interest 
rates decrease due to liquidity effects, whereas quantity theory of money tells us 
inflation rate will rise. As a consequence, CIP suggests that the current forward rates 
appreciate because of a lower interest rate, at the same time according to the 
purchasing power parity (PPP), the future spot rates depreciate due to higher inflation 
rate. Thus liquidity effects are able to weaken the one-to-one linkage between current 
forward rates and future spot rates, thereby offering a potential explanation for the 
action of current forward rates against the movement of future spot rates. They claim 
that the unbiased prediction of the forward discount rate is recovered to some extent 
to a theoretical manner once the liquidity effects in taken into consideration.  Coudert 
and Mignon (2013) find that the “forward bias” is somewhat alleviated by introducing 
default risk (proxied by the sovereign credit default swap spread) in the Fama 
regression. 
Researchers also adopt different econometric methodologies, statistical 
measures of the accuracy of the exchange rate forecast, and measures of the risk 
premium to either find evidence of forward rate as an unbiased predictor of spot rate, 
or to explain the forward premium anomaly. Tauchen (2001) examine the small 
sample properties of Fama’s estimator, he concluded that large deviation in β should 
not be surprising, while moderate deviations below unity are unlikely and negative 
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values for β are more unlikely. Given β turns out to be negative in many actual 
empirical work, he believes the evidence against the hypothesis of unbiased forward 
rates is effectively much stronger. McMillan (2009) use logistic smooth-transition 
model (LSTR) to examine the forward premium behaviour of 16 countries. He finds 
that only in four cases does the model support an unbiased predictor interpretation. 
For the remaining countries, results generally support the view that the larger the 
forward premium the better predictor of the future spot rates. Some suggest that the 
forward premium puzzle may be primarily a statistical artefact rather than a true 
economic puzzle. Maynard and Phillips (2001) use both semiparametric and 
parametric estimation methods to evaluate the traditional regression approaches used 
to test the forward rate unbiasedness hypothesis, including regression in levels, in 
returns and in error-correction format. They find evidence of non-stationary, long-
memory, fractionally integrated behaviour in the forward premium. They suggest that 
the principal failure of unbiasedness may be due to the difference in persistence 
between the two series. Baillie and Bollerslev (2000) also find that the forward 
premium has very persistent autocorrelation or long memory. They suggest the 
forward premium anomaly may be viewed mainly a statistical artefact from having 
small sample sizes and persistent autocorrelation in the forward premium. Kellard and 
Sarantis (2008) agreed that long memory in the forward premium contribute to the 
forward premium anomaly. They further pointed out that the fractionally integrated 
behaviour of the forward premium can be jointly explained by similar behaviour in 
the true risk premium (TRP) and the conditional variance of the spot rate. However, 
Maynard (2006) is against the view that forward premium anomaly is a statistical 
artefact, but rather a real economic puzzle. In order to provide inference robust to the 
presence of persistent conditioning variables, they use sign, covariance and 
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conditional tests, where the process of driving the forward premium is modelled as a 
near-unit roots, long-memory or structural break process. They find that a substantial 
puzzle remained even after their influence is accounted for, and forward premium 
puzzle cannot be explained as a purely statistical phenomenon. Pippenger (2011) 
argued that the standard test equation that produces the puzzle is due to two missing 
variables that covered interest parity implies should be included. He further claimed 
that those two missing variables explain the downward bias in the forward-bias puzzle 
and that the solution to the forward-bias puzzle is straightforward. However Baillie 
(2011) argue that the model that Pippenger (2011) presents has nothing to do with the 
issues surrounding Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). Furthermore, his model suffers 
from extreme misspecification and multicollinearity issues which render its OLS 
estimates to be suspicious from any testing perspective. Della Corte, Sarno et al. 
(2009) evaluate the economic value of exchange rate predictability of economic 
fundamentals. In their research, forward premium is modelled in a framework which 
allows for time-varying volatility. They use Bayesian estimation methods and 
construct combined forecasts based on Bayesian model averaging (BMA). Their 
results provide robust evidence against the random walk (no predictability) 
benchmark, and therefore reinforce the notion that exchange rates are predictable. 
They argued that the random walk hypothesis as applied to exchange rates might have 
been overstated; while at the same time justify the widespread use of forward bias and 
volatility timing strategies in the practice of currency management. Al-Zoubi (2011) 
decomposes the spot and forward rates into permanent nonlinear trend components 
and transitory stationary component. They conclude that the forward rate is poor in 
tracking spot rate movements over short horizons. However the permanent component 
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of the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the permanent component of the future 
spot rate.  
The foregoing review makes it amply clear that there has been heightened 
interest in explaining the forward premium puzzle. However, to our knowledge, 
existing literature in the topic has not engaged the time horizon pattern of the forward 
premium bias. In this chapter we investigate how exchange rates the forward premium 
puzzle behave in different time horizons. 
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3.3 Data Description 
 
We collect daily data (5 day week) on spot exchange rates and forward 
exchange rates including both developed and emerging countries for 31 economies 
from WM/Reuters, DataStream. The sample period covers from January 1990 to 
March 2013.  
There are two different quotation of an exchange rate for a currency pair in the 
foreign exchange market Direct (Price) Quotation and Indirect (Quantity) quotation. 
Direct Quotation uses a country’s domestic currency as the price currency. Exchange 
rate is measured as domestic currency per unit of the foreign currency, so that an 
increase in exchange rate implies depreciation of the domestic currency. Direct 
Quotation is used by most countries in the foreign exchange market, and US dollar is 
often the domestic currency. Indirect Quotation on the other hand, uses a country’s 
domestic countries as the unit currency, where the foreign currency is in the 
numerator and the domestic currency is in the denominator. It is not difficult to see 
that Indirect Quotation = 1 / Direct Quotation. Using Indirect Quotation, exchange 
rate increases when domestic currency appreciates. Indirect Quotation is used in 
British newspapers and is also common in Australia, New Zealand and the Eurozone. 
In research papers however, Direct Quotation is commonly used with US dollar being 
the numéraire currency. 
We use Direct Quotation in our study. In contrast with the existing literature 
where only US dollar is used as the base currency for exchange rates, in this chapter 
we examine three sets of exchange rate data using Sterling, Euro and US Dollar, each 
as numéraire currency. We mainly report the results based on Sterling as the base 
currency; however the results from the other two numéraire currencies are discussed 
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as robustness check. The spot rate is denoted as St, foreign currency per unit of home 
currency at time t. Ft, the forward rate is the exchange rate at time t, where only 
forward rate of one maturity date (1 month or 3 months forward rate in particular) is 
used in their researches, we also obtain results base on forward rates with different 
time to maturities. In order to carry out our research, our forward rates covers nine 
different time horizons: tomorrow next (one day), one week, one month, two months, 
three months, six months, nine months, one year and two years.  
Our data set contains 31 economies, 11 of which are classified as developed 
economies and the remaining 20 are emerging economies, according to the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF)'s World Economic Outlook Report
21
. We 
consider the 17 countries in the Euro Zone as one developed Economy. The European 
legacy currencies (preceding currencies of the Euro Zone) are not incorporated in the 
study. The 11 developed economies are: Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Hong Kong, 
Israel, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, Singapore, United State, and Euro Zone 
countries. The 20 emerging economies are: United Arab Emirates, Brazil, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Morocco, Mexico, 
Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan, Poland, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan and South 
Africa. Currency names and short codes are provided in Table 3.1. 
The sample of spot rates starts from beginning of January 1990 to end of March 
2013, which gives us 6066 observations. We cannot find data of exchange rate prior 
to 1990 for many emerging countries. Reason being that many emerging economies 
did not open for foreign investors until the early 90s. For example China industry 
shifted heavily to encourage and support foreign trade and investment after Chairman 
Deng Xiaoping's open market reform and his visit to one of the Special Economic 
                                                          
21 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf 
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Zones (SEZ) Shenzhen in 1992. In fact the majority of the sport rate data from 
WM/Reuters starts from December 1989. Most of the forward rates data start from 
1997, which provides 4240 observation (or 4026 observations if it starts from the end 
of October). Some of the forward rates data from the emerging economies only start 
from 2004, which give us 2351 observations. The full descriptive statistics of daily 
spot and forward exchange rates are presented in Table 3.2.  We report statistics for 
each of the 31 economies for Sterling exchange rates only. We also report the panel 
statistic of full sample, emerging economies and develop economies for Sterling, US 
and EURO exchange rates. 
Some of the forward rates, in particular the tomorrow next and the 2 years 
forward rates are not available for certain economies. Missing data is shown as NA in 
Table 3.2. For Sterling Forward rates, we don’t have BRL22, CLP, CNY, COP, MXN, 
PKR, and TWD for the tomorrow next, also we don’t have AUD, CAD, IDR, INR, 
MYR, PHP, PKR, RUR and THB for the 2 years forward rate. HUF, PKR is missing 
for the 1 year forward rate, and finally PKR is missing for the 9 months forward rate. 
For US Forward rates, 7 tomorrow next forward rates are missing for the same 
currency. IDR, INR, MYR, PHP and PKR are missing for the 2 years forward rate, 
and PKR is missing for the 1 year and 9 months forward rate. For Euro forward rates, 
again the same 7 tomorrow next forward rates are missing, we don’t have IDR, INR, 
MYR, PHP, PKR and THB for 2 years forward rates, also no 9 month forward rates 
for PKR. To sum up, out of the 31 economies, we have 24 tomorrow next, 30 nine 
months, 29 one year, and 23 two years Sterling forward rates; we have 24 tomorrow 
next, 30 nine months, 30 one year, and 25 two years for the US forward rates; we 
have 24 tomorrow next, 30 months and 25 two years for the Euro forward rates. 
                                                          
22 See Table 3.1 for Countries and Currency short codes 
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Currencies that not been mention here has the full 31 economies coverage. It is 
important to make clear the available number of economies, because later we will test 
our test equations for each forward rate individually, and see how many currencies / 
economies out of the 31 (or whatever is available) passes the test.  
Table 3.2 provides descriptive statistics of all Sterling exchanges rates for each 
country. The mean of forward rates increase as the time to maturity becomes longer 
for developed economies (except AUD). It suggests that the currencies in the 
developed economies have been expected to appreciate against Sterling.  We do not 
compare the overall mean value of the tomorrow next and 2 year forward rate because 
of the missing data. On the other hand, Table 3.2 also shows that the mean of forward 
rates for most of the emerging economies decrease as the time horizon becomes 
longer. It suggests that most of the currencies in the emerging economies have been 
expected to depreciate against Sterling, though some of the currencies remain strong, 
for example, United Arab Emirates Dirham, Chinese Yuan, Malaysian Ringgit and 
Taiwan New Dollar as in Table 3.2.  
Table 3.3 shows that daily exchange rate changes are more volatile for many 
emerging economies as we observe higher standard deviations of exchange rate 
changes in many emerging economies than developed economies. Also there is a 
greater dispersion in the exchange rate volatility of emerging economies.  
Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for the Sterling spot rate changes ΔSt, 
and forward premium Ft-St. The mean of spot rate changes and forward premium are 
close to zero, however the result of t test show that both of them are significantly 
different from zero. The standard deviation of spot rate changes is much greater than 
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the standard deviation of forward premium
23
. This is shown in Figure 3.1, where we 
plot the one month spot rate changes and forward premium in the same chart for all 
the 31 economies. The blue line is spot rate changes and the red line is the forward 
premium. The amplitude of forward premium in the graph is very small relative to 
spot rate changes, which looks like a straight line. The straighter the red line, the 
greater variance of spot rate changes than forward premium. Our statistics is 
comparable with Wang and Wang (2009). They use monthly spot exchange rates and 
30-day forward exchange rates of the US dollar vis-a`-vis the Australian dollar, the 
British pound, the Canadian dollar, the euro, the Japanese yen, and the Swiss franc in 
their study. They find that the variance of spot return is in the range of 100–200 times 
of the variance of the forward premium.  
Both the standard deviations of spot return and forward premium increase in 
longer time horizon. However the increase of variance in forward premium is greater 
than the increase if spot rate changes. As a result, in Table 3.4, the ratio of variance 
between spot rate changes and forward premium become less in longer time horizons. 
If we compare Figure 3.2 (one-year horizon) with Figure 3.1 (one-month horizon), we 
observe that the red lines are more straight in Figure 3.1; the forward premium is 
virtually static compare to the volatile spot return in the short horizon. However the 
red lines show more variation in longer time horizon as it is shown in Figure 3.2. This 
pattern is also shown in Figure 3.3, where US to Sterling spot rate changes and 
forward premium are plot in the same graph for all the 9 time horizons. Clearly the 
red line becomes more variant as the time horizon increase, which again implies that 
the variance of forward premium increase faster than the variance spot rate changes 
when the time horizon becomes longer.  
                                                          
23 The only exception is Turkish Lira (see Figure 3.4). We see an unusual slump of forward 
premium in the year 2001. 
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3.4 Methodology 
 
In this section we introduce some of the econometric methodologies and 
statistical procedures that applied in this Chapter. 
We mainly focus on the following two equations. The simple market efficiency 
hypothesis equation  
ntntnt uFS   ,      (3.8) 
and the Fama equation 
ntntntnt uSFS   )( ,,    (3.9) 
We will test these two equation using daily spot and forward exchange rates 
with three currencies as numeraire, namely US dollar, sterling, and Euro. Both 
equations are tested over 9 different horizons, one day, one week, one month, two 
month, three month, six month, nine month, one year and two year for 31 economies. 
We consider the hypothesis of α=1, β=1, and the joint test of α=1 and β=1. We 
calculate the number of rejections of these hypotheses out of the 31 economies, and 
see if the number of rejection increases as the time horizon goes forward. We will also 
investigate how α and β change in longer time horizons. 
We use cointegrating regression methods FMOLS and DOLS which are 
described as follows.  
It is well known that (Ordinary Least Squares) OLS regression involving non-
stationary series will produce misleading results. This problem dates back to Yule 
(1926) “Why Do We Sometimes Get Nonsense Correlations between Time-series?” It 
is known as spurious regression after Granger and Newbold (1974), where they 
showed that if integrated time-series data are used in regression model, a significant 
relationship are likely to be found even when the series are independent of each other. 
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They also illustrate that the regression residuals tends to be autocorrelated, as 
characterised by a high R
2
 value and a very low value of Durbin Watson (DW) 
statistics. Phillips (1986) provided an analytical explanation for the behaviour of the 
OLS coefficient estimator. He developed an asymptotic theory which showed that in a 
spurious regression, R
2
 and OLS parameter estimator converge to functionals of 
Brownian motions; the t-ratios and F-statistic diverge in distribution in larger sample; 
and the DW statistic converges in probability to zero. He proved that the 
consequences of spurious regression cannot be eliminated by increasing sample size.  
The fact that many macro time-series contains a unit root has spurred the 
development of the theory of non-stationary time-series analysis. Engle and Granger 
(1987) pointed out that a liner combination of two or more non-stationary time-series 
may be stationary. In this case non-stationary time-series are said to be cointegrated. 
In fact, if two or more series are individually integrated but some linear combination 
of them has a lower order of integration, then the series are cointegrated. The vector 
of coefficients which form such linear combination is defined as the cointegrating 
vector. The stationary linear combination is called the cointegrating equation and may 
be interpreted as a long-run equilibrium relationship among the variables.  
There are a number of methods to test the cointegrating relationship in time-
series. Engle and Granger (1987)and Phillips and Ouliaris (1990) are residual based 
tests, which are simply unit root tests applied to the residuals obtained from OLS 
estimation. The null hypothesis of nonstationarity against the alternative of 
stationarity in this unit root test corresponds to a test of the null of no cointegration 
against the alternative of cointegration. Engle and Granger (1987) is a two-step, bi-
variate single equation approach; it uses a parametric, augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) 
approach, while the Phillps-Ouliaris test uses the nonparametric Phillips and Perron 
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(1988) methodology. There is also the Johansen test which is a vector autoregression 
(VAR) based cointegration test developed in Johansen (1991), Johansen (1995). 
Compared to Engle-Granger test, this test allows more than one cointegrating 
relationship. 
 If cointegration holds, the variables share a common stochastic drift, the linear 
combination of them is stationary, and the OLS estimator is said to be super-
consistent. Also if cointegration exists, non-stationary regression methods may be 
used to estimate the cointegrating equation. The static OLS estimation of the 
cointegrating vector is consistent and converging at a faster rate than is standard. 
However Hamilton (1994) pointed out one important short coming of OLS is that the 
estimates have an asymptotic distribution that is generally non-Gaussian, exhibit 
asymptotic bias, asymmetry, and are a function of non-scalar nuisance parameters.   
OLS is generally not recommended if one wishes to conduct inference on the 
cointegrating vector. Conventional testing procedures are not valid unless modified 
substantially. 
 
  
129 
 
 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
3.5.1 Forward rate unbiasedness 
 
Before testing the market efficiency hypothesis, we carried out unit root test for 
the spot rate and each of the forward rates. Many studies have found that the spot and 
forward exchange rates for the major industrialized countries follow a unit root 
process. 
Since we are dealing with non-stationary data, we use cointegrating regression 
method to estimate. Phillips and Hansen (1990) propose an estimator which employs 
a semi-parametric correction to eliminate the problems caused by the long run 
correlation between the cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors innovations. 
The resulting Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator is asymptotically unbiased and 
has fully efficient mixture normal asymptotics allowing for standard Wald tests using 
asymptotic Chi-square statistical inference. Contrary to the nonparametric approach 
provided by Phillips and Hansen, the DOLS method proposed by Saikkonen (1991) is 
based on parametric regressions. We report the result for both FMOLS and DOLS. 
We also test for cointegration after estimating the cointegrating regression. This can 
be achieved by testing the unit root of the residual obtained from the cointegrating 
regression. If the residual series is stationary, then cointegration exists.  
We aim to see how the estimate changes with a longer time to maturity of the 
forward exchange rate. We start with the traditional approach to test the simple 
foreign market efficiency hypothesis based on the following regression.  
 
ntntnt uFS   ,  (3.10) 
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where St+n is the logarithm of the spot rate at time t+n, ; Ft,n is the logarithm of the 
forward rate at time t with n periods to maturity; α and β are coefficients; and ut+n is 
an error term. We have 9 forward exchange rates for each economy with different 
time to maturity: tomorrow next (one day), one week, one month, two months, three 
months, six months, nine months, one year and two years. Specifically the value of n 
is 1, 5, 20, 40, 60, 120, 180, 240 and 480 (days) for each period in our sample. Under 
the foreign exchange market efficiency hypothesis, the forward exchange rate can 
predict future spot rates accurately, or the forward rate is the unbiased estimate of spot 
rates. This suggests that St+n = Ft,n ; the null hypothesis of the simple test equation is α 
= 0 and β = 1 . Assuming ut+n is white noise, if we cannot reject this null, our 
evidences support the efficient market hypothesis and vice versa. For each of forward 
rates, we test for the market efficiency hypothesis, α = 0, β =1 separately and test α = 
0 and β =1 jointly. 
It is well known that the problem of Spurious Regression may arise when we 
model the long run relationship of non-stationary variables without taking 
consideration of their dynamics. Even series are unrelated, and there was no 
cointegrating relationship, the unit root in the error process led to a low Durbin 
Watson, a high R
2
, and a high significance of the coefficients. Engle and Granger 
(1987) point out, if a set of variables are cointegrated, then there exists a valid error 
correction representation of the data, and vice versa. If y and x are both I(1) and have 
a long run relationship, there must be some force which pulls the equilibrium error 
back to zero. We have found out that the spot and forward exchange rates are mostly 
I(1) in our sample. We perform ADF test of stationarity on the estimated residual 
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series ut. If ut is stationary, the variables in the test equation are cointegrated (forms a 
valid cointegration vector).  
The results of the unit root test for the natural logarithm of spot rate and forward 
rates for each economy are shown in Table 3.5. Overall the Augmented Dickey – 
Fuller (ADF) test results for each economy show that exchange rate is a non-
stationary unit root process. For most of the spot and forward exchange rates in our 
Sterling exchange rate sample, we cannot reject the unit root I(1) hypothesis. 
However there are some noticeable exceptions. For the spot rates, Brazilian Real 
(BRL), Colombian Peso (COP), Czech Koruna (CZK), Indian Rupee (INR), 
Norwegian Krone (NOK), Polish Zloty (PLZ), and Russian Rubble (RUR) are 
stationary
24
. For the forward rates, Indonesian Rupiah (IDR), Norwegian Krone 
(NOK), Pakistan Rupee (PKR) and Russian Rubble (RUR) appear to be a stationary 
process
25
.  
We estimate Equation (3.10) by both FMOLS and DOLS, and using Sterling, 
Euro and USD as numeraire currencies. Results are reported from Table 3.6.1 to 
Table 3.6.6 respectively. Before we look at the results, we test for cointegration. We 
obtain the residual series ut from both the FMOLS and DOLS estimation, then we use 
ADF test to test whether the ut has a unit root. If ut has a unit root then there is no 
cointegration relationship. On the other hand if ut is stationary then cointegration 
exists. The ADF test statistics are also reported in Table 3.6.1 to Table 3.6.6. By 
comparing the test statistics with MacKinnon (1996)’s critical values, we find the null 
hypothesis of ut has a unit root is rejected for all equations; only except some in the 2-
year forward rate, such as AED, CHF, JPY, TWD and USD. For other forward rates 
                                                          
24 However when ADF test are performed in levels (not in logarithm), only CZK and PZK spot 
rates are found to be trend stationary. 
25 Graphs of the stationary forward rates are shown in Figure 3.5 
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with time to maturity less than 2 years, ADF test results suggest that cointegrating 
relationship exists between spot rate and forward rates.  
We test for α=0, β=1 and α=0 and β=1 jointly for each of the 31 economy26, and 
we calculate the total number economies (currencies) that has been rejected by the test 
statistics in Table 3.7. For example in panel A using sterling as the base currency, the 
number of rejections for testing α=0 was only one when we use the tomorrow next (2 
days) forward rate. It rises to 3 rejections for 1 week (5 days) forward rate, then 9 
rejections for 1 month, 15 for 2 months and 17 for 3 months. The number of rejections 
for testing β=1 is exactly the same as testing α=0 for the above forward rates time 
horizons by coincident
27. The rejection number for α=0 reaches its peak at 21 when 
using 9 month forward rate. The maximum number of rejection for β=1 is 22; it 
appears from 6 months forward rates and onwards. We then move along and test α=0 
and β=1 jointly. The Wald statistics reported in the table above. The total number of 
rejections of the joint test was only when using tomorrow next forward rate, then it 
rises up to 7 using 1 week forward rate. The figure almost doubled to 13 when 1 
month forward rate is used, and it almost doubled again at 24 when the forward rate 
time to maturity increases to 2 months. The number of rejections gradually rises up to 
27 with 9 months forward rate. The rejections for the 2 years forward rates seem to 
reduce down to 22 from 27, but notice that we only have 22 economies for the 2 year 
forward rate; in fact the joint tests are rejected in all economies for the 2 year forward 
rate.  Table 3.7 summarises the number of restrictions of the same unbiased test 
equation, also use USD and EURO as numéraire currency, using both FMOLS and 
DOLS estimators. All the regression results are set out in Table 3.6.1 to 3.6.6. The 
                                                          
26 We have 31 economies for the 1 week for 6 months forward rate. We only have 24 economies 
for overnight forward rate, 30 economies for 9 months, 29 economies for 1 year and 22 
economies for 2 years. 
27 We say it is coincident because this relationship doesn’t hold when using EURO and USD 
samples, and rejecting a=0 does not necessarily imply rejecting β=1. 
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results using different numéraire currency are not exactly the same, suggesting that 
the arbitrage opportunities haven't completed been exploited. However, no matter 
which currency as numéraire and which estimator of the two we are using, we observe 
a common theme, where the number of rejections of efficient market hypothesis 
increases in longer forward exchange rate time to maturity horizon. The number of 
rejections increased rapidly when time horizon is longer than one month. Since this is 
a clear feature and the results are similar, we only focus on the results from sterling as 
numéraire currency using FMOLS estimator.  
When comparing the results between the developed and emerging economies, 
we find that although the number of rejections increases in longer time horizon for 
both economies, more developed economies pass the test than emerging economies in 
longer time horizon. Our sample consists of 11 developed economies and 20 
developing economies. As we can see in Table 3.7 panel A using sterling as an 
example, when time to maturity is 1 month, total number of rejections for the joint 
test is 13, and these rejections all come from the emerging economies, however all the 
11 developed economies in our sample pass the test. When time to maturity increase 
to 2 months, we have 24 rejections, of which 20 are from the emerging economies, 
and 4 are from the developed economies; all the developing economies expect China 
have failed the test. When time to maturity 6 months, Chinese Yuan also fail the test; 
total number of rejection is 27, the remaining 3 currencies that passed the test are all 
from the developed economies. They are Swiss Franc, Euro and Singaporean Dollar. 
We horizontally compare the estimates with different forward rates, and try to 
understand how the estimated results change as time to maturity of the forward rates 
increase. It is much straight forward to see the changes of the parameters in a graph. 
We use the results we obtained in Table 3.6.1 and make a plot of the coefficient of α 
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each economy in Figure 3.6. The values of α are on the vertical axis. The time to 
maturity is on the horizontal axis. Since we have 9 different time horizons, we will get 
9 points in each graph representing 9 different values of α for each economy. These 
points are then connected with a line. We are interested to see how α changes around 
the value of zero, because we are testing whether α=0, therefore we also add a horizon 
line, which represent the value of zero in Figure 3.6. With the values of β in Table 3.7, 
using the same method, we produce the line plot for β in Figure 3.7. For the same 
purpose, since the hypothesis is β=1, we add a horizontal line in Figure 3.7, which 
represent the value of one. We also add confidence intervals in the figure. It is not 
surprised to see the confidence interval get larger as the horizon goes forward because 
we get more rejections. Also the figures of α and β are mirror images. Because for 
equation 3.10 to hold under the condition α=0 and β =1, when β gets larger than one, 
α must go in a compensating opposite direction below zero. In other words when β 
gets larger, α must get smaller. 
In Table 3.6.1, we can see that α was very closed to zero and becomes 
significantly different from zero in longer time horizons. Most of the αs are positive 
and they get larger as the time to maturity increases. In Figure 3.6, we see that most of 
the graphs have a positive slope with positive values of α. We also observe some 
negative values of α, such as those in AUD, CAD, CHF, CNY, MAD, MYR, NZD 
and SGD. Regardless of the sign and slope of  α, we observe a general pattern of these 
graphs in Figure 3.6, the value of α gradually deviate from the zero line when time to 
maturity becomes longer.  From Figure 3.7, we also observe that β was closed to one 
but as the time horizon increases, it gradually deviate from unity. Most of the βs get 
smaller. We can observe this pattern in the mean equation at the end of Table 3.6.1, 
where we take the mean of the estimates across all 31 economies. The mean value of 
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β becomes smaller in longer time horizons. This can be observed clearly from Figure 
3.7. Most of the β coefficient curves follow a monotonic decreasing pattern starting 
from the unity line. Four currencies in the developing country, PHP, THB TWD and 
TRL had a period of increase in the value of β, although they maintain the overall 
decreasing trend because β continued to decrease after that one period of increase. 
The period of increase is from 6 month to 9 month for the three Asian countries, while 
for TRL it is from 9 month to 1 year. Only a few countries appeared to have an 
increasing trend. Their value of β deviates from one in a positive direction. They are 
AUD, CHF, and CNY, although their values of β decrease in the longer horizon. For 
AUD β decreases from the 9 month horizon, while for CHF and CHY, β decreases 
from the one year horizon. Three currencies do not have a strict increasing or 
decreasing pattern. They are CAD, NZD, SGD and MYR. Their value of β can 
become larger and smaller than one when the time horizon becomes longer. Overall, 
the statistics in Table 3.6.1 show that the deviation of β from unity increases as the 
time span of the forward rates increase. This can also be observed in Figure 3.7, for 
most of the economies, the value of β was one in the short horizon and it gradually 
deviates from one in the longer time horizon. Figure 3.6 and 3.7 give us the same 
message that the forward rate unbiasedness holds in the short horizon, but not in the 
long horizon. Forward rate gradually loses its predicting power for future spot rate as 
time horizon becomes longer. 
We find that β is less than unity for most of our sample. This is consistent with 
the finding from Froot and Thaler (1990) who review many of these regression tests, 
and conclude that the estimate β coefficient is reliably less that one. Because simple 
efficiency test rests upon two hypotheses, there are two explanations for the empirical 
rejection of the β=1 hypothesis. First, β<1 could be explained by a time-varying 
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currency risk premium such that higher interest rates imply greater risk when 
investing in assets. Alternatively, if we maintain that the currency risk is diversifiable 
or that investors are risk neutral, b<1 could be evidence of expectational errors and 
against rational expectations. Therefore the deviation of β from 1 can be interpreted as 
the combination of exceptional error and time-varying currency risk premium.  
In addition, when comparing the emerging economies with the developed 
economies, we find the both α and β drift further out from zero and one for emerging 
economies. For example Figure 3.6 shows that in most of the developed countries, the 
value of α is less than 0.5, although for HKD and JPY it gets over 2 in the two years 
horizon. For developing countries, for the two year horizon, the value of α exceeds 
two for most of the currencies. For IDR it even gets to 10. The same goes for the 
value of β. In general, β from the developed countries deviates from the unity line 
further away than the developing countries. This suggests that prediction bias is worse 
in emerging economies. Because premium comes out of risk aversion, and risk 
aversion increases over time, we argue forward rate is less an accurate predictor of the 
future spot rate because of the inability to measure the increasing risk premium in the 
longer time horizon. The prediction bias is worse in emerging economies, because it 
is less liquid in the emerging economies and hence higher the risk premium. It 
supports the view that emerging markets are less efficient than the developed market 
(Dickenson 1994, Vieito 2013). 
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3.5.2 Forward Premium Puzzle 
  
We test the equation which is extensively used to document forward premium 
puzzle. This equation can be derived by subtracting St from both sides of equation 
(3.6). 
ntntntnt uSFS   )( ,,   ( 3.11 ) 
 
This equation is also known as the Fama regression, where St+n is the logarithm 
of the spot rate at time t+n, ; Ft,n is the logarithm of the forward rate at time t with n 
periods to maturity; α and β are coefficients; and ut+n is a white noise. ntS   is the 
spot return and )( , tnt SF   is the forward premium. Under the efficient market 
hypothesis, assuming uncovered interest rate parity holds, we would again expect a 
zero constant α, and a slop coefficient β of unity. Forward premium puzzle refers to 
the fact that empirical evidence doesn’t support the efficient market hypothesis, that 
forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the future spot rate. Moreover, we often 
observe negative slope-coefficient β in the Fama regression. 
Many studies have confirmed that the spot and forward exchange rates for the 
major industrialized countries follow a unit root process, implying a stationary spot 
return and forward premium. However, although the short-memory stationarity of the 
forward premium was taken for granted, the current evidence from unit root and 
cointegration tests appears to lead to conflicting conclusions. As discussed in 
(Maynard and Phillips 2001), Fama (1984) failed to reject unit roots in several 
forward series. Using KPSS test, he is also able to reject stationarity in both of his 
data set. However, this conclusion appears to contrast sharply with evidence from 
similar tests conducted by Tauchen (2001), Horvath and Watson (1995) and Engel 
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(1996).  Our ADF test for spot return and forward premium are presented in Table 3.9 
and Table 3.10.  
Table 3.8 shows that the hypothesis of a unit root in spot returns in all horizons 
are rejected in all the three specifications of the ADF test; with trend and constant, 
and with constant only. Our results confirm that spot return is a stationary process. 
However the results of ADF test for forward premium varies. Table 3.9 shows in the 
short horizons, one month and under in particular, forward premium are stationary. In 
horizons longer than three months, forward premium of many currencies have a unit 
root. In the developed economies, 6 out of 11 in our sample follows an I(1) process in 
longer horizons. They are AUD, CHF, XEU, JPY NOK and USD. In the emerging 
economies on the other hand, 7 out of 20 are found to have a unit root. They are AED, 
CLP, CNY, MAD, MXN, MYR, PKR and ZAR.  
Because the stationary of forward premium varies across countries and time 
horizons, we use OLS, FMOLS and DOLS estimators in the Fama equation 
depending on the situation. The reason is that when spot return and forward premium 
are both stationary, it is unnecessary to apply cointegrating estimation. In this case, 
we use the OLS estimator. However, when the spot return is stationary and the 
forward premium has a unit root, if we continue to use the OLS estimator, the 
resulting regression will be a spurious regression. In this case we must apply 
cointegrating estimation, namely, FMOLS or DOLS.  The ADF unit root test result 
for forward premium is presented in Table 3.9. Using the result in Table 3.9, for each 
time horizon and each currency, we use OLS estimator when the forward premium is 
stationary, and FMOLS and DOLS estimator when the forward premium has a unit 
root. The estimated results of the Fama equations for sterling exchange rate are shown 
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in Table 3.10.1 and Table 3.10.2. Estimated results for Euro and USD are not reported 
due to the length of the table, and also because it yields similar results and patterns. 
The presence of forward premium still prevails with the sterling exchange. We 
can see in Table 3.10.1, the R squares of the Fama equation is very low, many 
coefficient of β are negative. These are two of the most distinct feature in forward 
premium puzzle. A negative β implies that domestic currency will appreciate when 
the domestic interest rate is higher which is contradicting to the UIP theory. We 
observe a negative β even in the shortest time horizon – one day. 7 out of the 11 
developed countries’ β is negative even on the one day horizon. Out of the 13 
developing countries, which has data on one day forward rate, 6 of them has a 
negative beta on the one day horizon. Only 4 currencies have positive β across all 
time horizons. They are CZK, HUF, MYR and TWD, which are all from the 
developing countries. We cannot say that the evidence of forward premium puzzle is 
less in the developing countries, because only 4 out of 21 developing countries can 
produce a positive β, and we have less developed countries than developing countries 
in the sample. However, even those 4 countries can produce a positive β, their 
estimating equation still has a very low R squares, which indicates the presence of the 
forward premium puzzle.   
We produce the same plot of coefficient of α and β as we did when testing 
forward rate unbiasedness. In Figure 3.9, quite often we see the line plot of β go under 
the zero line, showing negative values of β. Compare Figure 3.9 with Figure 3.7, in 
Figure 3.7 β starts from one in the short horizon, and it gradually deviates from one in 
the long horizon, implying forward rate gradually loses its predicting power in the 
longer horizon. However we do not observe this pattern in Figure 3.9. The behaviour 
of β in Figure 3.7 is rather radical compared to Figure 3.7. The value of β doesn’t start 
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from the unity line. As the time horizon becomes longer, β fluctuates, while in Figure 
3.7, β often monotonically decreases. Another evidence for the premium puzzle is that 
often  the confidence interval of β becomes more precise in the longer time horizons. 
We can see that in Figure 3.9 the distance between β+, β and β- becoming smaller as 
the time horizon increases. This is opposite to what we observe in Figure 3.7 for the 
efficiency market testing equation, where the distance β+, β and β- become larger in 
the longer time horizons. Also α and β are no longer mirroring each other in Figure 
3.8 and Figure 3.9. 
Does the severity forward premium puzzle change in longer time horizon? 
According to To (2007) there are two possible explanations. Time-varying risk 
premium explanation suggests that the longer the time horizon of holding a financial 
asset, the higher the risk associated due to more expected changes in the market. A 
one year forward rate carries more uncertainty and risks than a one-month forward 
rate, therefore we would expect a higher risk premium in the one year forward rate. 
Thus the puzzle should be more severe or the β coefficient should be more negative 
using forward rates of longer maturity. Conversely, systematic forecast error 
explanation implies that bias of the forward rate is reduced over time. Over a learning 
period after a shift in the regime, market participants will rationally update their 
information, adjusting the spot rate in accordance to the new underlying permanent 
distribution. Assuming investors in the markets are rational, we would expect peso 
problem to result in the eventual realization of market expectations. A longer maturity 
forward rate allows these processes to materialize, reducing the bias. This explanation 
suggests that β coefficient should be less negative using forward rates of longer 
maturity. 
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We cannot see evidence for either side of the argument in our result. The only 
currency out of the 31 countries that has a clear increasing trend in β is HUF, but for 
the most part, the value of β fluctuates.  We cannot say whether the phenomenon of 
forward premium puzzle improves or worsens when time horizon gets longer, because 
the changing path of β is erratic and unpredictable. Our finding does not support To 
(2007) where they find that the longer the maturity of the forward contracts, the less 
negative the β coefficient is.  
Table 3.13 summarises the number of rejections in different time horizons using 
Sterling, USD and the Euro exchange rate sample. Numbers in each row of the table 
represents the number of restrictions of Fama equation for the hypothesis α=0, β=1, 
and the joint test α=0 and β=1 respectively, We still see a gradual increase of 
rejections for the test α=0, however if we look at the number of rejections for the joint 
test α=0 and β=1, the majority of the currencies are rejected even in the short horizon 
– one week. The phenomenon of premium puzzle still presents in both short and long 
horizons. 
Our main findings are, market is efficient in the short horizon, typically within a 
one month period, but inefficient in the long horizon; forward premium puzzle 
presents in the short horizon and it persists in the long horizon. We also find that 
emerging markets are less efficient than the developed market. This motivates us for 
our future research. We are interested to find out what differences between the 
developed and developing countries are the key factors influencing their level of 
market efficiency. It could be the level of capital control, the reliance on trade, or the 
level of liquidity. We could use different measures of capital control, or liquidity to 
see how sensitive the market efficiency is to the change of these measures, and see 
how the sensitivity changes in longer time horizons. The focus of this chapter 
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however is to find out the commonality in these countries. We are also interested to 
look at the dynamics of the forward premium in different time horizons. On the basis 
of our result, we conject that the forward premium for short forecast horizons are 
likely to be stationary, whereas, for longer forecast horizons, they are likely to be 
nonstationary, making it much harder to forecast.  
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3.6 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter we examine two important anomalies in international finance and 
economics; the forward rate biasedness and forward premium puzzle. The forward 
rate biasedness is the rejection of the joint hypothesis a zero intercept and a unity 
slope coefficient in the regression of the natural logarithm of spot exchange rate on 
forward exchange rate. Thus it rejects the implication from the efficient market 
hypothesis, that the forward rate is an unbiased predictor of the corresponding 
expected future spot rate under the assumptions of risk neutrality and rational 
expectations. The forward premium puzzle refers to the regression of the spot rate 
return on the forward premium, which should also yield a slope coefficient of unity, 
however, the slope coefficient has been typically reported a negative figure 
throughout literature. Its implication is counterintuitive – high interest rate currencies 
are expected to depreciate. This is contrary to what uncovered interest rate parity 
predicts. 
Prior literatures often use currencies in developed economies to USD exchange 
rate as their sample.  We contribute to the literature by using a much large sample 
from both developed and emerging economy at a daily frequency from 1990 to 2013. 
Our sample consists of 11 currencies from the developed economy and 21 currencies 
from the emerging economy. This sample covers currencies not only to USD, but also 
GBP (Sterling) and Euro exchange rates. The main contribution of this chapter is we 
suggest a new way to examine the anomalies by looking at the time horizon pattern of 
the forward rate bias. Previous literatures only use a single time horizon, usually one 
month or three months in particular to carry out their research. In this study, we 
obtained forward rates cover 9 time horizons: 1 day, 1week, 1 month, 2 months, 3 
144 
 
months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year and 2 years. We use ADF Unit Root test, along 
with FMOLS and DOLS estimators to test and model the cointegrating relationship 
between forward and spot exchange rates.  
Comparing developed economies with emerging economies, we find the 
exchange rates changes are more volatile in the emerging economies, and also there is 
greater dispersion in the exchange rate volatility of emerging economies.  The 
variance of the spot return is much greater than the variance of the forward premium. 
The variances of the spot return and forward premium increase in longer time 
horizons. The ratio of the spot return to forward premium variance decreases when the 
time horizon becomes longer, implying the variance of forward premium increase at a 
larger scale compare to the variance of the spot return.  
We compare the results from 3 different currencies as numeraire, namely US 
dollar, Sterling and Euro. We see slightly different results. This could be a rejection of 
market efficiency, or it could be some arbitrage opportunities haven't completed been 
exploited due to different transaction cost. 
We find that forward rate unbiasedness holds in the short horizon but not in the 
longer horizon. Forward rate started to lose its predictive power when the time to 
maturity is longer than a month. When comparing emerging economies with 
developed economies, we find that the predicting bias is worse in emerging 
economies, because emerging economies are less liquid and have higher risk premium. 
Forward premium puzzle prevails in both short horizons and long horizons, and it 
does not seem to disappear over long horizon.  
It is recognized in the literature that risk premium is not constant but time 
variant, and risk premium increase over time. We find the forward rate’s prediction 
worsen in longer horizons. This could be the inability to measure the increasing risk 
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premium as time goes forward. Diminishing prediction accuracy of forward rate is a 
common feature in our selection of countries; whether it’s a liquid or less liquid 
market, strict capital controlled or open free market, large or small economies, 
developed or developing economies, they all have the same pattern. In a way the 
exchange rate resembles the liquidity of the term structure, the longer the time horizon 
the greater the risk premium, which makes the forward rate even more difficult to 
predict the future spot rate. 
 
As a practical matter, knowing whether the market is efficient is very important 
for policy makers of any country. If a foreign exchange market is inefficient, the 
ability of government authorities to influence the movement of exchange rates is 
restricted as the exchange rates are not predictable. The government cannot make 
informed decisions on exchange rates, and take actions to intervene the market, such 
as borrowing foreign currency or changing the interest rate. An efficient foreign 
exchange market on other hand is typically favourable for mercantilist countries that 
are reliant on trade, because it is essential for policy makers to predict the exchange 
rate movement and to facilitate international trade and the inflow of foreign 
investments.  
The information of market efficiency is also important for participants in the 
foreign exchange market such as investors and multinational firms. When the market 
if efficient, they can make profit and protect their investment because the exchange 
rates behave in a predictable manner. However if the market is inefficient, investors 
cannot devise various trading rules or techniques to make abnormal profits from 
transactions in the foreign exchange market, and they cannot gain from any hedging 
policies to avoid the effects of exchange rate risks. Our results suggest that the market 
is efficient in the short run but not in the long run. Forward rates started to lose its 
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predictive power when the time to maturity is longer than a month. This gives an 
important message to policy makers and investors. Horizons of the forward rate and 
timing of transactions should be considered as important factors in decision making. 
Decisions should be made based on the prediction of exchange rate movement within 
a one month period. Predictions made for longer horizons are not reliable. 
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Appendix       
 
Table 3.1  Country and currency short codes 
 
 
Currency Code Name of Currency Country 
AED  United Arab Emirates Dirham  United Arab Emirates 
AUD  Australian Dollar  Australia 
BRL  Brazilian Real  Brazil 
CAD  Canadian Dollar  Canada 
CHF  Swiss Franc  Switzerland 
CLP  Chilean Peso  Chile 
CNY  Chinese Yuan  China 
COP  Colombian Peso  Colombia 
CZK  Czech Koruna  Czech Republic 
XEU  Euro  Euro Zone 
GBP  British Pound United Kingdom 
HKD  Hong Kong Dollar Hong Kong 
HUF  Hungarian Forint  Hungary 
IDR  Indonesian Rupiah  Indonesia 
ILS  Israelite Shekel Israel 
INR  Indian Rupee India 
JPY  Japanese Yan  Japan 
MAD  Moroccan Dirham  Morocco 
MXN  Mexican Peso  Mexico 
MYR  Malaysian Ringgit  Malaysia 
NOK  Norwegian Krone  Norway 
NZD  New Zealand Dollar  New Zealand 
PHP  Philippine Peso  Philippines 
PKR  Pakistan Rupee  Pakistan 
PLZ  Polish Zloty  Poland 
RUR  Russian Rubble  Russia 
SGD  Singaporean Dollar Singapore 
THB  Thai Baht  Thailand 
TRL  Turkish Lira  Turkey 
TWD  Taiwan New Dollar  Taiwan 
USD  US Dollar  United States 
ZAR  South African Rand  South Africa 
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Table 3.2  Descriptive statistics of daily spot and forward Sterling exchange rates 
 
 
 SP TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD          
Mean  2.2559  2.2874  2.2879  2.2824  2.2841  2.2857  2.2905  2.3043  2.3009  NA 
Std dev  0.3582  0.4220  0.4214  0.4105  0.4087  0.4069  0.4017  0.4052  0.3921  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  0 
CAD          
Mean  2.0881  2.0831  2.0827  2.0893  2.0874  2.0856  2.0802  2.0689  2.0710  NA 
Std dev  0.2672  0.3156  0.3152  0.3082  0.3069  0.3056  0.3018  0.3046  0.2950  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  0 
CHF          
Mean  2.1560  2.1130  2.1116  2.1203  2.1149  2.1096  2.0938  2.0676  2.0638  1.8318 
Std dev  0.3486  0.3784  0.3776  0.3704  0.3677  0.3652  0.3578  0.3566  0.3446  0.3270 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
XEU          
Mean  1.3787  1.4027  1.4023  1.4029  1.4012  1.3995  1.3945  1.3883  1.3847  1.2764 
Std dev  0.1518  0.1710  0.1707  0.1663  0.1655  0.1647  0.1623  0.1638  0.1578  0.1250 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
HKD          
Mean  12.8759  12.9589  12.9551  12.9295  12.9181  12.9079  12.8816  12.8739  12.8436  13.1786 
Std dev  1.2527  1.3249  1.3227  1.2852  1.2769  1.2691  1.2471  1.2584  1.2140  1.2188 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
ILS          
Mean  6.0455  6.9504  6.9503  6.9498  6.9488  6.9479  6.9456  6.9465  6.9478  6.9822 
Std dev  1.3956  1.1060  1.1049  1.1022  1.0995  1.0972  1.0908  1.0868  1.0826  1.0842 
N  6066  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351 
JPY          
Mean  184.4128  179.3534  179.1837  179.4890  178.8677  178.2506  176.4036  173.9672  172.7716  162.8856 
Std dev  36.6938  33.7394  33.6447  32.7273  32.3986  32.0771  31.1399  30.9161  29.4620  33.1065 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
NOK          
Mean  11.1409  11.3122  11.3127  11.3223  11.3223  11.3223  11.3209  11.3226  11.3177  10.4757 
Std dev  1.2537  1.4422  1.4412  1.4078  1.4038  1.4000  1.3892  1.4094  1.3702  1.0023 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
NZD          
Mean  2.7267  2.7250  2.7260  2.7133  2.7167  2.7201  2.7303  2.7573  2.7513  2.5507 
Std dev  0.4296  0.4607  0.4604  0.4533  0.4524  0.4516  0.4493  0.4526  0.4450  0.3454 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
SGD          
Mean  2.6050  2.6095  2.6082  2.5930  2.5883  2.5837  2.5699  2.5687  2.5439  2.4464 
Std dev  0.3777  0.3701  0.3693  0.3620  0.3596  0.3573  0.3508  0.3493  0.3390  0.3915 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
USD          
Mean  1.6577  1.6662  1.6658  1.6630  1.6616  1.6603  1.6564  1.6544  1.6492  1.7086 
Std dev  0.1595  0.1693  0.1692  0.1648  0.1643  0.1639  0.1626  0.1652  0.1603  0.1618 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
AED          
Mean  6.0879  6.1198  6.1183  6.1075  6.1021  6.0969  6.0814  6.0733  6.0535  6.2668 
Std dev  0.5855  0.6219  0.6208  0.6031  0.5996  0.5962  0.5870  0.5934  0.5721  0.5678 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
BRL          
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Mean  2.5689  NA  3.5765  3.5957  3.6196  3.6439  3.7154  3.7764  3.8617  4.1720 
Std dev  1.6157  NA  0.8196  0.8281  0.8391  0.8501  0.8843  0.8998  0.9544  1.1033 
N  6066  0  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351 
CLP          
Mean  817.4939  NA  915.2716  915.7017  916.1646  916.6920  918.2406  919.8969  921.9700  935.6144 
Std dev  177.7416  NA  128.1060  127.1324  125.9490  124.8433  121.6201  118.6665  116.0029  105.9258 
N  6066  0  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351 
CNY          
Mean  12.1986  NA  12.6941  12.6679  12.6312  12.5931  12.4753  12.3619  12.2506  11.7878 
Std dev  2.1060  NA  2.1077  2.0808  2.0464  2.0123  1.9192  1.8362  1.7581  1.6843 
N  6066  0  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2351 
COP          
Mean  2779.2325  NA  3636.6610  3641.8497  3649.8646  3658.8342  3687.3401  3717.6715  3750.4752  3886.9708 
Std dev  1237.1979  NA  679.2436  679.5075  680.6536  682.9452  690.9893  698.9671  708.6841  730.6806 
N  6066  0  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351 
CZK          
Mean  43.2364  42.6486  42.6482  43.0849  43.0986  43.1102  43.1362  42.6170  43.1779  34.5784 
Std dev  9.4249  10.4521  10.4600  10.4283  10.4723  10.5139  10.6437  10.7465  10.9104  5.8685 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
HUF          
Mean  299.1596  362.7318  363.1883  364.4657  366.0245  367.5169  371.7745  375.7027  NA  371.3328 
Std dev  99.7239  35.2453  35.2908  35.4540  35.6910  35.9445  36.7563  37.5400  NA  26.3459 
N  6066  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  0  2351 
IDR          
Mean  11339.3332  15256.9296  15276.9303  14788.3415  14872.4544  14965.7130  15217.1043  16015.9548  15691.6271  NA 
Std dev  5890.2031  2322.7691  2328.4433  3334.7444  3370.7809  3412.8595  3571.9522  2843.4256  3963.6941  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  0 
INR          
Mean  66.2678  75.8674  75.9239  76.0661  76.2423  76.4099  76.8850  77.3298  77.7572  NA 
Std dev  15.3510  6.6336  6.6336  6.6357  6.6290  6.6197  6.5832  6.5553  6.5455  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  4026  0 
MAD          
Mean  14.8510  14.5320  14.5377  14.5566  14.5816  14.6080  14.6890  14.7794  14.8772  15.3243 
Std dev  1.3561  1.5565  1.5503  1.5320  1.5088  1.4859  1.4183  1.3548  1.2945  1.1182 
N  6066  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351 
MXN          
Mean  14.6438  NA  18.3186  18.1164  18.2100  18.3031  18.5874  19.1180  19.1573  21.9423 
Std dev  5.9626  NA  2.9394  3.0782  3.0444  3.0118  2.9197  2.7053  2.7868  1.0940 
N  6066  0  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
MYR          
Mean  5.9584  5.9585  5.9580  5.9562  5.9536  5.9509  5.9421  5.9334  5.9243  NA 
Std dev  0.9034  0.9039  0.9012  0.8939  0.8852  0.8770  0.8541  0.8338  0.8157  NA 
N  2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  2413  0 
PHP          
Mean  66.6098  78.8312  78.8874  77.3984  77.6164  77.8327  78.5235  80.8818  79.9244  NA 
Std dev  20.4290  13.2385  13.2302  14.7740  14.7499  14.7337  14.7194  13.1232  14.8220  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  0 
PKR          
Mean  88.7533  NA  126.3309  126.8185  127.4343  128.0547  129.9902  NA  NA  NA 
Std dev  35.1497  NA  14.7431  15.0448  15.4023  15.7367  16.7163  NA  NA  NA 
N  6066  0  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  0  0  0 
PLZ          
Mean  4.7978  5.4483  5.4507  5.4571  5.4648  5.4719  5.4918  5.5097  5.5261  5.3625 
Std dev  1.4900  0.7567  0.7568  0.7571  0.7576  0.7581  0.7600  0.7617  0.7637  0.6443 
N  6066  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2906  2351 
150 
 
RUR          
Mean  35.8236  49.1937  49.2323  49.3491  49.4902  49.6337  50.0649  50.4868  50.9431  NA 
Std dev  18.7998  2.5994  2.5596  2.4744  2.4104  2.3859  2.4659  2.6486  2.9235  NA 
N  5276  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  2351  0 
THB          
Mean  55.4154  62.1483  62.1600  61.4575  61.5061  61.5531  61.6637  62.4323  61.8783  NA 
Std dev  12.1852  8.8723  8.8693  9.3474  9.3245  9.3134  9.2921  8.8773  9.3534  NA 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  0 
TRL          
Mean  1.4121  2.0462  2.0543  1.9849  2.0132  2.0418  2.1327  2.3286  2.3337  3.0787 
Std dev  1.1581  0.8255  0.8260  0.9011  0.9054  0.9100  0.9282  0.8737  0.9826  0.3223 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
TWD          
Mean  50.4485  NA  53.8193  53.3386  53.2452  53.1507  52.8719  52.9845  52.3529  52.6184 
Std dev  7.1479  NA  5.9559  6.0196  5.9503  5.8817  5.7008  5.4250  5.3976  4.9735 
N  6066  0  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
ZAR          
Mean  10.0013  12.2541  12.2716  12.0758  12.1345  12.1919  12.3610  12.7719  12.6916  13.9584 
Std dev  3.5904  1.9562  1.9591  2.1904  2.2012  2.2128  2.2506  2.0797  2.3285  1.7390 
N  6066  4026  4026  4240  4240  4240  4240  4026  4240  2351 
 
 
Statistics of exchange rates in levels. N is the number of observations. 
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Table 3.3  Summary statistics of Sterling exchange rate daily changes 
 
 SP TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Developed 
Economies          
AUD          
Mean -0.7152 -2.4843 -2.4778 -1.6610 -1.6438 -1.6292 -1.5825 -2.2586 -1.4855  NA 
Std dev  11.9594  11.8665  11.8660  11.8565  11.8627  11.8488  11.7889  11.7657  11.6951  NA 
CAD          
Mean -0.2857 -2.0990 -2.0933 -2.0320 -2.0136 -1.9943 -1.9399 -1.9244 -1.8358  NA 
Std dev  10.1631  9.9861  9.9869  9.9442  9.9396  9.9291  9.8972  9.9083  9.8180  NA 
CHF          
Mean -1.8808 -2.8224 -2.8153 -2.3373 -2.3188 -2.2974 -2.2361 -2.6153 -2.1120 -4.0558 
Std dev  9.5014  9.8525  9.8558  9.9287  9.9252  9.9265  9.9169  9.8261  9.8666  10.6187 
XEU          
Mean -0.2737 -1.0977 -1.0944 -0.5438 -0.5356 -0.5268 -0.4955 -0.9966 -0.4271 -1.7905 
Std dev  7.7427  7.9661  7.9651  8.0434  8.0334  8.0256  8.0021  7.9015  7.9323  7.9476 
HKD          
Mean  0.1888 -0.0861 -0.1137 -0.2643 -0.2613 -0.2567 -0.2429 -0.3138 -0.2151 -0.8230 
Std dev  9.5370  9.2449  9.2345  9.2150  9.2187  9.2395  9.2772  9.2689  9.3344  9.8413 
ILS          
Mean  3.1022 -3.7984 -3.7943 -3.7885 -3.7829 -3.7751 -3.7508 -3.7373 -3.7077 -3.6582 
Std dev  11.2956  10.8243  10.8253  10.8198  10.8113  10.7979  10.7457  10.7395  10.7585  11.0031 
JPY          
Mean -1.2725 -1.3492 -1.3402 -1.1147 -1.0876 -1.0591 -0.9725 -1.0488 -0.8057 -1.4828 
Std dev  12.8344  13.5006  13.5007  13.4954  13.4961  13.4892  13.4718  13.4444  13.3924  13.8272 
NOK          
Mean -0.3592 -1.3324 -1.3248 -0.7628 -0.7438 -0.7248 -0.6661 -1.1348 -0.5495 -2.5635 
Std dev  9.1953  9.8514  9.8559  10.0246  10.0219  10.0089  9.9789  9.7707  9.9365  10.4230 
NZD          
Mean -1.0184 -1.6994 -1.6967 -1.0189 -1.0101 -1.0025 -0.9743 -1.6044 -0.9089 -3.6414 
Std dev  11.7883  12.1883  12.1966  12.1111  12.1289  12.1426  12.1496  12.2510  12.1625  12.0918 
SGD          
Mean -1.6609 -1.6915 -1.6955 -1.0180 -1.0007 -0.9825 -0.9356 -1.7626 -0.8548 -4.2794 
Std dev  9.0226  8.9418  8.9622  9.1306  9.1887  9.2363  9.2996  9.1982  9.3123  8.6245 
USD          
Mean  0.2072 -0.1095 -0.1077 -0.2838 -0.2814 -0.2782 -0.2673 -0.0542 -0.2428 -0.8299 
Std dev  9.4992  9.2844  9.2825  9.2448  9.2298  9.2213  9.1788  9.1650  9.0808  9.9373 
Emerging 
Economies          
AED          
Mean  0.2569 -0.1088 -0.1071 -0.2834 -0.2804 -0.2776 -0.2677 -0.0521 -0.2409 -0.8355 
Std dev  9.8651  9.2859  9.2834  9.2450  9.2403  9.2326  9.1917  9.1831  9.1389  10.0025 
BRL          
Mean  60.4825  NA -4.9494 -4.9025 -4.8393 -4.7453 -4.4789 -4.1808 -3.8864 -2.5567 
Std dev  38.5592  NA  15.0768  15.0712  15.0832  15.1406  15.2580  15.5610  15.8863  18.3102 
CLP          
Mean  2.7607  NA -4.1396 -4.0835 -4.0133 -3.9364 -3.7263 -3.5260 -3.3389 -2.7400 
Std dev  12.6734  NA  12.2711  12.2639  12.2624  12.2664  12.2094  12.1588  12.1329  12.1298 
CNY          
Mean  1.8442  NA -1.4698 -1.4595 -1.4363 -1.4141 -1.3456 -1.2883 -1.2354 -2.7083 
Std dev  14.3464  NA  9.8005  9.7412  9.6921  9.6620  9.6581  9.6685  9.6712  11.1842 
COP          
Mean  7.0472  NA -5.2868 -5.2686 -5.2776 -5.2911 -5.3341 -5.3798 -5.4264 -5.6297 
Std dev  14.6707  NA  13.4817  13.5776  13.5671  13.5488  13.5196  13.4770  13.4874  13.7027 
CZK          
Mean  2.4143 -3.3131 -3.3236 -2.0132 -2.0589 -2.0903 -2.1682 -3.7093 -2.3150 -4.3444 
152 
 
Std dev  16.7477  10.3603  10.3556  11.1234  10.9638  10.9375  11.0020  10.4404  10.9167  10.7035 
HUF          
Mean  6.1326  1.3395  1.3263  1.2833  1.2468  1.2065  1.1096  0.9744  NA  0.0675 
Std dev  11.8232  11.7466  11.7430  11.7523  11.7626  11.8203  12.0377  11.8349  NA  14.1462 
IDR          
Mean  9.6815  9.3835  9.4063  11.4895  11.5782  11.6950  11.9420  9.4967  12.6484  NA 
Std dev  23.3937  26.6244  26.7075  26.9677  27.3450  27.8539  28.8062  28.2728  32.0229  NA 
INR          
Mean  5.4613  2.5218  2.5383  2.5727  2.6195  2.6660  2.7947  2.9165  3.0353  NA 
Std dev  11.2327  9.5182  9.5557  9.5467  9.5570  9.5979  9.6835  9.8351  9.9857  NA 
MAD          
Mean  0.9723 -2.1582 -2.1531 -2.1256 -2.1175 -2.0845 -1.9683 -1.9199 -1.7749 -1.2015 
Std dev  13.3161  7.7385  7.7315  7.7196  7.7297  7.7218  7.7476  7.8070  8.0603  9.0571 
MXN          
Mean  7.6125  NA  2.9546  2.7565  2.6980  2.6461  2.4958  2.6824  2.3064  0.2029 
Std dev  16.3991  NA  12.6277  12.7510  12.8930  13.0587  13.4673  13.7111  14.5771  12.4043 
MYR          
Mean -3.4293 -3.4301 -3.4241 -3.4068 -3.3898 -3.3726 -3.3189 -3.2711 -3.2243  NA 
Std dev  10.2705  10.2701  10.2717  10.2644  10.2417  10.2184  10.1667  10.1462  10.1273  NA 
PHP          
Mean  3.3753  1.0860  1.0740  2.7433  2.7389  2.7282  2.6966  0.5485  2.6381  NA 
Std dev  13.0431  11.6811  11.6983  12.5336  12.6444  12.7235  12.9442  12.1666  13.1624  NA 
PKR          
Mean  7.3990  NA  4.6205  4.7032  4.8042  4.9148  5.2281  NA  NA  NA 
Std dev  14.1795  NA  11.0879  11.0760  11.0500  11.1167  11.1607  NA  NA  NA 
PLZ          
Mean  7.7492 -0.9338 -0.9420 -0.9605 -0.9963 -1.0212 -1.0901 -1.1368 -1.1779 -2.9051 
Std dev  15.4482  12.0157  12.0182  12.0179  12.0103  12.0106  11.9971  12.0229  12.0037  12.9330 
RUR          
Mean  25.0940 -0.4834 -0.4616 -0.3676 -0.2370 -0.1094  0.2487  0.4596  0.6175  NA 
Std dev  28.9006  10.0298  10.0409  10.2615  10.8048  11.2839  12.5007  12.4944  12.7530  NA 
THB          
Mean  1.1256 -1.5755 -1.5661  0.9465  0.9768  1.0175  1.1229 -1.3105  1.3137  NA 
Std dev  11.9744  12.1255  12.1632  13.0136  13.2642  13.5938  14.3897  14.6957  15.6690  NA 
TRL          
Mean  30.2524  17.4801  17.4731  19.6434  19.8044  19.9548  20.7280  20.1897  23.5708  1.1002 
Std dev  20.2651  31.2016  31.9509  33.1806  36.0338  38.4987  47.3856  58.7520  67.4840  17.2280 
TWD          
Mean  0.8399  NA -0.2168  0.2703  0.2761  0.2811  0.2898 -0.1594  0.2983 -1.0880 
Std dev  10.1641  NA  9.5884  9.7838  9.8505  9.9142  10.0136  9.9780  10.0819  9.5282 
ZAR          
Mean  6.2320  4.9315  4.9161  4.6119  4.5842  4.5473  4.4783  4.8184  4.3768  3.3574 
Std dev  14.0125  15.8741  15.8847  15.6606  15.6886  15.6877  15.8313  16.1688  16.0015  15.7550 
The table presents summary statistics of the daily observations of daily Sterling exchange rates changes. Mean 
and standard deviations are annualized by 260 trading days (multiplied by 260 × 100 and √260 × 100). 
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Table 3.4: Sterling Spot return and forward premium 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Developed 
Economies         
AUD         
Mean DSP -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0012** -0.0025** -0.0037** -0.0072** -0.0114** -0.0161** -0.0340** 
Mean FP -0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0010**  0.0019**  0.0028**  0.0055**  0.0092**  0.0110**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0106  0.0166  0.0329  0.0451  0.0531  0.0702  0.0843  0.0934  0.1262 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0004  0.0016  0.0030  0.0045  0.0088  0.0126  0.0172  NA 
Var DSP/FP  2125.6318  1667.7862  419.7792  219.6769  139.0464  63.0415  44.8581  29.4908  NA 
CAD         
Mean DSP -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0007** -0.0016** -0.0023** -0.0043** -0.0074** -0.0110** -0.0222** 
Mean FP  0.0000** -0.0002** -0.0008** -0.0017** -0.0025** -0.0048** -0.0061** -0.0088**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0091  0.0143  0.0281  0.0377  0.0451  0.0652  0.0756  0.0800  0.0971 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0003  0.0011  0.0019  0.0028  0.0055  0.0073  0.0103  NA 
Var DSP/FP  1327.1526  2114.7981  707.0754  384.2984  256.5529  142.2195  107.4400  60.2401  NA 
CHF         
Mean DSP -0.0002** -0.0005** -0.0019** -0.0038** -0.0055** -0.0104** -0.0156** -0.0209** -0.0469** 
Mean FP  0.0001** -0.0005** -0.0025** -0.0049** -0.0072** -0.0143** -0.0202** -0.0278*** -0.0418*** 
Std DSP  0.0084  0.0132  0.0251  0.0356  0.0446  0.0650  0.0782  0.0933  0.1390 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0004  0.0014  0.0027  0.0039  0.0076  0.0105  0.0142  0.0207 
Var DSP/FP  1860.4447  1377.1579  319.1358  175.6566  127.5129  73.3972  55.1971  43.4366  45.0741 
XEU         
Mean DSP -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0005** -0.0011** -0.0016** -0.0026** -0.0039** -0.0053** -0.0141** 
Mean FP  0.0000** -0.0003** -0.0012** -0.0023** -0.0034** -0.0068** -0.0097** -0.0136** -0.0190** 
Std DSP  0.0068  0.0105  0.0201  0.0286  0.0347  0.0497  0.0600  0.0706  0.1031 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0002  0.0009  0.0018  0.0027  0.0052  0.0076  0.0101  0.0166 
Var DSP/FP  2793.5556  1951.6730  472.3386  256.4276  170.9351  90.3956  62.0769  48.8625  38.5865 
HKD         
Mean DSP -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0006** -0.0008** -0.0012** -0.0027** -0.0049** -0.0097** 
Mean FP  0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0009** -0.0017** -0.0025** -0.0044** -0.0061** -0.0071** -0.0202** 
Std DSP  0.0086  0.0136  0.0274  0.0397  0.0491  0.0724  0.0844  0.0920  0.1211 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0003  0.0015  0.0028  0.0041  0.0082  0.0126  0.0166  0.0186 
Var DSP/FP  3970.1533  1541.1019  331.6449  206.0281  145.4116  77.3321  44.8925  30.8604  42.1906 
ILS         
Mean DSP  0.0002**  0.0005**  0.0018**  0.0037**  0.0057**  0.0119**  0.0173**  0.0221**  0.0394** 
Mean FP -0.0000**  0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0052** 
Std DSP  0.0097  0.0147  0.0283  0.0403  0.0489  0.0681  0.0809  0.0947  0.1400 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0002  0.0009  0.0017  0.0024  0.0044  0.0061  0.0077  0.0129 
Var DSP/FP  23624.2751  4356.0115  965.1974  570.9475  416.2087  240.1013  175.9463  152.9889  118.6893 
JPY         
Mean DSP -0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0017** -0.0035** -0.0053** -0.0122** -0.0203** -0.0278** -0.0571** 
Mean FP  0.0001** -0.0007** -0.0033** -0.0065** -0.0097** -0.0194** -0.0282** -0.0390** -0.0577** 
Std DSP  0.0116  0.0183  0.0365  0.0530  0.0673  0.0992  0.1155  0.1349  0.2083 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0004  0.0019  0.0036  0.0054  0.0105  0.0153  0.0202  0.0328 
Var DSP/FP  5356.9811  1849.5044  378.4814  214.9523  157.7484  88.9676  57.2161  44.6643  40.3131 
NOK         
Mean DSP -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0007** -0.0015** -0.0022** -0.0039** -0.0061** -0.0082** -0.0188** 
Mean FP -0.0000**  0.0000**  0.0001**  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0002**  0.0014**  0.0002**  0.0022** 
Std DSP  0.0081  0.0124  0.0236  0.0319  0.0378  0.0499  0.0602  0.0700  0.0978 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0004  0.0019  0.0035  0.0050  0.0095  0.0129  0.0175  0.0274 
Var DSP/FP  1061.0032  784.6833  147.5108  85.3102  57.4257  27.7151  21.7724  16.0746  12.7370 
NZD         
Mean DSP -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0013** -0.0028** -0.0041** -0.0081** -0.0127** -0.0175** -0.0370** 
Mean FP -0.0001**  0.0003**  0.0014**  0.0027**  0.0041**  0.0081**  0.0125**  0.0162**  0.0471*** 
Std DSP  0.0105  0.0164  0.0319  0.0431  0.0512  0.0715  0.0871  0.1010  0.1434 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0004  0.0012  0.0021  0.0030  0.0056  0.0081  0.0106  0.0111 
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Var DSP/FP  1406.3504  1963.4247  708.4268  418.6076  291.6054  162.4034  116.5806  90.7989  166.3206 
SGD         
Mean DSP -0.0002** -0.0004** -0.0017** -0.0033** -0.0048** -0.0095** -0.0149** -0.0204** -0.0399** 
Mean FP  0.0001** -0.0004** -0.0016** -0.0033** -0.0050** -0.0101** -0.0148** -0.0198** -0.0298** 
Std DSP  0.0080  0.0124  0.0243  0.0344  0.0423  0.0605  0.0722  0.0847  0.1313 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0004  0.0017  0.0028  0.0040  0.0073  0.0106  0.0135  0.0244 
Var DSP/FP  980.8706  899.4118  214.5124  146.3762  111.5870  68.2390  46.5222  39.6164  28.8575 
USD         
Mean DSP -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0010** -0.0025** -0.0047** -0.0096** 
Mean FP  0.0000** -0.0002** -0.0008** -0.0016** -0.0024** -0.0047** -0.0069** -0.0090** -0.0123** 
Std DSP  0.0086  0.0136  0.0275  0.0397  0.0490  0.0720  0.0838  0.0912  0.1201 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0002  0.0010  0.0019  0.0028  0.0055  0.0082  0.0104  0.0154 
Var DSP/FP  14281.8219  3710.7222  809.6050  447.8198  308.9784  171.4025  103.4913  77.0330  61.1165 
Emerging 
Economies         
AED         
Mean DSP -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0006** -0.0007** -0.0010** -0.0025** -0.0047** -0.0095** 
Mean FP  0.0000** -0.0002** -0.0009** -0.0017** -0.0025** -0.0049** -0.0072** -0.0094** -0.0133** 
Std DSP  0.0087  0.0137  0.0276  0.0397  0.0491  0.0721  0.0839  0.0912  0.1201 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0003  0.0013  0.0024  0.0036  0.0069  0.0101  0.0128  0.0219 
Var DSP/FP  3687.6082  2009.0980  456.6534  273.0676  189.9124  109.5968  68.3129  50.9773  30.0580 
BRL         
Mean DSP  0.0042**  0.0104**  0.0417**  0.0832**  0.1231**  0.2415**  0.3584**  0.4729**  0.9062** 
Mean FP  NA  0.0017**  0.0069***  0.0132***  0.0196***  0.0382***  0.0545***  0.0752***  0.1492*** 
Std DSP  0.0286  0.0457  0.1093  0.1913  0.2692  0.4964  0.7166  0.9310  1.7347 
Std FP  NA  0.0010  0.0028  0.0052  0.0076  0.0141  0.0172  0.0263  0.0471 
Var DSP/FP  NA  2102.5655  1579.0093  1332.3094  1265.6784  1244.9228  1741.6482  1250.6670  1357.7285 
CLP         
Mean DSP  0.0001**  0.0004**  0.0014**  0.0028**  0.0043**  0.0088**  0.0118**  0.0146**  0.0254** 
Mean FP  NA  0.0002**  0.0008**  0.0015**  0.0022**  0.0044**  0.0067**  0.0093**  0.0255** 
Std DSP  0.0111  0.0174  0.0345  0.0497  0.0606  0.0819  0.0895  0.0973  0.1324 
Std FP  NA  0.0005  0.0023  0.0043  0.0062  0.0112  0.0157  0.0199  0.0331 
Var DSP/FP  NA  1116.9440  228.6939  134.9578  96.5776  52.9740  32.4109  23.8736  15.9632 
CNY         
Mean DSP  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0006**  0.0013**  0.0021**  0.0046**  0.0063**  0.0071**  0.0105** 
Mean FP  NA -0.0005** -0.0022** -0.0047** -0.0074** -0.0158** -0.0241** -0.0323** -0.0569** 
Std DSP  0.0115  0.0180  0.0360  0.0510  0.0629  0.0920  0.1122  0.1289  0.1715 
Std FP  NA  0.0009  0.0033  0.0064  0.0094  0.0178  0.0253  0.0328  0.0584 
Var DSP/FP  NA  434.0254  118.7507  64.4375  44.5552  26.7210  19.6417  15.4539  8.6309 
COP         
Mean DSP  0.0005**  0.0012**  0.0045**  0.0089**  0.0133**  0.0266**  0.0384**  0.0491**  0.0945** 
Mean FP  NA  0.0004**  0.0019**  0.0041**  0.0065**  0.0141**  0.0221**  0.0307***  0.0666*** 
Std DSP  0.0128  0.0204  0.0411  0.0579  0.0681  0.0919  0.1097  0.1288  0.2012 
Std FP  NA  0.0006  0.0027  0.0042  0.0055  0.0088  0.0120  0.0153  0.0283 
Var DSP/FP  NA  1120.3430  231.6642  185.8976  154.6621  110.2687  83.1919  70.8633  50.6382 
CZK         
Mean DSP  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0005**  0.0007**  0.0009**  0.0023**  0.0030**  0.0011** -0.0230** 
Mean FP  0.0000** -0.0000**  0.0002**  0.0004**  0.0004**  0.0004** -0.0021**  0.0002** -0.0190** 
Std DSP  0.0131  0.0204  0.0392  0.0543  0.0666  0.1017  0.1301  0.1490  0.1849 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0006  0.0031  0.0055  0.0078  0.0144  0.0180  0.0264  0.0222 
Var DSP/FP  1806.5687  1360.8122  159.4401  95.9581  73.0441  49.8062  52.3117  31.7443  69.3848 
HUF         
Mean DSP  0.0004**  0.0010**  0.0041**  0.0080**  0.0119**  0.0240**  0.0356**  0.0476**  0.0908** 
Mean FP -0.0002**  0.0011**  0.0046**  0.0088**  0.0128**  0.0243**  0.0347**  NA  0.0727*** 
Std DSP  0.0104  0.0163  0.0314  0.0437  0.0517  0.0726  0.0926  0.1094  0.1789 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0006  0.0024  0.0046  0.0067  0.0125  0.0180  NA  0.0351 
Var DSP/FP  1994.3398  756.3376  171.7164  90.6706  60.1663  33.5793  26.4893  NA  25.9985 
IDR         
Mean DSP  0.0005**  0.0013**  0.0053**  0.0106**  0.0161**  0.0327**  0.0483**  0.0632**  0.1264** 
Mean FP -0.0031** -0.0018**  0.0030**  0.0086**  0.0147**  0.0305**  0.0432**  0.0589**  NA 
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Std DSP  0.0212  0.0338  0.0703  0.1062  0.1328  0.1925  0.2520  0.2985  0.4012 
Std FP  0.0242  0.0242  0.0249  0.0287  0.0337  0.0512  0.0693  0.0832  NA 
Var DSP/FP  0.7672  1.9573  7.9969  13.6918  15.5461  14.1354  13.2333  12.8574  NA 
INR         
Mean DSP  0.0004**  0.0009**  0.0036**  0.0071**  0.0109**  0.0223**  0.0327**  0.0424**  0.0746** 
Mean FP -0.0001**  0.0006**  0.0025**  0.0048**  0.0071**  0.0134**  0.0192**  0.0248**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0098  0.0152  0.0311  0.0441  0.0536  0.0742  0.0852  0.0955  0.1349 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0007  0.0026  0.0049  0.0071  0.0135  0.0198  0.0257  NA 
Var DSP/FP  1322.1979  467.2030  145.4969  82.2735  57.7921  30.1242  18.5571  13.7844  NA 
MAD         
Mean DSP  0.0000**  0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0002** -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0010** -0.0022** -0.0083** 
Mean FP -0.0000**  0.0004**  0.0018**  0.0037**  0.0057**  0.0118**  0.0184**  0.0254**  0.0561** 
Std DSP  0.0096  0.0114  0.0210  0.0296  0.0360  0.0519  0.0604  0.0682  0.0948 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0005  0.0023  0.0045  0.0067  0.0128  0.0186  0.0241  0.0421 
Var DSP/FP  9327.3200  439.7168  81.6154  42.4794  29.3322  16.4343  10.5868  7.9814  5.0706 
MXN         
Mean DSP  0.0005**  0.0012**  0.0048**  0.0096**  0.0147**  0.0299**  0.0442**  0.0584**  0.1187** 
Mean FP  NA  0.0012**  0.0058**  0.0115**  0.0170**  0.0337**  0.0470**  0.0658**  0.0697*** 
Std DSP  0.0140  0.0214  0.0453  0.0641  0.0793  0.1150  0.1388  0.1651  0.2518 
Std FP  NA  0.0012  0.0053  0.0103  0.0151  0.0288  0.0401  0.0529  0.0213 
Var DSP/FP  NA  313.6614  72.1351  38.4540  27.4693  16.0073  12.0050  9.7477  139.3170 
MYR         
Mean DSP -0.0003** -0.0008** -0.0033** -0.0066** -0.0097** -0.0188** -0.0284** -0.0386** -0.0879** 
Mean FP -0.0000** -0.0000** -0.0001** -0.0003** -0.0006** -0.0015** -0.0025** -0.0036**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0088  0.0133  0.0243  0.0345  0.0435  0.0631  0.0712  0.0746  0.0946 
Std FP  0.0001  0.0004  0.0018  0.0034  0.0050  0.0095  0.0135  0.0171  NA 
Var DSP/FP  7303.8202  1075.0695  189.9809  102.6218  75.9500  44.4547  27.9551  19.0788  NA 
PHP         
Mean DSP  0.0002**  0.0005**  0.0018**  0.0036**  0.0056**  0.0116**  0.0163**  0.0196**  0.0362** 
Mean FP -0.0001**  0.0006**  0.0031**  0.0060**  0.0090**  0.0181**  0.0265**  0.0362**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0114  0.0176  0.0350  0.0519  0.0657  0.0988  0.1165  0.1281  0.1834 
Std FP  0.0004  0.0008  0.0029  0.0054  0.0078  0.0148  0.0215  0.0288  NA 
Var DSP/FP  663.6116  546.2681  143.7786  91.4466  70.9903  44.5307  29.4449  19.8523  NA 
PKR         
Mean DSP  0.0005**  0.0012**  0.0048**  0.0096**  0.0146**  0.0295**  0.0435**  0.0568**  0.1119** 
Mean FP  NA  0.0011**  0.0047**  0.0093**  0.0139**  0.0281**  NA  NA  NA 
Std DSP  0.0112  0.0157  0.0306  0.0432  0.0525  0.0723  0.0779  0.0786  0.0981 
Std FP  NA  0.0009  0.0038  0.0070  0.0100  0.0188  NA  NA  NA 
Var DSP/FP  NA  287.9484  66.2321  38.1012  27.7150  14.8217  NA  NA  NA 
PLZ         
Mean DSP  0.0005**  0.0013**  0.0041**  0.0078**  0.0116**  0.0236**  0.0350**  0.0464**  0.0907** 
Mean FP -0.0001**  0.0004**  0.0016**  0.0030**  0.0043**  0.0080**  0.0113**  0.0142**  0.0248** 
Std DSP  0.0126  0.0197  0.0344  0.0487  0.0586  0.0856  0.1082  0.1256  0.1897 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0004  0.0016  0.0030  0.0044  0.0082  0.0114  0.0143  0.0251 
Var DSP/FP  4546.9564  2422.1206  471.6907  258.3881  177.2263  109.2602  89.5526  77.1801  57.2289 
RUR         
Mean DSP  0.0016**  0.0041**  0.0158**  0.0313**  0.0465**  0.0890**  0.1313**  0.1730**  0.3217** 
Mean FP -0.0000**  0.0008**  0.0033**  0.0062**  0.0091**  0.0177**  0.0260**  0.0347**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0247  0.0388  0.0715  0.1103  0.1418  0.2226  0.2921  0.3522  0.5449 
Std FP  0.0002  0.0028  0.0080  0.0137  0.0189  0.0307  0.0407  0.0485  NA 
Var DSP/FP  18058.5552  190.0770  80.8575  64.6305  56.5289  52.4364  51.5407  52.8304  NA 
THB         
Mean DSP  0.0000**  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0004**  0.0008**  0.0022**  0.0028**  0.0030**  0.0065** 
Mean FP -0.0000**  0.0002**  0.0012**  0.0021**  0.0029**  0.0049**  0.0048**  0.0084**  NA 
Std DSP  0.0108  0.0169  0.0352  0.0522  0.0659  0.0961  0.1165  0.1322  0.1832 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0010  0.0047  0.0078  0.0106  0.0175  0.0220  0.0298  NA 
Var DSP/FP  1255.9173  280.8382  57.1692  44.7714  38.8097  30.2720  27.9230  19.6303  NA 
TRL         
Mean DSP  0.0022**  0.0054**  0.0218**  0.0435**  0.0655**  0.1321**  0.1984**  0.2651**  0.5351** 
Mean FP -0.0354** -0.0299** -0.0115**  0.0087**  0.0286**  0.0881**  0.1291**  0.2043**  0.1796*** 
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Std DSP  0.0172  0.0258  0.0531  0.0842  0.1097  0.1752  0.2351  0.2912  0.5006 
Std FP  0.1484  0.1497  0.1510  0.1591  0.1688  0.2062  0.2449  0.2991  0.0615 
Var DSP/FP  0.0135  0.0297  0.1237  0.2804  0.4222  0.7220  0.9211  0.9479  66.3659 
TWD         
Mean DSP  0.0000**  0.0001**  0.0002**  0.0003**  0.0005**  0.0010**  0.0005** -0.0008** -0.0016** 
Mean FP  NA -0.0004** -0.0015** -0.0032** -0.0048** -0.0098** -0.0151** -0.0192** -0.0388** 
Std DSP  0.0089  0.0137  0.0274  0.0395  0.0492  0.0707  0.0829  0.0941  0.1348 
Std FP  NA  0.0009  0.0027  0.0046  0.0064  0.0114  0.0153  0.0193  0.0411 
Var DSP/FP  NA  220.7291  104.1396  74.8548  58.4481  38.6283  29.5004  23.6856  10.7918 
ZAR         
Mean DSP  0.0004**  0.0010**  0.0040**  0.0078**  0.0118**  0.0236**  0.0342**  0.0446**  0.0856** 
Mean FP -0.0002**  0.0012***  0.0052***  0.0101***  0.0149***  0.0287***  0.0408***  0.0550***  0.0913*** 
Std DSP  0.0125  0.0196  0.0396  0.0558  0.0663  0.0938  0.1120  0.1329  0.1898 
Std FP  0.0003  0.0006  0.0023  0.0043  0.0061  0.0112  0.0153  0.0199  0.0247 
Var DSP/FP  1825.6802  1152.4109  289.7401  171.7755  117.9280  70.0124  53.7963  44.7222  59.1578 
 
Mean and standard deviation spot return (DSP) and forward premium(FP). * indicates the significance level of a t 
test that the mean is equal to zero. 
* Significant at the 10% level 
** Significant at the 5% level 
*** Significant at the 1% level 
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Table 3.5 ADF test for Sterling spot and forward exchange rates 
 
 
 
 
 SP TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AED          
ADF trend -2.4601 -1.6975 -1.6997 -1.8372 -1.8471 -1.8560 -1.8762 -1.7534 -1.9128 -2.5605 
ADF const -2.4814 -1.7378 -1.7401 -1.8519 -1.8610 -1.8692 -1.8874 -1.7948 -1.9205 -1.4480 
ADF 1st.diff -76.6554*** -60.9339*** -60.9708*** -62.4116*** -62.5622*** -62.7016*** -62.7374*** -61.5502*** -63.3366*** -48.1207*** 
AUD          
ADF trend -1.6197 -2.6467 -2.6472 -2.4629 -2.4592 -2.4531 -2.4360 -2.6708 -2.4047 
ADF const -0.8346 -0.2023 -0.2031 -0.2629 -0.2719 -0.2771 -0.2908 -0.2276 -0.3247 
ADF 1st.diff -76.6605*** -64.6725*** -64.6638*** -66.0445*** -66.1050*** -66.1285*** -66.2278*** -65.2185*** -66.6819*** 
BRL          
ADF trend -5.3251*** -1.7958 -1.7810 -1.7674 -1.7587 -1.7368 -1.8046 -1.8192 -2.1326 
ADF const -7.3291*** -1.8750 -1.8335 -1.7828 -1.7348 -1.6033 -1.5259 -1.3993 -1.1490 
ADF 1st.diff -9.3009*** -49.7683*** -49.6546*** -49.5963*** -49.8758*** -49.8450*** -50.5242*** -50.3028*** -50.8046*** 
CAD          
ADF trend -2.3074 -2.9412 -2.9472 -2.6709 -2.6810 -2.6909 -2.7215 -3.1334* -2.7831 
ADF const -1.3517 -0.6973 -0.6984 -0.7514 -0.7564 -0.7597 -0.7703 -0.7258 -0.7870 
ADF 1st.diff -74.9920*** -63.1331*** -63.1418*** -64.3603*** -64.3811*** -64.4116*** -64.4675*** -63.4717*** -64.7195*** 
CHF          
ADF trend -1.3498 -2.0824 -2.0849 -2.2180 -2.2208 -2.2258 -2.2376 -2.1383 -2.2557 -2.1428 
ADF const -0.5291 -0.2676 -0.2700 -0.2218 -0.2296 -0.2375 -0.2576 -0.3116 -0.2876 -0.6715 
ADF 1st.diff -75.6748*** -61.9675*** -61.9457*** -63.9822*** -63.9284*** -64.0230*** -64.0355*** -61.9502*** -63.9760*** -47.8268*** 
CLP          
ADF trend -1.7350 -3.3606* -3.3660* -3.3652* -3.3578* -3.3589* -3.3593* -3.3771* -3.4758** 
ADF const -2.5406 -1.4341 -1.4479 -1.4613 -1.4715 -1.5004 -1.5252 -1.5560 -1.5120 
ADF 1st.diff -77.8182*** -45.1516*** -45.0122*** -45.0480*** -45.1822*** -45.1723*** -45.1915*** -45.1451*** -45.9734*** 
CNY          
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ADF trend -2.0201 -2.3979 -2.4052 -2.4216 -2.4352 -2.4710 -2.4990 -2.5254 -2.7632 
ADF const -2.4086 -0.2950 -0.3016 -0.3173 -0.3366 -0.4094 -0.4812 -0.5545 -0.8838 
ADF 1st.diff -76.9509*** -52.9564*** -53.4110*** -53.6667*** -53.9878*** -54.7468*** -55.5449*** -55.8519*** -53.4835*** 
COP          
ADF trend -0.9617 -3.2826* -3.2768* -3.2520* -3.2284* -3.1853* -3.1473* -3.1338* -3.3981* 
ADF const -2.8841** -1.3041 -1.3126 -1.3174 -1.3161 -1.3142 -1.3096 -1.3048 -1.4144 
ADF 1st.diff -75.9657*** -46.3250*** -46.9447*** -46.8353*** -46.7295*** -46.8946*** -46.8451*** -47.0804*** -45.4879*** 
CZK          
ADF trend -4.1819*** -2.4769 -2.4801 -3.1858* -3.2199* -3.2360* -3.2947* -2.5800 -3.4229** -1.8401 
ADF const -2.3469 -0.7722 -0.7756 -0.4050 -0.4167 -0.4127 -0.4249 -0.9459 -0.4625 -1.8198 
ADF 1st.diff -76.9869*** -46.3509*** -46.3465*** -50.6062*** -49.6801*** -49.7279*** -49.9021*** -46.4461*** -48.3243*** -47.8637*** 
XEU          
ADF trend -1.6917 -2.5428 -2.5435 -2.8377 -2.8364 -2.8358 -2.8389 -2.5585 -2.8451 -1.8789 
ADF const -1.4267 -0.9614 -0.9627 -1.0020 -1.0077 -1.0139 -1.0336 -0.9985 -1.0699 -1.3702 
ADF 1st.diff -78.6452*** -61.6013*** -61.5842*** -63.7679*** -63.7680*** -63.8180*** -63.8300*** -61.7747*** -63.9263*** -47.7545*** 
HKD          
ADF trend -2.4794 -1.6738 -1.6766 -1.8098 -1.8215 -1.8364 -1.8731 -1.8018 -1.9278 -2.3219 
ADF const -2.5001 -1.7191 -1.7191 -1.8295 -1.8406 -1.8550 -1.8906 -1.8168 -1.9435 -1.4020 
ADF 1st.diff -73.9237*** -61.0124*** -61.0141*** -62.6018*** -62.7486*** -62.9322*** -63.2559*** -62.2336*** -63.5906*** -48.6091*** 
HUF          
ADF trend -1.4808 -3.3854* -3.3884* -3.3916* -3.4067* -3.4227** -3.4890** -3.4712** -3.4614** 
ADF const -2.6941* -2.4672 -2.4625 -2.4481 -2.4341 -2.4256 -2.4139 -2.3303 -3.339545** 
ADF 1st.diff -76.4252*** -61.1531*** -61.0899*** -61.1532*** -61.0504*** -61.3267*** -62.4136*** -61.0114*** -45.0277*** 
IDR          
ADF trend -1.7786 -6.3337*** -6.3408*** -4.0002*** -4.0112*** -4.0219*** -4.0637*** -6.2772*** -3.7006** 
ADF const -1.5470 -6.382585*** -6.392701*** -4.300069*** -4.303847*** -4.312065*** -4.324582*** -6.322118*** -4.020844*** 
ADF 1st.diff -10.9419*** -10.2097*** -10.1719*** -10.2988*** -10.2365*** -10.1961*** -10.1720*** -9.8987*** -17.0066*** 
ILS          
ADF trend -1.5031 -2.1905 -2.1902 -2.1886 -2.1856 -2.1844 -2.1785 -2.1823 -2.1915 -2.2563 
ADF const -2.6807* -0.9009 -0.9037 -0.9096 -0.9172 -0.9197 -0.9289 -0.9429 -0.9570 -1.0232 
ADF 1st.diff -81.4074*** -46.4617*** -46.4872*** -46.4801*** -46.4920*** -46.5604*** -46.6187*** -46.6748*** -47.0035*** -47.6978*** 
INR          
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ADF trend -3.3881* -3.0002 -3.0235 -3.0559 -3.1061 -3.1607* -3.3025* -3.4249** -3.5204** 
ADF const -3.4342*** -2.820459* -2.833881* -2.847401* -2.871929** -2.899953** -2.980652** -3.061655** -3.135245** 
ADF 1st.diff -78.5969*** -63.3652*** -63.6414*** -63.3683*** -63.2650*** -63.3419*** -63.3477*** -63.4593*** -63.4427*** 
JPY          
ADF trend -1.8546 -1.6690 -1.6711 -1.7570 -1.7641 -1.7703 -1.7890 -1.7253 -1.8139 -1.8652 
ADF const -1.6646 -1.2222 -1.2256 -1.2635 -1.2774 -1.2897 -1.3272 -1.3176 -1.3926 -0.9688 
ADF 1st.diff -74.0449*** -38.1820*** -38.1753*** -62.7462*** -62.7789*** -62.7996*** -39.3211*** -38.2864*** -62.8390*** -47.7935*** 
MAD          
ADF trend -1.9912 -1.7488 -1.7577 -1.7839 -1.8347 -1.8740 -1.9956 -2.1590 -2.3695 -2.7416 
ADF const -1.8564 -1.2377 -1.2406 -1.2540 -1.2641 -1.2801 -1.3533 -1.4074 -1.5191 -1.8846 
ADF 1st.diff -24.1059*** -47.0959*** -47.1148*** -47.1466*** -47.3432*** -47.2991*** -47.6795*** -48.4870*** -49.4348*** -52.4123*** 
MXN          
ADF trend -1.2072 -2.0278 -2.0729 -2.1152 -2.1603 -2.2719 -2.2429 -2.5022 -3.6263** 
ADF const -1.8848 -1.9671 -1.7924 -1.8081 -1.8295 -1.8974 -1.9441 -2.0895 -3.558915*** 
ADF 1st.diff -14.6474*** -64.1169*** -64.4269*** -63.9749*** -64.0653*** -64.1628*** -64.0789*** -65.6106*** -47.0248*** 
MYR          
ADF trend -2.8956 -2.8948 -2.8990 -2.9085 -2.9170 -2.9253 -2.9557 -2.9932 -3.0280 
ADF const -0.7151 -0.7144 -0.7193 -0.7328 -0.7471 -0.7615 -0.8079 -0.8542 -0.9006 
ADF 1st.diff -51.1074*** -51.1085*** -51.1022*** -51.1282*** -51.1712*** -51.2004*** -51.2194*** -51.3209*** -51.3707*** 
NOK          
ADF trend -1.9324 -3.7235** -3.7393** -3.6093** -3.6253** -3.6392** -3.6742** -4.0520*** -3.7045** -3.8050** 
ADF const -1.4680 -0.9437 -0.9458 -1.0439 -1.0531 -1.0601 -1.0838 -0.9760 -1.1359 -1.6706 
ADF 1st.diff -77.5135*** -61.6849*** -61.6746*** -63.5526*** -63.5243*** -63.5294*** -63.5450*** -61.7355*** -63.7195*** -48.2891*** 
NZD          
ADF trend -1.7721 -3.5526** -3.5489** -2.8267 -2.8209 -2.8148 -2.7998 -3.4702** -2.7774 -2.6710 
ADF const -0.9227 -0.4635 -0.4659 -0.5995 -0.6080 -0.6149 -0.6325 -0.5125 -0.6723 -0.6915 
ADF 1st.diff -76.0388*** -62.1774*** -62.1809*** -63.8373*** -63.8458*** -63.8746*** -64.0095*** -62.5170*** -64.3625*** -49.3069*** 
PHP          
ADF trend -0.9004 -1.4719 -1.4728 -1.8314 -1.8581 -1.8813 -1.9408 -1.4863 -2.0539 
ADF const -1.8883 -1.6192 -1.6157 -2.4393 -2.4452 -2.4481 -2.4530 -1.4532 -2.4547 
ADF 1st.diff -77.7254*** -61.2984*** -61.2678*** -47.3725*** -47.3158*** -47.1923*** -46.9207*** -45.9325*** -46.7920*** 
PKR          
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ADF trend -2.8596 -3.6875** -3.7086** -3.7254** -3.7776** -3.8560**   
ADF const -1.3095 -1.4417 -1.4386 -1.4359 -1.4526 -1.4867   
ADF 1st.diff -23.4910*** -47.7257*** -47.6511*** -47.6610*** -47.9490*** -48.4096***   
PLZ          
ADF trend -3.3961* -2.2535 -2.2504 -2.2401 -2.2240 -2.2122 -2.1756 -2.1522 -2.1238 -2.4473 
ADF const -4.8004*** -1.4674 -1.4704 -1.4782 -1.4879 -1.4971 -1.5212 -1.5467 -1.5646 -2.712821* 
ADF 1st.diff -77.5874*** -53.4533*** -53.4738*** -53.4445*** -53.4168*** -53.4052*** -53.4545*** -53.4604*** -53.3415*** -46.8370*** 
RUR          
ADF trend -3.0135 -3.5922** -3.6988** -3.8485** -3.8354** -3.9778*** -3.2201* -3.0724 -2.9325 
ADF const -4.8345*** -3.088337** -3.175914** -3.315950** -3.331684** -3.513190*** -2.995991** -2.976350** -2.895967** 
ADF 1st.diff -14.4655*** -45.0714*** -30.3068*** -45.3206*** -46.5195*** -47.3768*** -14.6441*** -14.4838*** -14.0860*** 
SGD          
ADF trend -1.2433 -1.5234 -1.5230 -1.6277 -1.6434 -1.6588 -1.6942 -1.5357 -1.7495 -2.8758 
ADF const -0.9618 -0.2575 -0.2655 -0.4434 -0.4681 -0.4906 -0.5407 -0.4243 -0.6145 -0.4224 
ADF 1st.diff -47.4656*** -40.0271*** -39.9866*** -40.9216*** -40.9081*** -40.7897*** -40.8500*** -39.7222*** -40.8340*** -49.1344*** 
THB          
ADF trend -0.8415 -1.7417 -1.7500 -2.6953 -2.7262 -2.7580 -2.8420 -2.0302 -2.9891 
ADF const -1.3909 -0.7891 -0.7946 -1.6478 -1.6573 -1.6773 -1.7300 -1.0373 -1.8268 
ADF 1st.diff -47.0887*** -39.7073*** -39.7078*** -40.3783*** -40.7614*** -40.9322*** -41.2108*** -42.1403*** -41.6054*** 
TRL          
ADF trend -0.1207 -2.3004 -2.2967 -2.2827 -2.2874 -2.3041 -2.3618 -2.6109 -2.5380 -2.6151 
ADF const -5.5964*** -3.436994*** -3.396456** -3.670190*** -3.512468*** -3.394977** -3.083749** -2.833361* -2.846043* -2.5250 
ADF 1st.diff -49.3584*** -64.0515*** -63.9570*** -65.7340*** -66.2361*** -66.6144*** -67.1472*** -65.8101*** -68.5988*** -50.0972*** 
TWD          
ADF trend -1.6537 -1.4797 -1.6870 -1.7242 -1.7615 -1.8516 -1.7326 -1.9044 -2.1997 
ADF const -1.8946 -1.3300 -1.6721 -1.7018 -1.7312 -1.7975 -1.5182 -1.8031 -1.2618 
ADF 1st.diff -78.3771*** -66.4744*** -67.3057*** -67.4502*** -67.6790*** -67.7789*** -67.6301*** -68.1157*** -54.4480*** 
USD          
ADF trend -2.5047 -1.6969 -1.6978 -1.8310 -1.8334 -1.8370 -1.8436 -1.7119 -1.8493 -2.3662 
ADF const -2.5245 -1.7372 -1.7381 -1.8457 -1.8477 -1.8507 -1.8558 -1.7549 -1.8588 -1.3683 
ADF 1st.diff -73.6568*** -60.9163*** -60.9279*** -62.3932*** -62.4254*** -62.4772*** -62.5908*** -61.2630*** -62.7724*** -47.9278*** 
ZAR          
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ADF trend -1.7580 -2.6735 -2.6675 -2.2181 -2.2138 -2.2035 -2.1911 -2.6336 -2.2775 -2.0930 
ADF const -1.7287 -2.728800* -2.721614* -2.1664 -2.1596 -2.1471 -2.1244 -2.647921* -2.1696 -2.0430 
ADF 1st.diff -74.8231*** -61.0554*** -61.0569*** -62.4332*** -62.4084*** -62.2185*** -62.2541*** -60.3374*** -61.4505*** -45.5777*** 
 
 
 
Exchange rates are in natural logarithms. t-statistics of ADF tests are reported in the table. For each economy we carried out ADF test sequentially. The first test equation has both 
constant and a linear time trend. Second test equation has constant only. In the last equation variables are tested in first difference. Standard currency short codes are employed in 
the above table. 
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.1:  Simple efficiency hypothesis FMOLS test equation for Sterling exchange rates 
 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0002 -0.0016 -0.0072 -0.0145 -0.0228 -0.0458 -0.0930 -0.0811 
Se a  0.0005  0.0014  0.0056  0.0084  0.0103  0.0150  0.0184  0.0256 
β  0.9997***  1.0015***  1.0059***  1.0117***  1.0188***  1.0379***  1.0727***  1.0596*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0017  0.0067  0.0101  0.0124  0.0178  0.0216  0.0299 
t β=1 -0.4837  0.8920  0.8799  1.1598  1.5209  2.1300**  3.3701***  1.9935** 
Wald  0.2563  2.3882  4.2395  8.1867**  12.4729***  24.7815***  81.8263***  42.8018*** 
ADF -13.7030*** -11.1783*** -9.0782*** -7.9340*** -6.8347*** -5.1082*** -4.5742*** -3.6108*** 
R2  0.9974  0.9938  0.9751  0.9545  0.9370  0.8865  0.8605  0.7532 
CAD         
a  0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0045 -0.0029 -0.0054 -0.0208 
Se a  0.0004  0.0013  0.0052  0.0073  0.0090  0.0137  0.0167  0.0192 
β  0.9997***  1.0003***  1.0006***  1.0028***  1.0031***  0.9972***  0.9903***  1.0125*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0018  0.0070  0.0099  0.0121  0.0185  0.0225  0.0257 
t β=1 -0.4651  0.1790  0.0899  0.2884  0.2604 -0.1508 -0.4330  0.4876 
Wald  0.7375  0.0377  0.3644  1.0542  1.4546  3.2054  14.1669***  10.4426*** 
ADF -15.8438*** -11.1395*** -9.2261*** -8.5540*** -7.1848*** -4.9863*** -4.1889*** -3.8632*** 
R2  0.9970  0.9929  0.9732  0.9552  0.9363  0.8701  0.8292  0.7898 
CHF         
a  0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0039 -0.0092 -0.0118 -0.0186 -0.0238 -0.0292 -0.0381 
Se a  0.0004  0.0011  0.0042  0.0063  0.0080  0.0122  0.0151  0.0185  0.0405 
β  0.9998***  1.0014***  1.0061***  1.0133***  1.0171***  1.0270***  1.0301***  1.0420***  0.9538*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0015  0.0055  0.0082  0.0105  0.0162  0.0203  0.0248  0.0607 
t β=1 -0.4674  0.9374  1.1142  1.6119  1.6339  1.6648*  1.4854  1.6935* -0.7610 
Wald  2.5379  2.3708  1.5941  2.7373  2.8326  2.9205  2.5002  2.9764  57.3795*** 
ADF -13.5593*** -11.9756*** -9.9006*** -8.3785*** -6.9736*** -4.7067*** -3.8889*** -3.3464*** -1.5318 
R2  0.9980  0.9952  0.9831  0.9690  0.9526  0.9028  0.8664  0.8109  0.5123 
XEU         
a  0.0000  0.0001  0.0017  0.0033  0.0051  0.0135*  0.0184**  0.0320***  0.0995*** 
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Se a  0.0002  0.0007  0.0026  0.0039  0.0049  0.0070  0.0084  0.0100  0.0162 
β  0.9997***  1.0002***  0.9967***  0.9924***  0.9880***  0.9664***  0.9452***  0.9153***  0.4948*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0073  0.0112  0.0138  0.0200  0.0242  0.0289  0.0586 
t β=1 -0.5531  0.1112 -0.4523 -0.6760 -0.8717 -1.6793* -2.2637** -2.9319*** -8.6240*** 
Wald  1.0102  0.5964  0.6052  0.8073  1.2007  3.8486  5.1499*  10.3405***  99.8086*** 
ADF -13.8261*** -11.4322*** -9.5321*** -8.0943*** -6.7368*** -4.5051*** -3.5384*** -3.2608*** -1.6579* 
R2  0.9968  0.9922  0.9701  0.9423  0.9177  0.8428  0.7928  0.7082  0.2308 
HKD         
a  0.0017  0.0029  0.0498*  0.1221***  0.2031***  0.5186***  0.7880***  1.0220***  1.9412*** 
Se a  0.0023  0.0070  0.0272  0.0424  0.0532  0.0813  0.1014  0.1101  0.1927 
β  0.9993***  0.9989***  0.9807***  0.9526***  0.9212***  0.7982***  0.6930***  0.6015***  0.2464*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0027  0.0106  0.0166  0.0208  0.0318  0.0397  0.0431  0.0743 
t β=1 -0.7573 -0.3831 -1.8114* -2.8560*** -3.7831*** -6.3378*** -7.7323*** -9.2360*** -10.1464*** 
Wald  1.0654  0.5965  3.5892  8.6446**  15.1284***  41.5415***  61.0463***  87.0583***  106.2772*** 
ADF -12.8159*** -9.5313*** -8.7701*** -7.7850*** -6.2407*** -3.6346*** -2.8679*** -2.5077** -1.2575 
R2  0.9932  0.9835  0.9347  0.8692  0.8059  0.5885  0.4331  0.3197  0.0441 
ILS         
a  0.0008 -0.0001  0.0088  0.0251  0.0452  0.1264***  0.1943***  0.2851***  0.5709*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0052  0.0179  0.0271  0.0326  0.0444  0.0521  0.0611  0.0883 
β  0.9996***  0.9998***  0.9940***  0.9839***  0.9720***  0.9260***  0.8872***  0.8358***  0.6666*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0027  0.0093  0.0140  0.0168  0.0229  0.0268  0.0314  0.0448 
t β=1 -0.4828 -0.0597 -0.6495 -1.1510 -1.6666* -3.2339*** -4.2064*** -5.2320*** -7.4419*** 
Wald  0.4467  0.7226  4.0892  8.8009**  14.2074***  32.0653***  50.1457***  72.5750***  205.7373*** 
ADF -11.5810*** -8.3876*** -7.0770*** -6.4321*** -5.2192*** -3.3397*** -2.8297*** -2.6187*** -1.9708** 
R2  0.9963  0.9911  0.9706  0.9439  0.9225  0.8489  0.7957  0.7232  0.4821 
JPY         
a  0.0028 -0.0032  0.0236  0.0737  0.1509*  0.3655***  0.4737***  0.5887***  1.4333*** 
Se a  0.0034  0.0105  0.0405  0.0632  0.0827  0.1312  0.1572  0.1919  0.3860 
β  0.9994***  1.0007***  0.9959***  0.9865***  0.9719***  0.9311***  0.9094***  0.8891***  0.7119*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0078  0.0122  0.0160  0.0254  0.0305  0.0372  0.0751 
t β=1 -0.8527  0.3553 -0.5306 -1.1074 -1.7561* -2.7116*** -2.9723*** -2.9809*** -3.8354*** 
Wald  2.5473  2.2032  2.3439  3.9438  6.6559**  11.8663***  10.3853***  16.2694***  26.0867*** 
ADF -14.3360*** -9.7526*** -8.2774*** -7.6079*** -5.8609*** -3.7921*** -3.3909*** -2.8914*** -1.4188 
R2  0.9962  0.9907  0.9650  0.9296  0.8860  0.7570  0.6920  0.5797  0.2759 
NOK         
164 
 
a  0.0006 -0.0005  0.0087  0.0124  0.0173  0.0253  0.0253  0.0978  0.0778 
Se a  0.0017  0.0052  0.0204  0.0298  0.0369  0.0504  0.0583  0.0727  0.1396 
β  0.9997***  1.0001***  0.9961***  0.9941***  0.9916***  0.9869***  0.9832***  0.9542***  0.9391*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0022  0.0084  0.0123  0.0152  0.0208  0.0240  0.0299  0.0588 
t β=1 -0.3601  0.0602 -0.4663 -0.4816 -0.5532 -0.6310 -0.6999 -1.5324 -1.0362 
Wald  0.1402  0.3412  0.8124  1.7890  2.8956  6.8607**  27.9191***  17.1114***  182.2298*** 
ADF -15.9222*** -11.0489*** -9.3944*** -8.6048*** -7.2708*** -5.4300*** -4.6028*** -3.9488*** -2.7143*** 
R2  0.9956  0.9896  0.9606  0.9308  0.9021  0.8378  0.8057  0.7106  0.5115 
NZD         
a  0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0016 -0.0041 -0.0052  0.0025 -0.0438  0.0399 -0.1852 
Se a  0.0007  0.0020  0.0079  0.0114  0.0140  0.0212  0.0255  0.0348  0.0686 
β  0.9998***  1.0005***  0.9991***  0.9991***  0.9979***  0.9835***  1.0119***  0.9316***  1.0599*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0020  0.0079  0.0114  0.0139  0.0210  0.0248  0.0338  0.0695 
t β=1 -0.2871  0.2741 -0.1098 -0.0794 -0.1505 -0.7874  0.4776 -2.0226**  0.8619 
Wald  0.2030  1.9268  3.2207  6.6000**  9.6585***  17.4819***  64.6076***  36.6866***  331.7089*** 
ADF -14.6575*** -11.0358*** -9.0035*** -8.0384*** -6.8129*** -4.7355*** -4.5576*** -3.2556*** -2.3454** 
R2  0.9963  0.9909  0.9660  0.9406  0.9173  0.8349  0.8048  0.6479  0.4900 
SGD         
a  0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0030 -0.0053 -0.0044  0.0006 -0.0414  0.0261 -0.0929 
Se a  0.0005  0.0016  0.0062  0.0096  0.0122  0.0189  0.0223  0.0303  0.0420 
β  0.9997***  1.0016***  1.0041***  1.0073***  1.0073***  1.0049***  1.0437***  0.9815***  1.0183*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0017  0.0065  0.0101  0.0128  0.0198  0.0234  0.0320  0.0445 
t β=1 -0.4923  0.9400  0.6356  0.7260  0.5751  0.2446  1.8724* -0.5792  0.4120 
Wald  2.1804  1.8728  1.1955  1.7519  2.3154  3.6732  3.5061  4.8951*  153.9177*** 
ADF -13.1468*** -10.7539*** -9.5326*** -8.1735*** -5.9528*** -4.5373*** -4.0590*** -2.8647*** -1.9529** 
R2  0.9973  0.9938  0.9762  0.9534  0.9303  0.8559  0.8336  0.6951  0.6887 
USD         
a  0.0002  0.0010  0.0120**  0.0280***  0.0452***  0.1088***  0.1599***  0.2030***  0.3843*** 
Se a  0.0005  0.0014  0.0055  0.0085  0.0106  0.0158  0.0195  0.0209  0.0400 
β  0.9994***  0.9982***  0.9771***  0.9465***  0.9137***  0.7907***  0.6906***  0.6070***  0.2632*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0028  0.0107  0.0166  0.0206  0.0310  0.0382  0.0412  0.0715 
t β=1 -0.6149 -0.6389 -2.1304** -3.2324*** -4.1890*** -6.7582*** -8.1033*** -9.5491*** -10.3103*** 
Wald  0.6923  0.6628  4.7631*  10.8401***  18.2978***  47.3587***  67.4179***  94.5174***  116.1581*** 
ADF -12.8776*** -9.6660*** -8.8339*** -7.7931*** -6.2598*** -3.8412*** -2.8888*** -2.5564** -1.3132 
R2  0.9930  0.9831  0.9332  0.8683  0.8070  0.5974  0.4505  0.3447  0.0538 
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AED         
a  0.0014  0.0022  0.0370*  0.0890***  0.1453***  0.3553***  0.5154***  0.6444***  1.2283*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0050  0.0195  0.0302  0.0377  0.0565  0.0692  0.0744  0.1376 
β  0.9992***  0.9989***  0.9798***  0.9513***  0.9205***  0.8051***  0.7168***  0.6460***  0.3253*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0028  0.0108  0.0167  0.0208  0.0313  0.0384  0.0413  0.0743 
t β=1 -0.8551 -0.4116 -1.8699* -2.9174*** -3.8139*** -6.2277*** -7.3767*** -8.5695*** -9.0828*** 
Wald  1.0587  0.4476  3.7524  8.9570**  15.3838***  40.6853***  56.4899***  77.3254***  91.3968*** 
ADF -12.9010*** -9.6545*** -8.8173*** -7.8230*** -6.2993*** -3.8887*** -2.9691*** -2.6633*** -1.3647 
R2  0.9930  0.9831  0.9329  0.8675  0.8058  0.6014  0.4665  0.3714  0.0742 
BRL         
a  0.0033  0.0270**  0.0599***  0.0969***  0.1975***  0.2845***  0.3989***  0.4592*** 
Se a  0.0033  0.0127  0.0178  0.0206  0.0244  0.0298  0.0335  0.0374 
β  0.9957***  0.9700***  0.9347***  0.8967***  0.7947***  0.7080***  0.6005***  0.4891*** 
Se β  0.0026  0.0099  0.0138  0.0160  0.0186  0.0224  0.0247  0.0255 
t β=1 -1.6646* -3.0196*** -4.7147*** -6.4591*** -11.0502*** -13.0439*** -16.1997*** -20.0646*** 
Wald  17.0539***  33.6982***  77.4726***  135.6450***  377.2750***  534.0811***  787.0964***  2456.3520*** 
ADF -9.7567*** -7.6149*** -6.2874*** -5.4800*** -4.1932*** -3.6713*** -3.1857*** -2.5265** 
R2  0.9917  0.9653  0.9402  0.9181  0.8614  0.7789  0.6839  0.6056 
CLP         
a  0.0002  0.0543  0.1606  0.3308**  0.7605***  0.9443***  1.0328***  1.2624*** 
Se a  0.0256  0.0926  0.1348  0.1675  0.2133  0.2426  0.2568  0.3833 
β  0.9999***  0.9915***  0.9752***  0.9495***  0.8847***  0.8561***  0.8416***  0.8022*** 
Se β  0.0038  0.0136  0.0198  0.0246  0.0313  0.0355  0.0376  0.0558 
t β=1 -0.0266 -0.6286 -1.2537 -2.0546** -3.6884*** -4.0496*** -4.2153*** -3.5444*** 
Wald  0.9368  4.8374*  11.4704***  20.3473***  55.3051***  89.9085***  134.5693***  276.5088*** 
ADF -8.8923*** -6.4564*** -6.0098*** -5.1947*** -3.8955*** -3.3583*** -3.0000*** -2.5148** 
R2  0.9832  0.9405  0.8914  0.8420  0.7313  0.6723  0.6459  0.4585 
CNY         
a -0.0078 -0.0279 -0.0483 -0.0584 -0.0521 -0.0854 -0.1410  0.1146 
Se a  0.0053  0.0200  0.0324  0.0424  0.0686  0.0849  0.0992  0.1435 
β  1.0032***  1.0114***  1.0200***  1.0245***  1.0239***  1.0388***  1.0624***  0.9418*** 
Se β  0.0021  0.0079  0.0128  0.0168  0.0272  0.0337  0.0394  0.0574 
t β=1  1.5272  1.4450  1.5589  1.4628  0.8790  1.1513  1.5826 -1.0132 
Wald  3.1015  2.6789  3.4300  3.8311  4.5255  7.4257**  10.6281***  16.6940*** 
ADF -8.8912*** -6.9608*** -5.8351*** -4.6859*** -3.0641*** -2.7105*** -2.5022** -1.8764* 
166 
 
R2  0.9936  0.9742  0.9453  0.9145  0.8140  0.7535  0.7045  0.5312 
COP         
a  0.0164  0.1388  0.3095**  0.4908***  0.8955***  1.2235***  1.5043***  1.6196*** 
Se a  0.0254  0.0918  0.1351  0.1590  0.1856  0.2101  0.2372  0.3338 
β  0.9979***  0.9823***  0.9606***  0.9376***  0.8857***  0.8433***  0.8068***  0.7833*** 
Se β  0.0031  0.0112  0.0165  0.0194  0.0226  0.0255  0.0288  0.0402 
t β=1 -0.6788 -1.5754 -2.3888** -3.2173*** -5.0541*** -6.1327*** -6.7096*** -5.3930*** 
Wald  2.6954  10.3027***  24.2152***  44.1176***  128.3093***  226.8997***  320.3254***  755.6698*** 
ADF -8.8770*** -7.2627*** -6.1194*** -4.7524*** -3.7425*** -3.3364*** -2.9094*** -2.3753** 
R2  0.9887  0.9576  0.9214  0.8943  0.8398  0.7947  0.7421  0.6121 
CZK         
a  0.0000  0.0029  0.0169  0.0295  0.0438  0.1004**  0.2124***  0.2418***  1.1919*** 
Se a  0.0015  0.0044  0.0179  0.0264  0.0324  0.0451  0.0549  0.0621  0.1409 
β  1.0000***  0.9992***  0.9950***  0.9910***  0.9866***  0.9696***  0.9363***  0.9274***  0.6430*** 
Se β  0.0004  0.0012  0.0048  0.0071  0.0086  0.0120  0.0147  0.0165  0.0395 
t β=1 -0.0519 -0.7123 -1.0501 -1.2764 -1.5514 -2.5286** -4.3423*** -4.3904*** -9.0408*** 
Wald  0.2967  0.8872  3.3893  6.8910**  10.6547***  25.3378***  64.3497***  69.5067***  231.4904*** 
ADF -14.3642*** -11.2426*** -9.1172*** -7.4770*** -6.0939*** -4.8049*** -3.6430*** -3.6780*** -1.7227* 
R2  0.9987  0.9969  0.9870  0.9762  0.9660  0.9375  0.9111  0.8847  0.5278 
HUF         
a  0.0056  0.0245  0.2463***  0.5022***  0.6852***  1.1498***  1.6971***  5.0994*** 
Se a  0.0068  0.0207  0.0803  0.1157  0.1339  0.1674  0.1986  0.4492 
β  0.9991***  0.9957***  0.9575***  0.9134***  0.8818***  0.8016***  0.7079***  0.1231 
Se β  0.0012  0.0035  0.0136  0.0196  0.0227  0.0283  0.0335  0.0759 
t β=1 -0.7920 -1.2329 -3.1209*** -4.4136*** -5.2089*** -7.0111*** -8.7189*** -11.5470*** 
Wald  3.8124  10.3292***  19.7682***  38.1567***  56.6241***  116.4671***  172.5091***  356.1801*** 
ADF -14.0703*** -11.2033*** -9.3729*** -7.9817*** -6.8531*** -5.2486*** -4.0955*** -2.1504** 
R2  0.9887  0.9722  0.8991  0.8237  0.7742  0.6552  0.5224  0.0106 
IDR         
a  0.1119  0.2328***  0.4910***  1.2475***  2.0879***  4.5617***  8.6916***  9.9088*** 
Se a  0.0713  0.0830  0.0999  0.1535  0.1927  0.2386  0.3620  0.2010 
β  0.9887***  0.9760***  0.9488***  0.8698***  0.7822***  0.5250***  0.0970*** -0.0290 
Se β  0.0074  0.0086  0.0104  0.0160  0.0201  0.0249  0.0374  0.0209 
t β=1 -1.5257 -2.7774*** -4.9040*** -8.1191*** -10.8225*** -19.1012*** -24.1174*** -49.2488*** 
Wald  9.5115***  10.1142***  24.2618***  66.0723***  117.3559***  365.5660***  615.6370***  2429.4700*** 
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ADF -6.8739*** -7.4922*** -9.0204*** -10.0337*** -7.9780*** -4.5976*** -4.5075*** -4.4158*** 
R2  0.9559  0.9204  0.9325  0.8496  0.7631  0.4886  0.0116  0.0050 
INR         
a  0.0039  0.0139  0.1733***  0.3705***  0.5365***  1.0150***  1.3641***  1.5971*** 
Se a  0.0046  0.0138  0.0548  0.0843  0.1029  0.1465  0.1773  0.1932 
β  0.9991***  0.9967***  0.9596***  0.9138***  0.8754***  0.7648***  0.6842***  0.6305*** 
Se β  0.0011  0.0032  0.0127  0.0195  0.0237  0.0338  0.0409  0.0445 
t β=1 -0.8234 -1.0468 -3.1908*** -4.4278*** -5.2485*** -6.9610*** -7.7245*** -8.3015*** 
Wald  3.3789  4.4620  11.9774***  21.7420***  29.9763***  50.7904***  62.4482***  72.7670*** 
ADF -13.7733*** -10.1163*** -8.7411*** -7.2078*** -5.8175*** -4.1141*** -3.6200*** -3.3543*** 
R2  0.9908  0.9779  0.9105  0.8251  0.7550  0.5516  0.4085  0.3130 
MAD         
a  0.0024 -0.0059 -0.0067 -0.0070  0.0040  0.0596  0.0320  0.0569  0.5183*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0078  0.0280  0.0432  0.0547  0.0780  0.0925  0.1117  0.1984 
β  0.9991***  1.0020***  1.0012***  0.9998***  0.9943***  0.9696***  0.9760***  0.9627***  0.7752*** 
Se β  0.0010  0.0029  0.0105  0.0161  0.0204  0.0290  0.0343  0.0413  0.0724 
t β=1 -0.9339  0.6889  0.1117 -0.0117 -0.2815 -1.0484 -0.6987 -0.9015 -3.1061*** 
Wald  0.8899  3.9311  10.3399***  20.0714***  30.1464***  62.3287***  102.7779***  139.1504***  329.7045*** 
ADF -10.0172*** -8.7198*** -6.7177*** -5.7354*** -4.9636*** -3.1893*** -2.8488*** -2.5879*** -1.9052* 
R2  0.9959  0.9899  0.9641  0.9291  0.8943  0.7934  0.7425  0.6659  0.3227 
MXN         
a -0.0065  0.0050  0.0314  0.0546  0.1719**  0.4180***  0.6192***  3.3622*** 
Se a  0.0062  0.0232  0.0364  0.0455  0.0711  0.1018  0.1134  0.1957 
β  1.0018***  0.9967***  0.9864***  0.9772***  0.9335***  0.8471***  0.7754*** -0.1105 
Se β  0.0021  0.0080  0.0126  0.0157  0.0244  0.0346  0.0386  0.0634 
t β=1  0.8650 -0.4066 -1.0846 -1.4517 -2.7226*** -4.4134*** -5.8222*** -17.5226*** 
Wald  10.7889***  9.6629***  14.0008***  19.3274***  35.0807***  53.8957***  78.6061***  716.9326*** 
ADF -10.6058*** -9.0949*** -7.4892*** -6.1962*** -4.2934*** -3.1242*** -2.8080*** -3.3014*** 
R2  0.9901  0.9637  0.9277  0.8944  0.7705  0.5989  0.4947  0.0118 
MYR         
a  0.0011 -0.0036 -0.0104 -0.0122 -0.0080  0.0146  0.0106 -0.0181 
Se a  0.0015  0.0044  0.0150  0.0233  0.0306  0.0477  0.0537  0.0583 
β  0.9994***  1.0019***  1.0044***  1.0037***  0.9997***  0.9827***  0.9804***  0.9919*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0025  0.0084  0.0131  0.0172  0.0267  0.0300  0.0325 
t β=1 -0.7720  0.7580  0.5237  0.2796 -0.0153 -0.6464 -0.6546 -0.2489 
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Wald  0.8668  1.3284  4.2463  8.3927**  10.9954***  18.1565***  34.8021***  55.1839*** 
ADF -10.2856*** -8.8191*** -7.0918*** -6.5820*** -5.1897*** -3.3945*** -2.8267*** -3.1506*** 
R2  0.9967  0.9926  0.9752  0.9501  0.9214  0.8356  0.7885  0.7691 
PHP         
a  0.0015 -0.0002  0.0741**  0.1993***  0.3420***  0.8376***  0.3787***  1.4538*** 
Se a  0.0030  0.0089  0.0292  0.0463  0.0588  0.0888  0.1156  0.1139 
β  0.9997***  0.9999***  0.9825***  0.9533***  0.9202***  0.8058***  0.9075***  0.6635*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0067  0.0107  0.0135  0.0204  0.0263  0.0260 
t β=1 -0.4689 -0.0503 -2.5982*** -4.3717*** -5.8900*** -9.5191*** -3.5122*** -12.9360*** 
Wald  1.1052  3.5782  8.6692**  21.2619***  37.1304***  93.9934***  56.7745***  180.3056*** 
ADF -13.3705*** -10.1802*** -8.7678*** -7.7854*** -6.0960*** -4.3511*** -3.7372*** -2.7259*** 
R2  0.9959  0.9902  0.9719  0.9408  0.9060  0.7809  0.7491  0.6118 
PKR         
a  0.0361**  0.2212***  0.4556***  0.6675***  1.2687***   
Se a  0.0180  0.0602  0.0891  0.1122  0.1536   
β  0.9924***  0.9538***  0.9051***  0.8611***  0.7367***   
Se β  0.0037  0.0124  0.0184  0.0232  0.0317   
t β=1 -2.0460** -3.7130*** -5.1530*** -5.9945*** -8.3156***   
Wald  7.6249**  16.0552***  28.9587***  38.8030***  73.3042***   
ADF -8.7279*** -6.7897*** -5.9164*** -4.7875*** -3.0224***   
R2  0.9831  0.9434  0.8899  0.8294  0.6513   
PLZ         
a  0.0010  0.0029  0.0322*  0.0749**  0.1098***  0.2485***  0.3939***  0.4784***  1.0148*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0051  0.0189  0.0296  0.0360  0.0512  0.0612  0.0664  0.0729 
β  0.9995***  0.9980***  0.9793***  0.9524***  0.9304***  0.8445***  0.7547***  0.7018***  0.3522*** 
Se β  0.0010  0.0030  0.0112  0.0175  0.0212  0.0301  0.0359  0.0389  0.0434 
t β=1 -0.5351 -0.6593 -1.8518* -2.7232*** -3.2807*** -5.1729*** -6.8356*** -7.6717*** -14.9359*** 
Wald  0.4460  1.6803  6.3115**  12.4464***  18.1580***  40.0732***  67.8139***  87.1865***  384.5890*** 
ADF -10.7334*** -8.9869*** -7.3095*** -6.0173*** -4.9858*** -3.5355*** -2.7988*** -2.4724** -2.2092** 
R2  0.9942  0.9859  0.9464  0.8908  0.8479  0.7063  0.5837  0.5182  0.2153 
RUR         
a  0.0142 -0.0286  0.1716  0.6021***  0.9633***  2.0404***  3.3702***  3.9715*** 
Se a  0.0099  0.0301  0.1050  0.1676  0.1963  0.2167  0.2261  0.2086 
β  0.9964***  1.0071***  0.9550***  0.8437***  0.7503***  0.4729***  0.1322** -0.0217 
Se β  0.0025  0.0077  0.0269  0.0430  0.0503  0.0554  0.0577  0.0531 
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t β=1 -1.4253  0.9227 -1.6731* -3.6385*** -4.9683*** -9.5154*** -15.0451*** -19.2301*** 
Wald  2.0523  5.7034*  11.3737***  27.0419***  47.5782***  151.8289***  326.5188***  540.6915*** 
ADF -9.1554*** -9.9810*** -7.4307*** -6.2749*** -5.3469*** -3.9906*** -3.4112*** -3.3539*** 
R2  0.9712  0.9332  0.7704  0.5515  0.4257  0.1872  0.0172  0.0004 
THB         
a  0.0016  0.0017  0.0745*  0.2159***  0.3962***  1.0033***  0.4822***  1.7313*** 
Se a  0.0032  0.0098  0.0392  0.0637  0.0836  0.1231  0.1203  0.1648 
β  0.9996***  0.9995***  0.9816***  0.9471***  0.9032***  0.7560***  0.8780***  0.5785*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0024  0.0095  0.0155  0.0203  0.0299  0.0291  0.0399 
t β=1 -0.5188 -0.2130 -1.9279* -3.4182*** -4.7631*** -8.1694*** -4.1945*** -10.5632*** 
Wald  0.3873  1.3869  4.2108  12.1140***  23.0207***  66.8168***  47.7070***  113.3533*** 
ADF -11.5413*** -10.2572*** -8.1837*** -6.6685*** -4.9353*** -3.1114*** -3.1679*** -2.9733*** 
R2  0.9946  0.9874  0.9456  0.8807  0.8073  0.5929  0.6945  0.3360 
TRL         
a  0.0676***  0.0626***  0.0385***  0.0351***  0.0327***  0.0255*  0.0847***  0.0462**  1.2085*** 
Se a  0.0099  0.0102  0.0092  0.0101  0.0110  0.0137  0.0221  0.0219  0.0521 
β  0.9444***  0.9466***  0.9692***  0.9628***  0.9555***  0.9322***  0.8295***  0.8388*** -0.2400 
Se β  0.0118  0.0121  0.0104  0.0115  0.0126  0.0156  0.0249  0.0240  0.0467 
t β=1 -4.7155*** -4.4110*** -2.9566*** -3.2343*** -3.5478*** -4.3567*** -6.8375*** -6.7225*** -26.5504*** 
Wald  46.8755***  38.0431***  18.1659***  14.3130***  13.6773***  20.8048***  56.0818***  65.6495***  1734.1180*** 
ADF -3.0450*** -3.1842*** -3.8276*** -3.6765*** -3.7146*** -3.3386*** -2.9267*** -2.8412*** -2.4285** 
R2  0.9395  0.9363  0.9521  0.9422  0.9313  0.8952  0.7376  0.7499  0.0967 
TWD         
a -0.0054  0.0347  0.1074*  0.2044***  0.5169***  0.4660***  1.2784***  1.1928*** 
Se a  0.0097  0.0369  0.0582  0.0745  0.1125  0.1397  0.1681  0.3253 
β  1.0014***  0.9916***  0.9737***  0.9498***  0.8724***  0.8847***  0.6822***  0.6988*** 
Se β  0.0024  0.0093  0.0147  0.0188  0.0284  0.0352  0.0424  0.0817 
t β=1  0.5895 -0.8996 -1.7902* -2.6763*** -4.5009*** -3.2778*** -7.4861*** -3.6866*** 
Wald  1.5672  2.9727  7.2459**  13.5566***  33.2107***  16.2985***  78.3748***  14.3141*** 
ADF -11.6196*** -9.0916*** -7.8368*** -6.3018*** -4.1282*** -3.4543*** -2.7192*** -1.3232 
R2  0.9871  0.9505  0.8994  0.8444  0.6843  0.6122  0.3828  0.2346 
ZAR         
a  0.0023  0.0079  0.0630***  0.1609***  0.2506***  0.5556***  1.0882***  1.2098***  3.5608*** 
Se a  0.0024  0.0071  0.0236  0.0364  0.0436  0.0612  0.0845  0.0815  0.1283 
β  0.9992***  0.9964***  0.9733***  0.9331***  0.8965***  0.7729***  0.5624***  0.5110*** -0.3809 
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Se β  0.0009  0.0029  0.0095  0.0147  0.0175  0.0245  0.0333  0.0323  0.0488 
t β=1 -0.8452 -1.2425 -2.8085*** -4.5672*** -5.9081*** -9.2818*** -13.1246*** -15.1354*** -28.2852*** 
Wald  4.2499  6.2014**  10.8599***  23.8982***  38.4592***  91.3360***  183.5436***  240.1844***  901.7290*** 
ADF -13.0110*** -11.0426*** -9.1769*** -7.3542*** -6.4629*** -4.6431*** -3.2254*** -2.9998*** -2.8418*** 
R2  0.9922  0.9811  0.9462  0.8935  0.8505  0.6949  0.4095  0.3745  0.1955 
Mean         
a  0.0092  0.0111  0.0626  0.1552  0.2514  0.5426  0.7675  0.9717  1.1829 
Se a  0.0055  0.0110  0.0329  0.0501  0.0616  0.0831  0.0981  0.0987  0.1642 
β  0.9966  0.9972  0.9852  0.9639  0.9418  0.8705  0.8199  0.7586  0.5253 
se β  0.0016  0.0031  0.0099  0.0149  0.0183  0.0255  0.0306  0.0338  0.0583 
t β=1 -0.1708 -0.0530 -0.2291 -0.3677 -0.4906 -0.8241 -0.9260 -1.3617 -1.8864 
Wald  3.6145  4.6961  7.8823  16.2357  26.1906  66.0258  105.4878  202.6224  433.8629 
R2  0.9902  0.9826  0.9496  0.9030  0.8613  0.7386  0.6472  0.5633  0.3266 
 
 
 
We use the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and standard 
errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1  and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) for the 
residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short codes are 
employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.2:  Simple efficiency hypothesis FMOLS test equation for USD exchange rates 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0001 -0.0007 -0.0021 -0.0031 -0.0042 -0.0035 -0.0138  0.0002  0.0017 
Se a  0.0002  0.0007  0.0026  0.0042  0.0054  0.0086  0.0114  0.0138  0.0236 
β  0.9997*** -1.0004 -0.9976 -0.9908 -0.9847 -0.9540 -0.9304 -0.8872 -0.4583 
Se β  0.0006  0.0018  0.0070  0.0111  0.0144  0.0227  0.0291  0.0351  0.0857 
t β=1 -0.4812 -1136.5212*** -283.6479*** -178.8950*** -137.4584*** -86.0626*** -66.3493*** -53.7880*** -17.0241*** 
Wald  0.4781  3773101.0000***  245436.0000***  99841.2600***  60350.7700***  25647.6900***  15817.7000***  11860.4500***  2191.5240*** 
ADF -13.5342*** -9.7691*** -7.9239*** -7.1877*** -5.9778*** -3.9166*** -3.2343*** -2.7743*** -1.8642* 
R2  0.9971  0.9929  0.9717  0.9415  0.9102  0.8022  0.7206  0.6096  0.1059 
CAD         
a -0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0005  0.0003 -0.0015 -0.0002  0.0216*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0004  0.0016  0.0024  0.0031  0.0048  0.0061  0.0071  0.0070 
β  0.9999***  0.9996***  0.9961***  0.9906***  0.9849***  0.9610***  0.9306***  0.9212***  0.3042*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0016  0.0058  0.0086  0.0110  0.0171  0.0217  0.0249  0.0499 
t β=1 -0.1913 -0.2623 -0.6782 -1.0940 -1.3663 -2.2810** -3.1915*** -3.1686*** -13.9376*** 
Wald  0.0986  0.4655  1.6656  3.8249  6.2248**  14.2633***  32.6224***  31.0739***  356.6592*** 
ADF -15.8795*** -9.7596*** -8.5909*** -8.0309*** -6.5246*** -4.3168*** -3.5272*** -3.0759*** -2.4220** 
R2  0.9977  0.9944  0.9809  0.9639  0.9452  0.8782  0.8218  0.7700  0.1329 
CHF         
a -0.0000  0.0002  0.0010  0.0013  0.0013  0.0016  0.0009  0.0039 -0.0489 
Se a  0.0002  0.0005  0.0020  0.0031  0.0037  0.0054  0.0066  0.0077  0.0091 
β  0.9997***  1.0002***  0.9968***  0.9931***  0.9904***  0.9814***  0.9649***  0.9573***  1.0172*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0016  0.0066  0.0101  0.0123  0.0180  0.0224  0.0260  0.0695 
t β=1 -0.4954  0.1090 -0.4910 -0.6801 -0.7734 -1.0328 -1.5634 -1.6416  0.2476 
Wald  0.9871  0.5837  0.2799  0.4916  0.7584  1.6941  5.1395*  4.2500  66.7246*** 
ADF -13.5557*** -10.7310*** -9.3707*** -7.4653*** -6.3083*** -4.5248*** -3.6371*** -3.1701*** -2.1345** 
R2  0.9976  0.9943  0.9755  0.9529  0.9335  0.8739  0.8232  0.7672  0.4690 
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XEU         
a -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0025 -0.0062 -0.0097 -0.0215 -0.0332 -0.0449 -0.2507 
Se a  0.0002  0.0005  0.0019  0.0030  0.0036  0.0052  0.0064  0.0074  0.0201 
β  0.9996***  0.9988***  0.9873***  0.9706***  0.9559***  0.9048***  0.8535***  0.8007***  0.1776*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0078  0.0122  0.0150  0.0216  0.0264  0.0304  0.0668 
t β=1 -0.5553 -0.6181 -1.6347 -2.4089** -2.9417*** -4.4066*** -5.5492*** -6.5619*** -12.3199*** 
Wald  0.3473  0.3828  2.7074  6.0101**  9.2148**  21.0683***  33.4829***  46.5622***  156.0804*** 
ADF -12.6065*** -9.9070*** -8.3444*** -6.7076*** -5.4209*** -3.8461*** -3.0442*** -2.7593*** -2.3836** 
R2  0.9969  0.9922  0.9669  0.9318  0.9017  0.8071  0.7203  0.6365  0.0277 
GBP         
a -0.0002 -0.0010 -0.0120 -0.0280 -0.0452 -0.1088 -0.1600 -0.2031 -0.3843 
Se a  0.0005  0.0014  0.0055  0.0085  0.0106  0.0158  0.0195  0.0209  0.0400 
β  0.9994***  0.9982***  0.9771***  0.9465***  0.9137***  0.7907***  0.6905***  0.6070***  0.2632*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0028  0.0107  0.0166  0.0206  0.0310  0.0382  0.0412  0.0715 
t β=1 -0.6044 -0.6362 -2.1286** -3.2310*** -4.1886*** -6.7591*** -8.1043*** -9.5497*** -10.3093*** 
Wald  0.7381  0.6403  4.7478*  10.8248***  18.2876***  47.3630***  67.4301***  94.5220***  116.1469*** 
ADF -12.9120*** -11.0602*** -8.8678*** -7.7821*** -6.2534*** -3.8381*** -2.8911*** -2.5590** -1.3123 
R2  0.9930  0.9831  0.9332  0.8683  0.8070  0.5973  0.4504  0.3447  0.0538 
HKD         
a  0.0117*** -0.0222  0.1530***  0.8541***  1.6144***  2.2310***  2.2040***  2.1310***  2.3167*** 
Se a  0.0035  0.0135  0.0590  0.0865  0.0856  0.0469  0.0285  0.0211  0.0621 
β  0.9943***  1.0108***  0.9255***  0.5836***  0.2129*** -0.0877 -0.0744 -0.0389 -0.1302 
Se β  0.0017  0.0066  0.0288  0.0422  0.0418  0.0228  0.0139  0.0103  0.0304 
t β=1 -3.3131***  1.6508* -2.5898*** -9.8743*** -18.8502*** -47.6137*** -77.4360*** -101.2196*** -37.1544*** 
Wald  17.6883***  8.5342**  7.8204**  98.4550***  355.7213***  2272.6340***  6027.6030***  10437.4900***  4010.4620*** 
ADF -14.0938*** -10.5181*** -8.0093*** -5.4961*** -4.0341*** -3.8319*** -3.6765*** -3.8024*** -2.9784*** 
R2  0.9780  0.9385  0.6406  0.2601  0.0457  0.0303  0.0644  0.0322  0.0646 
ILS         
a  0.0011  0.0033  0.0384**  0.0925***  0.1417***  0.3510***  0.5197***  0.6046***  0.8192*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0053  0.0195  0.0293  0.0356  0.0510  0.0603  0.0643  0.0658 
β  0.9992***  0.9974***  0.9707***  0.9300***  0.8929***  0.7381***  0.6134***  0.5491***  0.3766*** 
Se β  0.0012  0.0038  0.0141  0.0211  0.0256  0.0366  0.0432  0.0460  0.0464 
t β=1 -0.6353 -0.6966 -2.0828** -3.3233*** -4.1848*** -7.1474*** -8.9409*** -9.8009*** -13.4335*** 
Wald  0.4058  1.2949  7.0159**  16.3345***  25.4392***  64.5739***  98.9655***  124.3897***  375.6740*** 
ADF -10.4153*** -7.8235*** -6.5934*** -5.7682*** -4.2590*** -2.6114*** -2.1565** -1.9748** -2.3558** 
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R2  0.9932  0.9823  0.9329  0.8680  0.8114  0.5785  0.4168  0.3453  0.2148 
JPY         
a  0.0028 -0.0014  0.0357  0.0985*  0.1729**  0.3071***  0.3561***  0.3512**  0.0124 
Se a  0.0031  0.0095  0.0386  0.0595  0.0770  0.1160  0.1319  0.1647  0.3657 
β  0.9994***  1.0004***  0.9927***  0.9795***  0.9638***  0.9354***  0.9238***  0.9266***  0.9918*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0083  0.0127  0.0165  0.0249  0.0283  0.0354  0.0798 
t β=1 -0.9356  0.1992 -0.8806 -1.6090 -2.1948** -2.5990*** -2.6878*** -2.0748** -0.1024 
Wald  2.3379  2.0225  2.5373  4.7105*  7.2757**  9.3037***  7.3974**  8.5561**  10.4543*** 
ADF -14.3820*** -10.2362*** -8.1728*** -7.2090*** -5.8888*** -3.8635*** -3.8216*** -3.1559*** -1.6676* 
R2  0.9960  0.9904  0.9611  0.9231  0.8793  0.7671  0.7272  0.6237  0.3936 
NOK         
a  0.0003  0.0029  0.0286*  0.0660***  0.1041***  0.2201***  0.3254***  0.4239***  1.7065*** 
Se a  0.0014  0.0041  0.0160  0.0248  0.0319  0.0467  0.0570  0.0636  0.1322 
β  0.9999***  0.9983***  0.9844***  0.9641***  0.9433***  0.8803***  0.8207***  0.7699***  0.0392 
Se β  0.0007  0.0021  0.0083  0.0129  0.0166  0.0242  0.0294  0.0328  0.0725 
t β=1 -0.1909 -0.7851 -1.8821* -2.7851*** -3.4265*** -4.9469*** -6.0915*** -7.0163*** -13.2592*** 
Wald  0.1428  1.4208  4.5151  9.7413***  15.0016***  31.6715***  55.3359***  65.1448***  255.1698*** 
ADF -15.0295*** -9.5921*** -8.0691*** -7.5835*** -6.0304*** -4.2557*** -3.3272*** -3.0041*** -2.6625*** 
R2  0.9956  0.9895  0.9598  0.9183  0.8743  0.7529  0.6606  0.5726  0.0011 
NZD         
a  0.0002 -0.0005  0.0004  0.0023  0.0045  0.0226*  0.0252  0.0702***  0.3401*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0010  0.0039  0.0061  0.0078  0.0127  0.0168  0.0203  0.0381 
β -0.9997 -0.9998 -0.9932 -0.9832 -0.9726 -0.9191 -0.8800 -0.7939  0.0342 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0075  0.0116  0.0147  0.0236  0.0304  0.0366  0.0867 
t β=1 -3187.4572*** -1047.7808*** -264.6240*** -171.5147*** -134.0507*** -81.1966*** -61.8861*** -49.0395*** -11.1372*** 
Wald  63182323.0000***  6851117.0000***  453346.0000***  195181.1000***  122300.5000***  49299.6200***  30198.8300***  22043.8500*** 
 10071.3500**
* 
ADF -15.2496*** -9.8554*** -8.4052*** -7.3056*** -6.0786*** -3.7944*** -3.1658*** -2.5372** -1.6312* 
R2  0.9965  0.9916  0.9678  0.9364  0.9040  0.7757  0.6774  0.5337  0.0006 
SGD         
a  0.0000 -0.0002  0.0007  0.0018  0.0022  0.0018 -0.0230  0.0095  0.0049 
Se a  0.0002  0.0006  0.0027  0.0044  0.0056  0.0083  0.0092  0.0130  0.0189 
β  0.9998***  1.0007***  0.9992***  0.9974***  0.9968***  0.9988***  1.0403***  0.9816***  0.8461*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0014  0.0060  0.0096  0.0123  0.0182  0.0201  0.0285  0.0482 
t β=1 -0.4839  0.4913 -0.1268 -0.2748 -0.2602 -0.0637  2.0035** -0.6452 -3.1937*** 
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Wald  1.6844  0.7282  0.2822  0.3828  0.3772  0.3727  9.1181**  0.6125  219.8662*** 
ADF -13.8162*** -10.6335*** -8.6901*** -7.1375*** -5.9120*** -4.2696*** -3.9311*** -3.4850*** -1.8595* 
R2  0.9981  0.9954  0.9794  0.9569  0.9354  0.8757  0.8706  0.7417  0.5652 
AED         
a  0.6092***  0.9913***  1.2550***  1.2749***  1.2887***  1.3027***  1.3037***  1.3026***  1.3018*** 
Se a  0.0351  0.0165  0.0075  0.0044  0.0030  0.0018  0.0014  0.0011  0.0010 
β  0.5317***  0.2380***  0.0353***  0.0200***  0.0095*** -0.0013 -0.0021 -0.0013 -0.0007 
Se β  0.0270  0.0127  0.0057  0.0034  0.0023  0.0014  0.0011  0.0008  0.0008 
t β=1 -17.3587*** -60.1457*** -167.8483*** -292.0967*** -422.8578*** -713.8526*** -921.9265*** -1191.7628*** 
-
1259.0592*** 
Wald  301.5244***  3620.9830***  28254.4500***  85624.1900***  179463.0000***  512508.9000***  856370.3000***  1429739.0000*** 
 1609516.0000
*** 
ADF -8.4325*** -14.1234*** -11.3459*** -11.0920*** -10.9547*** -10.6005*** -10.2663*** -10.4449*** -7.7993*** 
R2  0.0554  0.1473  0.0330  0.0349  0.0153  0.0009  0.0039  0.0024  0.0013 
BRL         
a  0.0027  0.0249***  0.0619***  0.1047***  0.2272***  0.3210***  0.3912***  0.4820*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0090  0.0137  0.0175  0.0230  0.0265  0.0270  0.0291 
β  0.9931***  0.9510***  0.8851***  0.8122***  0.6111***  0.4605***  0.3465***  0.1743*** 
Se β  0.0034  0.0123  0.0185  0.0233  0.0298  0.0336  0.0331  0.0315 
t β=1 -2.0145** -3.9930*** -6.2129*** -8.0562*** -13.0503*** -16.0447*** -19.7178*** -26.1904*** 
Wald  17.1716***  37.9711***  78.8747***  122.4765***  299.9464***  465.4917***  742.7979***  2133.0990*** 
ADF -8.3947*** -6.4000*** -5.7412*** -4.5776*** -3.1766*** -2.7220*** -2.5363** -2.1572** 
R2  0.9853  0.9436  0.8819  0.8059  0.5848  0.3995  0.2861  0.1132 
CLP         
a  0.0291  0.3223***  0.8439***  1.4680***  3.2328***  4.6885***  5.2832***  6.2384*** 
Se a  0.0328  0.1246  0.1861  0.2392  0.3034  0.3415  0.3532  0.3939 
β  0.9953***  0.9481***  0.8643***  0.7642***  0.4816***  0.2488***  0.1536***  0.0004 
Se β  0.0052  0.0199  0.0297  0.0381  0.0483  0.0543  0.0562  0.0624 
t β=1 -0.9021 -2.6118*** -4.5704*** -6.1837*** -10.7271*** -13.8251*** -15.0722*** -16.0275*** 
Wald  1.8730  9.8677***  27.3531***  48.3793***  141.8844***  237.4127***  294.4967***  466.2828*** 
ADF -8.1177*** -5.3654*** -4.8004*** -4.2843*** -3.0198*** -2.4711** -2.0799** -2.1275** 
R2  0.9664  0.8683  0.7332  0.5849  0.2492  0.0691  0.0269 -0.0000 
CNY         
a -0.0067 -0.0307 -0.0586 -0.0852 -0.1356 -0.1497 -0.1386  0.3415*** 
Se a  0.0011  0.0038  0.0061  0.0081  0.0155  0.0225  0.0309  0.0769 
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β  1.0033***  1.0151***  1.0289***  1.0422***  1.0677***  1.0754***  1.0704***  0.8196*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0030  0.0040  0.0078  0.0113  0.0155  0.0395 
t β=1  5.9437***  7.8926***  9.5502***  10.4580***  8.7100***  6.6795***  4.5333*** -4.5667*** 
Wald  35.3751***  67.8723***  98.5759***  115.5861***  76.5390***  44.6850***  21.2724***  29.7540*** 
ADF -9.7120*** -7.5697*** -6.8080*** -5.9966*** -4.4117*** -3.3151*** -3.0084*** -2.0982** 
R2  0.9997  0.9986  0.9969  0.9949  0.9832  0.9668  0.9401  0.6432 
COP         
a  0.0314  0.3090***  0.7917***  1.3009***  2.5855***  3.5351***  3.7518***  4.2458*** 
Se a  0.0297  0.1131  0.1789  0.2257  0.2854  0.3183  0.3242  0.3713 
β  0.9958***  0.9589***  0.8950***  0.8276***  0.6576***  0.5319***  0.5021***  0.4320*** 
Se β  0.0039  0.0148  0.0234  0.0295  0.0372  0.0415  0.0421  0.0479 
t β=1 -1.0856 -2.7757*** -4.4873*** -5.8440*** -9.1936*** -11.2901*** -11.8140*** -11.8655*** 
Wald  3.9955  14.4555***  34.0139***  56.9693***  146.4882***  243.8317***  334.9830***  841.3440*** 
ADF -7.9003*** -5.6919*** -5.2001*** -3.8194*** -2.6374*** -2.1988** -2.1257** -2.0078** 
R2  0.9810  0.9214  0.8288  0.7364  0.5143  0.3715  0.3438  0.2519 
CZK         
a  0.0001  0.0040  0.0299*  0.0630**  0.0936***  0.1985***  0.3175***  0.3566***  2.0116*** 
Se a  0.0014  0.0043  0.0180  0.0280  0.0348  0.0506  0.0612  0.0645  0.1367 
β  1.0000***  0.9987***  0.9900***  0.9790***  0.9686***  0.9334***  0.8923***  0.8788***  0.3129*** 
Se β  0.0004  0.0013  0.0055  0.0086  0.0107  0.0156  0.0189  0.0198  0.0453 
t β=1 -0.0375 -1.0055 -1.7968* -2.4350** -2.9319*** -4.2766*** -5.7097*** -6.1362*** -15.1620*** 
Wald  0.0014  1.7003  5.2629*  10.0788***  15.3592***  33.0165***  63.5964***  79.9227***  326.7667*** 
ADF -13.5052*** -9.8707*** -8.7902*** -7.2618*** -5.6715*** -3.9773*** -3.0511*** -3.2210*** -2.1914** 
R2  0.9984  0.9959  0.9820  0.9637  0.9469  0.8929  0.8503  0.8289  0.1643 
HUF         
a  0.0034  0.0173  0.1693***  0.3837***  0.5781***  1.1868***  1.6876***  1.9252***  5.0763*** 
Se a  0.0050  0.0152  0.0615  0.0943  0.1154  0.1616  0.1900  0.1909  0.3673 
β  0.9994***  0.9966***  0.9677***  0.9272***  0.8904***  0.7758***  0.6817***  0.6366***  0.0414 
Se β  0.0009  0.0028  0.0114  0.0175  0.0214  0.0299  0.0350  0.0351  0.0685 
t β=1 -0.6215 -1.2170 -2.8281*** -4.1667*** -5.1315*** -7.5116*** -9.0922*** -10.3522*** -14.0008*** 
Wald  3.6614  9.0861**  15.2497***  29.2330***  43.8094***  89.7351***  132.1756***  185.2012***  279.8635*** 
ADF -13.0628*** -9.8849*** -8.6045*** -7.1713*** -5.7096*** -3.9615*** -3.1523*** -2.8151*** -1.9246* 
R2  0.9927  0.9819  0.9275  0.8581  0.7983  0.6193  0.4872  0.4322  0.0015 
IDR         
a  0.3541**  0.5529***  0.6643***  1.4546***  2.3416***  4.7627***  10.4459***  9.7810*** 
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Se a  0.1672  0.1725  0.1132  0.1593  0.1942  0.2236  0.2757  0.1515 
β  0.9595***  0.9376***  0.9247***  0.8375***  0.7398***  0.4744*** -0.1435 -0.0716 
Se β  0.0183  0.0189  0.0125  0.0175  0.0213  0.0245  0.0299  0.0165 
t β=1 -2.2118** -3.3077*** -6.0450*** -9.2759*** -12.1937*** -21.4524*** -38.2113*** -64.8677*** 
Wald  44.5532***  57.0176***  62.4482***  102.4072***  162.7976***  476.4150***  1791.5660***  4264.1240*** 
ADF -3.8748*** -4.2029*** -7.3082*** -9.1818*** -7.9509*** -5.4725*** -4.4069*** -6.1717*** 
R2  0.8442  0.7964  0.9076  0.8152  0.7203  0.4429  0.0578  0.0425 
INR         
a -0.0003  0.0218**  0.1572***  0.3172***  0.4761***  0.9282***  1.5503***  2.1927*** 
Se a  0.0027  0.0086  0.0386  0.0622  0.0791  0.1136  0.1482  0.1714 
β  1.0001***  0.9941***  0.9584***  0.9162***  0.8743***  0.7557***  0.5930***  0.4255*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0022  0.0101  0.0163  0.0207  0.0296  0.0386  0.0446 
t β=1  0.1963 -2.6306*** -4.1200*** -5.1543*** -6.0817*** -8.2401*** -10.5361*** -12.8730*** 
Wald  12.2975***  22.4087***  23.5154***  34.0427***  45.8495***  80.3922***  126.7797***  184.2659*** 
ADF -12.3272*** -9.4415*** -7.9756*** -6.2329*** -4.8827*** -3.1851*** -2.4390** -1.6090 
R2  0.9955  0.9880  0.9393  0.8693  0.8028  0.6067  0.3633  0.1694 
MAD         
a  0.0041  0.0117  0.1562***  0.3602***  0.5254***  1.1302***  1.5545***  1.6390***  1.7861*** 
Se a  0.0042  0.0124  0.0480  0.0727  0.0861  0.1102  0.1240  0.1288  0.1191 
β  0.9981***  0.9942***  0.9253***  0.8282***  0.7494***  0.4636***  0.2641***  0.2238***  0.1492*** 
Se β  0.0020  0.0058  0.0225  0.0341  0.0403  0.0514  0.0577  0.0598  0.0544 
t β=1 -0.9710 -0.9866 -3.3132*** -5.0433*** -6.2122*** -10.4302*** -12.7561*** -12.9872*** -15.6356*** 
Wald  1.4156  3.7886  15.9527***  35.2608***  55.1648***  147.9562***  228.0052***  267.2788***  741.6160*** 
ADF -10.7424*** -8.2542*** -6.7412*** -4.9821*** -4.2581*** -2.8243*** -2.3961** -2.2341** -2.4087** 
R2  0.9830  0.9580  0.8240  0.6649  0.5504  0.2143  0.0687  0.0481  0.0294 
MXN         
a -0.0066 -0.0004  0.0237  0.0533  0.1935***  0.5179***  0.6038***  2.0141*** 
Se a  0.0054  0.0197  0.0320  0.0420  0.0672  0.0967  0.1023  0.1564 
β  1.0022***  0.9981***  0.9862***  0.9722***  0.9090***  0.7726***  0.7328***  0.1882*** 
Se β  0.0023  0.0083  0.0134  0.0176  0.0279  0.0397  0.0419  0.0616 
t β=1  0.9734 -0.2290 -1.0262 -1.5849 -3.2626*** -5.7307*** -6.3697*** -13.1778*** 
Wald  18.8858***  16.7495***  23.4948***  30.9693***  57.6730***  94.8473***  129.4498***  228.3096*** 
ADF -9.5575*** -7.8587*** -7.2038*** -5.8214*** -4.0390*** -3.0623*** -2.9407*** -2.0620** 
R2  0.9883  0.9619  0.9170  0.8701  0.7099  0.4868  0.4245  0.0373 
MYR         
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a  0.0774***  0.0758***  0.1480***  0.2218***  0.2428***  0.3893***  0.4540***  0.5771*** 
Se a  0.0058  0.0065  0.0144  0.0195  0.0225  0.0280  0.0307  0.0312 
β  0.9339***  0.9350***  0.8728***  0.8094***  0.7902***  0.6642***  0.6076***  0.5033*** 
Se β  0.0047  0.0053  0.0116  0.0157  0.0181  0.0222  0.0243  0.0245 
t β=1 -14.1705*** -12.3442*** -10.9556*** -12.1616*** -11.6143*** -15.0973*** -16.1547*** -20.2802*** 
Wald  294.6921***  238.6900***  195.9375***  244.4565***  241.3266***  408.7303***  494.5018***  739.3583*** 
ADF -3.5234*** -3.7898*** -4.1936*** -4.4444*** -3.9451*** -2.7917*** -2.2992** -2.1376** 
R2  0.9903  0.9853  0.9477  0.9034  0.8744  0.7725  0.6871  0.6043 
PHP         
a  0.0007  0.0075  0.0979***  0.2512***  0.4143***  0.9711***  0.7725***  1.8629*** 
Se a  0.0026  0.0080  0.0233  0.0378  0.0481  0.0690  0.1038  0.0924 
β  0.9999***  0.9978***  0.9738***  0.9334***  0.8905***  0.7448***  0.7931***  0.5127*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0021  0.0061  0.0099  0.0125  0.0179  0.0267  0.0238 
t β=1 -0.2052 -1.0388 -4.3150*** -6.7526*** -8.7473*** -14.2411*** -7.7539*** -20.4600*** 
Wald  3.5314  11.0020***  24.4779***  52.1562***  84.7707***  217.5302***  162.6223***  459.8111*** 
ADF -12.1079*** -10.3861*** -9.8650*** -9.4109*** -5.1186*** -3.8878*** -3.2700*** -2.2536** 
R2  0.9958  0.9895  0.9756  0.9463  0.9135  0.7949  0.6871  0.5246 
PKR         
a  0.0140***  0.0579***  0.1086***  0.1609***  0.3325***   
Se a  0.0039  0.0158  0.0245  0.0333  0.0551   
β  0.9965***  0.9861***  0.9741***  0.9617***  0.9213***   
Se β  0.0009  0.0037  0.0057  0.0078  0.0128   
t β=1 -3.8334*** -3.7914*** -4.5507*** -4.9411*** -6.1528***   
Wald  39.8177***  21.3353***  27.0875***  30.6874***  44.6147***   
ADF -8.2234*** -5.2722*** -4.6304*** -3.5572*** -1.8203*   
R2  0.9990  0.9953  0.9897  0.9813  0.9445   
PLZ         
a  0.0006  0.0054  0.0486***  0.1113***  0.1675***  0.3616***  0.5166***  0.5825***  1.0719*** 
Se a  0.0014  0.0041  0.0150  0.0236  0.0289  0.0411  0.0464  0.0475  0.0644 
β  0.9995***  0.9947***  0.9548***  0.8973***  0.8457***  0.6705***  0.5302***  0.4680***  0.0035 
Se β  0.0012  0.0035  0.0128  0.0202  0.0246  0.0348  0.0392  0.0400  0.0569 
t β=1 -0.3967 -1.5217 -3.5359*** -5.0935*** -6.2670*** -9.4598*** -11.9989*** -13.3168*** -17.5199*** 
Wald  0.4355  3.9973  16.0480***  32.1285***  48.5563***  106.4765***  172.3220***  218.7118***  346.3151*** 
ADF -10.2896*** -8.8548*** -7.6500*** -5.9404*** -4.6164*** -2.9960*** -2.5909*** -2.3364** -1.8908* 
R2  0.9924  0.9809  0.9246  0.8422  0.7705  0.5288  0.3678  0.3116 -0.0000 
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RUR         
a  0.0004  0.0307**  0.2078***  0.4718***  0.7227***  1.5263***  2.1204***  2.3818*** 
Se a  0.0045  0.0139  0.0504  0.0818  0.0994  0.1318  0.1482  0.1510 
β  0.9999***  0.9906***  0.9370***  0.8575***  0.7820***  0.5414***  0.3643***  0.2865*** 
Se β  0.0014  0.0042  0.0150  0.0244  0.0296  0.0391  0.0439  0.0446 
t β=1 -0.0620 -2.2681** -4.1914*** -5.8468*** -7.3743*** -11.7263*** -14.4857*** -15.9853*** 
Wald  0.4129  10.5868***  23.8334***  42.1304***  65.5373***  156.2984***  234.0859***  286.6966*** 
ADF -9.0565*** -8.2985*** -7.2221*** -5.2781*** -4.1012*** -2.7015*** -2.0108** -1.7177* 
R2  0.9913  0.9784  0.9099  0.8037  0.7083  0.3921  0.1983  0.1326 
THB         
a  0.0013  0.0071  0.0961***  0.2664***  0.4576***  1.0526***  0.6946***  1.8252*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0078  0.0329  0.0559  0.0742  0.1040  0.0992  0.1363 
β  0.9996***  0.9979***  0.9729***  0.9254***  0.8722***  0.7074***  0.8014***  0.4927*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0021  0.0091  0.0155  0.0205  0.0288  0.0273  0.0375 
t β=1 -0.5383 -0.9787 -2.9709*** -4.8196*** -6.2221*** -10.1746*** -7.2809*** -13.5179*** 
Wald  0.3107  4.7468*  10.4014***  24.7463***  40.2503***  105.1955***  111.7793***  190.8736*** 
ADF -10.3348*** -10.3627*** -7.5445*** -6.1159*** -4.9173*** -3.0052*** -2.6919*** -2.8190*** 
R2  0.9958  0.9896  0.9471  0.8726  0.7943  0.5766  0.6835  0.2923 
TRL         
a  0.0392***  0.0351***  0.0214***  0.0115  0.0021 -0.0272 -0.0388 -0.0746  0.3666*** 
Se a  0.0074  0.0075  0.0074  0.0077  0.0080  0.0091  0.0127  0.0135  0.0465 
β  0.9538***  0.9561***  0.9797***  0.9784***  0.9755***  0.9649***  0.8973***  0.8959***  0.0830 
Se β  0.0124  0.0128  0.0104  0.0111  0.0118  0.0141  0.0239  0.0224  0.0818 
t β=1 -3.7126*** -3.4370*** -1.9500* -1.9504* -2.0766** -2.4912** -4.3042*** -4.6453*** -11.2058*** 
Wald  37.9729***  29.9582***  12.3375***  5.9455*  4.3407  17.7429***  50.8155***  80.9694***  416.3438*** 
ADF -3.1958*** -3.1504*** -3.7258*** -3.7090*** -3.8835*** -3.1004*** -2.8427*** -2.6636*** -1.3663 
R2  0.9342  0.9308  0.9530  0.9474  0.9409  0.9175  0.7819  0.7973  0.0041 
TWD         
a  0.0141  0.1425***  0.3566***  0.5877***  1.2882***  1.4141***  2.4153***  3.5186*** 
Se a  0.0095  0.0358  0.0597  0.0768  0.1098  0.1336  0.1332  0.3313 
β  0.9960***  0.9592***  0.8978***  0.8314***  0.6302***  0.5934***  0.3060*** -0.0212 
Se β  0.0027  0.0103  0.0172  0.0222  0.0317  0.0385  0.0385  0.0966 
t β=1 -1.4678 -3.9516*** -5.9384*** -7.6053*** -11.6760*** -10.5637*** -18.0384*** -10.5764*** 
Wald  3.3521  18.2403***  39.7794***  64.3118***  149.1210***  113.9154***  353.7586***  132.1732*** 
ADF -10.7093*** -8.0127*** -6.3141*** -5.0164*** -3.3356*** -2.9162*** -1.8940* -1.0696 
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R2  0.9834  0.9331  0.8438  0.7481  0.4748  0.3717  0.1317  0.0002 
ZAR         
a  0.0015  0.0063  0.0465**  0.1225***  0.2034***  0.4679***  0.8990***  1.0282***  2.0991*** 
Se a  0.0018  0.0055  0.0185  0.0291  0.0370  0.0530  0.0714  0.0708  0.1043 
β  0.9994***  0.9963***  0.9745***  0.9349***  0.8931***  0.7577***  0.5451***  0.4766*** -0.0325 
Se β  0.0009  0.0027  0.0094  0.0147  0.0186  0.0265  0.0351  0.0349  0.0501 
t β=1 -0.6201 -1.3639 -2.7231*** -4.4381*** -5.7452*** -9.1501*** -12.9656*** -14.9873*** -20.5972*** 
Wald  4.6468*  7.3366**  11.0961***  23.8821***  37.7096***  91.1651***  181.4951***  239.8593***  459.1531*** 
ADF -15.3825*** -10.0708*** -8.2131*** -7.0841*** -5.8817*** -4.0949*** -2.8550*** -2.6133*** -2.2978** 
R2  0.9928  0.9827  0.9482  0.8911  0.8324  0.6509  0.3717  0.3073  0.0017 
Mean         
a  0.0461  0.0589  0.1343  0.2747  0.4221  0.8057  1.1935  1.3678  1.4622 
Se a  0.0105  0.0131  0.0298  0.0455  0.0562  0.0735  0.0869  0.0875  0.1242 
β  0.8903  0.8392  0.8104  0.7664  0.7223  0.6116  0.5153  0.4544  0.2338 
se β  0.0033  0.0040  0.0105  0.0157  0.0192  0.0255  0.0308  0.0326  0.0585 
t β=1 -27.5232 -13.2067 -4.5586 -4.3578 -4.8488 -6.5328 -8.2995 -10.4259 -13.3294 
Wald  2632627.2235  342850.8337  23473.2604  12314.9346  11737.6588  19121.4863  30455.7951  49450.9911  68072.7972 
R2  0.9459  0.9501  0.9068  0.8428  0.7851  0.6326  0.5076  0.4208  0.1366 
 
 
We use the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and standard 
errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1  and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) for the 
residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short codes are 
employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.3:  Simple efficiency hypothesis FMOLS test equation for EURO exchange rates 
 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0003 -0.0004 -0.3428  0.0047  0.0077  0.0116  0.0140  0.0330  0.1171* 
Se a  0.0005  0.0015  0.0324  0.0079  0.0099  0.0151  0.0202  0.0259  0.0604 
β  0.9994***  0.9994***  1.5946***  0.9733***  0.9594***  0.9297***  0.9040***  0.8472***  0.5543*** 
Se β  0.0011  0.0031  0.0631  0.0162  0.0202  0.0300  0.0395  0.0497  0.1084 
t β=1 -0.5638 -0.2028  9.4176*** -1.6462* -2.0118** -2.3448** -2.4274** -3.0752*** -4.1099*** 
Wald  0.6514  4.1483  216.5395***  22.5291***  32.9335***  60.0148***  86.9449***  113.2649***  244.9696*** 
ADF -17.0196*** -10.6450*** -2.7874*** -7.8191*** -6.8009*** -5.0666*** -3.9496*** -3.3350*** -1.3887 
R2  0.9919  0.9805  0.5825  0.8837  0.8330  0.6921  0.5599  0.4185  0.0993 
CAD         
a  0.0005  0.0020  0.0205***  0.0418***  0.0631***  0.1217***  0.1662***  0.2358***  0.2787*** 
Se a  0.0005  0.0016  0.0059  0.0086  0.0104  0.0148  0.0177  0.0203  0.0319 
β  0.9986***  0.9941***  0.9422***  0.8825***  0.8235***  0.6623***  0.5394***  0.3556***  0.1966** 
Se β  0.0014  0.0042  0.0152  0.0219  0.0266  0.0375  0.0444  0.0505  0.0781 
t β=1 -0.9914 -1.4144 -3.8145*** -5.3630*** -6.6444*** -9.0080*** -10.3814*** -12.7575*** -10.2855*** 
Wald  0.9860  2.4877  16.4553***  32.3566***  49.2019***  90.9910***  125.6299***  188.1041***  192.3797*** 
ADF -14.5904*** -11.9968*** -8.6453*** -7.4966*** -5.8480*** -4.2089*** -3.3473*** -2.7305*** -1.7879* 
R2  0.9862  0.9660  0.8755  0.7740  0.6761  0.4199  0.2621  0.1073  0.0254 
CHF         
a  0.0000 -0.0001  0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0070 -0.0078 -0.0090 -0.1148 
Se a  0.0003  0.0008  0.0030  0.0044  0.0053  0.0076  0.0102  0.0130  0.0368 
β  0.9998***  1.0006***  0.9988***  1.0004***  1.0004***  1.0127***  1.0112***  1.0091***  1.1939*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0073  0.0108  0.0131  0.0190  0.0255  0.0325  0.0918 
t β=1 -0.3465  0.2956 -0.1662  0.0376  0.0308  0.6678  0.4375  0.2809  2.1126** 
Wald  1.5953  0.5066  0.0284  0.1721  0.2693  1.8587  2.6860  4.2829  44.6193*** 
ADF -13.7344*** -13.2748*** -9.6393*** -10.6047*** -6.8537*** -5.2168*** -3.8456*** -3.1112*** -1.3711 
R2  0.9966  0.9918  0.9705  0.9490  0.9286  0.8713  0.7934  0.7084  0.4193 
GBP         
a -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0022 -0.0035 -0.0100 -0.0162 -0.0261 -0.0995 
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Se a  0.0002  0.0007  0.0025  0.0038  0.0047  0.0067  0.0080  0.0095  0.0162 
β  0.9996***  1.0000***  0.9968***  0.9926***  0.9877***  0.9659***  0.9455***  0.9120***  0.4948*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0020  0.0072  0.0109  0.0134  0.0191  0.0232  0.0275  0.0586 
t β=1 -0.6618 -0.0177 -0.4487 -0.6837 -0.9193 -1.7810* -2.3520** -3.2002*** -8.6242*** 
Wald  1.1508  0.2827  0.2123  0.4854  0.9281  3.3588  5.7559*  10.6724***  99.8114*** 
ADF -13.3399*** -10.8341*** -8.7070*** -7.6192*** -6.4153*** -4.3566*** -3.6237*** -3.2713*** -1.6581* 
R2  0.9970  0.9926  0.9728  0.9475  0.9247  0.8589  0.8032  0.7334  0.2308 
HKD         
a  0.0008  0.0021  0.0261  0.0624**  0.0953***  0.2093***  0.3251***  0.4480***  1.9890*** 
Se a  0.0015  0.0044  0.0173  0.0273  0.0338  0.0492  0.0606  0.0703  0.1577 
β  0.9997***  0.9991***  0.9885***  0.9727***  0.9585***  0.9088***  0.8581***  0.8040***  0.1561** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0077  0.0122  0.0151  0.0220  0.0271  0.0315  0.0675 
t β=1 -0.5319 -0.4614 -1.4795 -2.2337** -2.7423*** -4.1404*** -5.2319*** -6.2272*** -12.5080*** 
Wald  0.2831  0.2459  2.3853  5.5764*  8.7424**  19.9820***  31.5159***  43.7527***  173.3888*** 
ADF -12.5936*** -9.8071*** -8.2615*** -6.6847*** -5.3932*** -3.8238*** -3.0294*** -2.7584*** -2.3455** 
R2  0.9969  0.9923  0.9671  0.9315  0.9003  0.8024  0.7115  0.6216  0.0212 
ILS         
a  0.0023  0.0086  0.0900**  0.2053***  0.2539***  0.4739***  0.6048***  0.7450***  0.4913*** 
Se a  0.0036  0.0106  0.0368  0.0542  0.0594  0.0719  0.0776  0.0831  0.0699 
β  0.9986***  0.9946***  0.9450***  0.8749***  0.8450***  0.7112***  0.6305***  0.5440***  0.6807*** 
Se β  0.0021  0.0064  0.0220  0.0324  0.0355  0.0429  0.0461  0.0493  0.0408 
t β=1 -0.6435 -0.8438 -2.4951** -3.8610*** -4.3639*** -6.7356*** -8.0108*** -9.2578*** -7.8188*** 
Wald  0.4272  1.5852  8.2693**  18.5731***  25.4541***  61.0170***  96.1245***  144.7567***  479.7557*** 
ADF -10.3856*** -7.8964*** -6.9430*** -5.8802*** -5.3687*** -3.9765*** -3.5563*** -3.1181*** -4.0942*** 
R2  0.9792  0.9513  0.8387  0.7064  0.6630  0.4750  0.3920  0.3026  0.5211 
JPY         
a  0.0024  0.0094  0.1034**  0.2441***  0.3895***  0.7979***  1.0821***  1.3770***  1.7423*** 
Se a  0.0044  0.0133  0.0482  0.0750  0.0940  0.1378  0.1654  0.1856  0.4606 
β  0.9995***  0.9981***  0.9789***  0.9501***  0.9203***  0.8361***  0.7776***  0.7173***  0.6394*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0028  0.0100  0.0155  0.0195  0.0286  0.0343  0.0385  0.0944 
t β=1 -0.5813 -0.6752 -2.1104** -3.2109*** -4.0909*** -5.7335*** -6.4797*** -7.3341*** -3.8194*** 
Wald  1.0231  1.3690  5.7344*  12.3361***  19.6302***  36.5715***  46.7916***  61.9318***  17.2879*** 
ADF -13.2359*** -10.0369*** -8.2737*** -6.9053*** -5.3892*** -3.4987*** -2.9684*** -2.9611*** -1.5558 
R2  0.9942  0.9855  0.9450  0.8878  0.8317  0.6716  0.5587  0.4645  0.1615 
NOK         
182 
 
a  0.0037  0.0111  0.1185***  0.2631***  0.3992***  0.7237***  1.1724***  1.7065***  2.3693*** 
Se a  0.0032  0.0095  0.0351  0.0523  0.0640  0.0881  0.1080  0.1213  0.1756 
β  0.9982***  0.9945***  0.9422***  0.8719***  0.8059***  0.6487***  0.4332***  0.1780*** -0.1360 
Se β  0.0016  0.0046  0.0168  0.0250  0.0307  0.0421  0.0514  0.0577  0.0829 
t β=1 -1.1426 -1.1972 -3.4338*** -5.1139*** -6.3311*** -8.3464*** -11.0198*** -14.2529*** -13.7052*** 
Wald  1.7293  4.3687  17.8413***  38.3194***  58.8129***  109.6281***  183.1777***  291.3776***  295.5109*** 
ADF -16.8337*** -10.4375*** -8.2792*** -6.9060*** -5.9607*** -4.2862*** -3.1770*** -2.6486*** -1.8158* 
R2  0.9828  0.9590  0.8492  0.7179  0.6030  0.3545  0.1426  0.0224  0.0106 
NZD         
a  0.0006  0.0010  0.0150  0.0305**  0.0466***  0.0878***  0.1325***  0.2149***  0.6111*** 
Se a  0.0009  0.0026  0.0092  0.0132  0.0163  0.0238  0.0305  0.0375  0.0684 
β  0.9991***  0.9973***  0.9710***  0.9416***  0.9118***  0.8356***  0.7559***  0.6240***  0.0242 
Se β  0.0013  0.0040  0.0139  0.0199  0.0244  0.0350  0.0443  0.0536  0.0939 
t β=1 -0.6486 -0.6678 -2.0872** -2.9342*** -3.6103*** -4.6936*** -5.5081*** -7.0189*** -10.3977*** 
Wald  0.8638  4.2725  13.6390***  26.6243***  39.8417***  75.5614***  115.9256***  165.7945***  272.1010*** 
ADF -13.7592*** -10.8675*** -8.6419*** -8.1397*** -6.8590*** -4.7252*** -3.7697*** -2.9880*** -1.0415 
R2  0.9875  0.9696  0.8993  0.8243  0.7532  0.5697  0.4114  0.2494  0.0003 
SGD         
a  0.0001  0.0010  0.0095*  0.0217**  0.0329***  0.0662***  0.1096***  0.1704*** -0.1758 
Se a  0.0005  0.0015  0.0056  0.0087  0.0106  0.0154  0.0196  0.0238  0.0532 
β  0.9997***  0.9985***  0.9845***  0.9647***  0.9467***  0.8931***  0.8237***  0.7263***  1.1918*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0024  0.0089  0.0140  0.0169  0.0246  0.0314  0.0380  0.0781 
t β=1 -0.3599 -0.6057 -1.7345* -2.5317** -3.1474*** -4.3429*** -5.6213*** -7.2080***  2.4570** 
Wald  0.6213  0.4261  3.0107  6.4157**  9.9063***  18.8705***  31.6450***  52.0694***  105.3107*** 
ADF -12.5348*** -10.1765*** -8.6483*** -6.9460*** -5.8545*** -4.1664*** -3.1932*** -2.6328*** -2.3175** 
R2  0.9951  0.9888  0.9563  0.9117  0.8755  0.7586  0.6284  0.4771  0.4912 
USD         
a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0025  0.0062**  0.0097***  0.0215***  0.0332***  0.0449***  0.2507*** 
Se a  0.0002  0.0005  0.0019  0.0030  0.0036  0.0052  0.0064  0.0074  0.0201 
β  0.9996***  0.9988***  0.9873***  0.9706***  0.9559***  0.9048***  0.8535***  0.8007***  0.1776*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0078  0.0122  0.0150  0.0216  0.0264  0.0304  0.0668 
t β=1 -0.5563 -0.6184 -1.6347 -2.4089** -2.9417*** -4.4067*** -5.5492*** -6.5620*** -12.3199*** 
Wald  0.3484  0.3831  2.7075  6.0103**  9.2148**  21.0686***  33.4831***  46.5626***  156.0812*** 
ADF -12.6063*** -9.9065*** -8.3443*** -6.7075*** -5.4209*** -3.8461*** -3.0441*** -2.7592*** -2.3836** 
R2  0.9969  0.9922  0.9669  0.9318  0.9017  0.8071  0.7203  0.6365  0.0277 
183 
 
AED         
a  0.0006  0.0014  0.1389***  0.0417**  0.0636***  0.1380***  0.2110***  0.2867***  1.3112*** 
Se a  0.0010  0.0030  0.0169  0.0182  0.0225  0.0324  0.0394  0.0453  0.1177 
β  0.9996***  0.9990***  0.9110***  0.9725***  0.9584***  0.9100***  0.8624***  0.8128***  0.1837** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0020  0.0114  0.0122  0.0151  0.0218  0.0265  0.0305  0.0738 
t β=1 -0.6077 -0.4852 -7.8097*** -2.2458** -2.7546*** -4.1348*** -5.1929*** -6.1449*** -11.0656*** 
Wald  0.3881  0.2359  76.5397***  5.2909*  8.2277**  18.9671***  30.0227***  41.7625***  128.1744*** 
ADF -13.5561*** -9.8667*** -4.9846*** -6.6959*** -5.4061*** -3.8521*** -3.0745*** -2.7973*** -2.3797** 
R2  0.9969  0.9922  0.9311  0.9314  0.9007  0.8067  0.7233  0.6418  0.0242 
BRL         
a  0.0064  0.0518***  0.1139***  0.1748***  0.3423***  0.4896***  0.6506***  0.7927*** 
Se a  0.0040  0.0156  0.0222  0.0255  0.0302  0.0340  0.0340  0.0354 
β  0.9914***  0.9382***  0.8665***  0.7972***  0.6101***  0.4507***  0.2834***  0.1249*** 
Se β  0.0040  0.0155  0.0219  0.0250  0.0289  0.0319  0.0310  0.0294 
t β=1 -2.1367** -3.9804*** -6.0899*** -8.1207*** -13.4956*** -17.2161*** -23.0916*** -29.8109*** 
Wald  20.0374***  37.3622***  81.3335***  140.9077***  383.9162***  641.1748***  1147.1250***  3138.3040*** 
ADF -9.3266*** -7.6602*** -6.0648*** -5.2486*** -3.9600*** -3.7227*** -3.3864*** -2.5431** 
R2  0.9786  0.9128  0.8431  0.7818  0.6005  0.4116  0.2305  0.0691 
CLP         
a  0.0196  0.2648*  0.6123***  0.9580***  1.8569***  3.3475***  4.5662***  7.7876*** 
Se a  0.0384  0.1402  0.2051  0.2475  0.3170  0.4025  0.4504  0.5015 
β  0.9969***  0.9592***  0.9057***  0.8525***  0.7142***  0.4862***  0.3002*** -0.1882 
Se β  0.0059  0.0214  0.0313  0.0377  0.0483  0.0612  0.0684  0.0759 
t β=1 -0.5237 -1.9092* -3.0153*** -3.9089*** -5.9203*** -8.3918*** -10.2269*** -15.6612*** 
Wald  1.3951  6.2903**  14.7180***  24.7203***  61.3923***  112.4941***  167.1293***  389.8765*** 
ADF -9.3765*** -6.5861*** -5.8428*** -4.6621*** -3.6650*** -2.6863*** -2.0922** -1.7452* 
R2  0.9592  0.8533  0.7378  0.6422  0.4213  0.1809  0.0656  0.0237 
CNY         
a  0.0023  0.0709**  0.1838***  0.2902***  0.5955***  0.9051***  1.1872*** -0.4537 
Se a  0.0079  0.0312  0.0495  0.0613  0.0911  0.1129  0.1316  0.2053 
β  0.9991***  0.9692***  0.9199***  0.8736***  0.7400***  0.6040***  0.4796***  1.2025*** 
Se β  0.0035  0.0139  0.0221  0.0274  0.0407  0.0506  0.0590  0.0917 
t β=1 -0.2565 -2.2157** -3.6251*** -4.6195*** -6.3844*** -7.8331*** -8.8212***  2.2084** 
Wald  0.8179  6.7843**  17.4544***  29.0381***  56.1035***  85.7320***  111.5248***  4.8868* 
ADF -8.7797*** -6.9181*** -5.4294*** -4.5775*** -3.0793*** -2.4528** -1.9090* -2.8887*** 
184 
 
R2  0.9813  0.9164  0.8257  0.7454  0.4995  0.3089  0.1744  0.4047 
COP         
a  0.0474  0.3803***  0.8451***  1.3238***  2.4625***  3.4397***  3.9865***  3.9728*** 
Se a  0.0401  0.1434  0.2090  0.2520  0.3119  0.3581  0.3863  0.4394 
β  0.9939***  0.9514***  0.8921***  0.8311***  0.6858***  0.5612***  0.4910***  0.4878*** 
Se β  0.0051  0.0181  0.0263  0.0318  0.0392  0.0449  0.0484  0.0546 
t β=1 -1.2049 -2.6856*** -4.0951*** -5.3195*** -8.0107*** -9.7641*** -10.5204*** -9.3834*** 
Wald  4.1237  13.6031***  31.0810***  52.7712***  134.1398***  229.4658***  334.0455***  762.6284*** 
ADF -8.5904*** -6.4182*** -5.5415*** -4.6677*** -3.3642*** -2.8859*** -2.4661** -2.3119** 
R2  0.9688  0.8882  0.7949  0.7090  0.5077  0.3558  0.2735  0.2468 
CZK         
a -0.0000  0.0059  0.0440**  0.1035***  0.1654***  0.3462***  0.4964***  0.6321***  1.7708*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0052  0.0182  0.0267  0.0327  0.0457  0.0545  0.0586  0.1026 
β  1.0000***  0.9982***  0.9864***  0.9681***  0.9491***  0.8934***  0.8469***  0.8047***  0.4494*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0015  0.0054  0.0079  0.0097  0.0135  0.0161  0.0173  0.0310 
t β=1  0.0047 -1.1819 -2.5210** -4.0421*** -5.2623*** -7.8948*** -9.5078*** -11.2919*** -17.7628*** 
Wald  0.0363  2.4694  12.3189***  31.6804***  52.7181***  120.0380***  184.0067***  270.0956***  695.4369*** 
ADF -12.7873*** -10.9044*** -8.5377*** -7.6866*** -6.4453*** -4.3668*** -3.6195*** -3.2195*** -2.5433** 
R2  0.9982  0.9955  0.9842  0.9698  0.9554  0.9126  0.8722  0.8458  0.4657 
HUF         
a  0.0069  0.0195  0.2236**  0.6237***  1.0739***  2.3949***  3.3355***  3.5046***  4.5137*** 
Se a  0.0085  0.0257  0.0912  0.1408  0.1807  0.2472  0.2775  0.2894  0.3074 
β  0.9988***  0.9963***  0.9591***  0.8866***  0.8053***  0.5674***  0.3985***  0.3678***  0.1922*** 
Se β  0.0015  0.0046  0.0164  0.0253  0.0324  0.0442  0.0495  0.0516  0.0543 
t β=1 -0.7853 -0.8018 -2.4995** -4.4878*** -6.0103*** -9.7807*** -12.1430*** -12.2589*** -14.8700*** 
Wald  7.3292**  15.5373***  24.6259***  49.5840***  75.1470***  174.9520***  279.7336***  352.7221***  415.5178*** 
ADF -12.7088*** -9.9232*** -7.7834*** -7.3443*** -5.7032*** -3.7829*** -3.0831*** -2.9392*** -2.2479** 
R2  0.9829  0.9587  0.8595  0.7178  0.5754  0.2761  0.1341  0.1100  0.0485 
IDR         
a  0.1005**  0.0975*  0.1788*  0.3398**  0.4713***  1.0278***  1.7465***  2.9613*** 
Se a  0.0484  0.0523  0.0945  0.1399  0.1745  0.2398  0.2838  0.3257 
β  0.9894***  0.9896***  0.9806***  0.9629***  0.9484***  0.8879***  0.8106***  0.6802*** 
Se β  0.0052  0.0056  0.0102  0.0150  0.0187  0.0257  0.0304  0.0348 
t β=1 -2.0341** -1.8466* -1.9154* -2.4671** -2.7542*** -4.3589*** -6.2298*** -9.1833*** 
Wald  8.1065**  4.0955  4.8258*  9.5317***  14.1818***  31.7111***  52.9790***  103.1987*** 
185 
 
ADF -7.0988*** -7.2268*** -8.3203*** -6.7117*** -5.5672*** -5.1197*** -3.5365*** -3.6423*** 
R2  0.9840  0.9781  0.9464  0.8994  0.8547  0.7401  0.6347  0.4858 
INR         
a  0.0005  0.0023  0.0296  0.0615  0.0866  0.1431*  0.2112**  0.3325*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0076  0.0291  0.0451  0.0554  0.0784  0.0981  0.1222 
β  0.9999***  0.9993***  0.9921***  0.9839***  0.9775***  0.9632***  0.9461***  0.9161*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0072  0.0112  0.0138  0.0195  0.0244  0.0303 
t β=1 -0.1186 -0.3917 -1.0870 -1.4307 -1.6315 -1.8877* -2.2117** -2.7691*** 
Wald  3.9750  5.2586*  4.0036  4.6723*  5.3340*  5.8514*  6.9716**  9.1069** 
ADF -14.2686*** -10.1398*** -8.3005*** -6.9353*** -5.8784*** -4.5425*** -3.7349*** -3.3662*** 
R2  0.9972  0.9930  0.9719  0.9436  0.9191  0.8543  0.7875  0.6973 
MAD         
a  0.0058  0.0295*  0.2611***  0.5999***  0.9176***  1.9746***  2.5254***  2.6154***  2.3972*** 
Se a  0.0055  0.0160  0.0572  0.0850  0.0991  0.1061  0.0940  0.0810  0.0527 
β  0.9976***  0.9875***  0.8908***  0.7498***  0.6177***  0.1806*** -0.0459 -0.0824  0.0075 
Se β  0.0023  0.0066  0.0237  0.0352  0.0409  0.0437  0.0386  0.0331  0.0212 
t β=1 -1.0261 -1.8793* -4.6084*** -7.1148*** -9.3392*** -18.7593*** -27.1148*** -32.6913*** -46.7759*** 
Wald  10.7059***  52.2910***  94.7180***  173.8868***  278.6992***  849.2599***  1803.5460***  3024.3410*** 
 10099.0000**
* 
ADF -12.4768*** -7.9898*** -6.1138*** -4.7988*** -3.8578*** -2.6234*** -2.3270** -2.3328** -2.6701*** 
R2  0.9778  0.9499  0.7990  0.6061  0.4476  0.0540  0.0050  0.0220  0.0005 
MXN         
a -0.0041 -0.0070 -0.0059  0.0003  0.0321  0.0848  0.2160***  1.9104*** 
Se a  0.0040  0.0155  0.0249  0.0323  0.0496  0.0631  0.0811  0.1473 
β  1.0011***  1.0010***  0.9994***  0.9958***  0.9806***  0.9576***  0.9053***  0.3123*** 
Se β  0.0015  0.0059  0.0096  0.0124  0.0189  0.0239  0.0306  0.0520 
t β=1  0.7436  0.1751 -0.0650 -0.3358 -1.0233 -1.7698* -3.0920*** -13.2326*** 
Wald  8.3280**  7.3121**  8.8620**  10.5962***  15.5142***  22.3746***  29.4956***  212.6578*** 
ADF -10.0309*** -7.7867*** -6.3738*** -5.3716*** -4.1552*** -3.4554*** -2.9558*** -2.5859*** 
R2  0.9954  0.9811  0.9593  0.9351  0.8653  0.7958  0.6849  0.1303 
MYR         
a  0.0018  0.0008  0.0342  0.0882**  0.1414***  0.3726***  0.6150***  0.7775*** 
Se a  0.0024  0.0070  0.0255  0.0400  0.0498  0.0792  0.0972  0.1131 
β  0.9988***  0.9993***  0.9762***  0.9392***  0.9032***  0.7482***  0.5865***  0.4773*** 
Se β  0.0016  0.0046  0.0168  0.0264  0.0328  0.0520  0.0636  0.0739 
186 
 
t β=1 -0.7313 -0.1586 -1.4149 -2.3037** -2.9530*** -4.8378*** -6.4979*** -7.0773*** 
Wald  0.5378  0.9940  4.1817  9.1538**  13.6939***  31.2919***  56.5354***  74.0087*** 
ADF -10.2625*** -8.4337*** -7.4672*** -5.6139*** -4.6745*** -2.9440*** -2.2013** -2.1052** 
R2  0.9878  0.9734  0.9014  0.8070  0.7234  0.4331  0.2282  0.1285 
PHP         
a  0.0020  0.0008  0.0378  0.0998**  0.1637***  0.3945***  0.5854***  0.7837*** 
Se a  0.0026  0.0076  0.0289  0.0454  0.0561  0.0813  0.0957  0.1093 
β  0.9995***  0.9996***  0.9900***  0.9741***  0.9579***  0.8997***  0.8515***  0.8018*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0071  0.0112  0.0138  0.0200  0.0234  0.0267 
t β=1 -0.7122 -0.2046 -1.4021 -2.3109** -3.0459*** -5.0213*** -6.3317*** -7.4215*** 
Wald  2.3464  4.3737  6.4197**  11.4650***  17.3823***  39.4642***  63.3902***  88.8892*** 
ADF -14.3314*** -10.1696*** -8.4394*** -7.0159*** -6.0643*** -4.4696*** -3.5931*** -3.1704*** 
R2  0.9971  0.9930  0.9718  0.9421  0.9146  0.8287  0.7650  0.6926 
PKR         
a  0.0163*  0.0989***  0.1941***  0.2786***  0.5840***  5.7799*** 
Se a  0.0096  0.0347  0.0501  0.0619  0.0894  1.3954 
β  0.9962***  0.9781***  0.9574***  0.9390***  0.8724*** -0.1978 
Se β  0.0021  0.0076  0.0109  0.0135  0.0195  0.2867 
t β=1 -1.7867* -2.8894*** -3.9008*** -4.5210*** -6.5597*** -4.1785*** 
Wald  6.7815**  8.9636**  15.3916***  20.5587***  43.2115***  81.7279*** 
ADF -8.7251*** -6.6248*** -5.7301*** -4.7824*** -3.0430*** -1.5417 
R2  0.9947  0.9801  0.9636  0.9456  0.8741  0.0087 
PLZ         
a  0.0014  0.0081  0.0758***  0.1920***  0.3146***  0.6739***  0.9348***  1.1432***  1.4512*** 
Se a  0.0020  0.0060  0.0214  0.0348  0.0439  0.0618  0.0694  0.0736  0.0744 
β  0.9991***  0.9939***  0.9446***  0.8610***  0.7731***  0.5160***  0.3298***  0.1825*** -0.0510 
Se β  0.0014  0.0043  0.0152  0.0247  0.0312  0.0437  0.0489  0.0517  0.0523 
t β=1 -0.6055 -1.4313 -3.6325*** -5.6202*** -7.2689*** -11.0719*** -13.6991*** -15.8087*** -20.0903*** 
Wald  1.8805  3.8737  15.1843***  33.8810***  55.4989***  128.5447***  198.9681***  264.6686***  472.2340*** 
ADF -10.2832*** -8.0131*** -6.9131*** -5.9081*** -4.3713*** -2.8057*** -2.2805** -2.0219** -1.9835** 
R2  0.9880  0.9705  0.8931  0.7597  0.6299  0.2942  0.1248  0.0395  0.0039 
RUR         
a -0.0005  0.0325**  0.1841***  0.4167***  0.6357***  1.2127***  1.6460***  2.0394*** 
Se a  0.0048  0.0147  0.0447  0.0714  0.0897  0.1138  0.1259  0.1358 
β  1.0002***  0.9908***  0.9485***  0.8840***  0.8234***  0.6640***  0.5446***  0.4365*** 
187 
 
Se β  0.0013  0.0040  0.0123  0.0196  0.0246  0.0311  0.0344  0.0370 
t β=1  0.1270 -2.2632** -4.1946*** -5.9170*** -7.1842*** -10.7945*** -13.2557*** -15.2490*** 
Wald  0.7135  11.1940***  25.8655***  44.9949***  63.7602***  139.0805***  209.9088***  278.3262*** 
ADF -9.9699*** -9.4195*** -6.4470*** -6.1983*** -4.0414*** -3.3348*** -2.6111*** -2.0462** 
R2  0.9921  0.9809  0.9406  0.8651  0.7946  0.6076  0.4717  0.3383 
THB         
a  0.0020  0.0043  0.0742*  0.1879***  0.2917***  0.6186***  0.9395***  1.3285*** 
Se a  0.0040  0.0117  0.0426  0.0667  0.0818  0.1144  0.1375  0.1601 
β  0.9995***  0.9988***  0.9799***  0.9496***  0.9219***  0.8352***  0.7502***  0.6473*** 
Se β  0.0011  0.0031  0.0112  0.0176  0.0216  0.0302  0.0362  0.0421 
t β=1 -0.5012 -0.3970 -1.7847* -2.8631*** -3.6204*** -5.4667*** -6.9034*** -8.3790*** 
Wald  0.2737  1.5398  5.4129*  11.1123***  16.7442***  34.9109***  54.4270***  79.5850*** 
ADF -12.5000*** -10.2910*** -8.9260*** -7.4169*** -6.1394*** -4.4932*** -3.5074*** -2.9218*** 
R2  0.9917  0.9814  0.9309  0.8610  0.8038  0.6451  0.5123  0.3709 
TRL         
a  0.0870***  0.0844***  0.0842***  0.0857***  0.0890***  0.1049***  0.1389***  0.1865***  0.4470*** 
Se a  0.0097  0.0100  0.0106  0.0113  0.0122  0.0143  0.0171  0.0196  0.0628 
β  0.8606***  0.8602***  0.8505***  0.8364***  0.8191***  0.7589***  0.6708***  0.5696***  0.3155*** 
Se β  0.0141  0.0145  0.0153  0.0163  0.0174  0.0201  0.0233  0.0259  0.0731 
t β=1 -9.8775*** -9.6719*** -9.7491*** -10.0206*** -10.3828*** -11.9747*** -14.1195*** -16.5887*** -9.3591*** 
Wald  115.4138***  107.5451***  103.5789***  104.7742***  109.6041***  143.7169***  203.9124***  287.1793***  449.2780*** 
ADF -5.8229*** -6.1285*** -5.9046*** -5.4616*** -5.1913*** -4.4634*** -3.9292*** -3.5676*** -2.2470** 
R2  0.7617  0.7556  0.7387  0.7186  0.6950  0.6242  0.5250  0.4132  0.0693 
TWD         
a -0.0032  0.0131  0.0481  0.0829  0.1945**  0.3727***  0.6476***  3.9301*** 
Se a  0.0074  0.0276  0.0445  0.0561  0.0815  0.1031  0.1272  0.3373 
β  1.0009***  0.9967***  0.9874***  0.9783***  0.9489***  0.9012***  0.8269*** -0.0486 
Se β  0.0020  0.0075  0.0122  0.0154  0.0223  0.0283  0.0349  0.0906 
t β=1  0.4661 -0.4412 -1.0323 -1.4121 -2.2901** -3.4960*** -4.9588*** -11.5806*** 
Wald  0.6574  0.8948  2.6320  4.7169*  11.6023***  22.4225***  37.3421***  158.7509*** 
ADF -10.0007*** -8.3425*** -7.1510*** -5.5837*** -4.1813*** -3.3215*** -2.8258*** -1.6165 
R2  0.9921  0.9689  0.9338  0.9008  0.8114  0.7120  0.5832  0.0011 
ZAR         
a  0.0031  0.0055  0.0391*  0.0888***  0.1357***  0.3330***  0.5094***  0.7715***  2.2157*** 
Se a  0.0021  0.0055  0.0206  0.0317  0.0389  0.0571  0.0665  0.0780  0.1074 
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β  0.9988***  0.9971***  0.9807***  0.9571***  0.9349***  0.8432***  0.7620***  0.6434***  0.0501 
Se β  0.0009  0.0025  0.0094  0.0143  0.0176  0.0257  0.0297  0.0346  0.0452 
t β=1 -1.2662 -1.1744 -2.0597** -2.9949*** -3.7071*** -6.1052*** -8.0041*** -10.2916*** -21.0163*** 
Wald  7.7077**  5.0046*  7.3848**  12.9573***  18.9068***  45.4160***  77.0666***  122.4682***  460.7182*** 
ADF -15.6979*** -11.8380*** -8.4131*** -7.1294*** -5.8381*** -4.2817*** -3.2248*** -2.7528*** -2.5922*** 
R2  0.9949  0.9878  0.9527  0.9065  0.8647  0.7194  0.6149  0.4622  0.0049 
Mean         
a  0.0092  0.0133  0.0748  0.1870  0.2888  0.5903  0.8717  1.2689  1.6461 
Se a  0.0046  0.0107  0.0357  0.0523  0.0641  0.0864  0.1018  0.1553  0.1517 
β  0.9931  0.9924  0.9843  0.9306  0.8959  0.7912  0.6936  0.5763  0.3421 
se β  0.0018  0.0038  0.0139  0.0181  0.0220  0.0300  0.0360  0.0486  0.0669 
t β=1 -0.2140 -0.1912 -0.3975 -0.6118 -0.7585 -1.1393 -1.4717 -1.7187 -2.5296 
Wald  7.0456  8.9235  24.2933  27.2211  40.9078  95.7422  169.8271  258.9455  811.1950 
R2  0.9814  0.9726  0.9079  0.8533  0.7945  0.6341  0.5049  0.3874  0.1459 
 
 
 
We use the Fully Modified OLS (FMOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and standard 
errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1  and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) for the 
residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short codes are 
employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.4:  Simple efficiency hypothesis DOLS test equation for Sterling exchange rates 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0069 -0.0139 -0.0217 -0.0447 -0.0919 -0.0803 
Se a  0.0005  0.0017  0.0058  0.0085  0.0104  0.0151  0.0175  0.0257 
β  0.9997***  1.0013***  1.0051***  1.0106***  1.0173***  1.0364***  1.0711***  1.0583*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0021  0.0069  0.0102  0.0124  0.0179  0.0205  0.0300 
t β=1 -0.5615  0.6196  0.7397  1.0446  1.3906  2.0350**  3.4606***  1.9441* 
Wald  0.7365  3.4404  4.6015  8.4089**  12.4446***  24.7713***  91.0312***  43.0751*** 
ADF -63.3702*** -12.3502*** -9.4529*** -7.5201*** -6.7558*** -4.9551*** -4.5162*** -3.3432*** 
R2  0.9987  0.9950  0.9763  0.9555  0.9380  0.8876  0.8616  0.7545 
CAD         
a  0.0002  0.0002  0.0000 -0.0023 -0.0034 -0.0014 -0.0039 -0.0186 
Se a  0.0005  0.0017  0.0053  0.0074  0.0091  0.0138  0.0159  0.0192 
β  0.9995***  0.9993***  0.9987***  1.0008***  1.0014***  0.9949***  0.9880***  1.0095*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0023  0.0071  0.0099  0.0122  0.0185  0.0214  0.0257 
t β=1 -0.8435 -0.3030 -0.1782  0.0798  0.1141 -0.2752 -0.5602  0.3701 
Wald  2.6406  0.6253  0.6558  1.2177  1.6995  3.5077  16.1595***  10.5056*** 
ADF -63.3396*** -13.1825*** -10.3379*** -8.5571*** -6.8899*** -5.0007*** -4.0033*** -3.7605*** 
R2  0.9985  0.9942  0.9744  0.9563  0.9376  0.8713  0.8301  0.7908 
CHF         
a  0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0040 -0.0091 -0.0119 -0.0182 -0.0232 -0.0295 -0.0392 
Se a  0.0004  0.0014  0.0043  0.0063  0.0081  0.0123  0.0144  0.0186  0.0407 
β  0.9997***  1.0010***  1.0058***  1.0127***  1.0167***  1.0260***  1.0289***  1.0418***  0.9544*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0018  0.0056  0.0083  0.0106  0.0163  0.0193  0.0249  0.0609 
t β=1 -0.6924  0.5657  1.0275  1.5320  1.5746  1.5970  1.4953  1.6799* -0.7481 
Wald  6.5768**  0.3252  1.1262  2.3779  2.5234  2.6384  2.6635  2.8751  58.1359*** 
ADF -63.3869*** -11.7243*** -10.0532*** -7.7625*** -6.5506*** -4.3122*** -3.5632*** -3.3089*** -1.5480 
R2  0.9990  0.9961  0.9840  0.9698  0.9535  0.9036  0.8672  0.8120  0.5132 
XEU         
a  0.0001  0.0005  0.0021  0.0039  0.0058  0.0143**  0.0191**  0.0326***  0.0997*** 
Se a  0.0002  0.0008  0.0027  0.0040  0.0049  0.0070  0.0080  0.0100  0.0162 
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β  0.9992***  0.9987***  0.9948***  0.9903***  0.9857***  0.9637***  0.9427***  0.9132***  0.4929*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0023  0.0075  0.0113  0.0139  0.0201  0.0230  0.0290  0.0587 
t β=1 -1.2214 -0.5815 -0.6844 -0.8611 -1.0310 -1.8054* -2.4859** -2.9922*** -8.6325*** 
Wald  3.1831  0.3584  0.6900  0.9882  1.4309  4.2176  6.1970**  10.5965***  100.3479*** 
ADF -63.3507*** -10.7516*** -9.5011*** -8.0241*** -6.1979*** -4.3699*** -3.3316*** -3.3922*** -1.7807* 
R2  0.9985  0.9938  0.9716  0.9436  0.9191  0.8441  0.7938  0.7099  0.2319 
HKD         
a  0.0044*  0.0128  0.0635**  0.1372***  0.2160***  0.5313***  0.7970***  1.0311***  1.9444*** 
Se a  0.0023  0.0088  0.0283  0.0431  0.0541  0.0821  0.0967  0.1106  0.1934 
β  0.9983***  0.9951***  0.9753***  0.9467***  0.9161***  0.7933***  0.6894***  0.5980***  0.2451*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0034  0.0111  0.0169  0.0212  0.0321  0.0379  0.0433  0.0745 
t β=1 -1.9287* -1.4427 -2.2314** -3.1567*** -3.9616*** -6.4343*** -8.2023*** -9.2814*** -10.1259*** 
Wald  4.3955  2.2254  5.1789*  10.3887***  16.4466***  42.7118***  68.6180***  87.8680***  105.8962*** 
ADF -63.3648*** -10.5351*** -9.1930*** -7.6038*** -6.1140*** -3.6705*** -2.9217*** -2.4468** -1.3833 
R2  0.9967  0.9867  0.9383  0.8727  0.8093  0.5922  0.4351  0.3216  0.0454 
ILS         
a  0.0017  0.0034  0.0129  0.0301  0.0499  0.1307***  0.1986***  0.2895***  0.5739*** 
Se a  0.0016  0.0061  0.0184  0.0273  0.0328  0.0445  0.0522  0.0612  0.0886 
β  0.9990***  0.9979***  0.9916***  0.9811***  0.9694***  0.9236***  0.8848***  0.8334***  0.6649*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0032  0.0095  0.0141  0.0169  0.0230  0.0269  0.0315  0.0449 
t β=1 -1.1807 -0.6749 -0.8826 -1.3419 -1.8087* -3.3268*** -4.2830*** -5.2969*** -7.4626*** 
Wald  3.1258  2.6758  5.4600*  10.0117***  15.3508***  33.0695***  51.2407***  73.7535***  206.7388*** 
ADF -48.3931*** -9.2361*** -7.5127*** -5.7243*** -4.6464*** -3.0336*** -2.5213** -2.3383** -1.8798* 
R2  0.9982  0.9928  0.9721  0.9452  0.9238  0.8499  0.7967  0.7241  0.4827 
JPY         
a  0.0058*  0.0082  0.0379  0.0876  0.1631*  0.3754***  0.4843***  0.5988***  1.4295*** 
Se a  0.0034  0.0131  0.0420  0.0645  0.0846  0.1320  0.1496  0.1930  0.3875 
β  0.9988***  0.9985***  0.9930***  0.9837***  0.9695***  0.9291***  0.9073***  0.8870***  0.7124*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0025  0.0081  0.0125  0.0163  0.0256  0.0290  0.0374  0.0754 
t β=1 -1.7798* -0.5999 -0.8588 -1.3043 -1.8668* -2.7734*** -3.1950*** -3.0177*** -3.8124*** 
Wald  6.4737**  0.8702  2.1823  3.9304  6.4383**  11.8203***  11.7578***  16.0028***  26.2721*** 
ADF -63.4438*** -10.7781*** -8.7190*** -7.5302*** -5.8988*** -3.8317*** -3.1340*** -2.8714*** -1.4218 
R2  0.9982  0.9925  0.9668  0.9314  0.8883  0.7587  0.6933  0.5818  0.2778 
NOK         
a  0.0017  0.0037  0.0147  0.0183  0.0243  0.0342  0.0331  0.1054  0.0944 
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Se a  0.0017  0.0065  0.0209  0.0301  0.0371  0.0505  0.0556  0.0729  0.1400 
β  0.9993***  0.9983***  0.9935***  0.9916***  0.9886***  0.9832***  0.9800***  0.9510***  0.9321*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0027  0.0086  0.0124  0.0153  0.0208  0.0229  0.0300  0.0589 
t β=1 -1.0349 -0.6208 -0.7530 -0.6792 -0.7426 -0.8073 -0.8756 -1.6345 -1.1517 
Wald  1.4240  1.3058  1.3675  2.2207  3.2973  7.2649**  31.5654***  17.6164***  182.1603*** 
ADF -63.2928*** -12.3747*** -9.4472*** -7.7345*** -6.7772*** -5.4376*** -4.3305*** -3.6119*** -2.5584** 
R2  0.9979  0.9916  0.9625  0.9326  0.9037  0.8394  0.8073  0.7122  0.5137 
NZD         
a  0.0004 -0.0004  0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0032  0.0049 -0.0413  0.0420 -0.1789 
Se a  0.0007  0.0025  0.0081  0.0116  0.0141  0.0213  0.0243  0.0349  0.0688 
β  0.9996***  0.9997***  0.9972***  0.9970***  0.9958***  0.9809***  1.0092***  0.9295***  1.0534*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0025  0.0081  0.0115  0.0140  0.0211  0.0236  0.0339  0.0698 
t β=1 -0.6009 -0.1227 -0.3492 -0.2562 -0.2980 -0.9058  0.3879 -2.0794**  0.7657 
Wald  0.4111  2.6340  3.6804  6.9510**  9.9505***  17.8731***  72.2156***  37.1771***  331.0796*** 
ADF -63.3377*** -11.6008*** -9.5163*** -8.2944*** -6.3943*** -4.7784*** -4.6641*** -3.1404*** -2.2984** 
R2  0.9982  0.9927  0.9675  0.9419  0.9187  0.8362  0.8064  0.6495  0.4919 
SGD         
a  0.0001 -0.0013 -0.0027 -0.0043 -0.0037  0.0018 -0.0407  0.0271 -0.0920 
Se a  0.0006  0.0020  0.0064  0.0098  0.0123  0.0190  0.0213  0.0305  0.0422 
β  0.9997***  1.0014***  1.0036***  1.0061***  1.0064***  1.0034***  1.0427***  0.9802***  1.0171*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0021  0.0067  0.0102  0.0129  0.0199  0.0223  0.0321  0.0446 
t β=1 -0.5447  0.6489  0.5301  0.5992  0.4973  0.1688  1.9174* -0.6149  0.3828 
Wald  4.3793  0.4408  0.7298  1.3464  1.9325  3.4283  3.6857  4.6959*  154.3243*** 
ADF -63.3452*** -12.2240*** -9.9209*** -7.7996*** -6.4603*** -4.1741*** -3.6035*** -3.2757*** -1.7534* 
R2  0.9986  0.9949  0.9775  0.9546  0.9316  0.8570  0.8347  0.6969  0.6894 
USD         
a  0.0008  0.0030*  0.0147**  0.0310***  0.0477***  0.1112***  0.1617***  0.2048***  0.3850*** 
Se a  0.0005  0.0018  0.0057  0.0086  0.0107  0.0159  0.0186  0.0210  0.0401 
β  0.9984***  0.9942***  0.9716***  0.9404***  0.9085***  0.7858***  0.6870***  0.6035***  0.2618*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0035  0.0112  0.0168  0.0209  0.0312  0.0364  0.0413  0.0717 
t β=1 -1.8091* -1.6691* -2.5511** -3.5371*** -4.3708*** -6.8582*** -8.5980*** -9.5988*** -10.2895*** 
Wald  3.7461  2.8488  6.6429**  12.8472***  19.7937***  48.6476***  75.8293***  95.4217***  115.7760*** 
ADF -63.4076*** -10.6891*** -9.2798*** -7.5403*** -6.0638*** -3.7379*** -2.9471*** -2.6956*** -1.4589 
R2  0.9967  0.9864  0.9368  0.8716  0.8103  0.6010  0.4524  0.3466  0.0553 
AED         
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a  0.0033**  0.0094  0.0470**  0.1000***  0.1547***  0.3645***  0.5224***  0.6513***  1.2317*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0063  0.0203  0.0307  0.0382  0.0569  0.0660  0.0747  0.1382 
β  0.9981***  0.9949***  0.9742***  0.9452***  0.9153***  0.8000***  0.7130***  0.6422***  0.3234*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0035  0.0112  0.0170  0.0212  0.0315  0.0366  0.0415  0.0746 
t β=1 -2.0453** -1.4841 -2.3009** -3.2296*** -4.0048*** -6.3400*** -7.8463*** -8.6313*** -9.0724*** 
Wald  4.6726*  2.2749  5.4549*  10.8179***  16.8141***  42.0247***  63.8233***  78.3394***  91.2527*** 
ADF -63.3837*** -10.6475*** -9.2487*** -7.5813*** -6.0847*** -3.7530*** -2.9446*** -2.7402*** -1.4666 
R2  0.9967  0.9864  0.9366  0.8709  0.8091  0.6047  0.4683  0.3732  0.0755 
BRL         
a  0.0071*  0.0319**  0.0644***  0.1017***  0.2009***  0.2879***  0.4013***  0.4613*** 
Se a  0.0040  0.0130  0.0179  0.0207  0.0244  0.0299  0.0336  0.0375 
β  0.9922***  0.9655***  0.9308***  0.8926***  0.7918***  0.7051***  0.5983***  0.4877*** 
Se β  0.0032  0.0102  0.0139  0.0161  0.0186  0.0224  0.0247  0.0255 
t β=1 -2.4574** -3.3895*** -4.9745*** -6.6853*** -11.1766*** -13.1385*** -16.2440*** -20.0867*** 
Wald  20.9897***  38.0156***  81.7242***  140.2990***  381.3005***  538.0024***  789.4593***  2451.0860*** 
ADF -10.1510*** -7.8557*** -5.7338*** -5.1356*** -3.9688*** -3.6579*** -3.0763*** -2.3342** 
R2  0.9932  0.9670  0.9415  0.9193  0.8626  0.7802  0.6856  0.6069 
CLP         
a  0.0256  0.0882  0.1983  0.3708**  0.7984***  0.9776***  1.0646***  1.3043*** 
Se a  0.0297  0.0937  0.1359  0.1682  0.2136  0.2431  0.2574  0.3845 
β  0.9961***  0.9864***  0.9696***  0.9436***  0.8791***  0.8513***  0.8370***  0.7961*** 
Se β  0.0044  0.0138  0.0199  0.0247  0.0313  0.0356  0.0377  0.0560 
t β=1 -0.8927 -0.9871 -1.5239 -2.2851** -3.8611*** -4.1796*** -4.3298*** -3.6422*** 
Wald  3.0095  6.2312**  12.9952***  22.0387***  56.9434***  91.2784***  135.9806***  276.5435*** 
ADF -9.8825*** -6.6813*** -6.5397*** -5.0829*** -4.3599*** -3.5227*** -3.2595*** -2.6546*** 
R2  0.9868  0.9433  0.8941  0.8443  0.7331  0.6736  0.6474  0.4606 
CNY         
a -0.0069 -0.0274 -0.0465 -0.0570 -0.0497 -0.0829 -0.1381  0.1193 
Se a  0.0064  0.0208  0.0330  0.0431  0.0691  0.0852  0.0996  0.1439 
β  1.0028***  1.0111***  1.0191***  1.0239***  1.0228***  1.0377***  1.0612***  0.9398*** 
Se β  0.0025  0.0082  0.0130  0.0170  0.0274  0.0338  0.0396  0.0576 
t β=1  1.1069  1.3603  1.4689  1.4032  0.8343  1.1161  1.5449 -1.0459 
Wald  1.3226  2.1568  2.9296  3.3944  4.1789  7.1017**  10.2189***  17.0435*** 
ADF -9.5584*** -7.3710*** -6.2126*** -4.5557*** -3.0842*** -2.6097*** -2.3205** -1.6306* 
R2  0.9948  0.9757  0.9469  0.9162  0.8159  0.7548  0.7062  0.5322 
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COP         
a  0.0421  0.1682*  0.3417**  0.5201***  0.9193***  1.2456***  1.5254***  1.6445*** 
Se a  0.0293  0.0936  0.1358  0.1595  0.1859  0.2103  0.2378  0.3346 
β  0.9947***  0.9787***  0.9566***  0.9339***  0.8828***  0.8406***  0.8042***  0.7803*** 
Se β  0.0036  0.0114  0.0166  0.0195  0.0226  0.0256  0.0289  0.0403 
t β=1 -1.4826 -1.8652* -2.6166*** -3.3943*** -5.1750*** -6.2307*** -6.7835*** -5.4545*** 
Wald  6.4066**  12.6950***  26.4922***  46.2521***  130.2048***  228.0215***  321.6380***  753.1623*** 
ADF -9.3584*** -7.1238*** -6.2849*** -5.1827*** -4.2970*** -3.6578*** -2.7481*** -2.6992*** 
R2  0.9910  0.9597  0.9229  0.8957  0.8410  0.7958  0.7431  0.6135 
CZK         
a  0.0006  0.0052  0.0188  0.0316  0.0463  0.1029**  0.2165***  0.2447***  1.1976*** 
Se a  0.0015  0.0055  0.0184  0.0267  0.0326  0.0453  0.0523  0.0622  0.1412 
β  0.9998***  0.9984***  0.9944***  0.9904***  0.9858***  0.9688***  0.9351***  0.9266***  0.6413*** 
Se β  0.0004  0.0015  0.0049  0.0071  0.0087  0.0121  0.0140  0.0165  0.0396 
t β=1 -0.5221 -1.0436 -1.1388 -1.3532 -1.6263 -2.5808*** -4.6477*** -4.4378*** -9.0621*** 
Wald  2.5939  3.2626  4.3241  7.7566**  11.5072***  26.3800***  73.1371***  70.8430***  231.2673*** 
ADF -63.2648*** -12.2818*** -9.3987*** -7.2814*** -6.1207*** -4.5287*** -3.3965*** -3.5868*** -1.6189* 
R2  0.9994  0.9975  0.9876  0.9768  0.9666  0.9380  0.9115  0.8853  0.5277 
HUF         
a  0.0176**  0.0683***  0.3024***  0.5536***  0.7323***  1.1942***  1.7361***  5.1160*** 
Se a  0.0069  0.0258  0.0828  0.1168  0.1344  0.1681  0.1893  0.4525 
β  0.9971***  0.9882***  0.9480***  0.9047***  0.8739***  0.7941***  0.7013***  0.1203 
Se β  0.0012  0.0044  0.0140  0.0198  0.0228  0.0284  0.0319  0.0765 
t β=1 -2.5167** -2.6832*** -3.7043*** -4.8135*** -5.5409*** -7.2452*** -9.3507*** -11.5007*** 
Wald  10.1459***  12.1797***  23.0334***  41.5123***  59.9831***  119.4579***  193.8326***  354.8720*** 
ADF -63.3159*** -12.2289*** -9.3500*** -7.1371*** -6.0016*** -4.8148*** -3.9031*** -2.2326** 
R2  0.9945  0.9777  0.9038  0.8273  0.7773  0.6580  0.5246  0.0118 
IDR         
a  0.1712**  0.4717***  0.6101***  1.3826***  2.1991***  4.6864***  8.7655***  9.9434*** 
Se a  0.0716  0.0926  0.1048  0.1585  0.1954  0.2419  0.3490  0.2010 
β  0.9826***  0.9513***  0.9365***  0.8559***  0.7708***  0.5121***  0.0894** -0.0326 
Se β  0.0074  0.0096  0.0110  0.0166  0.0204  0.0252  0.0361  0.0209 
t β=1 -2.3447** -5.0634*** -5.7964*** -8.7081*** -11.2399*** -19.3500*** -25.2281*** -49.4186*** 
Wald  13.3941***  28.9506***  34.2424***  76.2729***  126.7461***  375.3967***  673.0654***  2446.1340*** 
ADF -7.1295*** -6.9303*** -9.5979*** -9.5036*** -7.5547*** -5.0157*** -3.9208*** -3.7297*** 
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R2  0.9676  0.9311  0.9360  0.8540  0.7652  0.4920  0.0246  0.0063 
INR         
a  0.0129***  0.0451***  0.2150***  0.4116***  0.5711***  1.0505***  1.3940***  1.6203*** 
Se a  0.0047  0.0174  0.0570  0.0854  0.1038  0.1471  0.1691  0.1939 
β  0.9971***  0.9895***  0.9501***  0.9044***  0.8675***  0.7567***  0.6774***  0.6251*** 
Se β  0.0011  0.0040  0.0132  0.0197  0.0240  0.0339  0.0390  0.0447 
t β=1 -2.7218*** -2.6150*** -3.7927*** -4.8472*** -5.5296*** -7.1684*** -8.2766*** -8.3900*** 
Wald  12.4008***  7.6377**  15.4731***  25.1851***  32.5654***  53.5264***  71.4270***  74.2097*** 
ADF -63.3854*** -10.5760*** -8.5526*** -7.2807*** -5.6733*** -4.0366*** -3.3966*** -3.1142*** 
R2  0.9954  0.9821  0.9153  0.8291  0.7581  0.5538  0.4104  0.3148 
MAD         
a  0.0044*  0.0012  0.0014  0.0021  0.0138  0.0686  0.0408  0.0676  0.5336*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0092  0.0286  0.0436  0.0552  0.0782  0.0927  0.1120  0.1990 
β  0.9983***  0.9992***  0.9981***  0.9963***  0.9905***  0.9661***  0.9727***  0.9587***  0.7696*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0035  0.0107  0.0163  0.0206  0.0291  0.0344  0.0414  0.0726 
t β=1 -1.8104* -0.2208 -0.1818 -0.2247 -0.4616 -1.1633 -0.7930 -0.9954 -3.1726*** 
Wald  3.5376  4.8187*  11.5077***  21.0992***  30.9539***  62.9570***  103.1380***  139.6268***  330.0190*** 
ADF -48.3936*** -9.7158*** -7.0109*** -5.5549*** -4.5705*** -2.9655*** -2.4621** -2.3653** -1.7275* 
R2  0.9980  0.9919  0.9658  0.9308  0.8961  0.7947  0.7437  0.6673  0.3238 
MXN         
a  0.0036  0.0171  0.0435  0.0665  0.1861***  0.4337***  0.6326***  3.3545*** 
Se a  0.0078  0.0240  0.0367  0.0458  0.0714  0.0971  0.1137  0.1977 
β  0.9984***  0.9926***  0.9823***  0.9731***  0.9287***  0.8418***  0.7709*** -0.1080 
Se β  0.0027  0.0083  0.0127  0.0158  0.0245  0.0330  0.0387  0.0640 
t β=1 -0.5846 -0.8878 -1.3972 -1.7000* -2.9071*** -4.7892*** -5.9217*** -17.3075*** 
Wald  4.4219  8.4813**  13.7360***  19.2268***  35.2678***  60.1744***  79.1471***  707.8225*** 
ADF -11.4774*** -9.3793*** -7.2231*** -5.7745*** -4.2003*** -2.9886*** -2.7116*** -3.3765*** 
R2  0.9919  0.9655  0.9292  0.8958  0.7722  0.6005  0.4959  0.0135 
MYR         
a  0.0017 -0.0017 -0.0085 -0.0093 -0.0052  0.0182  0.0142 -0.0137 
Se a  0.0015  0.0052  0.0155  0.0237  0.0310  0.0480  0.0538  0.0584 
β  0.9990***  1.0006***  1.0031***  1.0018***  0.9979***  0.9805***  0.9783***  0.9893*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0029  0.0087  0.0133  0.0174  0.0268  0.0301  0.0326 
t β=1 -1.2653  0.2002  0.3557  0.1350 -0.1183 -0.7262 -0.7226 -0.3275 
Wald  3.5850  2.4273  5.3138*  9.4155***  11.9938***  18.9760***  35.0469***  55.5840*** 
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ADF -49.1022*** -10.3577*** -7.0012*** -6.3207*** -4.8895*** -3.1724*** -2.6585*** -2.7067*** 
R2  0.9983  0.9940  0.9766  0.9516  0.9229  0.8368  0.7895  0.7703 
PHP         
a  0.0052*  0.0124  0.0975***  0.2242***  0.3694***  0.8629***  0.3936***  1.4683*** 
Se a  0.0030  0.0113  0.0307  0.0474  0.0600  0.0894  0.1100  0.1143 
β  0.9988***  0.9970***  0.9771***  0.9476***  0.9140***  0.8001***  0.9041***  0.6602*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0026  0.0071  0.0109  0.0138  0.0205  0.0250  0.0261 
t β=1 -1.6967* -1.1537 -3.2339*** -4.7973*** -6.2203*** -9.7376*** -3.8296*** -13.0205*** 
Wald  3.9883  3.2962  11.6928***  24.6593***  40.5921***  97.8936***  63.9603***  182.3185*** 
ADF -63.2031*** -10.9126*** -9.2035*** -7.8828*** -6.5374*** -4.2199*** -3.5870*** -2.6074*** 
R2  0.9980  0.9920  0.9735  0.9424  0.9078  0.7821  0.7504  0.6127 
PKR         
a  0.0569***  0.2462***  0.4757***  0.6825***  1.2837***   
Se a  0.0213  0.0619  0.0904  0.1139  0.1542   
β  0.9881***  0.9487***  0.9011***  0.8581***  0.7336***   
Se β  0.0044  0.0128  0.0187  0.0235  0.0318   
t β=1 -2.6924*** -4.0100*** -5.2929*** -6.0296*** -8.3787***   
Wald  8.0238**  17.4677***  29.6973***  38.4093***  73.9848***   
ADF -9.7330*** -6.8612*** -5.8591*** -4.8202*** -2.9977***   
R2  0.9863  0.9463  0.8925  0.8323  0.6525   
PLZ         
a  0.0025  0.0083  0.0382*  0.0814***  0.1164***  0.2558***  0.4002***  0.4828***  1.0179*** 
Se a  0.0017  0.0062  0.0196  0.0300  0.0363  0.0515  0.0615  0.0665  0.0732 
β  0.9985***  0.9947***  0.9757***  0.9485***  0.9264***  0.8401***  0.7509***  0.6992***  0.3503*** 
Se β  0.0010  0.0037  0.0116  0.0177  0.0214  0.0303  0.0361  0.0389  0.0435 
t β=1 -1.5243 -1.4504 -2.1018** -2.9118*** -3.4434*** -5.2867*** -6.9088*** -7.7270*** -14.9181*** 
Wald  2.3349  3.6276  7.6325**  13.7910***  19.4202***  41.5101***  68.9315***  88.0414***  382.4504*** 
ADF -53.8742*** -10.1229*** -7.2155*** -6.1197*** -4.9510*** -3.7279*** -2.8344*** -2.2474** -2.1550** 
R2  0.9971  0.9886  0.9493  0.8935  0.8500  0.7088  0.5855  0.5190  0.2154 
RUR         
a  0.0319***  0.0363  0.2424**  0.6912***  1.0512***  2.0945***  3.3872***  3.9642*** 
Se a  0.0092  0.0350  0.1100  0.1704  0.1984  0.2191  0.2281  0.2103 
β  0.9918***  0.9904***  0.9367***  0.8208***  0.7278***  0.4591***  0.1279** -0.0199 
Se β  0.0024  0.0090  0.0282  0.0437  0.0508  0.0560  0.0582  0.0536 
t β=1 -3.4792*** -1.0667 -2.2421** -4.1039*** -5.3588*** -9.6601*** -14.9851*** -19.0389*** 
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Wald  12.1091***  5.5257*  13.5340***  30.7106***  51.6294***  154.4171***  324.6486***  533.3688*** 
ADF -48.3687*** -10.4403*** -7.2537*** -5.6264*** -4.9367*** -3.8699*** -3.4106*** -3.3941*** 
R2  0.9867  0.9456  0.7820  0.5615  0.4331  0.1917  0.0178  0.0020 
THB         
a  0.0033  0.0078  0.0945**  0.2377***  0.4208***  1.0270***  0.4989***  1.7439*** 
Se a  0.0033  0.0125  0.0413  0.0656  0.0852  0.1242  0.1146  0.1652 
β  0.9992***  0.9979***  0.9767***  0.9418***  0.8973***  0.7503***  0.8739***  0.5754*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0030  0.0101  0.0159  0.0207  0.0302  0.0277  0.0400 
t β=1 -1.0135 -0.6789 -2.3126** -3.6486*** -4.9604*** -8.2814*** -4.5507*** -10.6097*** 
Wald  1.7428  2.4669  5.7650*  13.6769***  24.8819***  68.6440***  54.3818***  114.3533*** 
ADF -63.5210*** -10.9584*** -8.4661*** -6.9245*** -5.2165*** -3.1524*** -3.0994*** -2.6833*** 
R2  0.9975  0.9898  0.9487  0.8845  0.8104  0.5959  0.6964  0.3386 
TRL         
a  0.0696***  0.0651***  0.0406***  0.0368***  0.0340***  0.0268*  0.0879***  0.0483**  1.2051*** 
Se a  0.0099  0.0102  0.0092  0.0102  0.0111  0.0138  0.0211  0.0219  0.0523 
β  0.9423***  0.9439***  0.9669***  0.9609***  0.9539***  0.9304***  0.8256***  0.8358*** -0.2368 
Se β  0.0118  0.0122  0.0105  0.0115  0.0126  0.0156  0.0237  0.0240  0.0469 
t β=1 -4.8779*** -4.6134*** -3.1568*** -3.3858*** -3.6655*** -4.4619*** -7.3502*** -6.8320*** -26.3600*** 
Wald  49.0789***  40.6833***  19.9985***  15.5540***  14.5776***  21.6986***  64.2348***  67.1548***  1720.8360*** 
ADF -3.0097*** -3.1591*** -3.7257*** -3.5409*** -3.5376*** -3.1790*** -2.7230*** -2.6122*** -2.4153** 
R2  0.9397  0.9366  0.9523  0.9424  0.9315  0.8955  0.7380  0.7505  0.0973 
TWD         
a  0.0051  0.0506  0.1261**  0.2220***  0.5358***  0.4810***  1.2943***  1.2062*** 
Se a  0.0121  0.0384  0.0592  0.0758  0.1133  0.1333  0.1691  0.3263 
β  0.9988***  0.9876***  0.9691***  0.9454***  0.8676***  0.8809***  0.6782***  0.6954*** 
Se β  0.0030  0.0097  0.0149  0.0191  0.0286  0.0336  0.0427  0.0819 
t β=1 -0.4015 -1.2806 -2.0753** -2.8616*** -4.6360*** -3.5486*** -7.5381*** -3.7174*** 
Wald  0.6482  3.5665  8.2297**  14.3874***  34.3084***  18.5868***  78.9091***  14.5585*** 
ADF -12.1716*** -9.1553*** -7.7227*** -5.7153*** -4.1791*** -3.4531*** -2.4446** -1.2641 
R2  0.9896  0.9533  0.9021  0.8474  0.6865  0.6143  0.3858  0.2354 
ZAR         
a  0.0069***  0.0243***  0.0786***  0.1756***  0.2642***  0.5696***  1.1043***  1.2201***  3.5557*** 
Se a  0.0024  0.0091  0.0246  0.0368  0.0439  0.0615  0.0808  0.0819  0.1291 
β  0.9974***  0.9900***  0.9672***  0.9273***  0.8911***  0.7674***  0.5562***  0.5071*** -0.3788 
Se β  0.0010  0.0037  0.0099  0.0148  0.0177  0.0246  0.0319  0.0325  0.0491 
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t β=1 -2.6951*** -2.7359*** -3.3074*** -4.9016*** -6.1651*** -9.4582*** -13.9156*** -15.1845*** -28.0809*** 
Wald  13.4654***  8.6082**  12.8668***  26.5008***  41.1012***  94.2197***  205.5230***  241.2177***  889.3404*** 
ADF -63.3434*** -11.8659*** -9.3277*** -7.1947*** -6.2066*** -4.5103*** -3.2707*** -3.0013*** -2.8602*** 
R2  0.9963  0.9848  0.9491  0.8957  0.8523  0.6968  0.4128  0.3765  0.2041 
Mean         
a  0.0144  0.0295  0.0802  0.1741  0.2689  0.5592  0.7799  0.9801  1.1893 
Se a  0.0055  0.0130  0.0341  0.0508  0.0623  0.0836  0.0954  0.0990  0.1649 
β  0.9955  0.9933  0.9808  0.9592  0.9374  0.8662  0.8165  0.7559  0.5234 
se β  0.0016  0.0037  0.0102  0.0151  0.0185  0.0257  0.0297  0.0339  0.0585 
t β=1 -0.3463 -0.2097 -0.2906 -0.4118 -0.5237 -0.8467 -0.9744 -1.3729 -1.8848 
Wald  7.0893  6.0752  9.4119  17.8531  27.6801  67.5239  112.3093  203.6597  431.8630 
R2  0.9935  0.9854  0.9521  0.9053  0.8634  0.7404  0.6490  0.5649  0.3281 
 
We use the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and 
standard errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1 and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) 
for the residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short codes 
are employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.5:  Simple efficiency hypothesis DOLS test equation for USD exchange rates 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0019 -0.0030 -0.0041 -0.0034 -0.0138  0.0001  0.0026 
Se a  0.0002  0.0008  0.0027  0.0042  0.0055  0.0087  0.0109  0.0138  0.0238 
β  0.9994*** -0.9994 -0.9960 -0.9897 -0.9834 -0.9529 -0.9291 -0.8864 -0.4540 
Se β  0.0006  0.0022  0.0073  0.0114  0.0146  0.0229  0.0277  0.0352  0.0861 
t β=1 -0.9131 -897.5679*** -272.9289*** -174.7783*** -135.7746*** -85.2052*** -69.5424*** -53.5413*** -16.8871*** 
Wald  0.8506  2355964.0000***  227624.1000***  95431.5900***  58974.9400***  25174.5700***  17401.3100***  11770.2200***  2179.4760*** 
ADF -63.2922*** -10.6455*** -8.5502*** -7.3102*** -5.9670*** -3.7955*** -3.2656*** -2.6861*** -1.8342* 
R2  0.9985  0.9944  0.9732  0.9431  0.9116  0.8042  0.7220  0.6112  0.1064 
CAD         
a  0.0000  0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0005  0.0002 -0.0015 -0.0002  0.0218*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0005  0.0017  0.0024  0.0031  0.0049  0.0058  0.0071  0.0070 
β  0.9995***  0.9983***  0.9944***  0.9893***  0.9837***  0.9599***  0.9292***  0.9201***  0.3022*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0019  0.0059  0.0088  0.0111  0.0173  0.0207  0.0249  0.0501 
t β=1 -0.8717 -0.8740 -0.9439 -1.2219 -1.4584 -2.3224** -3.4153*** -3.2018*** -13.9199*** 
Wald  1.4763  1.9241  2.4714  4.6018  6.9700**  15.0402***  37.1537***  31.7623***  355.1551*** 
ADF -63.3579*** -12.2387*** -8.7664*** -7.9206*** -6.2741*** -4.5006*** -3.3815*** -2.9961*** -2.3491** 
R2  0.9989  0.9955  0.9818  0.9649  0.9461  0.8795  0.8227  0.7709  0.1332 
CHF         
a -0.0000  0.0001  0.0010  0.0012  0.0012  0.0017  0.0010  0.0037 -0.0485 
Se a  0.0002  0.0006  0.0021  0.0031  0.0038  0.0054  0.0063  0.0077  0.0091 
β  0.9995***  0.9993***  0.9956***  0.9919***  0.9893***  0.9800***  0.9630***  0.9565***  1.0110*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0021  0.0068  0.0102  0.0125  0.0180  0.0214  0.0261  0.0699 
t β=1 -0.9724 -0.3546 -0.6466 -0.7949 -0.8578 -1.1104 -1.7340* -1.6660*  0.1578 
Wald  3.3350  0.1371  0.4205  0.7328  1.0068  1.9695  6.2002**  4.5035  67.0813*** 
ADF -63.4334*** -11.5813*** -9.4252*** -7.3522*** -6.1090*** -4.2106*** -3.4185*** -3.1936*** -2.2420** 
R2  0.9988  0.9954  0.9768  0.9539  0.9346  0.8748  0.8241  0.7684  0.4705 
XEU         
199 
 
a -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0030 -0.0067 -0.0102 -0.0220 -0.0336 -0.0453 -0.2522 
Se a  0.0002  0.0006  0.0020  0.0030  0.0037  0.0053  0.0064  0.0074  0.0202 
β  0.9992***  0.9971***  0.9852***  0.9685***  0.9539***  0.9028***  0.8516***  0.7991***  0.1732*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0080  0.0123  0.0151  0.0217  0.0265  0.0305  0.0671 
t β=1 -1.2842 -1.2081 -1.8497* -2.5523** -3.0509*** -4.4787*** -5.6017*** -6.5924*** -12.3173*** 
Wald  1.7737  1.4793  3.4895  6.7860**  9.9350***  21.7818***  34.0984***  47.0669***  156.1272*** 
ADF -60.9739*** -9.7345*** -8.1417*** -6.7608*** -5.6733*** -4.0656*** -3.2415*** -2.7052*** -2.5299** 
R2  0.9985  0.9938  0.9688  0.9335  0.9035  0.8088  0.7219  0.6385  0.0290 
GBP         
a -0.0008 -0.0030 -0.0147 -0.0309 -0.0477 -0.1113 -0.1617 -0.2048 -0.3850 
Se a  0.0005  0.0018  0.0057  0.0086  0.0107  0.0159  0.0186  0.0210  0.0401 
β  0.9983***  0.9942***  0.9716***  0.9404***  0.9085***  0.7857***  0.6869***  0.6034***  0.2618*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0035  0.0112  0.0168  0.0209  0.0312  0.0364  0.0413  0.0717 
t β=1 -1.8079* -1.6709* -2.5505** -3.5364*** -4.3710*** -6.8596*** -8.5993*** -9.5997*** -10.2887*** 
Wald  3.8127  2.8478  6.6347**  12.8364***  19.7888***  48.6597***  75.8467***  95.4305***  115.7673*** 
ADF -63.2039*** -10.6395*** -9.2826*** -7.5414*** -6.0674*** -3.7492*** -2.9467*** -2.6929*** -1.4573 
R2  0.9967  0.9864  0.9368  0.8717  0.8102  0.6009  0.4523  0.3466  0.0552 
HKD         
a  0.0195***  0.0057  0.2339***  0.9262***  1.6467***  2.2252***  2.2008***  2.1296***  2.3076*** 
Se a  0.0037  0.0159  0.0601  0.0883  0.0874  0.0474  0.0272  0.0212  0.0628 
β  0.9905***  0.9972***  0.8860***  0.5484***  0.1971*** -0.0849 -0.0728 -0.0382 -0.1258 
Se β  0.0018  0.0078  0.0293  0.0430  0.0426  0.0231  0.0133  0.0103  0.0307 
t β=1 -5.3362*** -0.3560 -3.8902*** -10.4913*** -18.8427*** -46.9628*** -80.8370*** -100.5457*** -36.6238*** 
Wald  34.1133***  4.1821  16.2610***  111.0254***  355.4370***  2211.0640***  6568.4270***  10301.2500***  3967.7150*** 
ADF -61.7586*** -10.6345*** -6.9164*** -5.2121*** -3.7443*** -3.7183*** -3.5937*** -3.7842*** -2.9231*** 
R2  0.9885  0.9491  0.6585  0.2715  0.0480  0.0312  0.0648  0.0328  0.0659 
ILS         
a  0.0027*  0.0096  0.0468**  0.1007***  0.1488***  0.3575***  0.5249***  0.6081***  0.8233*** 
Se a  0.0016  0.0063  0.0200  0.0296  0.0360  0.0513  0.0605  0.0644  0.0660 
β  0.9980***  0.9927***  0.9645***  0.9238***  0.8876***  0.7332***  0.6095***  0.5466***  0.3735*** 
Se β  0.0012  0.0045  0.0144  0.0213  0.0259  0.0369  0.0434  0.0461  0.0465 
t β=1 -1.7224* -1.6232 -2.4646** -3.5733*** -4.3429*** -7.2310*** -8.9953*** -9.8305*** -13.4624*** 
Wald  3.1941  4.2413  9.2282***  18.5341***  27.1968***  66.1177***  100.0541***  124.8742***  377.1897*** 
ADF -48.4262*** -8.2404*** -6.2676*** -5.5124*** -4.5371*** -2.8211*** -2.1102** -1.8282* -2.4018** 
R2  0.9967  0.9859  0.9358  0.8712  0.8150  0.5826  0.4186  0.3459  0.2150 
200 
 
JPY         
a  0.0060*  0.0099  0.0508  0.1122*  0.1856**  0.3198***  0.3698***  0.3588**  0.0211 
Se a  0.0033  0.0122  0.0400  0.0607  0.0782  0.1163  0.1255  0.1656  0.3670 
β  0.9987***  0.9979***  0.9894***  0.9765***  0.9610***  0.9326***  0.9209***  0.9249***  0.9898*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0026  0.0086  0.0130  0.0168  0.0249  0.0269  0.0356  0.0801 
t β=1 -1.9027* -0.7909 -1.2334 -1.8056* -2.3275** -2.7021*** -2.9367*** -2.1117** -0.1269 
Wald  6.2311**  1.0819  2.8050  4.9999*  7.4580**  9.6791***  8.7723**  8.3460**  10.7409*** 
ADF -63.4122*** -11.1278*** -8.7736*** -7.5653*** -6.1943*** -3.9077*** -3.6892*** -3.3205*** -1.5427 
R2  0.9980  0.9922  0.9631  0.9251  0.8816  0.7684  0.7286  0.6257  0.3952 
NOK         
a  0.0016  0.0074  0.0346**  0.0706***  0.1091***  0.2250***  0.3306***  0.4278***  1.7117*** 
Se a  0.0014  0.0052  0.0166  0.0254  0.0324  0.0470  0.0543  0.0638  0.1330 
β  0.9992***  0.9959***  0.9812***  0.9616***  0.9406***  0.8777***  0.8179***  0.7678***  0.0364 
Se β  0.0007  0.0027  0.0086  0.0132  0.0168  0.0244  0.0281  0.0329  0.0729 
t β=1 -1.1669 -1.5182 -2.1720** -2.9105*** -3.5328*** -5.0240*** -6.4878*** -7.0550*** -13.2146*** 
Wald  1.3620  3.3012  5.7605*  10.5914***  15.8417***  32.5308***  62.4742***  65.7625***  253.9507*** 
ADF -63.3656*** -10.6310*** -8.3576*** -7.7251*** -6.1792*** -4.2572*** -3.3993*** -2.9773*** -2.6715*** 
R2  0.9978  0.9916  0.9618  0.9206  0.8766  0.7548  0.6623  0.5742  0.0011 
NZD         
a  0.0004 -0.0000  0.0014  0.0031  0.0052  0.0233*  0.0258  0.0707***  0.3400*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0013  0.0041  0.0062  0.0079  0.0128  0.0160  0.0204  0.0383 
β -0.9993 -0.9984 -0.9908 -0.9812 -0.9709 -0.9172 -0.8783 -0.7925  0.0342 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0078  0.0118  0.0149  0.0239  0.0290  0.0368  0.0873 
t β=1 -3085.0913*** -823.9144*** -255.5289*** -168.1346*** -132.0770*** -80.2918*** -64.7315*** -48.7425*** -11.0695*** 
Wald 
 59278934.0000**
*  4245493.0000***  424046.7000***  188104.9000***  119044.9000***  48346.7000***  33120.6400***  21836.1500*** 
 10040.1000**
* 
ADF -63.3629*** -10.7456*** -8.6175*** -7.4615*** -6.1575*** -3.8468*** -3.1525*** -2.5216** -1.6281* 
R2  0.9983  0.9932  0.9693  0.9380  0.9057  0.7779  0.6795  0.5358  0.0007 
SGD         
a -0.0000 -0.0003  0.0009  0.0019  0.0023  0.0021 -0.0226  0.0097  0.0055 
Se a  0.0002  0.0008  0.0028  0.0045  0.0056  0.0083  0.0088  0.0130  0.0190 
β  0.9998***  1.0006***  0.9985***  0.9968***  0.9962***  0.9978***  1.0389***  0.9807***  0.8440*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0018  0.0062  0.0098  0.0124  0.0182  0.0191  0.0286  0.0483 
t β=1 -0.4360  0.3351 -0.2327 -0.3294 -0.3036 -0.1204  2.0316** -0.6724 -3.2284*** 
Wald  3.6123  0.1306  0.1797  0.3075  0.3161  0.3318  10.1445***  0.6092  219.9871*** 
201 
 
ADF -63.3892*** -11.4305*** -9.0151*** -7.3836*** -5.7830*** -4.1001*** -3.8936*** -3.4688*** -1.7512* 
R2  0.9990  0.9963  0.9805  0.9580  0.9364  0.8766  0.8715  0.7433  0.5654 
AED         
a  0.4754***  1.0284***  1.2581***  1.2756***  1.2893***  1.3027***  1.3036***  1.3026***  1.3018*** 
Se a  0.0385  0.0196  0.0076  0.0044  0.0031  0.0018  0.0014  0.0011  0.0010 
β  0.6346***  0.2095***  0.0330***  0.0195***  0.0090*** -0.0013 -0.0020 -0.0012 -0.0007 
Se β  0.0296  0.0151  0.0058  0.0034  0.0024  0.0014  0.0011  0.0008  0.0008 
t β=1 -12.3622*** -52.4170*** -165.6222*** -288.2381*** -418.7752*** -708.7453*** -953.4731*** -1186.6155*** 
-
1255.0241*** 
Wald  153.1358***  2750.4200***  27512.0600***  83385.0900***  176027.2000***  505230.9000***  916039.1000***  1417493.0000*** 
 1599344.0000
*** 
ADF -6.6452*** -12.4417*** -11.5721*** -11.1294*** -10.9818*** -10.6083*** -10.2697*** -10.4402*** -7.7957*** 
R2  0.2099  0.1656  0.0359  0.0351  0.0164  0.0015  0.0041  0.0025  0.0047 
BRL         
a  0.0064**  0.0294***  0.0664***  0.1096***  0.2304***  0.3234***  0.3927***  0.4827*** 
Se a  0.0030  0.0093  0.0140  0.0178  0.0231  0.0266  0.0271  0.0292 
β  0.9874***  0.9438***  0.8779***  0.8044***  0.6059***  0.4568***  0.3441***  0.1735*** 
Se β  0.0041  0.0128  0.0189  0.0237  0.0300  0.0337  0.0332  0.0316 
t β=1 -3.0660*** -4.4102*** -6.4462*** -8.2358*** -13.1172*** -16.1062*** -19.7379*** -26.1626*** 
Wald  21.9924***  42.2320***  82.5915***  125.9337***  301.9986***  467.8309***  743.8782***  2127.7860*** 
ADF -9.4384*** -6.7464*** -5.4788*** -4.6706*** -3.2117*** -2.8704*** -2.7446*** -2.1356** 
R2  0.9883  0.9465  0.8853  0.8100  0.5885  0.4004  0.2875  0.1134 
CLP         
a  0.0811**  0.3923***  0.9074***  1.5304***  3.2764***  4.7096***  5.2914***  6.2458*** 
Se a  0.0383  0.1276  0.1903  0.2420  0.3057  0.3430  0.3546  0.3959 
β  0.9870***  0.9369***  0.8541***  0.7542***  0.4746***  0.2454***  0.1523*** -0.0008 
Se β  0.0061  0.0204  0.0303  0.0386  0.0487  0.0546  0.0564  0.0627 
t β=1 -2.1363** -3.1016*** -4.8061*** -6.3704*** -10.7893*** -13.8266*** -15.0331*** -15.9662*** 
Wald  6.2527**  13.1162***  30.0891***  51.2253***  143.6522***  237.5381***  293.3593***  463.8525*** 
ADF -10.1066*** -5.6097*** -5.8880*** -4.7435*** -3.1316*** -2.5146** -2.3737** -1.9073* 
R2  0.9743  0.8745  0.7422  0.5915  0.2543  0.0695  0.0270  0.0009 
CNY         
a -0.0075 -0.0313 -0.0589 -0.0851 -0.1349 -0.1484 -0.1369  0.3482*** 
Se a  0.0012  0.0039  0.0061  0.0081  0.0155  0.0225  0.0309  0.0770 
β  1.0037***  1.0154***  1.0290***  1.0421***  1.0673***  1.0747***  1.0695***  0.8161*** 
202 
 
Se β  0.0006  0.0019  0.0030  0.0040  0.0078  0.0113  0.0155  0.0396 
t β=1  6.0777***  7.9606***  9.5659***  10.4438***  8.6561***  6.6108***  4.4691*** -4.6461*** 
Wald  43.8905***  72.5992***  100.4552***  116.0342***  75.8147***  43.7264***  20.5384***  30.7524*** 
ADF -10.4235*** -8.0068*** -6.7064*** -5.2608*** -3.6730*** -2.7273*** -2.5130** -1.9749** 
R2  0.9997  0.9987  0.9970  0.9951  0.9834  0.9671  0.9405  0.6445 
COP         
a  0.0759**  0.3640***  0.8484***  1.3527***  2.6258***  3.5571***  3.7717***  4.2603*** 
Se a  0.0352  0.1177  0.1827  0.2285  0.2870  0.3192  0.3251  0.3731 
β  0.9899***  0.9516***  0.8875***  0.8207***  0.6523***  0.5290***  0.4995***  0.4302*** 
Se β  0.0046  0.0154  0.0239  0.0299  0.0375  0.0416  0.0423  0.0481 
t β=1 -2.1873** -3.1396*** -4.7103*** -6.0023*** -9.2829*** -11.3266*** -11.8400*** -11.8464*** 
Wald  8.9073**  17.6623***  37.2044***  59.9288***  148.8816***  244.1677***  334.7014***  832.4887*** 
ADF -8.3679*** -6.2087*** -5.4302*** -4.1512*** -2.9544*** -2.4973** -2.0651** -2.1197** 
R2  0.9851  0.9259  0.8336  0.7401  0.5175  0.3715  0.3442  0.2549 
CZK         
a  0.0010  0.0073  0.0335*  0.0663**  0.0967***  0.2015***  0.3222***  0.3601***  2.0216*** 
Se a  0.0014  0.0055  0.0187  0.0284  0.0352  0.0509  0.0582  0.0645  0.1372 
β  0.9997***  0.9975***  0.9888***  0.9778***  0.9676***  0.9324***  0.8908***  0.8776***  0.3095*** 
Se β  0.0004  0.0017  0.0058  0.0088  0.0108  0.0156  0.0179  0.0198  0.0455 
t β=1 -0.7251 -1.4427 -1.9354* -2.5282** -2.9962*** -4.3191*** -6.0884*** -6.1912*** -15.1837*** 
Wald  1.0062  3.8154  6.1622**  10.9698***  16.1529***  33.8701***  71.9526***  81.0751***  327.2825*** 
ADF -63.3742*** -11.0885*** -8.7101*** -7.1189*** -5.8263*** -4.0921*** -3.2166*** -3.3838*** -2.2208** 
R2  0.9992  0.9968  0.9830  0.9646  0.9478  0.8938  0.8508  0.8295  0.1637 
HUF         
a  0.0101**  0.0414**  0.2033***  0.4160***  0.6068***  1.2138***  1.7099***  1.9418***  5.0803*** 
Se a  0.0051  0.0193  0.0641  0.0959  0.1165  0.1627  0.1809  0.1912  0.3696 
β  0.9982***  0.9921***  0.9614***  0.9212***  0.8851***  0.7708***  0.6776***  0.6336***  0.0406 
Se β  0.0009  0.0036  0.0119  0.0178  0.0216  0.0301  0.0333  0.0352  0.0689 
t β=1 -1.9214* -2.2016** -3.2427*** -4.4364*** -5.3250*** -7.6266*** -9.6717*** -10.4211*** -13.9253*** 
Wald  7.7287**  8.6447**  16.8402***  31.0321***  45.3446***  91.0115***  148.1126***  186.5563***  277.5701*** 
ADF -63.3576*** -10.9480*** -8.6569*** -6.9541*** -5.6386*** -3.9672*** -3.0528*** -2.6521*** -1.9783** 
R2  0.9964  0.9855  0.9312  0.8613  0.8013  0.6220  0.4887  0.4333  0.0025 
IDR         
a  0.4226**  0.8555***  0.7900***  1.6003***  2.4547***  4.8877***  10.4787***  9.8093*** 
Se a  0.1691  0.1798  0.1180  0.1645  0.1968  0.2268  0.2668  0.1509 
203 
 
β  0.9520***  0.9045***  0.9110***  0.8217***  0.7275***  0.4608*** -0.1470 -0.0747 
Se β  0.0185  0.0197  0.0130  0.0181  0.0216  0.0248  0.0290  0.0165 
t β=1 -2.5903*** -4.8514*** -6.8543*** -9.8581*** -12.6057*** -21.7032*** -39.6135*** -65.3078*** 
Wald  45.6380***  63.5941***  67.6382***  110.4044***  171.6101***  485.7306***  1928.9880***  4323.5080*** 
ADF -4.0340*** -3.8675*** -7.5478*** -8.8539*** -7.4053*** -5.4496*** -4.1612*** -6.0581*** 
R2  0.8573  0.8082  0.9115  0.8203  0.7222  0.4470  0.0730  0.0464 
INR         
a  0.0034  0.0366***  0.1775***  0.3409***  0.4947***  0.9505***  1.5614***  2.2112*** 
Se a  0.0029  0.0112  0.0407  0.0639  0.0802  0.1150  0.1427  0.1728 
β  0.9992***  0.9903***  0.9532***  0.9101***  0.8696***  0.7500***  0.5903***  0.4208*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0029  0.0107  0.0167  0.0210  0.0300  0.0372  0.0450 
t β=1 -1.0841 -3.3211*** -4.3961*** -5.3865*** -6.2233*** -8.3343*** -11.0149*** -12.8772*** 
Wald  21.2704***  14.7290***  22.9026***  34.4084***  45.8338***  80.2332***  136.0205***  182.8634*** 
ADF -63.3789*** -10.5997*** -8.6572*** -6.5802*** -5.2424*** -3.2306*** -2.5721*** -1.8761* 
R2  0.9979  0.9906  0.9435  0.8734  0.8061  0.6111  0.3733  0.1753 
MAD         
a  0.0099**  0.0330**  0.1853***  0.3863***  0.5461***  1.1443***  1.5604***  1.6445***  1.7938*** 
Se a  0.0041  0.0152  0.0498  0.0736  0.0869  0.1109  0.1246  0.1295  0.1198 
β  0.9954***  0.9842***  0.9116***  0.8159***  0.7397***  0.4571***  0.2613***  0.2213***  0.1457*** 
Se β  0.0019  0.0071  0.0234  0.0345  0.0407  0.0518  0.0580  0.0601  0.0547 
t β=1 -2.3802** -2.2186** -3.7811*** -5.3338*** -6.3923*** -10.4830*** -12.7377*** -12.9671*** -15.6143*** 
Wald  6.0146**  7.2211**  19.2436***  38.4340***  57.4768***  148.9745***  227.1727***  266.3173***  740.0526*** 
ADF -48.4303*** -8.8030*** -6.5705*** -5.1764*** -4.2784*** -3.1131*** -2.4046** -2.2129** -2.6251*** 
R2  0.9915  0.9666  0.8337  0.6714  0.5558  0.2183  0.0699  0.0486  0.0318 
MXN         
a  0.0037  0.0108  0.0358  0.0654  0.2082***  0.5332***  0.6181***  2.0179*** 
Se a  0.0069  0.0204  0.0326  0.0424  0.0675  0.0921  0.1026  0.1568 
β  0.9980***  0.9936***  0.9813***  0.9672***  0.9030***  0.7664***  0.7270***  0.1868*** 
Se β  0.0029  0.0086  0.0137  0.0177  0.0280  0.0378  0.0421  0.0618 
t β=1 -0.6766 -0.7499 -1.3664 -1.8495* -3.4617*** -6.1830*** -6.4924*** -13.1672*** 
Wald  7.3553**  13.5948***  21.6141***  30.0650***  57.6047***  106.0083***  130.2463***  227.7640*** 
ADF -10.0662*** -7.8843*** -7.3882*** -5.5646*** -3.9484*** -2.8111*** -2.7080*** -2.0555** 
R2  0.9906  0.9636  0.9190  0.8717  0.7116  0.4880  0.4254  0.0375 
MYR         
a  0.0779***  0.0780***  0.1512***  0.2244***  0.2450***  0.3914***  0.4559***  0.5787*** 
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Se a  0.0058  0.0068  0.0146  0.0196  0.0226  0.0281  0.0308  0.0313 
β  0.9335***  0.9330***  0.8701***  0.8071***  0.7883***  0.6624***  0.6060***  0.5020*** 
Se β  0.0047  0.0055  0.0117  0.0158  0.0181  0.0223  0.0243  0.0245 
t β=1 -14.2600*** -12.1780*** -11.0595*** -12.2312*** -11.6804*** -15.1353*** -16.1816*** -20.2894*** 
Wald  299.1827***  234.7452***  200.1251***  247.6626***  243.9968***  410.1590***  494.6606***  738.1952*** 
ADF -2.5877*** -3.4884*** -4.3715*** -4.4656*** -3.6725*** -2.6538*** -2.1244** -1.9600** 
R2  0.9919  0.9868  0.9491  0.9047  0.8753  0.7732  0.6875  0.6047 
PHP         
a  0.0049**  0.0237**  0.1276***  0.2815***  0.4459***  1.0021***  0.7878***  1.8843*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0101  0.0247  0.0389  0.0491  0.0697  0.0992  0.0930 
β  0.9988***  0.9937***  0.9661***  0.9256***  0.8823***  0.7369***  0.7891***  0.5073*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0026  0.0064  0.0101  0.0128  0.0181  0.0255  0.0240 
t β=1 -1.9002* -2.4133** -5.2527*** -7.3445*** -9.2056*** -14.5394*** -8.2722*** -20.5557*** 
Wald  8.6885**  10.6728***  31.1335***  59.0133***  91.5757***  224.9889***  180.7107***  462.8611*** 
ADF -63.1727*** -11.8347*** -9.9143*** -9.4833*** -6.5686*** -4.3248*** -3.2379*** -2.2709** 
R2  0.9981  0.9915  0.9773  0.9477  0.9150  0.7961  0.6889  0.5257 
PKR         
a  0.0132***  0.0570***  0.1069***  0.1587***  0.3314***   
Se a  0.0048  0.0163  0.0251  0.0341  0.0560   
β  0.9969***  0.9865***  0.9747***  0.9625***  0.9219***   
Se β  0.0011  0.0038  0.0058  0.0079  0.0130   
t β=1 -2.7834*** -3.5731*** -4.3264*** -4.7196*** -6.0039***   
Wald  9.6376***  14.9201***  21.0044***  24.5935***  39.3763***   
ADF -8.0733*** -5.4001*** -4.2824*** -3.8224*** -2.0794**   
R2  0.9992  0.9956  0.9902  0.9821  0.9462   
PLZ         
a  0.0025*  0.0118**  0.0566***  0.1191***  0.1744***  0.3686***  0.5216***  0.5847***  1.0741*** 
Se a  0.0013  0.0049  0.0157  0.0240  0.0293  0.0414  0.0466  0.0476  0.0647 
β  0.9979***  0.9890***  0.9475***  0.8902***  0.8394***  0.6642***  0.5257***  0.4661***  0.0014 
Se β  0.0011  0.0042  0.0134  0.0205  0.0249  0.0351  0.0393  0.0400  0.0572 
t β=1 -1.9118* -2.6066*** -3.9187*** -5.3520*** -6.4373*** -9.5652*** -12.0678*** -13.3330*** -17.4725*** 
Wald  3.7106  8.7586**  19.2452***  35.2182***  51.0370***  108.7986***  174.1055***  218.8773***  344.4714*** 
ADF -53.8558*** -10.1983*** -7.5789*** -6.0095*** -4.8301*** -3.3834*** -2.6348*** -2.2199** -1.9169* 
R2  0.9963  0.9847  0.9291  0.8460  0.7740  0.5321  0.3688  0.3120  0.0005 
RUR         
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a  0.0045  0.0463***  0.2256***  0.4901***  0.7383***  1.5363***  2.1260***  2.3863*** 
Se a  0.0043  0.0166  0.0537  0.0839  0.1015  0.1333  0.1489  0.1515 
β  0.9987***  0.9860***  0.9317***  0.8521***  0.7774***  0.5385***  0.3626***  0.2852*** 
Se β  0.0013  0.0049  0.0160  0.0250  0.0302  0.0396  0.0441  0.0448 
t β=1 -1.0392 -2.8429*** -4.2613*** -5.9173*** -7.3706*** -11.6623*** -14.4521*** -15.9602*** 
Wald  1.8505  11.2864***  23.2380***  42.3669***  64.7589***  154.0644***  232.6006***  285.6671*** 
ADF -48.3005*** -8.7326*** -7.4437*** -6.3823*** -4.6368*** -2.3713** -1.8195* -1.7689* 
R2  0.9961  0.9826  0.9159  0.8089  0.7148  0.3993  0.2004  0.1336 
THB         
a  0.0025  0.0119  0.1181***  0.2905***  0.4816***  1.0758***  0.7072***  1.8364*** 
Se a  0.0026  0.0100  0.0352  0.0580  0.0755  0.1053  0.0946  0.1368 
β  0.9993***  0.9965***  0.9668***  0.9188***  0.8656***  0.7011***  0.7978***  0.4896*** 
Se β  0.0007  0.0028  0.0098  0.0161  0.0209  0.0291  0.0260  0.0377 
t β=1 -0.9589 -1.2594 -3.3968*** -5.0518*** -6.4295*** -10.2704*** -7.7686*** -13.5469*** 
Wald  1.0586  5.5116*  12.6442***  26.7320***  42.6717***  106.9875***  125.8429***  191.6119*** 
ADF -63.5264*** -9.9956*** -8.3668*** -9.4511*** -6.9757*** -3.1277*** -2.7988*** -2.8587*** 
R2  0.9981  0.9918  0.9509  0.8780  0.7974  0.5808  0.6854  0.2957 
TRL         
a  0.0402***  0.0363***  0.0225***  0.0127*  0.0030 -0.0262 -0.0368 -0.0738  0.3669*** 
Se a  0.0074  0.0075  0.0074  0.0077  0.0080  0.0091  0.0121  0.0135  0.0468 
β  0.9515***  0.9531***  0.9771***  0.9757***  0.9732***  0.9625***  0.8929***  0.8934***  0.0825 
Se β  0.0125  0.0128  0.0105  0.0111  0.0118  0.0142  0.0227  0.0225  0.0823 
t β=1 -3.8828*** -3.6507*** -2.1823** -2.1784** -2.2601** -2.6489*** -4.7143*** -4.7432*** -11.1436*** 
Wald  40.0129***  32.3926***  14.0924***  7.2939**  5.1756*  17.9966***  57.0941***  81.5738***  413.8129*** 
ADF -3.0821*** -3.1522*** -3.2426*** -3.5833*** -3.6456*** -3.1567*** -2.7964*** -2.5468** -1.4218 
R2  0.9344  0.9311  0.9531  0.9476  0.9411  0.9177  0.7822  0.7974  0.0048 
TWD         
a  0.0275**  0.1682***  0.3835***  0.6123***  1.3107***  1.4290***  2.4252***  3.5165*** 
Se a  0.0120  0.0380  0.0614  0.0784  0.1106  0.1274  0.1339  0.3336 
β  0.9921***  0.9518***  0.8900***  0.8243***  0.6237***  0.5891***  0.3031*** -0.0206 
Se β  0.0034  0.0110  0.0177  0.0226  0.0319  0.0367  0.0387  0.0972 
t β=1 -2.2866** -4.4022*** -6.2101*** -7.7638*** -11.7888*** -11.1891*** -18.0217*** -10.4982*** 
Wald  5.8945*  22.0961***  43.1529***  66.7286***  151.7965***  127.6913***  352.9854***  130.4140*** 
ADF -12.2326*** -8.8644*** -6.3397*** -4.9222*** -3.4073*** -3.0692*** -1.9943** -1.1065 
R2  0.9869  0.9376  0.8485  0.7529  0.4777  0.3748  0.1345  0.0004 
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ZAR         
a  0.0045**  0.0173**  0.0581***  0.1341***  0.2151***  0.4792***  0.9100***  1.0367***  2.1000*** 
Se a  0.0019  0.0070  0.0193  0.0298  0.0375  0.0534  0.0684  0.0713  0.1046 
β  0.9979***  0.9909***  0.9690***  0.9293***  0.8874***  0.7523***  0.5400***  0.4726*** -0.0329 
Se β  0.0009  0.0035  0.0098  0.0150  0.0188  0.0267  0.0336  0.0352  0.0503 
t β=1 -2.1866** -2.6040*** -3.1744*** -4.7116*** -5.9758*** -9.2840*** -13.7018*** -15.0016*** -20.5492*** 
Wald  12.0638***  8.1035**  12.4129***  25.4196***  39.7175***  92.9580***  201.7596***  239.5810***  456.9730*** 
ADF -63.3193*** -10.8290*** -8.3772*** -6.8519*** -5.7902*** -4.1140*** -2.5396** -2.6175*** -2.2925** 
R2  0.9965  0.9861  0.9509  0.8939  0.8346  0.6534  0.3752  0.3106  0.0020 
Mean         
a  0.0454  0.0792  0.1532  0.2936  0.4378  0.8192  1.2011  1.3741  1.4649 
Se a  0.0108  0.0149  0.0310  0.0465  0.0570  0.0741  0.0849  0.0878  0.1248 
β  0.8933  0.8339  0.8047  0.7608  0.7178  0.6081  0.5128  0.4524  0.2324 
se β  0.0034  0.0046  0.0108  0.0161  0.0195  0.0257  0.0300  0.0327  0.0588 
t β=1 -26.7803 -10.6060 -4.4898 -4.3279 -4.8268 -6.5029 -8.5970 -10.3947 -13.2866 
Wald  2469983.1301  213056.1339  21931.3551  11874.0988  11478.7371  18839.8143  32622.3401  49030.4457  67644.1879 
R2  0.9556  0.9537  0.9101  0.8458  0.7876  0.6350  0.5096  0.4223  0.1375 
 
We use the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and 
standard errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1 and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) 
for the residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries are due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short 
codes are employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.6.6:  Simple efficiency hypothesis DOLS test equation for EURO exchange rates 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a  0.0008  0.0010 -0.3284  0.0069  0.0096  0.0135  0.0153  0.0350  0.1173* 
Se a  0.0005  0.0018  0.0325  0.0080  0.0100  0.0151  0.0203  0.0261  0.0608 
β  0.9983***  0.9957***  1.5663***  0.9683***  0.9550***  0.9253***  0.9008***  0.8427***  0.5536*** 
Se β  0.0010  0.0038  0.0635  0.0164  0.0203  0.0302  0.0398  0.0500  0.1091 
t β=1 -1.6768* -1.1337  8.9145*** -1.9326* -2.2176** -2.4768** -2.4941** -3.1461*** -4.0912*** 
Wald  2.8165  6.6741**  207.8279***  24.3767***  34.7051***  61.4760***  88.2298***  114.4186***  244.9043*** 
ADF -60.9149*** -10.8920*** -2.8317*** -7.3295*** -6.4875*** -4.7627*** -3.7982*** -3.1970*** -1.3948 
R2  0.9960  0.9843  0.5886  0.8865  0.8366  0.6956  0.5628  0.4218  0.1004 
CAD         
a  0.0015***  0.0054***  0.0245***  0.0454***  0.0665***  0.1245***  0.1681***  0.2377***  0.2792*** 
Se a  0.0005  0.0020  0.0061  0.0087  0.0105  0.0149  0.0178  0.0204  0.0321 
β  0.9960***  0.9848***  0.9312***  0.8726***  0.8142***  0.6546***  0.5340***  0.3504***  0.1955** 
Se β  0.0013  0.0050  0.0155  0.0221  0.0269  0.0377  0.0447  0.0509  0.0785 
t β=1 -3.0235*** -3.0259*** -4.4290*** -5.7563*** -6.9136*** -9.1545*** -10.4335*** -12.7722*** -10.2464*** 
Wald  9.4781***  10.2840***  21.9197***  37.0156***  53.2636***  93.9949***  127.1436***  188.8119***  191.2157*** 
ADF -60.9166*** -11.2828*** -8.3951*** -7.4445*** -6.0755*** -4.2018*** -3.4535*** -2.7397*** -1.7954* 
R2  0.9933  0.9726  0.8813  0.7785  0.6822  0.4241  0.2650  0.1106  0.0256 
CHF         
a  0.0001  0.0001  0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0066 -0.0080 -0.0090 -0.1164 
Se a  0.0003  0.0010  0.0030  0.0044  0.0053  0.0077  0.0103  0.0131  0.0371 
β  0.9995***  0.9997***  0.9977***  0.9989***  0.9994***  1.0114***  1.0110***  1.0087***  1.1972*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0025  0.0076  0.0109  0.0132  0.0191  0.0257  0.0327  0.0926 
t β=1 -0.8113 -0.1154 -0.3110 -0.1041 -0.0447  0.5990  0.4271  0.2677  2.1292** 
Wald  5.0470*  0.0761  0.1831  0.3058  0.4455  1.9917  3.0830  4.6251*  44.9951*** 
ADF -61.0142*** -14.1031*** -11.2936*** -11.4041*** -6.3654*** -5.3944*** -3.7738*** -2.9532*** -1.3619 
R2  0.9984  0.9933  0.9724  0.9502  0.9298  0.8725  0.7951  0.7097  0.4205 
GBP         
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a -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0026 -0.0040 -0.0106 -0.0168 -0.0265 -0.0997 
Se a  0.0002  0.0008  0.0026  0.0038  0.0047  0.0067  0.0081  0.0095  0.0162 
β  0.9992***  0.9986***  0.9953***  0.9909***  0.9858***  0.9638***  0.9435***  0.9103***  0.4929*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0073  0.0109  0.0134  0.0192  0.0232  0.0276  0.0587 
t β=1 -1.2606 -0.5860 -0.6420 -0.8326 -1.0528 -1.8869* -2.4311** -3.2491*** -8.6327*** 
Wald  3.1637  0.3484  0.4156  0.7486  1.2353  3.7850  6.1660**  11.0539***  100.3507*** 
ADF -60.9390*** -10.2689*** -8.7212*** -7.0512*** -6.0199*** -4.2481*** -3.5329*** -3.4569*** -1.7806* 
R2  0.9985  0.9940  0.9741  0.9486  0.9261  0.8600  0.8045  0.7352  0.2319 
HKD         
a  0.0018  0.0059  0.0310*  0.0673**  0.0999***  0.2139***  0.3294***  0.4516***  1.9979*** 
Se a  0.0015  0.0054  0.0179  0.0277  0.0341  0.0495  0.0608  0.0705  0.1585 
β  0.9992***  0.9974***  0.9864***  0.9706***  0.9565***  0.9068***  0.8562***  0.8025***  0.1524** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0080  0.0124  0.0153  0.0221  0.0272  0.0316  0.0678 
t β=1 -1.2569 -1.0753 -1.6977* -2.3760** -2.8499*** -4.2108*** -5.2826*** -6.2549*** -12.4981*** 
Wald  1.6007  1.2575  3.1419  6.3355**  9.4363***  20.6592***  32.0758***  44.2092***  173.3323*** 
ADF -60.9761*** -9.6195*** -8.0535*** -6.7950*** -5.6947*** -4.0619*** -3.2521*** -2.6875*** -2.4703** 
R2  0.9985  0.9939  0.9690  0.9332  0.9022  0.8042  0.7132  0.6238  0.0223 
ILS         
a  0.0070**  0.0248**  0.1104***  0.2297***  0.2734***  0.4898***  0.6163***  0.7555***  0.5047*** 
Se a  0.0035  0.0127  0.0378  0.0545  0.0596  0.0723  0.0779  0.0834  0.0702 
β  0.9958***  0.9848***  0.9327***  0.8603***  0.8333***  0.7016***  0.6236***  0.5378***  0.6728*** 
Se β  0.0021  0.0076  0.0226  0.0326  0.0356  0.0431  0.0463  0.0495  0.0410 
t β=1 -2.0312** -2.0041** -2.9727*** -4.2833*** -4.6766*** -6.9197*** -8.1228*** -9.3458*** -7.9787*** 
Wald  4.1979  5.2773*  11.0769***  22.1285***  28.3430***  63.6764***  98.1864***  146.4662***  481.8779*** 
ADF -48.4682*** -8.1458*** -7.0807*** -6.2409*** -5.2002*** -3.6641*** -3.2505*** -2.8598*** -3.7194*** 
R2  0.9896  0.9606  0.8460  0.7123  0.6681  0.4791  0.3944  0.3047  0.5260 
JPY         
a  0.0071*  0.0266*  0.1236**  0.2644***  0.4071***  0.8116***  1.0932***  1.3894***  1.7492*** 
Se a  0.0043  0.0157  0.0498  0.0762  0.0953  0.1385  0.1659  0.1863  0.4628 
β  0.9985***  0.9946***  0.9747***  0.9459***  0.9166***  0.8332***  0.7753***  0.7147***  0.6380*** 
Se β  0.0009  0.0032  0.0103  0.0158  0.0197  0.0287  0.0344  0.0387  0.0949 
t β=1 -1.6941* -1.6733* -2.4488** -3.4299*** -4.2239*** -5.8039*** -6.5273*** -7.3753*** -3.8163*** 
Wald  3.7771  3.3279  7.0955**  13.6887***  20.5245***  37.1732***  47.2411***  62.3747***  17.3433*** 
ADF -60.8622*** -10.1917*** -8.0847*** -6.9016*** -5.7600*** -3.5942*** -2.8930*** -2.9067*** -1.5334 
R2  0.9971  0.9885  0.9481  0.8906  0.8348  0.6737  0.5603  0.4672  0.1639 
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NOK         
a  0.0095***  0.0318***  0.1436***  0.2869***  0.4201***  0.7417***  1.1887***  1.7143***  2.3645*** 
Se a  0.0031  0.0116  0.0360  0.0530  0.0647  0.0887  0.1090  0.1223  0.1767 
β  0.9954***  0.9845***  0.9301***  0.8605***  0.7958***  0.6400***  0.4253***  0.1742*** -0.1338 
Se β  0.0015  0.0056  0.0173  0.0254  0.0310  0.0424  0.0519  0.0581  0.0834 
t β=1 -3.0795*** -2.7851*** -4.0433*** -5.4989*** -6.5935*** -8.4955*** -11.0633*** -14.2014*** -13.5926*** 
Wald  9.5609***  11.0101***  22.9251***  42.9400***  62.7306***  112.5208***  184.6351***  290.1468***  292.2365*** 
ADF -60.9515*** -10.5833*** -8.1238*** -6.8547*** -5.6270*** -4.1756*** -3.1966*** -2.6424*** -1.8045* 
R2  0.9918  0.9670  0.8565  0.7235  0.6083  0.3584  0.1479  0.0252  0.0108 
NZD         
a  0.0017**  0.0050  0.0201**  0.0356***  0.0514***  0.0926***  0.1365***  0.2197***  0.6105*** 
Se a  0.0008  0.0031  0.0094  0.0134  0.0165  0.0239  0.0307  0.0377  0.0688 
β  0.9974***  0.9908***  0.9628***  0.9337***  0.9044***  0.8283***  0.7497***  0.6169***  0.0249 
Se β  0.0013  0.0047  0.0141  0.0201  0.0246  0.0352  0.0446  0.0539  0.0943 
t β=1 -2.0982** -1.9439* -2.6291*** -3.3013*** -3.8865*** -4.8764*** -5.6110*** -7.1087*** -10.3360*** 
Wald  4.4432  8.3190**  16.8478***  29.4825***  42.4898***  77.8069***  117.6515***  167.4326***  270.5818*** 
ADF -60.9523*** -10.9854*** -8.5563*** -7.5471*** -6.3188*** -4.4443*** -3.6979*** -2.9332*** -1.0798 
R2  0.9940  0.9756  0.9040  0.8284  0.7580  0.5734  0.4147  0.2519  0.0006 
SGD         
a  0.0005  0.0022  0.0109*  0.0235***  0.0342***  0.0673***  0.1098***  0.1713*** -0.1717 
Se a  0.0005  0.0018  0.0058  0.0088  0.0107  0.0155  0.0198  0.0240  0.0535 
β  0.9991***  0.9964***  0.9821***  0.9616***  0.9443***  0.8911***  0.8229***  0.7246***  1.1856*** 
Se β  0.0008  0.0029  0.0092  0.0141  0.0171  0.0247  0.0316  0.0382  0.0784 
t β=1 -1.1101 -1.2265 -1.9434* -2.7283*** -3.2597*** -4.4033*** -5.6100*** -7.2054***  2.3657** 
Wald  2.5334  1.5336  3.8175  7.4631**  10.6302***  19.3904***  31.4917***  52.0003***  104.9884*** 
ADF -60.9549*** -10.4253*** -8.7254*** -6.7571*** -5.8299*** -4.1744*** -3.0619*** -2.5497** -1.9708** 
R2  0.9976  0.9909  0.9587  0.9136  0.8777  0.7605  0.6312  0.4810  0.4932 
USD         
a  0.0002  0.0006  0.0030  0.0067**  0.0102***  0.0220***  0.0336***  0.0453***  0.2522*** 
Se a  0.0002  0.0006  0.0020  0.0030  0.0037  0.0053  0.0064  0.0074  0.0202 
β  0.9992***  0.9971***  0.9852***  0.9685***  0.9539***  0.9027***  0.8516***  0.7991***  0.1732*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0080  0.0123  0.0151  0.0217  0.0265  0.0305  0.0671 
t β=1 -1.2852 -1.2083 -1.8497* -2.5523** -3.0509*** -4.4788*** -5.6017*** -6.5924*** -12.3173*** 
Wald  1.7762  1.4800  3.4896  6.7862**  9.9350***  21.7821***  34.0987***  47.0672***  156.1280*** 
ADF -60.9741*** -9.7344*** -8.1418*** -6.7607*** -5.6732*** -4.0656*** -3.2414*** -2.7052*** -2.5298** 
210 
 
R2  0.9985  0.9938  0.9688  0.9335  0.9035  0.8088  0.7219  0.6385  0.0290 
AED         
a  0.0013  0.0040  0.1422***  0.0450**  0.0667***  0.1412***  0.2139***  0.2893***  1.3195*** 
Se a  0.0010  0.0036  0.0172  0.0185  0.0227  0.0325  0.0395  0.0455  0.1184 
β  0.9991***  0.9973***  0.9088***  0.9704***  0.9563***  0.9079***  0.8605***  0.8112***  0.1786** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0024  0.0116  0.0124  0.0152  0.0219  0.0266  0.0306  0.0742 
t β=1 -1.3383 -1.0977 -7.8817*** -2.3896** -2.8645*** -4.2094*** -5.2488*** -6.1767*** -11.0680*** 
Wald  1.8764  1.2262  77.5990***  6.0278**  8.9152**  19.6660***  30.6388***  42.2670***  128.3273*** 
ADF -60.9695*** -9.6858*** -5.0485*** -6.7604*** -5.6623*** -4.0404*** -3.2393*** -2.7389*** -2.4658** 
R2  0.9985  0.9938  0.9331  0.9331  0.9025  0.8084  0.7248  0.6438  0.0247 
BRL         
a  0.0126**  0.0599***  0.1210***  0.1818***  0.3467***  0.4931***  0.6525***  0.7936*** 
Se a  0.0051  0.0161  0.0224  0.0257  0.0304  0.0341  0.0341  0.0355 
β  0.9848***  0.9297***  0.8592***  0.7899***  0.6056***  0.4471***  0.2812***  0.1242*** 
Se β  0.0051  0.0160  0.0221  0.0252  0.0290  0.0320  0.0312  0.0295 
t β=1 -2.9875*** -4.3899*** -6.3828*** -8.3441*** -13.5817*** -17.2808*** -23.0486*** -29.7275*** 
Wald  21.8475***  41.2970***  85.7479***  145.2730***  386.6125***  644.8500***  1144.2860***  3121.8350*** 
ADF -9.9075*** -7.8375*** -5.5200*** -5.1820*** -3.9521*** -3.7896*** -3.4897*** -2.6097*** 
R2  0.9826  0.9169  0.8457  0.7848  0.6031  0.4137  0.2358  0.0705 
CLP         
a  0.0776*  0.3423**  0.6907***  1.0320***  1.9203***  3.3857***  4.5865***  7.7631*** 
Se a  0.0447  0.1431  0.2068  0.2491  0.3188  0.4052  0.4532  0.5042 
β  0.9881***  0.9473***  0.8937***  0.8412***  0.7046***  0.4804***  0.2971*** -0.1845 
Se β  0.0068  0.0218  0.0315  0.0380  0.0486  0.0616  0.0689  0.0763 
t β=1 -1.7500* -2.4145** -3.3707*** -4.1818*** -6.0853*** -8.4301*** -10.2087*** -15.5274*** 
Wald  4.5077  8.7118**  17.1719***  27.1784***  63.6162***  113.4856***  166.8526***  385.2427*** 
ADF -11.3432*** -6.6495*** -6.0582*** -5.0762*** -3.7950*** -2.7148*** -2.2203** -1.7327* 
R2  0.9681  0.8602  0.7431  0.6470  0.4250  0.1836  0.0671  0.0243 
CNY         
a  0.0150  0.0900***  0.2038***  0.3070***  0.6133***  0.9205***  1.2012*** -0.4120 
Se a  0.0096  0.0324  0.0502  0.0619  0.0918  0.1136  0.1323  0.2067 
β  0.9935***  0.9607***  0.9111***  0.8662***  0.7321***  0.5971***  0.4733***  1.1838*** 
Se β  0.0043  0.0145  0.0224  0.0276  0.0410  0.0509  0.0593  0.0923 
t β=1 -1.5294 -2.7149*** -3.9695*** -4.8406*** -6.5298*** -7.9180*** -8.8753***  1.9910** 
Wald  3.1394  9.3743***  20.2905***  31.2550***  58.0407***  87.0225***  112.4583***  3.9761 
211 
 
ADF -9.3746*** -7.2439*** -5.6912*** -4.6606*** -3.1892*** -2.6170*** -2.0032** -2.8287*** 
R2  0.9851  0.9212  0.8292  0.7488  0.5023  0.3109  0.1759  0.4095 
COP         
a  0.1075**  0.4509***  0.9130***  1.3814***  2.5079***  3.4726***  4.0141***  3.9975*** 
Se a  0.0471  0.1470  0.2113  0.2541  0.3136  0.3595  0.3880  0.4413 
β  0.9863***  0.9425***  0.8835***  0.8238***  0.6801***  0.5570***  0.4875***  0.4848*** 
Se β  0.0059  0.0185  0.0266  0.0320  0.0394  0.0451  0.0486  0.0548 
t β=1 -2.3098** -3.1034*** -4.3735*** -5.5055*** -8.1120*** -9.8161*** -10.5465*** -9.3980*** 
Wald  8.7977**  16.6636***  34.0334***  55.4686***  136.3496***  231.0650***  334.6561***  759.8717*** 
ADF -8.9864*** -6.5849*** -5.4050*** -4.4105*** -3.3511*** -2.7105*** -2.4045** -2.2465** 
R2  0.9752  0.8934  0.7986  0.7124  0.5108  0.3566  0.2743  0.2485 
CZK         
a  0.0012  0.0106*  0.0497***  0.1098***  0.1719***  0.3515***  0.5018***  0.6364***  1.7744*** 
Se a  0.0016  0.0061  0.0186  0.0269  0.0329  0.0458  0.0546  0.0587  0.1029 
β  0.9996***  0.9967***  0.9847***  0.9662***  0.9471***  0.8917***  0.8452***  0.8035***  0.4483*** 
Se β  0.0005  0.0018  0.0055  0.0080  0.0097  0.0136  0.0161  0.0173  0.0311 
t β=1 -0.8016 -1.7894* -2.7876*** -4.2531*** -5.4369*** -7.9883*** -9.5963*** -11.3554*** -17.7332*** 
Wald  1.6781  5.9642*  15.1870***  34.9774***  56.3335***  123.2096***  186.7944***  272.1440***  688.9584*** 
ADF -60.8706*** -10.6509*** -8.9189*** -7.4425*** -6.4631*** -4.2915*** -3.4436*** -3.1733*** -2.4691** 
R2  0.9991  0.9964  0.9850  0.9705  0.9562  0.9132  0.8728  0.8462  0.4672 
HUF         
a  0.0201**  0.0637**  0.2773***  0.6743***  1.1255***  2.4408***  3.3675***  3.5322***  4.5256*** 
Se a  0.0080  0.0309  0.0940  0.1437  0.1830  0.2491  0.2788  0.2908  0.3090 
β  0.9964***  0.9884***  0.9495***  0.8776***  0.7961***  0.5592***  0.3928***  0.3628***  0.1901*** 
Se β  0.0014  0.0055  0.0169  0.0258  0.0328  0.0446  0.0498  0.0518  0.0546 
t β=1 -2.4970** -2.0937** -2.9954*** -4.7481*** -6.2144*** -9.8919*** -12.2010*** -12.2954*** -14.8291*** 
Wald  16.1089***  12.4623***  25.3598***  50.1105***  76.2381***  176.1627***  280.6366***  353.1667***  413.2941*** 
ADF -60.9104*** -9.6375*** -7.9135*** -7.0721*** -5.4918*** -3.6201*** -2.9939*** -2.6789*** -2.2772** 
R2  0.9918  0.9666  0.8664  0.7248  0.5815  0.2800  0.1353  0.1111  0.0494 
IDR         
a  0.1070**  0.1198**  0.2076**  0.3674***  0.5007***  1.0590***  1.7782***  2.9899*** 
Se a  0.0485  0.0545  0.0971  0.1415  0.1752  0.2399  0.2847  0.3270 
β  0.9887***  0.9872***  0.9775***  0.9600***  0.9453***  0.8846***  0.8072***  0.6771*** 
Se β  0.0052  0.0059  0.0104  0.0152  0.0188  0.0257  0.0305  0.0350 
t β=1 -2.1655** -2.1788** -2.1566** -2.6324*** -2.9093*** -4.4871*** -6.3223*** -9.2321*** 
212 
 
Wald  8.8837**  5.6913*  5.5041*  9.9883***  14.7819***  32.5981***  53.9326***  103.7001*** 
ADF -7.1413*** -7.5980*** -8.8059*** -6.6438*** -5.0898*** -4.6407*** -3.6716*** -3.6140*** 
R2  0.9861  0.9800  0.9488  0.9013  0.8564  0.7422  0.6373  0.4901 
INR         
a  0.0018  0.0069  0.0343  0.0670  0.0918*  0.1506*  0.2169**  0.3366*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0092  0.0299  0.0455  0.0558  0.0785  0.0984  0.1225 
β  0.9996***  0.9982***  0.9910***  0.9826***  0.9763***  0.9614***  0.9448***  0.9151*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0023  0.0075  0.0113  0.0139  0.0195  0.0244  0.0304 
t β=1 -0.6253 -0.8057 -1.2057 -1.5327 -1.7084* -1.9779** -2.2593** -2.7928*** 
Wald  6.9489**  2.3647  3.3581  4.4612  5.1383*  6.0147**  6.9673**  9.0665** 
ADF -60.9586*** -10.1116*** -8.4147*** -6.8415*** -5.8874*** -4.4404*** -3.7823*** -3.3177*** 
R2  0.9985  0.9944  0.9734  0.9448  0.9206  0.8555  0.7890  0.6990 
MAD         
a  0.0148***  0.0579***  0.2948***  0.6276***  0.9368***  1.9825***  2.5258***  2.6144***  2.3973*** 
Se a  0.0057  0.0190  0.0593  0.0862  0.1002  0.1072  0.0944  0.0813  0.0529 
β  0.9939***  0.9758***  0.8769***  0.7383***  0.6098***  0.1773*** -0.0460 -0.0820  0.0074 
Se β  0.0024  0.0079  0.0246  0.0356  0.0414  0.0441  0.0387  0.0332  0.0213 
t β=1 -2.5699** -3.0783*** -5.0110*** -7.3446*** -9.4289*** -18.6488*** -27.0040*** -32.5585*** -46.6365*** 
Wald  16.2778***  42.8355***  92.7061***  173.6387***  276.4440***  836.6790***  1793.8830***  3010.2920*** 
 10076.0400**
* 
ADF -48.2318*** -9.0650*** -6.2372*** -4.7963*** -3.9491*** -2.6480*** -2.4497** -2.3430** -2.7748*** 
R2  0.9874  0.9597  0.8090  0.6123  0.4532  0.0624  0.0067  0.0227  0.0007 
MXN         
a -0.0013 -0.0039 -0.0029  0.0037  0.0358  0.0876  0.2180***  1.9182*** 
Se a  0.0049  0.0160  0.0253  0.0327  0.0498  0.0635  0.0816  0.1475 
β  1.0002***  1.0000***  0.9984***  0.9947***  0.9793***  0.9567***  0.9047***  0.3096*** 
Se β  0.0019  0.0061  0.0097  0.0125  0.0190  0.0241  0.0308  0.0521 
t β=1  0.0866 -0.0011 -0.1694 -0.4237 -1.0878 -1.7979* -3.0901*** -13.2636*** 
Wald  3.2487  5.8466*  7.8586**  9.6716***  15.0741***  21.7298***  28.6992***  213.2642*** 
ADF -10.0226*** -7.9311*** -6.6085*** -5.8799*** -4.2288*** -3.2840*** -2.9361*** -2.6134*** 
R2  0.9962  0.9821  0.9603  0.9366  0.8667  0.7979  0.6882  0.1303 
MYR         
a  0.0042*  0.0080  0.0434  0.0985**  0.1487***  0.3798***  0.6182***  0.7851*** 
Se a  0.0025  0.0085  0.0265  0.0405  0.0504  0.0800  0.0978  0.1136 
β  0.9972***  0.9943***  0.9699***  0.9323***  0.8982***  0.7433***  0.5843***  0.4723*** 
213 
 
Se β  0.0017  0.0056  0.0175  0.0267  0.0332  0.0525  0.0641  0.0742 
t β=1 -1.6849* -1.0042 -1.7202* -2.5325** -3.0668*** -4.8853*** -6.4908*** -7.1128*** 
Wald  3.0268  2.5633  5.5082*  10.4653***  14.6981***  32.0777***  56.7750***  74.6807*** 
ADF -49.0692*** -9.5013*** -7.6098*** -5.6100*** -4.6212*** -3.2710*** -2.4364** -2.0203** 
R2  0.9934  0.9784  0.9068  0.8110  0.7285  0.4373  0.2305  0.1292 
PHP         
a  0.0047*  0.0093  0.0487  0.1112**  0.1748***  0.4057***  0.5949***  0.7937*** 
Se a  0.0026  0.0092  0.0300  0.0460  0.0567  0.0815  0.0958  0.1097 
β  0.9989***  0.9975***  0.9873***  0.9714***  0.9552***  0.8969***  0.8492***  0.7994*** 
Se β  0.0006  0.0023  0.0074  0.0113  0.0140  0.0200  0.0235  0.0268 
t β=1 -1.7247* -1.0780 -1.7138* -2.5258** -3.2090*** -5.1432*** -6.4189*** -7.4850*** 
Wald  5.5515*  3.3051  6.6845**  11.9771***  17.9235***  40.3593***  64.3070***  89.2442*** 
ADF -60.8013*** -9.8764*** -8.7234*** -6.9593*** -6.0768*** -4.3653*** -3.5298*** -3.3854*** 
R2  0.9984  0.9944  0.9734  0.9434  0.9162  0.8301  0.7661  0.6945 
PKR         
a  0.0247**  0.1092***  0.2019***  0.2874***  0.5927***  6.0263*** 
Se a  0.0114  0.0354  0.0505  0.0624  0.0898  1.5245 
β  0.9945***  0.9760***  0.9558***  0.9372***  0.8706*** -0.2483 
Se β  0.0025  0.0077  0.0110  0.0136  0.0195  0.3132 
t β=1 -2.1855** -3.1035*** -4.0097*** -4.6145*** -6.6243*** -3.9862*** 
Wald  5.0046*  9.7459***  16.0958***  21.3032***  43.9597***  79.3537*** 
ADF -9.4872*** -6.9398*** -5.4671*** -4.6888*** -3.0803*** -1.4249 
R2  0.9957  0.9810  0.9644  0.9465  0.8749  0.0149 
PLZ         
a  0.0045**  0.0187**  0.0867***  0.2036***  0.3253***  0.6812***  0.9390***  1.1445***  1.4500*** 
Se a  0.0019  0.0073  0.0225  0.0357  0.0449  0.0625  0.0700  0.0739  0.0747 
β  0.9969***  0.9864***  0.9370***  0.8528***  0.7656***  0.5109***  0.3269***  0.1817*** -0.0502 
Se β  0.0013  0.0052  0.0161  0.0254  0.0319  0.0442  0.0493  0.0520  0.0526 
t β=1 -2.2797** -2.6079*** -3.9189*** -5.7887*** -7.3511*** -11.0545*** -13.6409*** -15.7466*** -19.9827*** 
Wald  7.6310**  7.5420**  16.8431***  35.4291***  56.3820***  127.8748***  196.9743***  262.4516***  467.1539*** 
ADF -53.8414*** -9.3502*** -6.5397*** -6.3399*** -4.8265*** -3.0376*** -2.0880** -2.1199** -1.9770** 
R2  0.9942  0.9762  0.8993  0.7668  0.6367  0.3021  0.1295  0.0416  0.0039 
RUR         
a  0.0046  0.0512***  0.2021***  0.4370***  0.6566***  1.2272***  1.6560***  2.0473*** 
Se a  0.0045  0.0171  0.0472  0.0739  0.0914  0.1145  0.1265  0.1366 
214 
 
β  0.9988***  0.9857***  0.9437***  0.8786***  0.8178***  0.6601***  0.5419***  0.4344*** 
Se β  0.0012  0.0047  0.0130  0.0203  0.0251  0.0313  0.0345  0.0372 
t β=1 -1.0022 -3.0413*** -4.3441*** -5.9855*** -7.2698*** -10.8545*** -13.2726*** -15.2172*** 
Wald  2.5171  12.4284***  25.1819***  44.1288***  63.7985***  139.6678***  209.7260***  276.3863*** 
ADF -48.3589*** -11.7656*** -6.1591*** -6.1224*** -4.0021*** -3.0726*** -2.1077** -1.6903* 
R2  0.9963  0.9844  0.9439  0.8697  0.7987  0.6104  0.4737  0.3408 
THB         
a  0.0063  0.0181  0.0912**  0.2070***  0.3102***  0.6362***  0.9542***  1.3436*** 
Se a  0.0040  0.0142  0.0442  0.0676  0.0824  0.1149  0.1381  0.1608 
β  0.9983***  0.9951***  0.9754***  0.9445***  0.9170***  0.8305***  0.7463***  0.6434*** 
Se β  0.0011  0.0037  0.0117  0.0178  0.0217  0.0303  0.0363  0.0423 
t β=1 -1.5713 -1.3049 -2.1038** -3.1118*** -3.8184*** -5.5986*** -6.9815*** -8.4401*** 
Wald  2.4728  3.0657  6.7023**  12.5978***  18.2343***  36.3779***  55.5734***  80.5983*** 
ADF -60.9045*** -10.3257*** -8.8749*** -6.9627*** -5.7272*** -4.1856*** -3.3793*** -2.9098*** 
R2  0.9957  0.9849  0.9346  0.8642  0.8067  0.6475  0.5144  0.3731 
TRL         
a  0.0917***  0.0893***  0.0891***  0.0907***  0.0941***  0.1101***  0.1438***  0.1913***  0.4514*** 
Se a  0.0091  0.0094  0.0101  0.0109  0.0118  0.0142  0.0172  0.0201  0.0631 
β  0.8484***  0.8478***  0.8382***  0.8244***  0.8072***  0.7480***  0.6614***  0.5612***  0.3104*** 
Se β  0.0138  0.0142  0.0152  0.0163  0.0176  0.0207  0.0245  0.0276  0.0735 
t β=1 -10.9851*** -10.7430*** -10.6692*** -10.7666*** -10.9666*** -12.1485*** -13.8193*** -15.8741*** -9.3814*** 
Wald  141.8986***  132.0047***  123.8029***  120.9568***  122.3279***  147.9221***  195.7208***  264.3150***  448.9671*** 
ADF -4.1680*** -4.2251*** -4.2673*** -3.8473*** -3.8601*** -3.3802*** -3.2383*** -3.0794*** -2.2259** 
R2  0.8794  0.8742  0.8588  0.8399  0.8164  0.7447  0.6339  0.5049  0.0706 
TWD         
a  0.0035  0.0211  0.0569  0.0915  0.2033**  0.3805***  0.6557***  3.9316*** 
Se a  0.0089  0.0286  0.0451  0.0567  0.0819  0.1038  0.1279  0.3390 
β  0.9991***  0.9945***  0.9850***  0.9759***  0.9465***  0.8991***  0.8247*** -0.0490 
Se β  0.0024  0.0078  0.0123  0.0155  0.0224  0.0285  0.0351  0.0910 
t β=1 -0.3703 -0.7027 -1.2128 -1.5496 -2.3863** -3.5474*** -4.9936*** -11.5253*** 
Wald  0.4884  1.1823  3.0830  5.1003*  12.0419***  22.6147***  37.6373***  157.5237*** 
ADF -10.9070*** -8.4924*** -6.9876*** -5.9034*** -4.2671*** -3.2109*** -2.7847*** -1.6619* 
R2  0.9936  0.9707  0.9354  0.9027  0.8130  0.7146  0.5864  0.0017 
ZAR         
a  0.0049**  0.0117*  0.0465**  0.0961***  0.1436***  0.3421***  0.5174***  0.7778***  2.2209*** 
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Se a  0.0021  0.0067  0.0213  0.0320  0.0392  0.0574  0.0669  0.0784  0.1077 
β  0.9980***  0.9944***  0.9775***  0.9539***  0.9314***  0.8393***  0.7585***  0.6408***  0.0481 
Se β  0.0009  0.0030  0.0096  0.0145  0.0177  0.0258  0.0299  0.0348  0.0453 
t β=1 -2.1199** -1.8328* -2.3282** -3.1829*** -3.8726*** -6.2324*** -8.0776*** -10.3137*** -20.9961*** 
Wald  13.7107***  4.2618  7.6104**  13.5070***  19.6278***  46.4935***  77.6863***  122.2675***  459.3925*** 
ADF -58.3115*** -10.6499*** -8.6817*** -6.5754*** -5.4553*** -4.0519*** -3.4906*** -2.6416*** -2.6208*** 
R2  0.9975  0.9902  0.9551  0.9084  0.8666  0.7215  0.6173  0.4653  0.0089 
Mean         
a  0.0124  0.0262  0.0910  0.2027  0.3032  0.6028  0.8811  1.2845  1.6508 
Se a  0.0046  0.0124  0.0368  0.0530  0.0647  0.0868  0.1023  0.1600  0.1525 
β  0.9913  0.9876  0.9778  0.9249  0.8907  0.7867  0.6901  0.5717  0.3397 
se β  0.0018  0.0044  0.0143  0.0184  0.0223  0.0302  0.0362  0.0497  0.0673 
t β=1 -0.4312 -0.3504 -0.4595 -0.6551 -0.7900 -1.1566 -1.4781 -1.7169 -2.5268 
Wald  11.5407  10.7206  25.9229  29.1554  42.5752  96.6147  170.0129  257.8429  808.4084 
R2  0.9904  0.9802  0.9155  0.8602  0.8015  0.6407  0.5106  0.3927  0.1473 
 
We use the Dynamic Ordinary Least Squares (DOLS) estimator. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and 
standard errors of α and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1 and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) 
for the residuals of the equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. Empty entries due to missing data in forward rates. Standard currency short codes 
are employed.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.7  Number of rejections of unbiasedness hypothesis using Sterling, USD 
and Euro sample 
Panel A (FMOLS) 
   TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Sterling 
         
a=0 1 3 9 15 17 20 21 20 17 
t β=1 1 3 9 15 17 22 22 22 17 
a=0 & β=1 2 7 13 24 25 26 27 27 22 
USD                   
a=0 5 7 19 20 21 22 21 22 18 
t β=1 6 11 22 25 27 29 29 28 22 
a=0 & β=1 7 16 23 26 28 29 29 28 24 
Euro                   
a=0 2 2 15 25 25 26 26 28 19 
t β=1 2 3 18 25 26 27 28 30 24 
a=0 & β=1 5 7 20 25 27 28 28 30 23 
 
 
 
Panel B (DOLS) 
 
TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Sterling 
         
a=0 7 6 13 16 17 21 21 20 17 
t β=1 7 7 14 16 17 22 22 21 17 
a=0 & β=1 8 8 15 24 25 26 28 27 22 
USD 
         
a=0 9 16 20 20 21 22 21 22 18 
t β=1 8 19 24 26 27 29 29 28 22 
a=0 & β=1 12 19 25 27 28 29 30 28 24 
Euro 
         
a=0 10 12 20 25 25 26 26 28 19 
t β=1 10 12 21 25 26 28 28 30 24 
a=0 & β=1 9 11 21 27 27 29 29 30 23 
 
 
Numbers in each row of the table represents of the number of economies that are rejected for the 
hypothesis α=0, β=1, and the joint test α=0 and β=1 respectively. Most periods contain all 31 economies 
data coverage, except only 24 economies for TN, and 30 economies for 9M. For 2Y forward rates, Sterling 
covers 22 economies, while both USD and Euro have 24 economies. For 1Y forward rates, Sterling has 29 
economies and USD has 30 economies data coverage. Empty entries in table 3.7.1 to 3.7.6 indicate the 
economies with missing data. 
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Table 3.8  ADF test for Sterling Spot returns 
 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
ADF trend -14.8155*** -13.4997*** -10.5008*** -9.1444*** -7.8592*** -5.9920*** -5.0162*** -4.7033*** -3.4576** 
ADF const -14.7499*** -13.43443*** -10.44149*** -9.100410*** -7.784599*** -5.867230*** -4.912309*** -4.609350*** -3.199108** 
ADF 1st.diff -23.5029*** -23.8387*** -30.8015*** -76.7234*** -75.4813*** -76.4891*** -75.2612*** -75.5105*** -55.0392*** 
CAD         
ADF trend -14.7150*** -13.1674*** -10.4929*** -9.9215*** -8.2489*** -5.7565*** -4.8683*** -4.7032*** -3.8068** 
ADF const -14.6676*** -13.11752*** -10.44810*** -9.884589*** -8.179004*** -5.691917*** -4.831383*** -4.656649*** -3.464863*** 
ADF 1st.diff -23.9796*** -25.4640*** -33.2714*** -74.0890*** -73.9469*** -73.6107*** -75.3781*** -73.6983*** -73.0464*** 
CHF         
ADF trend -16.3141*** -13.1364*** -11.0393*** -9.3792*** -7.5917*** -5.2303*** -4.1537*** -3.6042** -2.2100 
ADF const -16.2930*** -13.10970*** -11.01190*** -9.083858*** -7.551550*** -5.170244*** -4.090084*** -3.553535*** -2.2422 
ADF 1st.diff -24.5045*** -23.9748*** -26.0055*** -75.8460*** -74.2133*** -74.4549*** -74.7751*** -73.3416*** -71.9921*** 
XEU         
ADF trend -14.7603*** -12.9669*** -10.9239*** -9.2621*** -7.5540*** -5.2553*** -4.3310*** -3.6686** -2.5008 
ADF const -14.7458*** -12.95275*** -10.91216*** -9.255727*** -7.522632*** -5.229275*** -4.307906*** -3.657348*** -2.5240 
ADF 1st.diff -24.6787*** -24.2564*** -28.2011*** -77.1730*** -76.0566*** -77.4971*** -78.0444*** -76.4917*** -75.2927*** 
HKD         
ADF trend -12.7882*** -11.5548*** -10.0523*** -8.9363*** -7.1319*** -4.7354*** -4.1429*** -3.9357** -2.7511 
ADF const -12.7888*** -11.55557*** -10.05229*** -8.936335*** -7.128852*** -4.735627*** -4.143733*** -3.928708*** -2.746136* 
ADF 1st.diff -25.2118*** -25.3234*** -26.9292*** -72.9708*** -73.7593*** -72.8128*** -73.7363*** -72.8512*** -71.4248*** 
ILS         
ADF trend -14.0143*** -12.5030*** -10.7630*** -9.7743*** -8.0100*** -5.6281*** -4.8444*** -4.4355*** -2.8250 
ADF const -13.8248*** -12.31188*** -10.57867*** -9.609225*** -7.774694*** -5.369819*** -4.583359*** -4.197059*** -2.707664* 
ADF 1st.diff -23.2346*** -24.3530*** -28.1692*** -81.0725*** -79.2904*** -81.0178*** -81.0397*** -79.0538*** -46.9744*** 
JPY         
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ADF trend -16.4818*** -11.6920*** -9.8839*** -8.7137*** -6.9981*** -4.6327*** -3.8889** -3.3994* -1.9906 
ADF const -16.4827*** -11.69167*** -9.882237*** -8.712427*** -6.994374*** -4.622631*** -3.875080*** -3.391420** -1.9970 
ADF 1st.diff -24.6640*** -24.8792*** -30.4966*** -45.9643*** -73.6126*** -73.3201*** -46.2350*** -72.2785*** -44.7984*** 
NOK         
ADF trend -15.1376*** -14.0105*** -11.2742*** -9.8757*** -8.6127*** -6.3884*** -5.2421*** -4.5271*** -3.2498* 
ADF const -15.0929*** -13.96762*** -11.23739*** -9.848812*** -8.546919*** -6.300586*** -5.151889*** -4.451576*** -3.181975** 
ADF 1st.diff -23.2849*** -24.7416*** -30.5538*** -47.9632*** -47.7049*** -76.4028*** -76.3925*** -56.0608*** -74.2186*** 
NZD         
ADF trend -14.3284*** -13.1519*** -10.6125*** -9.3400*** -7.8861*** -5.6712*** -4.7030*** -4.1250*** -2.8688 
ADF const -14.2884*** -13.11028*** -10.57186*** -9.308396*** -7.827340*** -5.614141*** -4.656309*** -4.100352*** -2.850836* 
ADF 1st.diff -23.8785*** -25.1254*** -32.3308*** -76.2748*** -56.3209*** -75.1860*** -74.7389*** -74.7602*** -55.1576*** 
SGD         
ADF trend -14.5053*** -12.2151*** -10.0237*** -9.0534*** -6.9901*** -5.0487*** -4.3323*** -3.5416** -2.2997 
ADF const -14.4998*** -12.21006*** -10.01916*** -9.048578*** -6.978205*** -5.042590*** -4.336781*** -3.545799*** -2.2875 
ADF 1st.diff -24.1478*** -24.8525*** -30.0393*** -76.0857*** -48.1766*** -75.5912*** -47.6788*** -46.8784*** -46.2899*** 
USD         
ADF trend -16.5028*** -11.6300*** -10.0031*** -8.8956*** -7.1630*** -4.7777*** -4.1900*** -3.9762*** -2.7960 
ADF const -16.5029*** -11.63044*** -10.00306*** -8.895504*** -7.159610*** -4.777994*** -4.191098*** -3.969537*** -2.790572* 
ADF 1st.diff -25.3551*** -25.3050*** -30.4363*** -72.9433*** -73.1209*** -72.2418*** -73.6145*** -72.3628*** -70.6101*** 
AED         
ADF trend -13.4737*** -11.6987*** -9.7403*** -8.6187*** -6.9531*** -4.6531*** -4.1984*** -3.9289** -2.7461 
ADF const -13.4743*** -11.69906*** -9.740682*** -8.618808*** -6.949232*** -4.653114*** -4.199886*** -3.921934*** -2.740561* 
ADF 1st.diff -24.0120*** -25.2683*** -29.9914*** -75.8812*** -75.4908*** -75.8618*** -75.6729*** -74.9129*** -74.3039*** 
BRL         
ADF trend -8.8277*** -8.0284*** -7.7092*** -6.5533*** -5.4137*** -2.3082 -1.7287 -1.3279 -0.3174 
ADF const -7.1830*** -7.036046*** -6.646214*** -5.509062*** -4.669719*** -2.1234 -1.8304 -1.8906 -1.7933 
ADF 1st.diff -25.6663*** -28.5730*** -16.6351*** -17.3474*** -12.6101*** -58.8813*** -29.4055*** -83.1264*** -80.5981*** 
CLP         
ADF trend -13.6258*** -12.0949*** -10.0314*** -8.8645*** -7.4688*** -5.5131*** -5.0636*** -5.0928*** -3.7061** 
ADF const -12.8148*** -11.99215*** -9.934827*** -8.779919*** -7.347847*** -5.377156*** -4.892254*** -4.931015*** -3.497110*** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.2164*** -24.5843*** -29.4145*** -77.8783*** -74.6850*** -75.3777*** -76.5773*** -76.4416*** -75.2744*** 
CNY         
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ADF trend -13.2997*** -12.1465*** -10.1482*** -8.8799*** -7.2685*** -4.9522*** -4.1821*** -3.8150** -2.9022 
ADF const -13.1829*** -12.02999*** -10.04064*** -8.783905*** -7.130525*** -4.798006*** -4.068414*** -3.739187*** -2.655454* 
ADF 1st.diff -23.7405*** -25.2796*** -30.1306*** -76.4751*** -76.6917*** -76.0504*** -75.8370*** -75.5226*** -73.6660*** 
COP         
ADF trend -15.2016*** -13.4725*** -10.8865*** -9.0154*** -7.8684*** -5.8794*** -5.2194*** -4.8165*** -3.1006 
ADF const -14.9423*** -13.20587*** -10.63807*** -8.818548*** -7.566024*** -5.462824*** -4.811848*** -4.388221*** -2.635102* 
ADF 1st.diff -22.0822*** -23.1668*** -28.8200*** -75.3612*** -75.1276*** -75.1012*** -74.4754*** -74.2924*** -72.7497*** 
CZK         
ADF trend -14.4888*** -12.8263*** -10.7313*** -9.6402*** -7.0036*** -5.1757*** -4.1297*** -4.6716*** -4.1050*** 
ADF const -14.3576*** -12.68749*** -10.62176*** -9.567685*** -6.841151*** -5.076151*** -4.032510*** -4.869611*** -4.524123*** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.6950*** -24.8519*** -29.9325*** -76.5323*** -38.5931*** -76.5394*** -75.8204*** -55.9344*** -73.8303*** 
HUF         
ADF trend -14.6219*** -13.0456*** -11.0374*** -9.7681*** -7.9258*** -5.8008*** -4.7602*** -3.9448** -2.3010 
ADF const -14.4345*** -12.84948*** -10.86640*** -9.620103*** -7.682210*** -5.485644*** -4.391465*** -3.602378*** -2.1926 
ADF 1st.diff -23.1980*** -24.4068*** -30.0997*** -75.0987*** -76.1971*** -75.1539*** -75.3719*** -74.5107*** -72.8795*** 
IDR         
ADF trend -11.0887*** -10.9068*** -10.9029*** -12.6332*** -9.2698*** -5.4180*** -4.9666*** -4.1938*** -2.7373 
ADF const -11.0657*** -10.88386*** -10.87012*** -12.57610*** -9.216917*** -5.379627*** -4.932274*** -4.151123*** -2.658757* 
ADF 1st.diff -23.5797*** -23.2409*** -14.9451*** -11.6033*** -11.8216*** -11.1712*** -9.7814*** -10.3547*** -10.2708*** 
INR         
ADF trend -13.6882*** -12.6244*** -9.8627*** -8.7552*** -7.2290*** -5.1850*** -4.7740*** -4.3971*** -3.5819** 
ADF const -13.5800*** -12.50241*** -9.759654*** -8.669158*** -7.077726*** -5.030163*** -4.612288*** -4.249962*** -3.739776*** 
ADF 1st.diff -23.6084*** -24.0898*** -30.8596*** -78.3719*** -77.1337*** -76.0484*** -76.4679*** -77.1487*** -74.9161*** 
MAD         
ADF trend -15.4325*** -12.7469*** -10.9894*** -8.9981*** -7.9042*** -5.2412*** -4.2593*** -3.7180** -2.5776 
ADF const -15.3941*** -12.70959*** -10.95310*** -8.945182*** -7.813016*** -5.234721*** -4.256718*** -3.739094*** -2.640944* 
ADF 1st.diff -25.5457*** -24.2944*** -23.1617*** -24.7289*** -16.1970*** -23.9517*** -24.4136*** -19.9647*** -23.6937*** 
MXN         
ADF trend -14.8063*** -14.0717*** -11.3140*** -11.2425*** -8.3102*** -5.6838*** -4.1070*** -3.2538* -2.1561 
ADF const -14.7104*** -13.98087*** -11.19256*** -11.10088*** -8.174387*** -5.563733*** -4.015216*** -3.162940** -2.0157 
ADF 1st.diff -21.5467*** -22.0723*** -22.1525*** -14.6876*** -13.9063*** -14.0496*** -14.6804*** -15.0882*** -14.2646*** 
MYR         
 
 
220 
 
ADF trend -10.3633*** -8.8465*** -7.0737*** -6.5589*** -5.1752*** -3.4035* -2.8721 -3.0870 -2.1827 
ADF const -10.3583*** -8.851510*** -7.076823*** -6.558051*** -5.170754*** -3.403904** -2.872675** -3.110260** -2.2226 
ADF 1st.diff -22.0448*** -16.6679*** -16.7209*** -50.7481*** -49.3587*** -49.8238*** -50.4205*** -49.0293*** -46.1867*** 
PHP         
ADF trend -12.4452*** -11.3026*** -9.6956*** -8.7062*** -6.8224*** -4.5567*** -4.1381*** -4.0244*** -2.4876 
ADF const -12.3641*** -11.22489*** -9.614213*** -8.632818*** -6.727717*** -4.468319*** -4.124221*** -4.039902*** -2.4430 
ADF 1st.diff -24.9022*** -24.8883*** -28.4521*** -76.6794*** -56.4122*** -75.6505*** -76.5133*** -41.8776*** -74.2684*** 
PKR         
ADF trend -13.7382*** -12.3773*** -11.0300*** -9.7078*** -7.7591*** -5.5648*** -4.9737*** -4.9758*** -3.8241** 
ADF const -13.7233*** -12.36153*** -11.01378*** -9.678136*** -7.724153*** -5.540323*** -4.961337*** -4.948674*** -3.759700*** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.8026*** -24.7213*** -27.4606*** -24.4285*** -23.5324*** -23.4420*** -23.2098*** -23.6490*** -23.0867*** 
PLZ         
ADF trend -16.1871*** -12.4152*** -11.8585*** -11.6537*** -9.1558*** -6.5481*** -5.7171*** -5.0801*** -3.3533* 
ADF const -16.1395*** -12.13520*** -11.62420*** -11.51079*** -8.935432*** -6.273668*** -5.402483*** -4.814203*** -3.117258** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.4842*** -24.7770*** -26.0980*** -76.8030*** -76.1372*** -76.5868*** -76.0092*** -76.2308*** -74.6826*** 
RUR         
ADF trend -11.8709*** -11.0840*** -9.6944*** -9.3775*** -7.0149*** -4.7785*** -4.1133*** -2.8383 -2.5643 
ADF const -11.2394*** -10.45589*** -9.108887*** -8.678399*** -6.495297*** -4.346200*** -3.733253*** -2.642889* -2.771028* 
ADF 1st.diff -21.4196*** -20.4451*** -21.1695*** -13.3026*** -13.6223*** -13.1943*** -11.7455*** -13.2278*** -13.8733*** 
THB         
ADF trend -12.7958*** -11.2513*** -9.4654*** -8.1361*** -6.1439*** -4.1536*** -3.7451** -3.0451 -2.2298 
ADF const -12.7554*** -11.21124*** -9.429684*** -8.095941*** -6.091243*** -4.105633*** -3.708675*** -3.019472** -2.1255 
ADF 1st.diff -25.5552*** -24.5477*** -29.1761*** -56.2372*** -47.8014*** -46.7898*** -71.9608*** -46.8577*** -34.6296*** 
TRL         
ADF trend -11.3432*** -11.1143*** -9.2743*** -8.5167*** -7.4689*** -4.9778*** -3.9658*** -3.4876** -2.4205 
ADF const -10.4682*** -10.19940*** -8.451763*** -7.712154*** -6.457694*** -3.929878*** -2.860545* -2.2621 -1.1169 
ADF 1st.diff -23.7857*** -18.4439*** -24.8071*** -31.7079*** -17.1911*** -17.2886*** -17.2591*** -17.1808*** -17.3647*** 
TWD         
ADF trend -12.9328*** -11.8735*** -9.8592*** -8.9451*** -7.2132*** -4.9334*** -4.4380*** -3.9963*** -2.5187 
ADF const -12.9138*** -11.85541*** -9.842620*** -8.929309*** -7.185847*** -4.925837*** -4.456569*** -4.022706*** -2.5200 
ADF 1st.diff -25.1261*** -24.8979*** -29.5602*** -78.3755*** -77.1423*** -77.1868*** -78.0886*** -76.8504*** -75.9598*** 
ZAR         
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ADF trend -16.0222*** -14.1257*** -10.7450*** -8.9777*** -7.5905*** -5.4427*** -4.5151*** -3.5859** -2.4317 
ADF const -15.9989*** -14.09083*** -10.71668*** -8.954198*** -7.560765*** -5.404963*** -4.495669*** -3.587699*** -2.4442 
ADF 1st.diff -23.4011*** -22.5252*** -28.5498*** -75.3114*** -73.9195*** -73.5293*** -73.9564*** -74.0944*** -72.2560*** 
 
 
ADF test statistics for spot return and nt
S   is  the log difference of spot rate difference n period ahead. 
 
 
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table 3.9:  ADF test for Sterling forward premium 
 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
ADF trend -63.7860*** -4.8533*** -4.6371*** -3.4400** -2.6128 -2.7051 -2.0989 -2.6577 
ADF const -10.2572*** -2.4517 -1.5997 -1.0142 -1.0351 -1.0409 -2.0397 -1.0205 
ADF 1st.diff -22.7297*** -25.0106*** -27.8858*** -30.3521*** -35.4093*** -47.0015*** -43.7303*** -46.6501*** 
CAD         
ADF trend -62.3662*** -6.7473*** -2.2239 -2.0687 -1.9007 -1.9717 -2.3934 -2.5812 
ADF const -62.1679*** -5.268489*** -1.8388 -1.8010 -1.7091 -1.7369 -2.2410 -2.2262 
ADF 1st.diff -25.1819*** -24.2129*** -20.7520*** -19.2074*** -18.7839*** -16.0282*** -76.6823*** -83.5831*** 
CHF         
ADF trend -9.3106*** -3.8850** -3.0140 -2.8165 -2.3792 -1.9018 -1.6415 -1.8431 -2.4481 
ADF const -5.9582*** -2.588166* -1.5814 -1.2743 -0.9310 -0.6994 -1.2562 -0.7035 -1.4596 
ADF 1st.diff -21.3108*** -23.9936*** -34.6089*** -43.1258*** -49.1152*** -50.9499*** -51.4043*** -58.5336*** -58.0898*** 
XEU         
ADF trend -14.7831*** -4.0961*** -2.2297 -1.9251 -1.9156 -1.7582 -1.7187 -1.8839 -1.8574 
ADF const -7.7195*** -2.806973* -1.4839 -1.2605 -1.2929 -1.3075 -1.4566 -1.4500 -1.8085 
ADF 1st.diff -22.9965*** -25.3850*** -18.5600*** -15.9631*** -14.7189*** -45.7056*** -68.8774*** -75.4889*** -38.6731*** 
HKD         
ADF trend -6.6484*** -6.8691*** -5.7316*** -4.5690*** -3.9064** -3.3720* -2.5834 -2.3701 -2.3027 
ADF const -6.5784*** -6.890477*** -5.680424*** -4.511394*** -3.846675*** -3.295726** -2.811655* -2.2858 -2.3801 
ADF 1st.diff -21.9778*** -31.1564*** -25.0111*** -22.4291*** -32.4762*** -16.9597*** -29.8598*** -30.5027*** -48.1126*** 
ILS         
ADF trend -3.1857* -3.0144 -3.5936** -3.2758* -2.8245 -2.4709 -2.2268 -2.3537 -3.3643* 
ADF const -1.9035 -1.9465 -2.5441 -2.4197 -2.1207 -1.9052 -1.7906 -1.9145 -3.118113** 
ADF 1st.diff -14.7169*** -25.3674*** -31.5572*** -16.1486*** -43.8093*** -41.3726*** -33.2356*** -41.5014*** -56.6756*** 
JPY         
ADF trend -4.0893*** -2.7994 -2.6676 -1.9071 -1.8293 -2.1430 -1.4793 -2.1097 -1.6960 
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ADF const -2.3060 -1.5150 -0.8243 -0.4377 -0.7848 -0.7231 -0.6767 -0.0141 -0.3934 
ADF 1st.diff -21.1100*** -27.8227*** -21.9925*** -16.4629*** -13.3980*** -11.2811*** -26.1745*** -64.2969*** -55.2168*** 
NOK         
ADF trend -14.2859*** -2.9496 -2.5457 -2.1146 -1.8920 -1.6585 -1.6798 -1.5814 -1.8630 
ADF const -14.2849*** -2.995105** -2.5480 -2.1284 -1.9377 -1.7545 -1.8449 -1.6994 -1.5651 
ADF 1st.diff -22.7384*** -26.0121*** -22.9290*** -27.0910*** -29.5461*** -34.7902*** -73.5924*** -41.8432*** -32.7109*** 
NZD         
ADF trend -62.7464*** -6.1557*** -3.0087 -4.7706*** -4.4220*** -3.5077** -2.6616 -3.7147** -3.3385* 
ADF const -62.0875*** -4.168224*** -2.0849 -2.965508** -2.674852* -1.9852 -1.8684 -1.9838 -3.281305** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.2678*** -25.8152*** -20.3743*** -38.0529*** -38.7315*** -44.5762*** -42.9502*** -58.8789*** -68.8228*** 
SGD         
ADF trend -24.3049*** -6.6096*** -5.1005*** -3.7658** -3.3431* -3.0512 -3.3278* -2.5781 -1.5298 
ADF const -23.1071*** -3.525157*** -4.735845*** -3.376647** -2.938847** -2.625330* -2.5567 -2.1859 -1.3707 
ADF 1st.diff -26.3912*** -21.4524*** -24.6457*** -25.0176*** -24.2692*** -30.4509*** -11.8009*** -24.7441*** -40.6447*** 
USD         
ADF trend -2.9513 -2.9568 -2.7288 -1.9771 -1.7754 -1.4368 -1.6253 -1.4961 -2.5928 
ADF const -2.8869** -2.843501* -2.573271* -1.8255 -1.6276 -1.2959 -1.5883 -1.3840 -2.859375* 
ADF 1st.diff -18.5650*** -33.5959*** -34.7846*** -41.4359*** -44.1848*** -46.1754*** -19.2732*** -72.3335*** -49.7905*** 
AED         
ADF trend -6.6735*** -4.0331*** -3.3899* -3.3496* -3.4475** -2.1716 -1.7228 -1.8273 -1.7742 
ADF const -6.6460*** -3.984545*** -3.278878** -3.210493** -3.264514** -2.0225 -1.6897 -1.7829 -1.9658 
ADF 1st.diff -21.3580*** -33.1635*** -33.7800*** -47.5872*** -56.4038*** -50.0554*** -24.5310*** -77.3206*** -27.9471*** 
BRL         
ADF trend -4.0682*** -3.0922 -5.5461*** -5.7257*** -6.1210*** -6.5768*** -6.3865*** -6.6591*** 
ADF const -3.444797*** -2.4005 -3.993142*** -4.141506*** -4.138095*** -4.834997*** -4.298152*** -4.660160*** 
ADF 1st.diff -21.6082*** -18.2705*** -28.6980*** -39.1562*** -26.5914*** -26.7242*** -25.8676*** -52.8164*** 
CLP         
ADF trend -4.2551*** -2.3894 -3.2635* -2.8422 -2.3565 -2.1838 -2.1270 -2.4779 
ADF const -2.906288** -1.6286 -2.1974 -1.9065 -1.5776 -1.4620 -1.4385 -1.4598 
ADF 1st.diff -28.3728*** -19.5985*** -49.6452*** -49.8600*** -50.2875*** -50.1054*** -49.8117*** -51.7012*** 
CNY         
ADF trend -7.2645*** -4.8277*** -4.2050*** -3.8183** -3.0839 -2.7156 -2.4332 -2.1328 
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ADF const -6.490417*** -4.121785*** -3.541666*** -3.170583** -2.4287 -2.0212 -1.7054 -1.6030 
ADF 1st.diff -33.2871*** -19.8242*** -57.7730*** -54.5900*** -54.7770*** -55.0153*** -52.6203*** -54.2209*** 
COP         
ADF trend -4.3776*** -4.1910*** -3.4062* -2.9001 -2.4202 -2.1647 -2.0108 -2.0924 
ADF const -4.328730*** -4.147325*** -3.382981** -2.890682** -2.4226 -2.1592 -1.9970 -2.0943 
ADF 1st.diff -30.3295*** -34.2455*** -32.5620*** -32.3604*** -36.0452*** -34.9731*** -34.8572*** -52.2186*** 
CZK         
ADF trend -12.5168*** -3.2137* -4.9714*** -2.8271 -2.1817 -1.4231 -3.0028 -1.6411 -1.9084 
ADF const -11.9989*** -3.413569** -4.456604*** -2.777640* -2.3737 -1.7191 -3.815740*** -1.8264 -1.6633 
ADF 1st.diff -22.1762*** -26.7525*** -19.5027*** -19.6165*** -18.5038*** -15.2849*** -17.2808*** -16.1197*** -50.4445*** 
HUF         
ADF trend -6.0907*** -3.2122* -2.7061 -2.7751 -2.5519 -2.6612 -2.7224 -1.8563 
ADF const -5.7510*** -3.166466** -2.820735* -2.953877** -2.776299* -2.832670* -2.708812* -1.8169 
ADF 1st.diff -21.9545*** -23.7186*** -27.5844*** -29.5643*** -27.8143*** -33.4458*** -73.1699*** -38.2580*** 
IDR         
ADF trend -6.3243*** -6.3543*** -6.4015*** -5.8959*** -5.1276*** -4.3526*** -3.5632** -3.4283** 
ADF const -6.2730*** -6.319180*** -6.392153*** -5.804607*** -4.944278*** -4.074383*** -3.273483** -3.171592** 
ADF 1st.diff -25.9686*** -25.9996*** -27.3507*** -28.0988*** -33.8872*** -50.7778*** -27.5117*** -76.3130*** 
INR         
ADF trend -7.5144*** -4.7104*** -5.2866*** -3.9665*** -3.1100 -2.9017 -2.5868 -2.2434 
ADF const -7.0019*** -4.445219*** -5.037838*** -3.806198*** -3.000970** -2.855169* -2.569832* -2.2383 
ADF 1st.diff -20.9792*** -24.5826*** -44.6359*** -44.4908*** -20.4736*** -51.2183*** -50.5389*** -31.7508*** 
MAD         
ADF trend -5.7596*** -3.0266 -2.7186 -2.3295 -1.8530 -1.7008 -1.5029 -1.6575 -2.0213 
ADF const -4.7461*** -2.579493* -2.2645 -2.0626 -1.6682 -1.3932 -1.3319 -1.3894 -1.4422 
ADF 1st.diff -19.4380*** -29.1411*** -17.6547*** -19.2189*** -53.0404*** -53.6352*** -57.2366*** -63.7924*** -28.8155*** 
MXN         
ADF trend -3.5637** -4.4230*** -3.1679* -3.0979 -2.4183 -2.3082 -2.1506 -2.3067 
ADF const -2.902346** -4.030346*** -2.653921* -2.5142 -2.0891 -1.9371 -1.9457 -2.2836 
ADF 1st.diff -37.1214*** -51.0125*** -20.3199*** -19.4242*** -27.7426*** -19.1475*** -27.9906*** -51.8678*** 
MYR         
ADF trend -3.7246** -3.4335** -3.4097* -3.2956* -3.2338* -3.0772 -3.0582 -3.0541 
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ADF const -0.9510 -0.7457 -0.9547 -0.9577 -0.9793 -0.9950 -1.0354 -1.0521 
ADF 1st.diff -15.9273*** -22.8119*** -20.2449*** -23.5121*** -22.0814*** -30.9417*** -48.6297*** -49.4611*** 
PHP         
ADF trend -60.5902*** -9.9213*** -6.3989*** -5.1614*** -4.8162*** -4.0446*** -4.1256*** -3.6536** 
ADF const -41.5250*** -7.972960*** -5.028956*** -3.821170*** -3.472630*** -2.788471* -3.190486** -2.2356 
ADF 1st.diff -24.7216*** -31.5093*** -39.1490*** -34.9243*** -36.9333*** -45.9719*** -41.6049*** -54.9557*** 
PKR         
ADF trend -6.1244*** -4.1727*** -3.2717* -2.9620 -2.4883   
ADF const -3.877175*** -2.849971* -2.5135 -2.5138 -2.5231   
ADF 1st.diff -27.8075*** -33.5322*** -35.3653*** -40.8500*** -42.2779***   
PLZ         
ADF trend -4.8653*** -3.0359 -2.5580 -2.8996 -2.9608 -2.9335 -2.8381 -2.7601 -2.7199 
ADF const -4.7908*** -2.777964* -2.1786 -2.3907 -2.4955 -2.4952 -2.3833 -2.3173 -1.8945 
ADF 1st.diff -22.2182*** -24.2017*** -26.3573*** -23.5515*** -25.3098*** -61.0720*** -59.3961*** -57.5653*** -54.2014*** 
RUR         
ADF trend -3.0960 -5.8248*** -3.4965** -4.1763*** -4.3044*** -3.4760** -4.0433*** -3.6281** 
ADF const -2.8896** -5.706413*** -3.385449** -3.611620*** -4.031138*** -3.193129** -2.979960** -3.180973** 
ADF 1st.diff -18.0454*** -14.6854*** -15.6227*** -9.0839*** -7.3827*** -8.3175*** -8.3007*** -10.8147*** 
THB         
ADF trend -18.9605*** -6.7578*** -5.7890*** -4.9272*** -4.5402*** -4.1525*** -2.5588 -3.0409 
ADF const -18.9093*** -6.729318*** -5.609194*** -4.772174*** -4.394945*** -4.022600*** -2.617053* -2.979984** 
ADF 1st.diff -21.1512*** -22.0453*** -19.5776*** -19.3416*** -18.1882*** -28.1536*** -18.1417*** -31.1167*** 
TRL         
ADF trend -3.1673* -3.1798* -3.2807* -3.3289* -3.3171* -3.3018* -3.2113* -3.2473* -2.6527 
ADF const -3.0681** -3.103014** -3.264333** -3.333783** -3.316116** -3.213901** -3.098178** -2.966685** -1.7941 
ADF 1st.diff -47.5914*** -47.2659*** -47.7778*** -63.3164*** -63.8674*** -65.1895*** -64.2193*** -67.4769*** -65.4668*** 
TWD         
ADF trend -7.5896*** -5.6526*** -4.4105*** -4.8524*** -3.4580** -2.7600 -2.5346 -3.0340 
ADF const -7.422738*** -5.475469*** -4.258708*** -4.660207*** -3.332919** -2.691289* -2.5043 -1.3271 
ADF 1st.diff -26.3145*** -27.3859*** -25.7783*** -36.6697*** -40.1566*** -37.8720*** -38.1430*** -39.1597*** 
ZAR         
ADF trend -4.2958*** -2.9880 -3.1477* -2.4075 -2.4524 -2.2645 -1.8807 -2.5943 -1.8808 
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ADF const -4.0553*** -2.903138** -3.205336** -2.3781 -2.616457* -2.4545 -1.8877 -2.709999* -1.5130 
ADF 1st.diff -21.0319*** -26.9997*** -31.0076*** -11.7556*** -37.7175*** -36.0491*** -32.5520*** -50.5139*** -23.6466*** 
 
 
ADF test statistics for forward premium. 
 
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table  3.10.1  Fama FMOLS regression for Sterling exchange rate 
 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0003  0.0012  0.0021 -0.0126 -0.0013 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0026  0.0034  0.0044  0.0050 
β  1.0508 -1.0515 -1.6545* -2.0174** -2.2273** -2.1630** -1.2392 -1.9245* 
Se β  0.7083  0.6183  0.2971  0.2097  0.5004  0.3334  0.2872  0.2512 
t β=1  0.0717 -3.3176*** -8.9359*** -14.3885*** -6.4497*** -9.4873*** -7.7956*** -11.6402*** 
Wald  1.4241  22.3743***  114.0311***  276.9711***  53.0950***  114.2394***  138.8877***  186.2623*** 
R2  0.0005  0.0007  0.0073  0.0216  0.0394  0.0852  0.0419  0.1223 
CAD         
a -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0059 -0.0101 -0.0109 -0.0195 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0016 
β -0.4318 -0.2499 -0.5816 -0.4491 -0.3574  0.0069  1.2563***  0.1918 
Se β  0.5549  0.6830  0.3754  0.2683  0.2196  0.1654  0.1527  0.1177 
t β=1 -2.5803*** -1.8300* -4.2138*** -5.4014*** -6.1825*** -6.0051***  1.6779* -6.8650*** 
Wald  9.5701***  6.1009**  23.6414***  40.6827***  54.8349***  69.7879***  141.1809***  149.1537*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0000  0.0006  0.0007  0.0006  0.0000  0.0173  0.0007 
CHF         
a -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0059 -0.0107 -0.0150 -0.0287 -0.0444 -0.0689 -0.1607 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0022  0.0032  0.0041  0.0063  0.0079  0.0091  0.0076 
β  0.0650 -1.1917 -1.4871 -1.2408 -1.1170 -1.0433 -1.0220 -1.4191 -0.9738 
Se β  0.7030  0.6009  0.7795  0.5820  0.5000  0.3828  0.3396  0.2839  0.1498 
t β=1 -1.3301 -3.6470*** -3.1905*** -3.8502*** -4.2336*** -5.3379*** -5.9544*** -8.5199*** -13.1735*** 
Wald  8.5352**  13.4157***  10.2160***  14.8642***  17.9859***  28.6249***  35.8415***  72.6816***  675.8280*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0010  0.0069  0.0090  0.0109  0.0168  0.0219  0.0568  0.0221 
XEU         
a -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0022 -0.0036 -0.0052 -0.0090 -0.0127 -0.0173 -0.0100 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0015  0.0022  0.0027  0.0039  0.0048  0.0057  0.0039 
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β  0.3396 -1.1199 -1.2702 -0.8764 -0.8093 -0.6454 -0.3200 -0.5456  1.9368*** 
Se β  0.8737  0.7363  1.0144  0.7623  0.6277  0.4514  0.3784  0.3263  0.1391 
t β=1 -0.7558 -2.8792*** -2.2378** -2.4614** -2.8822*** -3.6454*** -3.4881*** -4.7368***  6.7327*** 
Wald  2.5571  8.2931**  5.2058*  6.3486**  8.7289**  14.3706***  12.1997***  24.2944***  205.4509*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0006  0.0030  0.0025  0.0034  0.0044  0.0016  0.0064  0.0939 
HKD         
a  0.0000  0.0003 -0.0000  0.0001  0.0006  0.0023*  0.0022  0.0006  0.0517*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0016  0.0043 
β -1.6753*  1.8336***  0.4769*  0.4795**  0.5360***  0.7299***  0.6806***  0.3644***  3.7425*** 
Se β  0.9552  0.5852  0.2560  0.1988  0.1660  0.1241  0.1037  0.0841  0.1404 
t β=1 -2.8008***  1.4245 -2.0433** -2.6179*** -2.7953*** -2.1753** -3.0811*** -7.5549***  19.5299*** 
Wald  8.3914**  2.3416  5.3584*  10.2639***  14.2738***  16.0407***  19.5846***  71.2064***  403.7265*** 
R2  0.0008  0.0024  0.0008  0.0014  0.0025  0.0083  0.0111  0.0047  0.2754 
ILS         
a -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0060 -0.0083 -0.0126 -0.0192 -0.0280 -0.0998 
Se a  0.0003  0.0006  0.0006  0.0008  0.0009  0.0033  0.0035  0.0041  0.0023 
β -3.4612***  3.3437  3.4577***  4.4289***  5.1381***  7.6894***  8.2673***  8.1053***  6.0725*** 
Se β  4.0628  2.6310  0.6172  0.4603  0.3782  0.7436  0.5881  0.5445  0.1758 
t β=1 -1.0981  0.8908  3.9821***  7.4499***  10.9428***  8.9954***  12.3580***  13.0493***  28.8515*** 
Wald  2.9662  3.0328  51.7399***  123.9849***  225.8479***  108.1764***  200.5929***  237.8188***  2233.6660*** 
R2 -0.0004  0.0027  0.0133  0.0386  0.0746  0.2584  0.4020  0.4355  0.3896 
JPY         
a  0.0000  0.0004  0.0016  0.0033  0.0059  0.0048  0.0009 -0.0206 -0.0499 
Se a  0.0003  0.0012  0.0032  0.0050  0.0066  0.0103  0.0040  0.0150  0.0344 
β -1.2813  1.1045  0.9484  0.9625  1.0588*  0.7647*  0.8089***  0.0798  0.9524** 
Se β  1.2073  1.3710  0.8530  0.6691  0.5901  0.4596  0.1207  0.3322  0.4680 
t β=1 -1.8897*  0.0763 -0.0605 -0.0560  0.0996 -0.5120 -1.5831 -2.7700*** -0.1017 
Wald  6.3961**  0.2903  1.2950  2.1960  2.9534  4.2991  16.1616***  14.9140***  10.9374*** 
R2  0.0003  0.0002  0.0020  0.0044  0.0071  0.0066  0.0115  0.0001  0.0174 
NOK         
a -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0064 -0.0138 -0.0142 -0.0704 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0005  0.0018  0.0024  0.0028  0.0032  0.0047 
β -0.3020 -1.3557 -1.1868 -1.1854 -1.2033 -0.9299 -0.2981 -0.5730 -0.0068 
Se β  0.5566  0.4788  0.2011  0.1488  0.3682  0.2490  0.2145  0.1829  0.1685 
t β=1 -2.3394** -4.9199*** -10.8728*** -14.6892*** -5.9834*** -7.7514*** -6.0521*** -8.6001*** -5.9732*** 
 
 
229 
 
Wald  6.3002**  27.6812***  125.2120***  232.5153***  38.7258***  67.3542***  65.7394***  90.8536***  242.5624*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0020  0.0082  0.0149  0.0211  0.0295  0.0038  0.0219 -0.0000 
NZD         
a -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0004  0.0066*** -0.0046  0.0296***  0.0209** 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0022  0.0011  0.0013  0.0019  0.0070  0.0027  0.0092 
β  0.2277  0.0308 -0.6415 -0.5556 -0.7451 -1.6114 -1.2283 -2.7589*** -2.1325** 
Se β  0.6101  0.7174  1.1693  0.3086  0.2553  0.1911  0.4710  0.1430  0.1887 
t β=1 -1.2657 -1.3510 -1.4039 -5.0411*** -6.8351*** -13.6633*** -4.7313*** -26.2872*** -16.5976*** 
Wald  2.0998  10.9109***  5.5347*  87.9349***  139.6124***  358.0121***  91.5369***  1063.3300***  3267.4380*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0004  0.0008  0.0020  0.0170  0.0158  0.0852  0.0639 
SGD         
a -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0009  0.0026 -0.0028 -0.0099 -0.0572 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0008  0.0010  0.0047  0.0056  0.0076  0.0103 
β -0.4609  0.4797 -0.0253  0.1475  0.3533**  0.7684**  0.8338***  0.1191  1.5625*** 
Se β  0.4804  0.4489  0.2103  0.1718  0.1502  0.3751  0.3016  0.3085  0.2417 
t β=1 -3.0411*** -1.1589 -4.8750*** -4.9610*** -4.3050*** -0.6174 -0.5510 -2.8555***  2.3271** 
Wald  13.3652***  1.3523  26.5215***  32.8897***  33.6162***  3.7560  0.3118  12.4887***  168.1167*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0003  0.0000  0.0002  0.0013  0.0084  0.0180  0.0003  0.1486 
USD         
a  0.0000  0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0004  0.0004  0.0044  0.0057  0.0027  0.0257*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0022  0.0028  0.0042  0.0054  0.0060  0.0035 
β -1.6236  0.6289 -0.2280  0.1765  0.4726  1.1113*  1.0879**  0.5185  4.3208*** 
Se β  1.8271  0.9134  0.4025  0.8854  0.7418  0.5746  0.4960  0.4225  0.1592 
t β=1 -1.4360 -0.4062 -3.0508*** -0.9301 -0.7109  0.1937  0.1773 -1.1396  20.8634*** 
Wald  2.4885  0.2832  10.0711***  1.1796  1.1661  1.5499  1.5355  3.9671  501.9754*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0010  0.0088  0.0125  0.0040  0.2828 
AED         
a -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0005  0.0005  0.0091**  0.0173***  0.0204***  0.0196*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008  0.0038  0.0048  0.0053  0.0029 
β -0.7189  0.5441 -0.3137  0.1501  0.5232***  1.9898***  2.5645***  2.2918***  3.5698*** 
Se β  0.9105  0.6665  0.3011  0.2294  0.1894  0.4442  0.3788  0.3225  0.1005 
t β=1 -1.8878* -0.6840 -4.3633*** -3.7052*** -2.5171**  2.2286**  4.1304***  4.0055***  25.5785*** 
Wald  4.0003  0.6085  19.9630***  16.8355***  12.9900***  6.7571**  19.0723***  19.4306***  725.1168*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0002  0.0003  0.0001  0.0018  0.0432  0.1023  0.1104  0.4032 
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BRL         
a -0.0019 -0.0009  0.0026  0.0037  0.0085* -0.0007  0.0054 -0.1209 
Se a  0.0008  0.0063  0.0030  0.0037  0.0051  0.0078  0.0087  0.0119 
β  0.4313 -0.5695 -0.9386 -0.9426 -0.9628 -0.7535 -0.8059 -0.0082 
Se β  0.4099  0.8441  0.2115  0.1727  0.1238  0.1328  0.1059  0.0718 
t β=1 -1.3876 -1.8594* -9.1658*** -11.2457*** -15.8485*** -13.1996*** -17.0465*** -14.0335*** 
Wald  52.4752***  29.4231***  526.1270***  846.4889***  1783.3200***  2067.2840***  2655.6570***  6773.8350*** 
R2  0.0005  0.0016  0.0085  0.0128  0.0264  0.0146  0.0267  0.0000 
CLP         
a -0.0010 -0.0034 -0.0072 -0.0118 -0.0268 -0.0404 -0.0536 -0.0938 
Se a  0.0004  0.0020  0.0028  0.0035  0.0043  0.0047  0.0049  0.0069 
β  0.3851 -0.4808 -0.1917  0.2136  1.3284***  1.6679***  1.7300***  0.8804*** 
Se β  0.7213  0.8458  0.6426  0.5490  0.3878  0.3189  0.2675  0.2309 
t β=1 -0.8525 -1.7509* -1.8545* -1.4322  0.8468  2.0946**  2.7287*** -0.5180 
Wald  9.8521***  8.5703**  14.1537***  18.4091***  39.6265***  73.2314***  119.4503***  248.7017*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0014  0.0003  0.0004  0.0380  0.0882  0.1329  0.0572 
CNY         
a -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0008  0.0174***  0.0456***  0.0586***  0.0075 
Se a  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0012  0.0057  0.0069  0.0080  0.0125 
β -0.1668 -0.2877  0.1578  0.4688***  1.5586***  2.2574***  2.1756***  1.5321*** 
Se β  0.2921  0.1530  0.1173  0.1002  0.2361  0.1922  0.1680  0.1390 
t β=1 -3.9943*** -8.4145*** -7.1819*** -5.2990***  2.3658**  6.5415***  6.9985***  3.8292*** 
Wald  16.0221***  72.4568***  57.3657***  39.6862***  9.4064***  49.6961***  58.0171***  31.5739*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0012  0.0006  0.0076  0.1112  0.2971  0.3532  0.3364 
COP         
a -0.0014 -0.0037 -0.0053 -0.0083 -0.0060  0.0023  0.0039 -0.0659 
Se a  0.0005  0.0010  0.0015  0.0019  0.0077  0.0090  0.0104  0.0158 
β  0.3436 -0.5994 -1.0609 -0.9949 -1.6107 -2.0736** -2.0292** -0.6615 
Se β  0.6672  0.2908  0.2496  0.2236  0.4623  0.3600  0.3030  0.2095 
t β=1 -0.9837 -5.5005*** -8.2557*** -8.9211*** -5.6468*** -8.5388*** -9.9987*** -7.9322*** 
Wald  17.0499***  102.0348***  231.5964***  370.6206***  137.3840***  282.4710***  426.6175***  899.4010*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0018  0.0078  0.0086  0.0378  0.1002  0.1345  0.0395 
CZK         
a -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0046 -0.0067 -0.0139 -0.0267 -0.0310 -0.0320 
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Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0006  0.0007  0.0031  0.0012  0.0044  0.0090 
β  0.3741  0.1897  0.9978***  1.2382***  1.1249***  1.1402***  0.6366***  1.0989***  3.2691*** 
Se β  0.4729  0.4051  0.1434  0.1087  0.0928  0.2130  0.0673  0.1601  0.2797 
t β=1 -1.3235 -2.0003** -0.0157  2.1910**  1.3456  0.6582 -5.4030***  0.6175  8.1118*** 
Wald  6.1056**  13.8536***  25.9569***  59.2706***  84.9360***  20.2946***  468.6072***  50.8774***  207.5140*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0001  0.0113  0.0300  0.0339  0.0621  0.0228  0.1028  0.3628 
HUF         
a  0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0088 -0.0200 -0.0322 -0.1202 
Se a  0.0002  0.0005  0.0011  0.0014  0.0017  0.0021  0.0026  0.0158 
β  0.2640  0.2686  0.3373  0.5813***  0.7343***  0.8570***  0.9515***  1.4456*** 
Se β  0.7096  0.4373  0.2080  0.1457  0.1148  0.0781  0.0665  0.1897 
t β=1 -1.0372 -1.6727* -3.1865*** -2.8737*** -2.3146** -1.8326* -0.7286  2.3485** 
Wald  3.2868  15.9440***  80.8534***  163.5326***  257.3583***  566.6244***  773.4079***  152.1639*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0001  0.0007  0.0040  0.0102  0.0300  0.0505  0.1909 
IDR         
a  0.0005  0.0012*  0.0054***  0.0100***  0.0175***  0.0496***  0.0408***  0.1169*** 
Se a  0.0004  0.0006  0.0013  0.0020  0.0026  0.0040  0.0032  0.0067 
β  0.0324**  0.0553**  0.2799***  0.3151***  0.1250* -0.3273 -0.7696 -0.7155 
Se β  0.0161  0.0256  0.0502  0.0658  0.0703  0.0671  0.0379  0.0638 
t β=1 -60.2071*** -36.8643*** -14.3458*** -10.4026*** -12.4398*** -19.7913*** -46.7523*** -26.8887*** 
Wald  3709.8640***  1381.3700***  212.3405***  112.7531***  158.4090***  397.9278***  2373.5170***  730.0586*** 
R2  0.0010  0.0012  0.0073  0.0054  0.0008  0.0058  0.0971  0.0305 
INR         
a  0.0003**  0.0008***  0.0032***  0.0037***  0.0037***  0.0070*  0.0103**  0.0096** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0010  0.0040  0.0046  0.0047 
β  1.1634** -0.7486 -0.7210 -0.2172  0.0623  0.1458  0.1444  0.2986** 
Se β  0.4910  0.2896  0.1598  0.1201  0.0989  0.2190  0.1736  0.1384 
t β=1  0.3328 -6.0370*** -10.7723*** -10.1343*** -9.4824*** -3.9012*** -4.9274*** -5.0693*** 
Wald  4.7658*  37.8007***  122.9273***  115.9464***  106.5734***  17.0619***  26.5699***  29.0058*** 
R2  0.0014  0.0017  0.0051  0.0008  0.0001  0.0011  0.0017  0.0103 
MAD         
a -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0067 -0.0105 -0.0248 -0.0407 -0.0553 -0.1283 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0015  0.0022  0.0028  0.0037  0.0043  0.0050  0.0079 
β -2.2298**  0.9080**  0.6840  0.7219*  0.8054**  1.2328***  1.4675***  1.4793***  1.6281*** 
Se β  1.4243  0.4081  0.4932  0.3703  0.3136  0.2161  0.1658  0.1446  0.1197 
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t β=1 -2.2676** -0.2255 -0.6407 -0.7510 -0.6206  1.0773  2.8191***  3.3151***  5.2486*** 
Wald  6.1503**  15.7658***  11.7680***  21.5331***  30.9043***  63.1837***  113.4339***  155.8425***  370.7623*** 
R2  0.0010  0.0021  0.0061  0.0134  0.0237  0.0991  0.2172  0.2757  0.4347 
MXN         
a  0.0010**  0.0046***  0.0088***  0.0128***  0.0263***  0.0394***  0.0479*** -0.0563 
Se a  0.0004  0.0008  0.0011  0.0013  0.0056  0.0070  0.0083  0.0159 
β -0.4822 -0.4984 -0.4320 -0.3984 -0.3844 -0.4568 -0.2953  0.8525*** 
Se β  0.2202  0.0971  0.0689  0.0555  0.1253  0.1105  0.0964  0.2117 
t β=1 -6.7316*** -15.4324*** -20.7960*** -25.2020*** -11.0486*** -13.1880*** -13.4362*** -0.6965 
Wald  55.7595***  300.7180***  548.3618***  809.4778***  155.7233***  220.0655***  239.6551***  182.5810*** 
R2  0.0012  0.0062  0.0093  0.0122  0.0225  0.0420  0.0228  0.0606 
MYR         
a -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0061 -0.0088 -0.0164 -0.0252 -0.0331 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0014  0.0020  0.0026  0.0040  0.0044  0.0047 
β  0.1342  0.3224  0.8639  1.0128*  1.1671**  1.1070***  0.8364***  0.9159*** 
Se β  1.7419  0.6688  0.7669  0.5922  0.5217  0.4170  0.3221  0.2687 
t β=1 -0.4971 -1.0132 -0.1775  0.0216  0.3204  0.2565 -0.5080 -0.3130 
Wald  3.1137  9.1839**  5.2835*  9.3549***  12.0542***  18.7502***  34.7820***  55.3525*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0001  0.0039  0.0101  0.0178  0.0269  0.0235  0.0396 
PHP         
a -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0095 -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0367 -0.0302 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0007  0.0011  0.0014  0.0023  0.0022  0.0031 
β -0.8502  0.2060  1.8015***  2.1109***  1.9961***  1.5726***  1.3453***  1.3301*** 
Se β  0.3702  0.3396  0.1737  0.1350  0.1185  0.0962  0.0621  0.0662 
t β=1 -4.9973*** -2.3384**  4.6135***  8.2284***  8.4088***  5.9517***  5.5621***  4.9886*** 
Wald  25.5693***  10.6800***  30.0534***  81.2000***  86.3960***  59.4110***  452.9469***  111.9661*** 
R2  0.0013  0.0001  0.0249  0.0550  0.0636  0.0609  0.1089  0.0918 
PKR         
a -0.0000  0.0017*  0.0063*  0.0121**  0.0272***   
Se a  0.0005  0.0009  0.0038  0.0050  0.0073   
β  0.6980**  0.2745*  0.0027 -0.1699 -0.2440   
Se β  0.3379  0.1542  0.3319  0.2945  0.2160   
t β=1 -0.8938 -4.7057*** -3.0043*** -3.9722*** -5.7582***   
Wald  2.0424  30.4426***  10.5201***  17.6182***  36.1963***   
R2  0.0018  0.0014  0.0000  0.0012  0.0037   
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PLZ         
a -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0059 -0.0114 -0.0165 -0.0295 -0.0422 -0.0604 -0.1092 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0014  0.0020  0.0025  0.0026  0.0089 
β -0.0399  2.4033***  2.8511***  2.9207***  2.9544***  2.8200***  2.7985***  3.4154***  3.0336*** 
Se β  1.0529  0.7655  0.3785  0.2841  0.2321  0.1794  0.1592  0.1382  0.2840 
t β=1 -0.9876  1.8331*  4.8910***  6.7611***  8.4193***  10.1424***  11.2994***  17.4753***  7.1594*** 
Wald  1.0364  8.4000**  48.4769***  89.8757***  135.1660***  215.3050***  296.8191***  539.0758***  151.5476*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0034  0.0193  0.0356  0.0539  0.0815  0.1019  0.1865  0.3155 
RUR         
a -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0047 -0.0083 -0.0124 -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0147 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0010  0.0013  0.0016  0.0017 
β -1.6139  1.1100***  1.1736***  1.0636***  1.0826***  0.7168***  0.4603***  0.2205*** 
Se β  1.0189  0.1012  0.0671  0.0557  0.0467  0.0362  0.0332  0.0286 
t β=1 -2.5654**  1.0865  2.5862***  1.1410  1.7690* -7.8167*** -16.2461*** -27.2867*** 
Wald  6.6277**  13.8070***  67.5754***  107.2190***  175.0159***  422.4335***  742.2736***  1507.9430*** 
R2  0.0011  0.0488  0.1161  0.1362  0.1903  0.1494  0.0813  0.0275 
THB         
a -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0152 -0.0022 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0011  0.0016  0.0012  0.0022 
β  0.3765  0.1845  1.3446***  1.2513***  1.0198***  0.8796*** -0.6670  0.2880*** 
Se β  0.5607  0.2598  0.1217  0.1077  0.1011  0.0899  0.0531  0.0698 
t β=1 -1.1119 -3.1396***  2.8304***  2.3333**  0.1957 -1.3388 -31.4012*** -10.2032*** 
Wald  2.3701  16.8496***  11.3346***  8.5881**  2.4532  2.2965  1340.7840***  117.2952*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0001  0.0281  0.0311  0.0238  0.0227  0.0394  0.0042 
TRL         
a  0.0011***  0.0026***  0.0127***  0.0251***  0.0361***  0.0565***  0.0681***  0.0842***  0.2833*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0024  0.0032  0.0042  0.0199 
β -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0007  0.0338***  0.0729***  0.2175***  0.1988***  0.3006*** -1.3071 
Se β  0.0018  0.0027  0.0051  0.0074  0.0087  0.0105  0.0115  0.0112  0.0973 
t β=1 -551.0027*** -376.4646*** -196.5120*** -131.3946*** -106.4461*** -74.2257*** -69.9020*** -62.3124*** -23.7144*** 
Wald  321927.9000***  148416.0000***  39612.6200***  17467.0400***  11370.6400***  5549.5780***  5070.0250***  4242.3310***  1451.6440*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0004  0.0000  0.0050  0.0165  0.0937  0.0726  0.1521  0.4191 
TWD         
a  0.0001  0.0007  0.0017**  0.0030***  0.0092***  0.0066  0.0212*** -0.0025 
 
 
234 
 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0009  0.0013  0.0051  0.0065  0.0167 
β  0.6575***  0.5086***  0.5152***  0.5761***  0.8440***  0.9007***  1.0558***  1.0716*** 
Se β  0.2119  0.1427  0.1196  0.1057  0.0864  0.2307  0.2325  0.2713 
t β=1 -1.6167 -3.4434*** -4.0546*** -4.0099*** -1.8059* -0.4304  0.2402  0.2639 
Wald  3.8076  25.9796***  50.5339***  71.9151***  120.8768***  5.4413*  19.4335***  0.7621 
R2  0.0024  0.0030  0.0044  0.0071  0.0227  0.0360  0.0470  0.0615 
ZAR         
a  0.0004  0.0021***  0.0127***  0.0305***  0.0499***  0.0983***  0.1545***  0.1803***  0.4495*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0008  0.0017  0.0072  0.0087  0.0128  0.0161  0.0199  0.0310 
β  0.3991 -1.1568 -1.9008* -2.4130** -2.7241*** -2.7681*** -3.1969*** -2.6196*** -4.6658*** 
Se β  0.7621  0.6024  0.2882  0.6562  0.5382  0.4126  0.3672  0.3369  0.3270 
t β=1 -0.7885 -3.5806*** -10.0654*** -5.2010*** -6.9201*** -9.1328*** -11.4292*** -10.7451*** -17.3279*** 
Wald  6.1178**  14.8313***  115.3860***  29.2928***  50.8116***  88.1123***  140.3556***  124.2564***  352.6393*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0009  0.0102  0.0288  0.0556  0.0949  0.1601  0.1279  0.4553 
Mean         
a -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0003  0.0030 -0.0002  0.0042 -0.0145 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0012  0.0017  0.0023  0.0041  0.0047  0.0060  0.0116 
β -0.4276  0.2775  0.1146  0.2159  0.2837  0.4771  0.5713  0.4239  1.1870 
se β  0.9197  0.5683  0.3826  0.2995  0.2724  0.2635  0.2232  0.2041  0.1983 
t β=1 -5.5012 -2.6922 -1.7565 -1.4197 -1.2149 -1.0117 -1.2733 -1.3501  0.2982 
Wald  13573.7917  4845.4251  1332.6771  662.9333  491.8956  338.5961  509.1452  452.7323  875.3611 
R2  0.0003  0.0024  0.0094  0.0155  0.0228  0.0476  0.0738  0.0901  0.2014 
 
 
 
 
We use OLS or FMOLS estimator according to the stationarity of the forward premium. For example, referring to Table 3.10, for AUD, OLS is applied for TN, 1W, 1M and 2M, and 
FMOLS is applied for 3M, 6M, 9M, and 1Y. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and standard errors of α 
and β, R squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1 and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) for the residuals of the 
equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. We append the total number of rejections of the market efficiency hypothesis out of the 31 economies at the 
end of the table.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table  3.10.2  Fama DOLS regression for Sterling exchange rate 
 
 TN 1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
AUD         
a -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0003  0.0011  0.0017 -0.0133 -0.0019 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0026  0.0035  0.0042  0.0050 
β  1.0508 -1.0515 -1.6545* -2.0174** -2.1888** -2.1369** -1.2046 -1.9100* 
Se β  0.7083  0.6183  0.2971  0.2097  0.5034  0.3359  0.2739  0.2525 
t β=1  0.0717 -3.3176*** -8.9359*** -14.3885*** -6.3351*** -9.3376*** -8.0495*** -11.5251*** 
Wald  1.4241  22.3743***  114.0311***  276.9711***  51.6078***  111.9233***  152.8805***  184.5695*** 
R2  0.0005  0.0007  0.0073  0.0216  0.0402  0.0877  0.0430  0.1246 
CAD         
a -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0042 -0.0059 -0.0101 -0.0109 -0.0195 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0016 
β -0.4318 -0.2499 -0.5816 -0.4491 -0.3574  0.0069  1.2563***  0.1918 
Se β  0.5549  0.6830  0.3754  0.2683  0.2196  0.1654  0.1527  0.1177 
t β=1 -2.5803*** -1.8300* -4.2138*** -5.4014*** -6.1825*** -6.0051***  1.6779* -6.8650*** 
Wald  9.5701***  6.1009**  23.6414***  40.6827***  54.8349***  69.7879***  141.1809***  149.1537*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0000  0.0006  0.0007  0.0006  0.0000  0.0173  0.0007 
CHF         
a -0.0003 -0.0013 -0.0061 -0.0106 -0.0151 -0.0288 -0.0442 -0.0688 -0.1607 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0023  0.0033  0.0042  0.0063  0.0075  0.0091  0.0076 
β  0.0650 -1.1917 -1.5437 -1.2179 -1.1149 -1.0339 -1.0095 -1.4091 -0.9738 
Se β  0.7030  0.6009  0.7967  0.5868  0.5032  0.3838  0.3230  0.2845  0.1498 
t β=1 -1.3301 -3.6470*** -3.1929*** -3.7797*** -4.2032*** -5.2997*** -6.2214*** -8.4677*** -13.1735*** 
Wald  8.5352**  13.4157***  10.2280***  14.3074***  17.6988***  28.1789***  39.1737***  71.7628***  675.8280*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0010  0.0075  0.0109  0.0126  0.0178  0.0221  0.0581  0.0221 
XEU         
a -0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0023 -0.0036 -0.0051 -0.0089 -0.0126 -0.0172 -0.0100 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0015  0.0023  0.0028  0.0039  0.0045  0.0057  0.0039 
β  0.3396 -1.1199 -1.2907 -0.8211 -0.7743 -0.6217 -0.2996 -0.5276  1.9368*** 
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Se β  0.8737  0.7363  1.0347  0.7703  0.6311  0.4526  0.3604  0.3271  0.1391 
t β=1 -0.7558 -2.8792*** -2.2138** -2.3640** -2.8115*** -3.5832*** -3.6064*** -4.6695***  6.7327*** 
Wald  2.5571  8.2931**  5.0869*  5.8282*  8.2733**  13.8317***  13.0269***  23.5235***  205.4509*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0006  0.0039  0.0045  0.0045  0.0057  0.0033  0.0081  0.0939 
HKD         
a  0.0000  0.0003 -0.0000  0.0001  0.0006  0.0023*  0.0022  0.0006  0.0517*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0016  0.0043 
β -1.6753*  1.8336***  0.4769*  0.4795**  0.5360***  0.7299***  0.6806***  0.3644***  3.7425*** 
Se β  0.9552  0.5852  0.2560  0.1988  0.1660  0.1241  0.1037  0.0841  0.1404 
t β=1 -2.8008***  1.4245 -2.0433** -2.6179*** -2.7953*** -2.1753** -3.0811*** -7.5549***  19.5299*** 
Wald  8.3914**  2.3416  5.3584*  10.2639***  14.2738***  16.0407***  19.5846***  71.2064***  403.7265*** 
R2  0.0008  0.0024  0.0008  0.0014  0.0025  0.0083  0.0111  0.0047  0.2754 
ILS         
a -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0060 -0.0083 -0.0127 -0.0192 -0.0282 -0.0998 
Se a  0.0003  0.0006  0.0006  0.0008  0.0009  0.0033  0.0035  0.0041  0.0023 
β -1.1766  3.4862  3.4577***  4.4289***  5.1381***  7.6313***  8.2036***  8.0336***  6.0725*** 
Se β  5.1047  2.6731  0.6172  0.4603  0.3782  0.7494  0.5914  0.5481  0.1758 
t β=1 -0.4264  0.9301  3.9821***  7.4499***  10.9428***  8.8491***  12.1809***  12.8322***  28.8515*** 
Wald  2.0088  3.1303  51.7399***  123.9849***  225.8479***  105.6173***  196.3538***  232.2703***  2233.6660*** 
R2  0.0013  0.0028  0.0133  0.0386  0.0746  0.2645  0.4055  0.4410  0.3896 
JPY         
a  0.0000  0.0003  0.0016  0.0033  0.0058  0.0048  0.0009 -0.0209 -0.0498 
Se a  0.0003  0.0012  0.0033  0.0050  0.0066  0.0103  0.0040  0.0150  0.0345 
β -1.2813  0.9394  0.9375  0.9778  1.0650*  0.7685*  0.8089***  0.0832  0.9591** 
Se β  1.2073  1.3950  0.8754  0.6749  0.5930  0.4603  0.1207  0.3328  0.4688 
t β=1 -1.8897* -0.0434 -0.0714 -0.0330  0.1096 -0.5029 -1.5831 -2.7551*** -0.0872 
Wald  6.3961**  0.2568  1.2692  2.0886  2.7805  4.2328  16.1616***  14.4550***  11.0489*** 
R2  0.0003  0.0027  0.0026  0.0051  0.0078  0.0066  0.0115  0.0011  0.0177 
NOK         
a -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0009 -0.0019 -0.0029 -0.0065 -0.0141 -0.0144 -0.0704 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0005  0.0019  0.0024  0.0027  0.0033  0.0047 
β -0.3020 -1.3557 -1.1868 -1.1854 -1.1787 -0.9115 -0.2736 -0.5581 -0.0018 
Se β  0.5566  0.4788  0.2011  0.1488  0.3727  0.2504  0.2053  0.1839  0.1690 
t β=1 -2.3394** -4.9199*** -10.8728*** -14.6892*** -5.8458*** -7.6337*** -6.2046*** -8.4735*** -5.9294*** 
Wald  6.3002**  27.6812***  125.2120***  232.5153***  37.1417***  65.7775***  71.7525***  89.2374***  240.7445*** 
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R2  0.0001  0.0020  0.0082  0.0149  0.0220  0.0306  0.0101  0.0242  0.0002 
NZD         
a -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0004 -0.0009 -0.0004  0.0066*** -0.0049  0.0296***  0.0209** 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0023  0.0011  0.0013  0.0019  0.0066  0.0027  0.0092 
β  0.2277  0.0308 -0.6145 -0.5556 -0.7451 -1.6114 -1.1960 -2.7589*** -2.1325** 
Se β  0.6101  0.7174  1.2690  0.3086  0.2553  0.1911  0.4489  0.1430  0.1887 
t β=1 -1.2657 -1.3510 -1.2722 -5.0411*** -6.8351*** -13.6633*** -4.8921*** -26.2872*** -16.5976*** 
Wald  2.0998  10.9109***  5.1599*  87.9349***  139.6124***  358.0121***  100.0968***  1063.3300***  3267.4380*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0000  0.0005  0.0008  0.0020  0.0170  0.0166  0.0852  0.0639 
SGD         
a -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0011 -0.0014 -0.0009  0.0023 -0.0032 -0.0099 -0.0568 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0008  0.0010  0.0048  0.0053  0.0076  0.0104 
β -0.4609  0.4797 -0.0253  0.1475  0.3533**  0.7374*  0.8153***  0.1146  1.5620*** 
Se β  0.4804  0.4489  0.2103  0.1718  0.1502  0.3781  0.2878  0.3100  0.2427 
t β=1 -3.0411*** -1.1589 -4.8750*** -4.9610*** -4.3050*** -0.6945 -0.6418 -2.8565***  2.3156** 
Wald  13.3652***  1.3523  26.5215***  32.8897***  33.6162***  3.8485  0.4235  12.4995***  165.1241*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0003  0.0000  0.0002  0.0013  0.0093  0.0182  0.0005  0.1519 
USD         
a  0.0000  0.0000 -0.0007 -0.0004  0.0005  0.0045  0.0058  0.0028  0.0257*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0005  0.0022  0.0028  0.0042  0.0052  0.0060  0.0035 
β -1.6236  0.6289 -0.2280  0.1931  0.4997  1.1273*  1.1036**  0.5320  4.3208*** 
Se β  1.8271  0.9134  0.4025  0.8931  0.7461  0.5778  0.4716  0.4230  0.1592 
t β=1 -1.4360 -0.4062 -3.0508*** -0.9035 -0.6706  0.2204  0.2197 -1.1064  20.8634*** 
Wald  2.4885  0.2832  10.0711***  1.1274  1.0985  1.5008  1.6789  3.8943  501.9754*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0001  0.0001  0.0010  0.0021  0.0121  0.0131  0.0041  0.2828 
AED         
a -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0005  0.0005  0.0091**  0.0172***  0.0205***  0.0196*** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0005  0.0007  0.0008  0.0039  0.0046  0.0053  0.0029 
β -0.7189  0.5441 -0.3137  0.1501  0.5232***  1.9976***  2.5661***  2.2955***  3.5698*** 
Se β  0.9105  0.6665  0.3011  0.2294  0.1894  0.4506  0.3621  0.3232  0.1005 
t β=1 -1.8878* -0.6840 -4.3633*** -3.7052*** -2.5171**  2.2140**  4.3257***  4.0079***  25.5785*** 
Wald  4.0003  0.6085  19.9630***  16.8355***  12.9900***  6.5862**  20.8205***  19.4258***  725.1168*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0002  0.0003  0.0001  0.0018  0.0509  0.1074  0.1108  0.4032 
BRL         
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a -0.0019 -0.0003  0.0026  0.0037  0.0085* -0.0007  0.0054 -0.1209 
Se a  0.0008  0.0064  0.0030  0.0037  0.0051  0.0078  0.0087  0.0119 
β  0.4313 -0.6607 -0.9386 -0.9426 -0.9628 -0.7535 -0.8059 -0.0082 
Se β  0.4099  0.8628  0.2115  0.1727  0.1238  0.1328  0.1059  0.0718 
t β=1 -1.3876 -1.9246* -9.1658*** -11.2457*** -15.8485*** -13.1996*** -17.0465*** -14.0335*** 
Wald  52.4752***  29.3114***  526.1270***  846.4889***  1783.3200***  2067.2840***  2655.6570***  6773.8350*** 
R2  0.0005  0.0025  0.0085  0.0128  0.0264  0.0146  0.0267  0.0000 
CLP         
a -0.0010 -0.0033 -0.0073 -0.0119 -0.0271 -0.0409 -0.0537 -0.0940 
Se a  0.0004  0.0020  0.0029  0.0035  0.0043  0.0048  0.0049  0.0069 
β  0.3851 -0.5798 -0.1945  0.2014  1.3285***  1.6778***  1.7334***  0.8769*** 
Se β  0.7213  0.8521  0.6455  0.5514  0.3898  0.3205  0.2683  0.2319 
t β=1 -0.8525 -1.8539* -1.8504* -1.4482  0.8427  2.1144**  2.7331*** -0.5307 
Wald  9.8521***  8.8469**  14.2042***  18.6900***  40.3113***  74.3733***  119.5913***  248.2320*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0016  0.0005  0.0006  0.0404  0.0917  0.1336  0.0570 
CNY         
a -0.0005 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0008  0.0170***  0.0451***  0.0582***  0.0071 
Se a  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0012  0.0058  0.0070  0.0081  0.0126 
β -0.1668 -0.2877  0.1578  0.4688***  1.5421***  2.2415***  2.1665***  1.5276*** 
Se β  0.2921  0.1530  0.1173  0.1002  0.2399  0.1942  0.1687  0.1394 
t β=1 -3.9943*** -8.4145*** -7.1819*** -5.2990***  2.2600**  6.3940***  6.9160***  3.7838*** 
Wald  16.0221***  72.4568***  57.3657***  39.6862***  8.6553**  47.5301***  56.7520***  31.2621*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0012  0.0006  0.0076  0.1229  0.3036  0.3547  0.3379 
COP         
a -0.0014 -0.0037 -0.0053 -0.0083 -0.0064  0.0017  0.0030 -0.0656 
Se a  0.0005  0.0010  0.0015  0.0019  0.0077  0.0091  0.0104  0.0159 
β  0.3436 -0.5994 -1.0609 -0.9949 -1.5852 -2.0441** -1.9972** -0.6603 
Se β  0.6672  0.2908  0.2496  0.2236  0.4658  0.3622  0.3053  0.2112 
t β=1 -0.9837 -5.5005*** -8.2557*** -8.9211*** -5.5497*** -8.4039*** -9.8176*** -7.8610*** 
Wald  17.0499***  102.0348***  231.5964***  370.6206***  135.9723***  279.7039***  420.2850***  885.8912*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0018  0.0078  0.0086  0.0384  0.1021  0.1375  0.0471 
CZK         
a -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0046 -0.0067 -0.0139 -0.0267 -0.0308 -0.0323 
Se a  0.0001  0.0002  0.0004  0.0006  0.0007  0.0031  0.0012  0.0044  0.0091 
β  0.3741  0.1897  0.9978***  1.2382***  1.1249***  1.1354***  0.6366***  1.0992***  3.2613*** 
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Se β  0.4729  0.4051  0.1434  0.1087  0.0928  0.2137  0.0673  0.1609  0.2806 
t β=1 -1.3235 -2.0003** -0.0157  2.1910**  1.3456  0.6338 -5.4030***  0.6163  8.0582*** 
Wald  6.1056**  13.8536***  25.9569***  59.2706***  84.9360***  20.0461***  468.6072***  49.8341***  206.6151*** 
R2  0.0002  0.0001  0.0113  0.0300  0.0339  0.0634  0.0228  0.1053  0.3643 
HUF         
a  0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0012 -0.0047 -0.0088 -0.0200 -0.0322 -0.1193 
Se a  0.0002  0.0005  0.0011  0.0014  0.0017  0.0021  0.0026  0.0158 
β  0.2640  0.2686  0.3373  0.5813***  0.7343***  0.8570***  0.9515***  1.4335*** 
Se β  0.7096  0.4373  0.2080  0.1457  0.1148  0.0781  0.0665  0.1904 
t β=1 -1.0372 -1.6727* -3.1865*** -2.8737*** -2.3146** -1.8326* -0.7286  2.2766** 
Wald  3.2868  15.9440***  80.8534***  163.5326***  257.3583***  566.6244***  773.4079***  151.3909*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0001  0.0007  0.0040  0.0102  0.0300  0.0505  0.1942 
IDR         
a  0.0005  0.0012*  0.0054***  0.0100***  0.0175***  0.0496***  0.0408***  0.1169*** 
Se a  0.0004  0.0006  0.0013  0.0020  0.0026  0.0040  0.0032  0.0067 
β  0.0324**  0.0553**  0.2799***  0.3151***  0.1250* -0.3273 -0.7696 -0.7155 
Se β  0.0161  0.0256  0.0502  0.0658  0.0703  0.0671  0.0379  0.0638 
t β=1 -60.2071*** -36.8643*** -14.3458*** -10.4026*** -12.4398*** -19.7913*** -46.7523*** -26.8887*** 
Wald  3709.8640***  1381.3700***  212.3405***  112.7531***  158.4090***  397.9278***  2373.5170***  730.0586*** 
R2  0.0010  0.0012  0.0073  0.0054  0.0008  0.0058  0.0971  0.0305 
INR         
a  0.0003**  0.0008***  0.0032***  0.0037***  0.0037***  0.0068*  0.0101**  0.0095** 
Se a  0.0001  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0010  0.0041  0.0044  0.0047 
β  1.1634** -0.7486 -0.7210 -0.2172  0.0623  0.1509  0.1474  0.2995** 
Se β  0.4910  0.2896  0.1598  0.1201  0.0989  0.2200  0.1657  0.1390 
t β=1  0.3328 -6.0370*** -10.7723*** -10.1343*** -9.4824*** -3.8588*** -5.1459*** -5.0406*** 
Wald  4.7658*  37.8007***  122.9273***  115.9464***  106.5734***  16.7895***  29.1159***  28.8552*** 
R2  0.0014  0.0017  0.0051  0.0008  0.0001  0.0022  0.0030  0.0126 
MAD         
a -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0033 -0.0068 -0.0106 -0.0249 -0.0408 -0.0553 -0.1280 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0015  0.0022  0.0028  0.0038  0.0043  0.0051  0.0079 
β -2.2298**  0.9080**  0.6897  0.7311**  0.8065**  1.2332***  1.4664***  1.4772***  1.6215*** 
Se β  1.4243  0.4081  0.4958  0.3719  0.3146  0.2173  0.1664  0.1452  0.1200 
t β=1 -2.2676** -0.2255 -0.6259 -0.7230 -0.6150  1.0730  2.8024***  3.2862***  5.1806*** 
Wald  6.1503**  15.7658***  11.8171***  21.5738***  30.9769***  63.1701***  113.3185***  155.3714***  369.6178*** 
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R2  0.0010  0.0021  0.0090  0.0161  0.0246  0.1075  0.2208  0.2806  0.4363 
MXN         
a  0.0010**  0.0046***  0.0088***  0.0128***  0.0265***  0.0395***  0.0481*** -0.0561 
Se a  0.0004  0.0008  0.0011  0.0013  0.0056  0.0066  0.0084  0.0161 
β -0.4822 -0.4984 -0.4320 -0.3984 -0.3921 -0.4594 -0.2970  0.8479*** 
Se β  0.2202  0.0971  0.0689  0.0555  0.1256  0.1051  0.0966  0.2134 
t β=1 -6.7316*** -15.4324*** -20.7960*** -25.2020*** -11.0806*** -13.8850*** -13.4274*** -0.7126 
Wald  55.7595***  300.7180***  548.3618***  809.4778***  156.4913***  243.8828***  239.0948***  181.3605*** 
R2  0.0012  0.0062  0.0093  0.0122  0.0225  0.0426  0.0234  0.0682 
MYR         
a -0.0003 -0.0008 -0.0031 -0.0062 -0.0088 -0.0163 -0.0251 -0.0332 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0014  0.0020  0.0026  0.0040  0.0044  0.0047 
β  0.1342  0.3224  0.8788  1.0281*  1.1787**  1.1179***  0.8409***  0.9128*** 
Se β  1.7419  0.6688  0.7693  0.5943  0.5231  0.4182  0.3229  0.2694 
t β=1 -0.4971 -1.0132 -0.1575  0.0472  0.3417  0.2820 -0.4928 -0.3236 
Wald  3.1137  9.1839**  5.3281*  9.4957***  12.1549***  18.6474***  34.6757***  55.5569*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0001  0.0069  0.0128  0.0200  0.0269  0.0236  0.0411 
PHP         
a -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0040 -0.0095 -0.0127 -0.0176 -0.0367 -0.0302 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0007  0.0011  0.0014  0.0023  0.0022  0.0031 
β -0.8502  0.2060  1.8015***  2.1109***  1.9961***  1.5726***  1.3453***  1.3301*** 
Se β  0.3702  0.3396  0.1737  0.1350  0.1185  0.0962  0.0621  0.0662 
t β=1 -4.9973*** -2.3384**  4.6135***  8.2284***  8.4088***  5.9517***  5.5621***  4.9886*** 
Wald  25.5693***  10.6800***  30.0534***  81.2000***  86.3960***  59.4110***  452.9469***  111.9661*** 
R2  0.0013  0.0001  0.0249  0.0550  0.0636  0.0609  0.1089  0.0918 
PKR         
a -0.0000  0.0017*  0.0063  0.0121**  0.0266***   
Se a  0.0005  0.0009  0.0039  0.0050  0.0073   
β  0.6980**  0.2745*  0.0166 -0.1697 -0.2288   
Se β  0.3379  0.1542  0.3339  0.2958  0.2172   
t β=1 -0.8938 -4.7057*** -2.9453*** -3.9544*** -5.6566***   
Wald  2.0424  30.4426***  10.1161***  17.4313***  35.2489***   
R2  0.0018  0.0014  0.0004  0.0020  0.0053   
PLZ         
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a -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0059 -0.0114 -0.0165 -0.0295 -0.0422 -0.0604 -0.1085 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0014  0.0020  0.0025  0.0026  0.0089 
β -0.0399  2.4033***  2.8511***  2.9207***  2.9544***  2.8200***  2.7985***  3.4154***  3.0019*** 
Se β  1.0529  0.7655  0.3785  0.2841  0.2321  0.1794  0.1592  0.1382  0.2849 
t β=1 -0.9876  1.8331*  4.8910***  6.7611***  8.4193***  10.1424***  11.2994***  17.4753***  7.0256*** 
Wald  1.0364  8.4000**  48.4769***  89.8757***  135.1660***  215.3050***  296.8191***  539.0758***  149.4522*** 
R2  0.0000  0.0034  0.0193  0.0356  0.0539  0.0815  0.1019  0.1865  0.3181 
RUR         
a -0.0001 -0.0011 -0.0047 -0.0083 -0.0124 -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.0147 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0008  0.0010  0.0013  0.0016  0.0017 
β -1.6139  1.1100***  1.1736***  1.0636***  1.0826***  0.7168***  0.4603***  0.2205*** 
Se β  1.0189  0.1012  0.0671  0.0557  0.0467  0.0362  0.0332  0.0286 
t β=1 -2.5654**  1.0865  2.5862***  1.1410  1.7690* -7.8167*** -16.2461*** -27.2867*** 
Wald  6.6277**  13.8070***  67.5754***  107.2190***  175.0159***  422.4335***  742.2736***  1507.9430*** 
R2  0.0011  0.0488  0.1161  0.1362  0.1903  0.1494  0.0813  0.0275 
THB         
a -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0006 -0.0152 -0.0022 
Se a  0.0002  0.0003  0.0006  0.0009  0.0011  0.0016  0.0012  0.0022 
β  0.3765  0.1845  1.3446***  1.2513***  1.0198***  0.8796*** -0.6670  0.2880*** 
Se β  0.5607  0.2598  0.1217  0.1077  0.1011  0.0899  0.0531  0.0698 
t β=1 -1.1119 -3.1396***  2.8304***  2.3333**  0.1957 -1.3388 -31.4012*** -10.2032*** 
Wald  2.3701  16.8496***  11.3346***  8.5881**  2.4532  2.2965  1340.7840***  117.2952*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0001  0.0281  0.0311  0.0238  0.0227  0.0394  0.0042 
TRL         
a  0.0011***  0.0026***  0.0127***  0.0251***  0.0361***  0.0565***  0.0681***  0.0842***  0.2827*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0004  0.0008  0.0012  0.0015  0.0024  0.0032  0.0042  0.0201 
β -0.0009 -0.0033 -0.0007  0.0338***  0.0729***  0.2175***  0.1988***  0.3006*** -1.3015 
Se β  0.0018  0.0027  0.0051  0.0074  0.0087  0.0105  0.0115  0.0112  0.0983 
t β=1 -551.0027*** -376.4646*** -196.5120*** -131.3946*** -106.4461*** -74.2257*** -69.9020*** -62.3124*** -23.4095*** 
Wald  321927.9000***  148416.0000***  39612.6200***  17467.0400***  11370.6400***  5549.5780***  5070.0250***  4242.3310***  1419.3710*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0004  0.0000  0.0050  0.0165  0.0937  0.0726  0.1521  0.4254 
TWD         
a  0.0001  0.0007  0.0017**  0.0030***  0.0092***  0.0064  0.0210*** -0.0026 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0007  0.0009  0.0013  0.0048  0.0065  0.0168 
β  0.6575***  0.5086***  0.5152***  0.5761***  0.8440***  0.8915***  1.0443***  1.0697*** 
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Se β  0.2119  0.1427  0.1196  0.1057  0.0864  0.2202  0.2334  0.2729 
t β=1 -1.6167 -3.4434*** -4.0546*** -4.0099*** -1.8059* -0.4928  0.1898  0.2554 
Wald  3.8076  25.9796***  50.5339***  71.9151***  120.8768***  6.0316**  19.3317***  0.7599 
R2  0.0024  0.0030  0.0044  0.0071  0.0227  0.0364  0.0472  0.0617 
ZAR         
a  0.0004  0.0021***  0.0127***  0.0307***  0.0505***  0.0984***  0.1545***  0.1800***  0.4472*** 
Se a  0.0003  0.0008  0.0017  0.0073  0.0087  0.0128  0.0153  0.0199  0.0311 
β  0.3991 -1.1568 -1.9008* -2.4491** -2.7717*** -2.7689*** -3.1966*** -2.6126*** -4.6412*** 
Se β  0.7621  0.6024  0.2882  0.6630  0.5418  0.4141  0.3495  0.3379  0.3280 
t β=1 -0.7885 -3.5806*** -10.0654*** -5.2020*** -6.9611*** -9.1015*** -12.0082*** -10.6915*** -17.1965*** 
Wald  6.1178**  14.8313***  115.3860***  29.3915***  51.4870***  87.4542***  154.9896***  122.9549***  347.9468*** 
R2  0.0001  0.0009  0.0102  0.0296  0.0563  0.0953  0.1612  0.1292  0.4575 
Mean         
a -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0004 -0.0002  0.0003  0.0029 -0.0003  0.0041 -0.0145 
Se a  0.0002  0.0004  0.0012  0.0017  0.0023  0.0041  0.0046  0.0060  0.0116 
β -0.3324  0.2768  0.1072  0.2194  0.2865  0.4785  0.5739  0.4245  1.1857 
se β  0.9631  0.5704  0.3887  0.3009  0.2734  0.2648  0.2177  0.2048  0.1990 
t β=1 -5.4955 -2.6927 -1.7564 -1.4178 -1.2127 -1.0100 -1.2888 -1.3482  0.2996 
Wald  13573.7518  4845.4272  1332.6691  662.8910  491.7952  338.2548  511.4140  451.9752  872.5388 
R2  0.0004  0.0025  0.0097  0.0159  0.0231  0.0493  0.0751  0.0913  0.2031 
 
 
 
We use OLS or DOLS estimator according to the stationarity of the forward premium. For example, referring to Table 3.10, for AUD, OLS is applied for TN, 1W, 1M and 2M, and DOLS 
is applied for 3M, 6M, 9M, and 1Y. For each economy we test for different time forward rates with different time to maturity. We report the values and standard errors of α and β, R 
squares of the equation, also the t statistics of testing β=1, the Wald statistics of joint test for α=1 and β=1, and the test statistics of unit root test (ADF) for the residuals of the 
equation. We calculate the mean of these statistics across the economies. We append the total number of rejections of the market efficiency hypothesis out of the 31 economies at the 
end of the table.  
*    Significance at 10% 
**   Significance at 5% 
***  Significance at 1% 
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Table  3.11  Number of rejections in the Fama equation using Sterling, USD and 
Euro sample 
 
Panel A (FMOLS) 
    1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Sterling 
         
a=0 2 4 5 6 7 9 7 9 6 
t β=1 9 13 24 25 23 21 23 25 18 
a=0 & β=1 13 23 26 29 28 27 27 28 21 
USD                   
a=0 2 3 8 7 8 8 7 10 8 
t β=1 9 23 24 24 25 26 28 26 22 
a=0 & β=1 8 27 28 30 30 30 29 29 24 
Euro                   
a=0 2 5 7 11 12 13 15 15 9 
t β=1 11 23 26 26 27 28 26 27 19 
a=0 & β=1 10 24 25 28 30 30 30 31 23 
 
 
Panel B (DOLS) 
 
    1W 1M 2M 3M 6M 9M 1Y 2Y 
Sterling 
         
a=0 2 4 5 6 7 9 7 9 6 
t β=1 9 13 24 25 23 21 23 25 18 
a=0 & β=1 13 23 26 28 28 27 28 28 21 
USD                   
a=0 3 3 8 7 8 8 7 10 8 
t β=1 9 23 24 24 25 26 28 26 21 
a=0 & β=1 8 27 28 29 30 30 29 29 24 
Euro                   
a=0 2 5 7 10 12 13 15 15 9 
t β=1 11 23 26 26 27 28 26 27 19 
a=0 & β=1 10 24 25 28 30 30 30 31 23 
 
Numbers in each row of the table represents of the number of economies that are rejected for the 
hypothesis α=0, β=1, and the joint test α=0 and β=1 respectively. Most periods contain all 31 economies 
data coverage, except only 24 economies for TN, and 30 economies for 9M. For 2Y forward rates, Sterling 
covers 22 economies, while both USD and Euro have 24 economies. For 1Y forward rates, Sterling has 29 
economies and USD has 30 economies data coverage. Empty entries in table 3.7.1 to 3.7.6 indicates the 
economies with missing data. 
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Figure 3.1 One-month Sterling spot returns and forward premium 
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Blue line is the change in sport rate and the red line is the forward premium. These 31 graphs are arranged 
in alphabetical order of currency short codes. Horizontal axis is the time line from 1990 to 2013. 
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Figure 3.2 One-year Sterling spot returns and forward premium 
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Blue line is the change in sport rate and the red line is the forward premium. These 31 graphs are arranged 
in alphabetical order of currency short codes. Horizontal axis is the time line from 1990 to 2013. 
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Figure 3.3 US dollar to Sterling spot returns and forward premium in different 
time horizons 
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Blue line is the change in sport rate and the red line is the forward premium. Graphs are ordered in the 
length of time horizons. i.e. from top left to bottom right, 1 day, 1 week, 1 month, 2 months, 3 months 6 
months, 9 months, 1 year and 2 years. 
 
 
253 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Turkish Lira to Sterling spot returns and forward premium in 
different time horizons 
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This Figure shows Turkish Lira experienced a dramatic decrease of forward premium in 2001. 
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Figure 3.5 Graphs of the forward rates that appear to be (trend) stationary 
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Figure 3.6 Line plot of the constant coefficient α 
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Line plot of the estimated coefficient α for each of the 31 economies, with the value of α on the vertical axis and the 9 different time to maturity periods on the horizontal axis. a+ and 
a- indicate the confidence interval. Coefficients correspond to Table 3.6.1 Simple efficiency hypothesis FMOLS test equation for Sterling exchange rates. 
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Figure 3.7 Line plot of the slope coefficient β  
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Line plot of the estimated slope coefficient β for each of the 31 economy, with the value of β on the vertical axis and the 9 different time to maturity periods on the horizontal axis. b+ 
and b- indicate the confidence interval. Coefficients correspond to Table 3.6.1 Simple efficiency hypothesis FMOLS test equation for Sterling exchange rates. 
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Figure 3.8 Line plot of the constant coefficient α from the Fama equation 
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Line plot of the estimated coefficient α from the Fama equation for each of the 31 economy, with the value of α on the vertical axis and the 9 different time to maturity periods on the 
horizontal axis. a+ and a- indicate the confidence interval. Coefficients correspond to Table 3.10.1 Fama FMOLS regression for Sterling exchange rate.  
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 Figure 3.9 Line plot of the slope coefficient β from the Fama equation 
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Line plot of the estimated slope coefficient β from the Fama equation for each of the 31 economy, with the value of β on the vertical axis and the 9 different time to maturity periods 
on the horizontal axis. a+ and a- indicate the confidence interval. Coefficients correspond to Table 3.10.1Fama FMOLS regression for Sterling exchange rate.
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Chapter 4        Financial Liberalization and Crisis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Many countries started to liberalize their financial sectors during the 1980s and 
continually rising in a more rapid speed in the 1990s with the goal of achieving economic 
growth through financial sector development. However, financial liberalization has often 
been followed by financial instability and is often considered a cause of banking crisis 
(Caprio and Klingebiel 1996, Kaminsky and Reinhart 1999).  
Financial liberalization can lead to financial fragility in two ways. One is that financial 
institutions take on more risk and with deposit insurance their downside risks are cushion and 
there is no cap on the upside rewards. The other one is that deregulation opens up the gates 
for banks to merge, and it becomes too big to fail, which makes it more imperative that 
reregulation rules to stop them from taking excessive risks. In this chapter we test whether 
financial liberalization has a role to play in explaining crisis.  
Most existing studies capture financial liberalization using 0/1 dummy. The drawback 
of this method is that it only gives financial liberalization two states, liberalized or non-
liberalized and it cannot capture the degree of financial liberalization. In this chapter we use a 
financial liberalization database on International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a grade 
index constructed according to the degree of liberalization. This liberalization index captures 
various liberalization policies taken as well as the extent of liberalization. The index is 
constructed using 7 dimensions. Each dimension has a score from 0 to 3. That is, fully 
liberalized=3; partially liberalized =2; partially repressed =1; fully repressed =0.  The data 
base is an index constructed using 7 different dimensions, namely credit controls and 
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excessively high reserve requirement, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in 
the banking sector, financial account restriction, prudential regulations and supervision of the 
banking sector, and securities market policy. Therefore it has the advantage that it allows for 
policy reversals. 
 
Figure 4.1 Financial Liberalization Index by Country Groups 
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Figure 4.1 shows that financial reforms advanced substantially through much of the 
sample in the past 30 years. Countries in all income groups and in all regions are liberalized. 
Higher income economies remained more liberalized than lower-income economies 
throughout. For advanced economies, most liberalization happened in the 80s and early 90s, 
with the process slowing down after that.  
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Figure 4.2 Distribution of Financial Sector Policy Changes Over time (Full Sample) 
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Figure 4.3 Distribution of Financial Sector Policy Changes Over time (Advanced Economy) 
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To examine the pace at which the liberalization took pace, the policy changes for each 
country-year is classified into five categories. A decrease in the financial liberalization 
measure by 3 points is classified as a large reversal; a decrease of 1 or 2 points as reversal; an 
increase by 1 or 2 points as a reform; and an increase of 3 or more points is classified as a 
large reform. Years when no changes were made are classified as status quo. 
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of various policy changes in the whole sample. It 
shows that most reforms concentrated in the first half of the 1990s. Liberalization was 
relatively rare in the early and late periods of the sample. This reflects the reforms in 
transition countries, and also the significant changes in Western Europe and Latin America. 
After peaking in 1995, the liberalization process began to slow down. This could be because 
a number of countries had essentially completed the liberalization process. 
In chapter 2, we have discussed that the European banking industry has a strong culture 
of ‘too big to fail’. Financial liberalization allows bank CEOs to take on excessive risk. Some 
argue that this could be a contributing factor to the financial crisis. As we can see in Figure 
4.1 and Figure 4.3, towards the end of the sample period 2005, most countries in the 
advanced economies have nearly fully liberalized.  Could it be that financial liberalization is 
one of the factors that led to the financial crisis in 2007? Our selections of sample countries 
are those countries that were mostly affected by the financial crisis. We use a sample of 10 
European countries which are commonly used in the sovereign debt crisis literature, adding 
USA and Canada which are also severely affected by the financial crisis. 
The 2007 crisis is one of the most serious crises we have ever seen. It lasted for a long 
time and resulted in a serious recession. The previous literature used panel data to investigate 
the relationship between financial crisis and all types of financial crises in general. We only 
focus the current episode of crisis in this study. In the same way, rather than using the 
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conventional way of capturing crisis using 0/1 dummy variable, we use 10-year government 
bond yield spread relative to Germany as a proxy for crisis. The long-term government bond 
yield spreads relative to Germany have increased dramatically for most euro area countries 
since the recent crisis happened. The advantage of using spread is it also shows the extent and 
severity of the crisis. Spread is widely and commonly used as a proxy of financial 
liberalization in recent literature. However the literature using spread as an indicator of crisis 
is usually in a different context. For example Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2011) empirically 
investigate the EMU sovereign crisis. They find evidence of contagion effects particularly 
among EMU periphery countries. The literature using spread as a measure of financial crisis 
and modelling sovereign debt issues, had not modelled the effect of financial liberalization. 
So there is scope for us to make contribution. 
In order to test this hypothesis we follow a simple specification which is already 
established in the literature (Arghyrou and Tsoukalas 2011), augmented by the proxy of 
financial liberalization. We also conceive that fundamental policy changes, such as financial 
liberalization, which liberalize capital control in the banking and financial industry, may take 
some time to take effect. We test whether the past liberalization also contributes to the recent 
crisis. We use a panel data fixed effect model with the OLS estimator. We also use SUR to 
control for both heteroskedasiticiy and contemporaneous correlation, and 2SLS to account for 
endogeneity.  
 Contrary to Shehzad (2009), who examine the impact of financial liberalization on 
systemic and non-systemic banking crises for a sample of developing and developed 
countries for the period 1981 to 2002, suggesting that financial liberalization reduces the 
likelihood of systemic crises, our result shows that there is no contemporaneous relationship 
between financial liberalization and crisis, rather, the past liberalization has influence on 
present crisis.   
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The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 summarises and discusses 
the literature. Section 4.3 provides details and analytical descriptions of the data. Section 4.4 
presents the empirical models and the results. Section 4.5 concludes this chapter. 
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4.2 Literature review 
 
 It is believe that Financial Liberalization can spur growth, however it may also leads 
to crisis. One strand of the literature of financial liberalization investigates the impact of 
financial liberalization on economic growth. McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) first 
strongly advocate increasing economic performance by fostering financial development in 
early years. Their work stimulated a fast-growing research on how financial development can 
stimulate economic growth. According to McKinnon and Shaw, financial repression, by 
forcing financial institutions to pay low and often negative real interest rates, reduces private 
financial savings, thereby decreasing the resources available to finance capital accumulation. 
From this point of view, through financial liberalization developing countries can stimulate 
domestic savings and growth, and reduce excessive dependence on foreign capital flows. 
Theoretical studies Greenwood and Jovanovic (1989) have presented models explaining the 
mechanism through which the increased growth was achieved. They show that the positive 
correlation between financial intermediation and growth is due to increased investment 
efficiency rather than the increased volume of investment.  
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find a positive correlation between the real interest 
rate (which was often used as a proxy for financial development in the early literature) and 
growth for thirty-four countries from 1965 to 1985. King and Levine (1993) find a significant 
and positive relationship between financial development and faster current and future 
economic growth. Jung (1986) finds a bi-directional causality between financial liberalization 
and economic growth. A positive effect of financial liberalization on economic growth was 
gradually established in the early 90s. Although an expanding body of literature has 
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documented this effect across space and time, the channel through which financial 
liberalization affects the economic growth remains unclear (Inkoo and Jong-Hyup 2008).  
Some has argued that the adverse effects of financial liberalization happen typically in 
countries with poor bank regulation and supervision, or poor “law and order”. Although there 
are benefits from financial deregulation, it may not be optimal to have an extensive 
deregulation for countries at an early stage in the liberalization process. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (1998) also point out that, financial liberalization gives banks another financial 
intermediaries more freedom of action, increases the opportunities to take on risk. However, 
because of limited liability, bankers take on risk higher that the socially desirable level. If 
prudential regulation and supervision fail to control banker’s behaviour and align incentives, 
liberalization may increase financial. Increased risk taking due to moral hazard can become a 
powerful source of financial fragility and leads to banking crisis. Mehrez and Kaufmann 
(2000) find that the probability of a crisis is higher in the period following financial 
liberalization in the country with poor transparency, where they use corruption as a proxy for 
transparency. Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) empirically examine the connection 
between financial liberalization and financial fragility for 53 countries during 1980-85. They 
also find that financial liberalization increases the probability of a banking crisis, though less 
so if legal institutions and governance are strong. Their institutional characteristics are rule of 
law, level of corruption and good contract enforcement. Rossi (1999) focuses on her new 
measures of capital controls, prudential regulation, supervision and depositors’ safety. Barth, 
Caprio et al. (1999) however, find mixed evidence regarding the impact of regulatory 
restrictions on bank performance. They find that countries that restrict securities market 
activities tend to have more fragile banking systems. 
Aware the existence of the possible trade-off between the benefits of liberalization and 
the costs of increasing financial frailty, researchers also tried to weight up both sides of the 
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impact from financial liberalization together. Taking account of both the positive effect of 
growth and negative effect of crisis, Inkoo and Jong-Hyup (2008) find a positive net effect 
from financial liberalization to growth. Johnston (1994)’s evidence suggest that only 
countries did not experienced financial crisis have higher economic from financial system 
reform, but countries faced a crisis experienced a deterioration in economic growth. 
 There has been an ongoing debate about the case for and against regulation. The case 
for free banking begins with the argument by analogy. If free trade and free competition is 
considered to be welfare superior to restricted trade and competition, why is free banking not 
better than central banks? This was the basis of much debate in the early mid-19
th
 century
28
. 
Free bank mangers understand that their long-term survival depends on their ability to retain 
depositor’s confidence. Government intervention in the form of deposit insurance has the 
opposite effect on capital ratios. The moral hazard created by deposit insurance will drive 
even conservative banks to take on extra risk when faced with competition from bad banks. 
The free-banking school argue that it is the ‘bad’ effect of depositor protection in the form of 
moral hazard that creates the needs for regulation.  
The second argument in favour of free banking is the poor record of central banks in 
maintaining the value of the currency. The free banking school argued that monetary stability 
is a necessary prerequisite for bank stability (Benston and Kaufman, 1996), and the loss of 
purchasing power incurred by depositors from unexpected inflation is much greater than 
losses from bank failures in the USA (Schwartz, 1987). However, the argument that central 
banks and a regulated banking system are financially less stable than a free-banking system 
has lost force with the development of independent central banks, in combination with strict 
inflation targets. An intermediate position taken by a number of economists is to argue that 
the current regulated system should be redesigned so as to allow market discipline to 
                                                          
28 For the historiacal arguments for the free banking case see Goodhart (1990) and smith(1936) 
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counteract the moral hazard problems created by deposit insurance. A popular suggestion is 
the use of subordinated debt in bank capital regulation. The existence of deposit insurance 
results in under-priced risk due to moral hazard. Wall (1989) proposes the use of 
subordinated debt aimed at creating a banking environment that functions as if deposit 
insurance did not exist. The advantage of the put characteristic of the subordinated debt is 
that the bank would always be forced to continuously satisfy the market of its soundness. An 
alternative proposal is the narrow banking scheme put forward by Tobin (1985) and strongly 
supported by the Economists (27 April 1996). His proposal is that deposit insurance and 
lender-of-last-resort facilities should be restricted to banks involved in the payment 
mechanism. These would be exclusively retail banks that would be required to hold only safe 
liquid assets such as Treasury and government bonds. Thus the banking market would be 
segmented in to a protected retail banking sector and a free-banking sector catering to 
corporate clients and sophisticated investors. 
The case for regulation of banks and other financial institutions hinges on the Coase 
(1998) argument that unregulated private actions creates outcomes whereby social marginal 
costs are greater that private marginal costs. The social marginal costs occur because bank 
failure has a far greater effect throughout the economy than a manufacturing concern because 
of the widespread use of banks to make payments and as a store for savings. In contrast, the 
private marginal costs are borne by the shareholders and the employees of the company, and 
these are likely to be a smaller magnitude than the social costs. Nevertheless, it should be 
borne in mind that regulation involves real resource cost. These costs arise from two sources: 
direct regulatory costs and compliance costs borne by the firms regulated. With a high level 
of costs, the free market is preferable unless it can be shown that the benefits of regulation 
outweigh the costs involved. The main reason for regulation are three fold. First, consumers 
lack market power and are prone to exploitation from the monopolistic behaviour of banks. 
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Second, depositors are uninformed and unable to monitor banks and therefore require 
protection. Finally, regulation is needed to ensure the safety and stability of the banking 
system. 
Another one of the main approach of financial liberalization is capital account 
liberalization. A speech
29
 by Stanley Fischer, Deputy Director of the International Monetary 
Fund and world leading macroeconomist, who argued that free capital movements facilitates 
a more efficient global allocation of savings, and helps channel resources into their most 
productive uses, thus increasing economic growth and welfare. International capital flows 
have expanded the opportunities for portfolio diversification, and thereby provided investors 
with a potential to achieve higher risk adjusted rates of returns. And just as current account 
liberalization promotes growth by increasing access to sophisticated technology, and export 
competition has improved domestic technology, so capital account liberalization can increase 
the efficiency of the domestic financial system. However, some researchers argue that 
financial liberalization has led to capital flows that are volatile and procyclical and has raised 
the instability of domestic financial markets. Broner (2010) shows evidence that financial 
liberalization has increased both output and consumption volatility, and that financial 
liberalization has made domestic financial markets more unstable and prone to crises. 
The Financial crisis highlighted several shortcomings in the policies and practices of 
some financial institutions, particularly in North America and Europe, and in the regulatory 
requirements for banks in respect of capital. In the lead-up to the Financial crisis, some 
financial institutions were highly leveraged (that is, their assets were funded by high levels of 
debt as compared to equity), with capital that proved insufficient to absorb the losses that 
they incurred. In several countries, governments provided funds to support failing banks, 
                                                          
29 Stanley Fischer, “Capital Account Liberalization and the Role of the IMF,” speech at the IMF Annual 
Meetings, September 19, 1997 
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effectively protecting holders of certain capital instruments from bearing losses, which came 
at a cost to the taxpayers. The complexity of capital rules, interaction with national 
accounting standards, and differences in application resulted in inconsistencies in the 
definition of regulatory capital across jurisdictions. Further, insufficient capital was held in 
respect of certain risks. This made it difficult for the market to assess the true quality of banks’ 
regulatory capital and led some market participants to turn to simpler solvency assessment 
methods. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) responded with new 
requirements for bank capital, collectively known as Basel III, which built on the existing 
frameworks of Basel I and Basel II. Basel III strengthens the minimum standards for the 
quality and quantity of banks’ capital, and aims to reduce bank leverage and improve the risk 
coverage of the Basel Capital Accords. One of the purposes of Basel III is to make it more 
likely that banks have sufficient capital to absorb the losses they might incur, thus reducing 
the likelihood that a bank will fail, or that a government will be called on to use taxpayer 
funds to bail out a bank. Basel III also introduced an international standard on bank liquidity. 
However Basel III focuses primarily on the risk of a run on the bank, requiring differing 
levels of reserves for different forms of bank deposits and other borrowings. Reserves were 
created as a by-product of policies designed to mitigate the effects of a disruption in financial 
markets. Researchers have found that the lack of international reserves contributes 
significantly to financial crisis vulnerability
30
. 
Interest rate liberalization is also a mean of financial liberalization. The Government 
can set the interest rate, let it subject to a binding celling or floor, or fluctuate within a bind. 
The conjecture  is that controls on bank interest rates limit the ability of banks to benefit from 
investment in high-risk, high-return projects, thereby curbing the moral hazard created by 
deposit insurance (Hellmann et al. 2000). The interest rate liberalization focused on freeing 
                                                          
30 See discussion in Mendoza (2004) 
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interest rates and credit allocations, but very often it made much less effort to improve the 
institutional basis of finance - a much harder, longer task. Some researchers also point out 
that interest rate liberalization increase the likelihood of banking crises. Goldfajn and Valde´s 
(1995) show how changes in international interest rates and capital inflows are amplified by 
the intermediating role of banks and how such swings may also produce an exaggerated 
business cycle that ends in bank runs and financial and currency crashes. Demirgüç and 
Detragiache (2002) analysed empirical evidence for a large panel of countries for 1980–1997. 
They find that explicit deposit insurance tends to be detrimental to bank stability, the more so 
where bank interest rates have been deregulated and where the institutional environment is 
weak. However, where institutions are good, opportunities for moral hazard are more limited, 
and more effective prudential regulation and supervision better offset the adverse incentives 
created by deposit insurance. 
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4.3 Data and Stylized Facts 
Researcher has used different ways to proxy financial liberalization. Real interest rate 
has been used to proxy for financial liberalization (De Gregorio and Guidotti 1995, Fry 1997, 
Bandiera, Caprio et al. 2000). However Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) point out 
that it may be limited in a cross-country study. In a panel data a positive correlation between 
real interest rates and crisis may simply reflect the fact that they are high during economic 
downturns, while financial liberalization plays no rule. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) show 
that the increase in growth domestic credit two years ago which they argue is a proxy for 
financial liberalization can help explain banking crises. Many others create a dummy variable 
according to policy changes using survey such as Williamson and Mahar (1998). Bekaert, 
Harvey et al. (2005) create a financial liberalization dummy based on the dates of official 
equity-market liberalization in each country. For liberalizing countries, their Official 
Liberalization indicator takes a value of one when the equity market is officially liberalized 
and zero otherwise. The Official Liberalization dates are based on Bekaert and Campbell R. 
Harvey A Chronology of Important Financial, Economic and Political Events in Emerging 
Markets
31
.  
In this chapter we use data on financial liberalization is from Abiad, Detragiache et al. 
(2010). This data base covers 91 economies over 1973-2005. Comparing other data bases 
using a dummy variable to measure financial liberalization, the advantage of this database is 
that it has time-series measures for the intensity of reform. As noted in their analysis of the 
pace of financial reform, there is variation among countries in terms of type of liberalization, 
intensity, and speed of reform. The database of financial reforms covers 91 economies over 
1973-2005. Compare to other graded indexed data base of financial liberalization such as 
                                                          
31 http://people.duke.edu/~charvey/country_risk/chronology/chronology_index.htm 
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Bandiera, Caprio et al. (2000), Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), Laeven (2003), this 
database has the widest and most extensive recent coverage.  
For each economy, 7 different dimensions are used to capture financial liberalization. 
The first one is credit controls and excessively high reserve requirements, which looks at the 
percentage of reserve requirement, and whether minimum amounts of credit must be 
channelled to certain sectors, any credits supplied to certain sectors at subsidised rates, and 
any aggregate ceiling exists.  The second one is interest rate controls. This considers whether 
deposit rates and lending rates are being control by the government; fluctuate within a band 
or freely floating. The third one is entry barriers, which is based on the extent the government 
allow foreign banks to enter into a domestic market, the entry of new domestic banks, the 
restrictions on branching, and whether government allow banks to engage in a wide range of 
activities. The fourth one is state ownership in the banking sector, which is constructed on the 
percentage of privatization of banks. The fifth one is financial account restrictions, which 
looks at the exchange rate regime and restrictions on capital inflows and outflows. The sixth 
one is prudential regulations and supervision of the bank sector. The last one is the securities 
market policy, which examine the existent and development of securities markets, and 
whether the equity market is open to foreign investors. Along each dimension, a country is 
given a final score on aggraded scale from zero to three, with zero corresponding to the 
highest degree of repression and three indicating full liberalization. The total score of these 7 
dimensions is the measure of financial liberalization.  
Given that each component takes the value between 0 and 3, the sum of these 7 
components which is measure of financial liberalization takes values between 0 and 21, with 
21 being fully liberalized. This database also classifies policy changes for each country-year 
into five categories. A decrease in the financial liberalization measure by 3 or more points is 
classified as a large reversal; a decrease of 1 to 2 points as a reversal; an increase by 1 or 2 
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points as a reform; and an increase of 3 or more points is classified as large reform. Finally 
years in which no policy changes were undertaken are classified as status quo observations.  
Figure 4.1 shows that financial reforms advanced substantially through much of the 
sample through much of the sample in the past 30 years. Advanced economies remained 
more liberalized than lower-income economies throughout. Figure 4.2 shows the distribution 
of liberalization over the sample period. Changes were relatively rare in the early and late 
part of the sample, with most reforms concentrated in the first half of the 1990s. After 
peaking in 1995, the liberalization process began to slow down. For the advanced economies, 
no large reform has happened since the year 1995 as it is shown in Figure 4.3. Moreover 
many advanced economies had completed the liberalization process, i.e. their liberalization 
index had reached the maximum 21. Based on these observations, we fill the series of 
financial liberalization index of the advanced economies from 2006 onwards with the value 
of 2005 since the data coverage is only up to 2005.  
Financial crisis has already emerged and documented in the 19
th
 century
32
. Researcher 
has been looking at the cause of crises. In particular, banking crisis and currency crisis, which 
are typically picked up by 0, 1 dummy variable. For example one of the most used data base 
is from Glick and Hutchinson (2000) who incorporated both banking crises and currencies 
and formed a “twin crisis” indicator.  Their work is followed up by Caprio and Klingebiel 
(2002) and Ranciere, Tornell et al. (2006). This data base covers the period from1980 to 2002. 
A more recent database is given by Caprio, Klingebiel et al. (2005), which is later extended 
by Laeven and Valencia (2008). Their data base covers the systemic banking crises for the 
period 1970-2007, with detailed data on crisis containment and resolution policies for 42 
crisis episodes, and also includes data on the timing of currency crises and sovereign debt 
                                                          
32 Reinhart, C. M. (2010) maps the cyclical history of financial crisis from 1810 to 2010 for sixty-six 
countries. It includes the four major financial crisis types (sovereign default, banking, currency, and 
inflation) along with stock market crashes. 
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crisis. Often researchers use these data bases, and estimate their models using Logit or Probit 
estimation.  While this crisis data looking very interesting, informative and valuable, however 
it doesn’t include the recent global financial crisis happened in 2007 and the sovereign debt 
crisis in Eurozone since 2009. Moreover, the way that crisis is captured by dummy variables 
does not distinguish between the severity of crisis which happened in different countries. 
The measure of financial crisis in this chapter is the monthly 10-year government bond 
yield spread relative to Germany. Germany has come under pressure due to not having a 
government budget deficit and funding it by borrowing more. Germany was not affected by 
the sovereign debt crisis and since then, German officials have resisted pressure to increase 
the debt, saying that too much deficit spending is what caused the European current problems. 
Our sample includes 10 Eurozone countries: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. We also include 2 Northern America 
countries: Canada and United States. Figure 4.4 presents the 10-year government bond yield 
spreads versus Germany. During the pre-crisis period, the spread of the European countries 
are steady despite deteriorating macroeconomic fundamentals in many countries. It is very 
clear from the figure that the spread had increased during the crisis period. In Austria, 
Finland and Netherlands, spread has increased sharply for globe financial crisis in 2007 and 
2008, also the sovereign debt crisis since 2010. However spread decreased during 2009. We 
can see two spikes in these countries. For other European countries, spread has increased 
since 2008, and they are serious affected by the following up sovereign debt crisis, from 
which we see their spread increased substantially in 2010. Although spread has come down 
since the year 2012, however they have not reached the pre-crisis level. In fact many of them 
are well above the crisis level such as Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. For the 2 Northern 
American countries USA and Canada, spread also increase since the year 2007. However 
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spread fluctuated at a fairly high level the pre-crisis periods, it may or may not be the best 
tool to capture financial crisis for these two countries. 
 
Figure 4.4 10-year government bond yield spreads versus Germany 
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We also have two other independent variables to capture the macro environment. The 
real exchange rate and the volatility of the stock market return. Volatility is calculated using 6 
months moving standard deviation of market price return using the following market index: 
ATX (Austria), BEL20 (Belgium),  S&P/TSX-60 (Canada), OMXH (Finland),  CAC-40 
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(France), ATHEX (Greece), IESQ (Ireland), FTSE MIB (Italy) AEX (Netherlands), PSI-20 
(Portugal), IBEX-35 (Spain) and NASDAQ (United States). Figure 4.5 plots the real 
exchange rate published by IMF, with an increase in the series indicating real appreciation. 
Figure 4.5 suggests a trend for real appreciation between 2001 and 2009 for the majority of 
the sample countries, especially for Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
 
Figure 4.5 Real effective exchange rate 
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4.4 Empirical frame work and results 
 
The overall state of macro-fundamentals is approximated by the real exchange rate. 
Empirical evidence generally is generally supportive of PPP’s validity in the long-run among 
European countries, suggesting that European real exchange rates are stationary (Arghyrou 
and Tsoukalas 2011). In accordance with literature on currency crises and many theoretical 
models of international economics, this assumption implicitly acknowledges that purchasing 
power parity (PPP) holds as a long-run equilibrium condition. Given that PPP is eventually 
mean-reverting, the movements of real exchange rate represent deviations from the 
economy’s steady-state equilibrium. Under PPP’s validity, real exchange rate offers 
quantitative measure of the size of macroeconomic imbalances. In addition we added the 
volatility of stock market index to capture the macro environment. We also added the lagged 
spreads to account for spread persistence (see Gerlach, Schulz et al. (2010) Attinasi, 
Checherita et al. (2009) ). Overall, our baseline model is an extension of Arghyrou and 
Tsoukalas (2011)’s model by: 
 
itititititit eFLSpreadVOLINDDREXSpread   413121          (4.1) 
 
where Spread is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany, REX is 
real exchange rate, DREX is the first difference of real exchange rate, VOLIND is the 
volatility of stock market return, FL is the financial liberalization index. We first started by 
estimating simple OLS. There are large and small countries, and it is likely to have the 
problem of hetroskedasticity. The potential hetroskedasticity may contaminate standard errors 
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and create problems in inference. Also crisis simultaneously happened in the countries, the 
errors are likely to be correlated. We use cross-section SUR in our penal estimation which 
control for both heteroskedasiticiy and contemporaneous correlation. In addition consider the 
potential issue of endogeneity so we 2SLS to account for endogeneity. One may argue that 
combing SUR and 2SLS, one can use 3SLS system estimation, but we only interested in the 
one way relationship between spread and financial liberalization. We applied fixed effects to 
all panel estimations. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, a potential problem is that the use 
of a lagged dependent variable in a fixed-effect estimation may produce bias in the estimates 
because the unobserved regional effects could be correlated with it. Judson, R. A. and A. L. 
Owen (1999) show that, this would only be a problem if the time dimension ‘T’ is small 
relative to the cross-section dimension ‘n’. They use Monte Carlo to evaluate several 
different techniques for estimating dynamic models with panel characteristic of many 
macroeconomic panel datasets. They conclude that macroeconomists should not dismiss the 
(least square dummy variable) LSDV bias as insignificant. Even with a time dimension as 
large as 30, they find that the bias may be equal to as much as 20% of the true value of the 
coefficient of interest. However, using a root-mean-square error (RMSE) criterion, the LSDV 
performs just as well or better than many alternatives when T=30. With a smaller time 
dimension, LSDV does not dominate the alternatives. In our sample, we have a large time 
dimension (T>30), and also it is much larger relative to the cross-section dimension, which 
justifies our choice of using the fixed effect model. Arghyrou, M. G. and A. Kontonikas 
(2012) also use a dynamic panel fixed effect model in their study. 
Many literatures in financial liberalization have used the 2SLS estimator in their studies. 
Chinn and Ito (2002) estimate from 2SLS with instrumental variables of regional dummies, 
lagged government budget surplus and current account balance, and suggest that the rate of 
financial development is linked to the capital controls liberalization. Ito (2006) uses 2SLS 
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instrumenting the capital account opening index and find that trade openness is found to be a 
prerequisite for successful inducement of financial development via capital account 
liberalization. Cubillas and González (2014) use the 2SLS approach to separate different 
effects of financial liberalization. They find that financial liberalization increases bank risk-
taking in both developed and developing countries but through different channels. Some 
financial liberalization literatures also use SUR estimation. Bekaert et al. (2005) report both 
OLS and SUR standard errors in their study. They find that in some cases the SUR estimates 
are close to the OLS estimates, although SUR standard errors are generally smaller than the 
OLS standard errors, because of the heteroskedasticity adjustment. They show that equity 
market liberalizations, on average, lead to a 1% increase in annual real economic growth. 
Bekaert and Harvey et al. (2006) also use SUR estimation that allows residual correlation 
across countries. They show that financial liberalization is mostly associated with lower 
consumption growth volatility, and it is also associated with declines in the ratio of 
consumption growth volatility to GDP growth volatility. 
Table 4.1 shows the result of panel estimation. The regression model is estimated over 
the time period 2000 to 2013. Result shows that spreads are persistent. The estimates of the 
autoregressive parameter of spreads are highly significant.  Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) 
finds the real exchange rates is either insignificant or significant with a negative sign for pre-
crisis period, and it is positive and significant for the crisis period. Volatility of stock market 
picks up new information. When information comes in the market, market price reacts to that 
information. More frequent changing of information, either good or bad will increase the 
volatility. Our result suggest that new information such as government policies aim to 
resolving crisis (reducing spread) also increase the volatility of stock market return. 
Therefore the volatility of market return is significant and carries a negative sign. 
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The main interest of this chapter however, is examine whether a high degree of 
financial liberalization in the developed countries contribute to the financial crisis.  Result in 
Table 4.1 shows that financial liberalization index on its own is not significant, which 
suggests that there is no contemporaneous relationship between financial liberalization and 
financial crisis. Our hypothesis is that is contemporaneous liberalization does not have effect 
on financial crisis, but it takes time for it to work its way through the system. We now 
examine whether financial liberalization in the past explain the current crisis.  
We use an approach similar to King and Levine (1993), where they conducted a study 
using data averaged over the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. Here we take the average of the 
financial liberalization index over the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s across countries, and 
denote them as FL70, FL80, FL90 and FL00. The financial liberalization FL in the baseline 
model is now replaced by these averages across countries in the past four decades. We also 
construct a interacted dummy variable D=1 for the year 2006 to 2013 as it is shown in 
equation 4.2. Results are presented in Table 4.2 to Table 4.5 in the Appendix. 
 
itiitititit eFLDSpreadVOLINDDREXSpread   413121       (4.2) 
 
The results for the macro variables are consistent in Table 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5. We 
observe a persistent spread as the coefficient of lagged spread is positive and significant. The 
coefficient of the change in the real exchange rate DREX is negative. It is significant at 5% 
significance level using the OLS estimator, and it is at 10% significance level with the SUR 
adjusted error. However the estimate is positive but insignificant using the 2SLS estimator. 
The coefficient of the volatility of stock market return VOLIND is negative and significant at 
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5% significance level with the OLS and the 2SLS estimator. It is also significant at 10% 
significant level with the SUR adjusted error. These results are also consistent with the result 
from Equation 4.1 in Table 4.1. Table 4.2 shows that the OLS estimate of the coefficient of 
FL70 is insignificant. However after control for heteroskesdasicity and contemporaneous 
correlation, the result of the SUR estimate shows the coefficient of FL70 is positive and 
significant at 5% significance level. We also use 2SLS to account for endogeneity. The result 
shows that the coefficient of FL70 is positive and significant at 10% significance level. Table 
4.3 shows the result of the FL80 index, which is very similar to Table 4.2 with the FL70 
index. Table 4.4 and Table 4.5 show that both the estimates of the coefficient of FL90 and 
FL00 are positive and significant with the OLS, 2SLS and SUR estimation. When comparing 
the coefficient of the FL index from Table 4.2 to Table 4.5, we find that the level of 
significance increases as time comes near to the recent decade (crisis period). 
Figure 4.1 in the previous section shows the financial liberalization index by country 
groups, where the curve at the top represents the advanced economies. From the scale of 0 to 
21, the average value of the liberalization over advance economies in the year 1970, 1980, 
1990 and 2000 are 7.57, 9.59, 15.32 and 19.48 respectively.  Most aggressive financial 
liberalization has finished during the 80s and early 90s. Although financial liberalization 
might have induced growth in the advanced economies, a fully financial liberalized economy 
may lead to crisis. Our result suggests that if the financial liberalization was maintained at a 
level below 10 (pre 80s level), it could have prevented financial crisis, or at least reduced the 
severity of financial crisis. 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) investigate the empirical relationship between 
banking crises and the financial liberalization using data from 1980-95 for 53 countries. Their 
findings suggest that banking crises are more likely to occur in liberalized financial systems. 
However, the indicator of financial liberalization of Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) 
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can be criticized as they took the first year in which some interest rates were liberalized as the 
start date of financial liberalization. Though interest rate liberalization is important, it is quite 
a narrow definition of financial liberalization, covering only a minor part of the financial 
sector reform. Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) analyse 76 currency crises and 26 banking 
crises for 20 countries during 1970 to 1995. One of their main findings is that financial 
liberalization often precedes banking crises. Their indicator for financial liberalization is two-
year lagged domestic credit growth. Caprio and Martinez (2000) investigate the relationship 
between government ownership of banks and banking crisis using panel data. They find that 
government ownership of banks increases the likelihood of banking crisis. However, Barth et 
al. (2004) using cross-country analysis, do not find that government ownership is 
significantly associated with increases in bank fragility once they control for the regulatory 
and supervisory environment. Our data on financial liberalization come from IMF which is an 
index constructed using 7 different dimensions. They are credit controls and excessively high 
reserve requirement, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking 
sector, financial account restriction, prudential regulations and supervision of the banking 
sector, and securities market policy. The database has the advantage that it allows for policy 
reversals. 
Our result shows that there is no contemporaneous relationship between financial 
liberalization and crisis; rather, the past liberalization has influence on present crisis. We 
suggest that financial liberalization may not have immediate impact on financial fragility, but 
our evidence shows that financial liberalization takes time to build up its effect. It might have 
increased the financial instability and is maybe one of the factors contributing to the financial 
crisis. 
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4.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter we offered an empirical investigation whether financial liberalization 
plays a role in explaining the crisis since 2007, which includes the financial crisis from 2007 
to 2008 and the European sovereign debt crisis since 2010. We use fixed effect panel 
estimation for 12 developed countries over the time period 2000 to 2013. 
The measure of financial liberalization is an index constructed using 7 different 
dimensions. They are credit controls and excessively high reserve requirement, interest rate 
controls, entry barriers, state ownership in the banking sector, financial account restriction, 
prudential regulations and supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy. 
Our proxy for crisis is the 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. 
Our evidence suggests that financial liberalization does play a role in explaining the 
current crisis. However there is no contemporaneous relationship between financial 
liberalization and crisis, rather, the past liberalization has influence on present crisis. 
Although it is generally established a positive link between financial liberalization and 
economic growth, we argue that a fully financial liberalized banking system might not be the 
best option for developed economies because it is prone to crisis. However we don’t mean the 
deregulation process should be reverse. We argue that after the deregulation, a different type 
of reregulation is needed to monitor the activities of the banks. 
The deepening crisis in 2008 and 2009 has already led to some reregulation around the 
world. Basel III was developed in response to the deficiencies in financial regulation revealed 
by the financial crisis of 2007–08. It was agreed upon by the members of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision in 2010–11, and was scheduled to be introduced from 
2013 until 2015; however, changes from 1 April 2013 extended implementation until 31 
March 2018 and again extended to 31 March 2019. Basel III is intended to strengthen bank 
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capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. It increases 
the required capital for banks in the form of risk-weighted asset form 2.5% to 7%. The bank 
leverage is designed to limit the size of banks’ balance sheet compare to its capital. The 
liquidity requirement compels banks to have sufficient liquidity available during 30 days of 
stressed conditions. 
Ever since the Northern Rock Bank failed in September 2007, the UK financial 
regulatory authorities have looked at how they operate and whether changes were needed to 
the existing system.  New legislation in the form of the Financial Services Act 2012 has been 
passed.  This established the new regulatory framework for the financial services industry.  In 
parallel with the passage of that legislation was the publication of the Report of the 
Independent Commission on Banking headed by Sir John Vickers. The Vickers Commission 
proposed a fundamental change in the way that banks in the UK are organised. The main 
change is that a 'ring fence' would separate retail 'utility ' banking work from a range of 
investment banking and corporate finance activities. It also proposes that banks retain higher 
capital and loss absorbing reserves than is currently proposed under the Basel rules. The 
Government has accepted the Commission's main proposals. Many of the recommendations 
of Vickers and of the Parliamentary Commission on banking standards were given effect by 
provisions in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013. 
There have been many debates about whether deregulation should be followed up by 
reregulation. Our study find that past financial liberalization is one of the factors contributed 
to the financial crisis. Financial liberalization is dismantling rules. That has led to excessive 
risk taking, and that excess risk taking led to greater financial fragility. Policy makers should 
take necessary actions to prevent crisis in the future. Banks play a particular important role in 
the financial system and problems in the banking sector have been an important factor 
promoting financial crisis. To prevent financial crisis, governments need to pay particular 
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attention to creating and sustaining a strong bank regulatory and supervisory system to reduce 
excessive risk-taking in their financial system. Consider limiting too-big-to-fail. Too-big-to-
fail reduces market discipline on large financial institutions and thus increases their moral 
hazard incentives to take on excessive risk. Also some level of capital controls should be 
considered to reduce financial instability. 
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Appendix  
Table 4.1 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
  OLS       
C -0.9445 0.9454 -0.9990 0.3179 
DREXit -4.1296 1.5939 -2.5908 0.0096 
VOLINDit-1 -1.1307 0.5059 -2.2351 0.0255 
SPREADit-1 0.9637 0.0062 156.3234 0.0000 
FLit 0.0531 0.0478 1.1117 0.2664 
Adj-R2 0.9394       
  SUR       
C -0.9445 1.1979 -0.7884 0.4305 
DREXit -4.1296 2.2758 -1.8145 0.0697 
VOLINDit-1 -1.1307 0.6228 -1.8157 0.0696 
SPREADit-1 0.9637 0.0184 52.3326 0.0000 
FLit 0.0531 0.0607 0.8750 0.3817 
Adj-R2 0.9394       
  2SLS       
C -0.9582 0.9753 -0.9824 0.3260 
DREXit 13.3135 8.5926 1.5494 0.1214 
VOLINDit-1 -1.4136 0.5309 -2.6626 0.0078 
SPREADit-1 0.9731 0.0069 141.2749 0.0000 
FLit 0.0538 0.0493 1.0906 0.2756 
Adj-R2 0.9358       
Regression models are estimated over the time period 2000m1 to 2013m12. The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada and USA. Dependent 
variable is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. REX is real exchange rate. DREX is the change 
is real exchange rate. VOLIND is volatility stock market return. FL is financial liberalization index. SUR denote fixed 
effects panel estimation with Seemingly Unrelated Regression which control for heteroskedasticity and 
contemporaneous correlation. 2SLS denote two-stage least squares fixed effects panel estimates which account for 
endogeneity. The instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the lagged values of the independent variables. 
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Table 4.2 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
  OLS       
C 0.0963 0.0367 2.6194 0.0089 
DREXit -4.1365 1.6903 -2.4472 0.0145 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2473 0.5525 -2.2577 0.0241 
SPREADit-1 0.9632 0.0065 148.7141 0.0000 
D*FL70it 0.0050 0.0036 1.4159 0.1570 
Adj-R2 0.9391       
  SUR       
C 0.0963 0.0460 2.0920 0.0366 
DREXit -4.1365 2.3320 -1.7738 0.0763 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2473 0.6687 -1.8651 0.0623 
SPREADit-1 0.9632 0.0186 51.7347 0.0000 
D*FL70it 0.0050 0.0023 2.2249 0.0262 
Adj-R2 0.9391       
  2SLS       
C 0.0892 0.0382 2.3349 0.0197 
DREXit 14.8508 9.3790 1.5834 0.1135 
VOLINDit-1 -1.5944 0.5864 -2.7192 0.0066 
SPREADit-1 0.9724 0.0072 134.7934 0.0000 
D*FL70it 0.0069 0.0039 1.7934 0.0731 
Adj-R2 0.9349       
Regression models are estimated over the time period 2000m1 to 2013m12. The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada and USA. Dependent 
variable is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. REX is real exchange rate. DREX is the change 
is real exchange rate. VOLIND is volatility stock market return. FL70 is the average value of financial liberalization 
index over the 1970s. D is a dummy variable equals one for the year 2007 to 2013.  SUR denote fixed effects panel 
estimation with Seemingly Unrelated Regression which control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. 2SLS denote two-stage least squares fixed effects panel estimates which account for endogeneity. The 
instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the lagged values of the independent variables. 
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Table 4.3 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
  OLS       
C 0.0929 0.0371 2.5049 0.0123 
DREXit -4.1243 1.6900 -2.4405 0.0148 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2403 0.5521 -2.2465 0.0248 
SPREADit-1 0.9628 0.0065 148.0555 0.0000 
D*FL80it 0.0042 0.0027 1.5699 0.1166 
Adj-R2 0.9392       
  SUR       
C 0.0929 0.0464 2.0006 0.0456 
DREXit -4.1243 2.3305 -1.7697 0.0769 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2403 0.6685 -1.8554 0.0637 
SPREADit-1 0.9628 0.0187 51.4945 0.0000 
D*FL80it 0.0042 0.0019 2.2557 0.0242 
Adj-R2 0.9392       
  2SLS       
C 0.0858 0.0386 2.2247 0.0262 
DREXit 14.8838 9.3716 1.5882 0.1124 
VOLINDit-1 -1.5833 0.5855 -2.7040 0.0069 
SPREADit-1 0.9720 0.0072 134.3935 0.0000 
D*FL80it 0.0055 0.0029 1.9072 0.0567 
Adj-R2 0.9349       
Regression models are estimated over the time period 2000m1 to 2013m12. The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada and USA. Dependent 
variable is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. REX is real exchange rate. DREX is the change 
is real exchange rate. VOLIND is volatility stock market return. FL80 is the average value of financial liberalization 
index over the 1980s. D is a dummy variable equals one for the year 2007 to 2013.  SUR denote fixed effects panel 
estimation with Seemingly Unrelated Regression which control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. 2SLS denote two-stage least squares fixed effects panel estimates which account for endogeneity. The 
instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the lagged values of the independent variables. 
  
 
 
326 
 
 
Table 4.4 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
  OLS       
C 0.0829 0.0369 2.2467 0.0248 
DREXit -4.0378 1.6888 -2.3910 0.0169 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2971 0.5525 -2.3475 0.0190 
SPREADit-1 0.9606 0.0066 145.1898 0.0000 
D*FL90it 0.0045 0.0019 2.3593 0.0184 
Adj-R2 0.9393       
  SUR       
C 0.0829 0.0479 1.7324 0.0834 
DREXit -4.0378 2.3266 -1.7355 0.0828 
VOLINDit-1 -1.2971 0.6638 -1.9542 0.0508 
SPREADit-1 0.9606 0.0189 50.7076 0.0000 
D*FL90it 0.0045 0.0019 2.3438 0.0192 
Adj-R2 0.9393       
  2SLS       
C 0.0765 0.0384 1.9905 0.0467 
DREXit 15.2156 9.3747 1.6231 0.1048 
VOLINDit-1 -1.6500 0.5877 -2.8076 0.0050 
SPREADit-1 0.9696 0.0073 132.4360 0.0000 
D*FL90it 0.0053 0.0021 2.5896 0.0097 
Adj-R2 0.9349       
Regression models are estimated over the time period 2000m1 to 2013m12. The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada and USA. Dependent 
variable is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. REX is real exchange rate. DREX is the change 
is real exchange rate. VOLIND is volatility stock market return. FL90 is the average value of financial liberalization 
index over the 1990s. D is a dummy variable equals one for the year 2007 to 2013.  SUR denote fixed effects panel 
estimation with Seemingly Unrelated Regression which control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. 2SLS denote two-stage least squares fixed effects panel estimates which account for endogeneity. The 
instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the lagged values of the independent variables. 
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Table 4.5 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic P-value 
  OLS       
C 0.0811 0.0368 2.2031 0.0277 
DREXit -4.0228 1.6883 -2.3827 0.0173 
VOLINDit-1 -1.3142 0.5527 -2.3778 0.0175 
SPREADit-1 0.9600 0.0066 144.4677 0.0000 
D*FL00it 0.0044 0.0017 2.5320 0.0114 
Adj-R2 0.9393       
  SUR       
C 0.0811 0.0483 1.6797 0.0932 
DREXit -4.0228 2.3258 -1.7296 0.0839 
VOLINDit-1 -1.3142 0.6625 -1.9837 0.0474 
SPREADit-1 0.9600 0.0190 50.5427 0.0000 
D*FL00it 0.0044 0.0019 2.3308 0.0199 
Adj-R2 0.9393       
  2SLS       
C 0.0751 0.0383 1.9582 0.0504 
DREXit 15.2515 9.3684 1.6280 0.1037 
VOLINDit-1 -1.6683 0.5881 -2.8366 0.0046 
SPREADit-1 0.9690 0.0073 131.8716 0.0000 
D*FL00it 0.0052 0.0019 2.7309 0.0064 
Adj-R2 0.9349       
Regression models are estimated over the time period 2000m1 to 2013m12. The panel members include 
Austria, Belgium, Spain, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Canada and USA. Dependent 
variable is 10-year government bond yield spread relative to Germany. REX is real exchange rate. DREX is the change 
is real exchange rate. VOLIND is volatility stock market return. FL00 is the average value of financial liberalization 
index over the 2000s. D is a dummy variable equals one for the year 2007 to 2013.  SUR denote fixed effects panel 
estimation with Seemingly Unrelated Regression which control for heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. 2SLS denote two-stage least squares fixed effects panel estimates which account for endogeneity. The 
instruments used in the 2SLS estimations are the lagged values of the independent variables. 
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Chapter 5   Conclusion 
 
The topic of CEO compensation, performance and risk has attracted considerable public 
and academic attention. Agency theory says the problem arises from the conflicts of interest 
existing between shareholders and executives. Researchers have been looking for evidence 
whether there is a strong link between CEO compensation and firm performance. In Chapter one, 
we explore this relationship in the banking industry because there are increasing criticism from 
the public that bankers are often taking huge amount of compensation and rewards despite poor 
performances and excessive risk taking, which even led to failure of banks that ended up being 
bailed out by the tax payer. Another strand of the literature attempts to quantify and explain risk 
taking behaviour at commercial banks. Incentive payment are designed to increase the CEO’s 
risk-taking incentives, so that executives might not reject the variance-increasing positive net 
present value (NPV) projects, and adopt low risk-return strategies. Thus it can align the interest 
between executives and shareholders. However it is also criticized that the incentive payment 
encourages the banks to take excessive risk, which is considered contributes to the financial 
crisis. 
We explore the link between the CEO compensation and performance, and also the link 
between CEO compensation and risk using fixed-effect panel estimation. In addition, we put 
these two relationships together and understand it in a systematic way. We specified 4 equations 
and estimate it in a system using 3SLS system estimation. This system estimation method also 
account for endogeneity. We use a two-factor market model from the literature, which allow us 
to decompose total risks into idiosyncratic (firm) risk and systematic (market) risk. Together 
with Beta, we employed 4 different measures of risks in our study. Research has been conducting 
their research in this area using US sample data due to data availability. We contribute to the 
existing literature by using European sample banks including UK. Our sample consists of 63 
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banks across 15 countries for the time period 1992 to 2010. There is no “click and download” 
data base for CEO compensation of European banks. The data was hand collected from annual 
reports. Enormous effort was made to compile the data. 
Our evidence supports a positive link between CEO compensation and performance. 
However this relationship is mainly attributed to bonus and performance. The relationship 
between salary and performance is not as strong. We also find bank size, market to book ratio 
and CEO tenure have positive effect on CEO salary. We find a negative relationship between 
CEO bonus and risk. This evidence is strong because the relationship is shown to be negative for 
all the 4 risk measures. We also examine the stability of our solution by looking at the dynamic 
properties of the system. We solve for the system and proved that our solution is stable. We also 
programmed a simulation using estimated parameters, and provide a steady-state solution. We 
argued that there may not be a behavioural relationship between risk and bonus. Potential 
positive movement of risk and bonus might be caused by other factors. Our results challenge the 
conventional view that bonus can induce risk taking. 
 In the second study we reconsider the market efficiency hypothesis (forward rate 
unbiasedness) and the forward premium puzzle. Market efficiency hypothesis implies the 
rejection of the joint hypothesis of zero intercept and slope of unity in the regression of spot 
exchange rate on forward exchange rate. The presence of the forward premium puzzle shows a 
negative slope coefficient in the regression of the spot rate return on forward premium. We 
conduct an extensive investigation using daily exchange rate and forward rate from 1990 to 2013. 
Our sample contains 31 economies, of which 11 are developed economies and 20 are emerging 
economies. Our selection of countries cover whether it’s a liquid or less liquid market, strict 
capital controlled or open free market, large or small economies, developed or developing 
economies. We aim to find a whether there is a common theme in these wide selection countries. 
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The main contribution of this study is that we look at this problem in different time 
horizons. The previous literature only studies this subject using one time horizon; often 1 month 
or 3 months. . In this study, we obtained forward rates cover 9 time horizons: 1 day, 1week, 1 
month, 2 months, 3 months, 6 months, 9 months, 1 year and 2 years. This allows us to examine 
the problem vertically by comparing different countries, and also horizontally by comparing 
different time horizons. We thoroughly examine the data in both levels and first differences. We 
look at the mean and variance of the spot and forward rate, spot rate return, forward premium 
and also their movement in different time horizon. We use the ADF unit root test to test the 
stationarity of the spot rate, forward rate, spot rate return and forward premium for each 
economy. We use the FMOLS and DOLS estimator which eliminate the problems caused by the 
long run correlation between the cointegrating equation and stochastic regressors innovations.  
We find that the variance of spot return is much greater than the variance of forward 
premium. The variances of the spot return and forward premium increases in longer time 
horizons. The ratio of  the spot return to forward premium variance decreases when the time 
horizon becomes longer, implying the variance of the forward premium increase at a larger scale 
compared to the variance of the spot return. Comparing developed economies with emerging 
economies, we find the exchange rates changes are more volatile in the emerging economies, and 
also there is greater dispersion in the exchange rate volatility of emerging economies.  Our main 
result suggests that the forward rate unbiasedness holds in the short horizon but not in the longer 
horizon. The forward rate started to lose its predictive power when the time to maturity is longer 
than a month. We still find a forward premium puzzle in both short horizons and long horizons, 
and it does not seem to disappear over the long horizon. When comparing the emerging 
economies with developed economies, we find that the prediction bias is worse in emerging 
economies because of their less liquidity and higher risk premium. We argue that exchange rate 
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is similar to the liquidity of the term structure of interest rates. The prediction bias in longer time 
horizon is due to the inability of measuring the increasing risk premium. 
Lastly we study the financial liberalization and the recent financial crisis. We 
empirically examine whether financial liberalization has a role in explaining crisis. Most 
existing literature use 0-1 dummies to capture both financial liberalization and financial crisis. 
The drawback of 0-1 dummy is that it cannot capture the severity of the crisis and the degree 
of financial liberalization. We use a financial liberalization measure from the IMF, which is 
an index range from 0 to 21 constructed using 7 different dimensions. They are credit 
controls and excessively high reserve requirement, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state 
ownership in the banking sector, financial account restriction, prudential regulations and 
supervision of the banking sector, and securities market policy. Our proxy for crisis is the 10-
year government bond yield spread relative to Germany, because bond yield increase sharply 
in most of the EMU countries since crisis happened in 2007 except Germany. The existing 
literature has been using dummy variable. We contribute to the literature by using a new 
index for financial liberalization and proxy for financial crisis. 
Our evidence suggests that there is no contemporaneous relationship between financial 
liberalization and the recent crisis, but the past liberalization has influence on present crisis. 
Although it is believed that financial liberalization can spur economic growth, we argue that a 
fully financial liberalized banking system might not be the best option for developed economies 
because it makes them vulnerable to crisis. We suggest re-regulation is needed after deregulation. 
 
